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ABSTRACT 
 
SARAH SHAIR-ROSENFIELD: Electoral Reform, Party System Evolution and Democracy 
in Contemporary Indonesia 
 (Under the direction of Jonathan Hartlyn) 
 
This dissertation examines the links between electoral reform and political party system 
development in new democracies where iterated reforms are increasingly common, requiring 
an understanding of their causes and short-term consequences.  It examines this relationship 
in detail in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim democracy.  It finds that, although the rules 
of the game may appear to be in flux during iterated electoral reforms, those reforms often 
follow a predictable dynamic and consistently demonstrate evidence of seat-maximization.  
Assessing how a combination of strategic and alternative motivations may affect decision-
making, as well as how prior reforms constrain future reform options, is key to understanding 
how reforms affect the composition and shape of the ensuing party system.  The dissertation 
employs a multi-methods approach, conducting both a large-N quantitative analysis with an 
original dataset of cross-national electoral reform and a case study of Indonesia.  The large-N 
analysis includes 34 cases of electoral reform from 1950 to 2010; for the case study I draw 
on in-depth interviews with key reform actors, archival research, and an analysis of election 
outcomes from 1999-2009 to assess the relationship between electoral reform, party system 
change and the process of democratization in Indonesia. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Why do some new democracies succeed in deepening and consolidating their political 
institutions and channels of representation while others fail or face severe instability?  I argue 
that one primary reason for some states' successful democratic progress is their adaptability.  
When an electoral system creates instability in the political party system citizens will become 
frustrated with the capacity of elites to represent and govern them, but if the state can adapt 
its electoral system to mitigate such problems then democratization can continue.  To be sure, 
the process of electoral reform can mitigate some problems, too much reform or reform 
undertaken with undemocratic goals can undermine progress.  To achieve a better 
understanding of the success or failure of democratization we must evaluate the process and 
effects of electoral reform, analyzing its potential benefits and limits. 
 A belief in institutional "stickiness" sustains most observers of politics: political 
institutions, particularly democratic ones, should be difficult to alter lest they be changed and 
abused at the hands of the power-hungry and powerful.  The US Constitution is nearly 
impossible to amend and, while slow to reflect demographic and social changes in society, is 
highlighted as a bulwark of stability that keeps U.S. democracy out of harm's way, 
particularly in the early period of system consolidation and state-building or through periods 
of temporary crisis such as the challenged outcome of the 2000 presidential elections.  The 
Italian system, in contrast, demonstrates the perils of institutional flexibility -- change to the 
electoral system, even with the best of long-term goals to create stability of inter-party 
competition and channels of accountability, wreaked enough havoc on the party system 
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andthreatened democratic chaos such that elites had to change the system back within a 
decade.  The myriad of undemocratic reforms that have occurred in many transitional and 
consolidating democracies over the past few decades attests to the need for stability in 
institutional design and construction. 
 But democratization is a tricky business, failures are often unpredicted and the scope 
and breadth of failure are sometimes impossible to comprehend.  The rollback of democratic 
practices, electoral competition, and respect for the rule of law in many countries, in addition 
to the erosion of political rights and civil liberties, suggest that, even when chosen with the 
best of intentions, democratic institutions are not perfect.  When flaws are clear and exposed 
they should be addressed.  This is not to suggest that every little problem with democratic 
function necessitates wholesale reform, but that some measure of flexibility can be used to 
rectify problems generated by the system itself.  Does this open the door to a landslide of 
abuse by elites?  Perhaps.  But is there a way to navigate the narrow space between 
productive, progressive reform and abuse?  Undoubtedly.  A handful of cases underscore this 
point, now the goal is to understand how and why they have succeeded, where they might 
have failed, and what general patterns and mechanisms we might glean from studying them. 
 Most scholarly work conceives of electoral reform as a strategic choice game, the 
byproduct of powerful elites attempting to consolidate democratic institutions in their favor.1  
Such theories are frequently powerful, especially when employing large-N samples over 
time.  These models can explain many general patterns but, in order to produce parsimonious 
theories, downplay or ignore the reform process and make broad assumptions regarding the 
knowledge and motivations of power-hungry, non-ideological actors and the competition-
limiting outcomes they seek.  There may in fact be cases where political elites do not enact 
                                                 
1
 See Boix (1999, 2010), Colomer (2005) and Remmer (2008) for examples of the strategic model. 
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reforms for the simple power-maximizing reasons that strategic choice theories would 
predict. 
 One irony of such assumptions is that when considering the initial choice of electoral 
systems scholars are far less pessimistic about the nature of elites, who adopt a wide range of 
options from the electoral menu for a wide range of ideological reasons and logistic 
constraints (Reynolds 2002; Reilly 2006).  An entire field of electoral engineers have advised 
and consulted on constitutional revisions and rewrites over the past few decades in countries 
from Mongolia to Estonia to South Africa.  Among the many considerations posed by 
advisors and adopted by elites when choosing the initial structure of institutions: will these 
institutions improve representation and competition and strengthen or deepen our 
democracy?  If scholars can accept that ideology and democratic performance matter to some 
degree at the initial stage of electoral system choice, why do they automatically discount its 
importance in the process of revisiting or revising those choices? 
 Additionally, the invitation to electoral engineers, international NGO advisors and 
domestic experts and academics suggests that many elites in new democracies are not 
themselves experienced or adequately prepared to make fully-informed decisions regarding 
the choice of electoral system rules and regulations.  Indeed, the very presence of such actors 
indicates the likely gap between aspirations and knowledge, especially in democracies where 
competition previously did not exist or existed in limited fashion in the prior regime.  Among 
the questions scholars might ask: how much do we really know about the level of knowledge 
and information possessed by political elites during the process of electoral reform? 
 In new democracies where information, understanding and ideology may be 
important or even dominant factors in the reform process, current strategic theories may 
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provide little insight to the shape and scope of reforms eventually adopted.  Previous 
literature demonstrates that ideological factors can play a role, such as in the adoption of 
proportionality rather than majoritarianism, and that the complexities of electoral system 
options can create misunderstanding or confusion among reformers in countries with limited 
experience with competitive electoral politics.2  In cases from Italy to Poland to Colombia 
politicians have adopted reforms for a diverse set of reasons, many of them reflecting 
ideological beliefs about the nature of elected representation, accounting for constituent 
demands and/or demonstrating what limited experience with electoral systems and structures 
can do to elite preferences and choices.  I believe that Indonesia fits this type of case, 
exemplifying the limits of strategic choice theories as its legislature has adopted 
progressively more democratic reforms over time despite the desires of many power-hungry 
elites who might derail the reform process in any given period. 
 The foundation of seat-maximization models rests on assumptions that actors 
undertaking reform: a) know exactly what they are doing, understanding not only the reform 
options they face but their likely effect on electoral outcomes as well; and b) only pursue 
reforms for resource-control/seat-accumulation reasons rather than ideological views about 
what might be best for democracy and the development and strengthening of democratic 
institutions and channels of representation. 
The case in Indonesia does not fit these basic assumptions.  Accordingly, I make two 
distinct arguments about the need for an alternative model of reform.  First, in new 
democracies there may be more diverse expectations about actor motivations and knowledge 
                                                 
2
 Examples include Katz (2005), who raises some of these issues with respect to established democracies and 
electoral reform, particularly in contrast with reforms adopted in new democracies or transitional situations, and  
Birch at al (2002) who discuss the adoption of electoral systems and reforms in Post-Communist democracies. 
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to consider.3  Particularly in new democracies where many political actors have little 
experience with competitive elections and party politics but do have concerns about the 
durability of the new regime, actors themselves are likely to draw on a broader range of 
motivations and experience a lower degree of certainty than is the case in established 
democracies.  Instead of high information and seat-driven strategy, in many new democracies 
reformers may pursue ideological beliefs about the need for proportional representation in 
diverse societies or misunderstand the functional difference between parallel and 
compensatory multiple tier systems. 
 Second, evaluating the process of reform -- how and why particular constellations of 
reforms are adopted at any given iteration -- is paramount to understanding the iterated nature 
of reform in new democracies, especially where the relationship between party system and 
electoral reform is endogenous.  In the aggregate, reforms are often viewed in a snapshot 
"one case of reform at one point in time" example: the switch from an indirectly- to directly-
elected executive in Israel in 1992, the switch from a list proportional representation to a 
mixed-electoral system in Italy in 1993, the switch from a mixed-electoral to a list 
proportional representation system in Italy in 2005.  Few reforms are viewed as the product 
of iterated processes, or as the result of multiple rounds of reforms about the same issues 
across election and reform periods.  The Italian case is one of great importance in this regard.  
The return to a PR system came as the direct result of unintended consequences of the 
previous switch away from PR -- a move meant to simplify the party system actually created 
greater fragmentation and thus reformers essentially "changed the system back" to a variation 
of the previous, less fragmentation-inducing, system. 
                                                 
3
 See Bawn (1993), Katz (2005), Renwick et al (2009), and Renwick (2010) for examples of more diverse, 
ideological motivations and considerations of coalition politics and partners that constrain actor choice. 
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 Yet we rarely see analyses where a theory explains both the first round outcome and 
its impact on the reforms adopted in the second round, either explicitly related in terms of 
causal relationship or indirectly linked where the first reform constrains outcomes that lead to 
the second reform.  In this sense, the iterated nature of the process requires conceptualization 
and explanation.  Ratchet effects can constrain choices in later rounds of reform, 
necessitating an understanding of the relationship to previous reform outcomes. 
Additionally, if reforms occur over multiple periods it is important to understand why, 
in part because it is a relatively uncommon occurrence or may seem as such because we are 
making too many or incorrect assumptions about the reason reform occurs.  For example, if 
there are new, unconventional, not exclusively strategic reasons for reform perhaps there will 
be more recognizable examples of iterated reform.  Though institutions are typically assumed 
to be sticky, following the logic that once the effort to reform has been made it is difficult to 
make changes again, perhaps the question should be: if you can reform once why can't you 
reform again?  If the past thirty years are any indication, with a number of countries 
exhibiting iterated reform tendencies, understanding the rise of iterated reform is important, 
especially if there is some aspect of iterated reform that diverges from existing theory about 
one-time reform. 
To that end, we must evaluate: 1) a more diverse set of motivations which include not 
only power/seat calculations, an undeniably important element of any electoral reform 
process, but also the underlying ideological beliefs of key actors; and 2) constraints posed by 
early period choices in iterated reform process.  I argue that we should consider these two 
constraints on the seat-maximizing strategies of actors in the reform process in order to more 
completely and accurately explain how and why the reform process unfolds as it does. 
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 In addition to a richer understanding of the cause and effects of electoral reform, I 
extend this discussion of democratization to an important case: Indonesia.  As the world's 
third largest democracy, the world's largest Muslim majority country, and one of the world's 
youngest democracies, it is surrounded mostly by countries with inconsistent, limited or non-
existent democracy.  Its progress has survived domestic conflicts in Aceh and Papua, ethnic 
and religious strife across the archipelago, and multiple large-scale natural disasters on an 
annual basis.  Despite virtually no history of open and competitive elections before 1999 it 
remains Southeast Asia's most robust democracy and its path has evolved through multiple 
rounds of reform to the country's democratic institutions. 
Figure 1.1 List of Indonesian Electoral Reforms 
 Pre-1999 
(Regulations for 
the 1999 
Elections) 
1999-2004 
(Reform 
from 2001-
2003) 
2004-2009 
(Reform from 
2007-2008) 
2004-2009 
(Constitutional 
Court rulings in 
late 2008) 
2009-2014 
(Reform from 
2010-2012) 
List Type Fully 
proportional, 
fully closed 
Fully 
proportional, 
semi-open 
with high 
individual 
threshold 
Fully 
proportional, 
semi-open with 
moderate 
individual 
threshold 
Fully open, 
lists still 
ordered if 
voters cast their 
votes for just 
parties 
Proposals: 
return to 
closed, keep 
open, switch 
to mixed or 
SMD 
District 
Magnitude 
Province-level 
with subdivided 
allocation 
District-
level: 3-12 
seats 
District-level: 
3-10 seats 
no change Proposal: 
district level 
of 2-7/8 seats 
Electoral 
Threshold 
Past entry 
threshold with 
low registration 
barriers 
Past entry 
threshold 
with 
moderate 
registration 
barriers  
Past entry 
threshold,  
legislative 
electoral 
threshold 
(2.5%) for 
national level 
Only legislative 
electoral 
threshold 
(2.5%) for 
national level 
Proposal:  
raise to 4-5% 
and apply to 
subnational 
levels 
 
 Indonesia represents a case of iterated reform, revising its election laws every five 
years prior to the next cycle of elections since democracy was instituted.  It also demonstrates 
some of the limitations of the core assumptions of the strategic choice model wherein key 
actors often do not fully understand or similarly understand reform options or view them with 
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a non-ideological lens.  Figure 1.1 summarizes the changes in Indonesia’s democratic 
electoral system. 
 While Indonesia's reform has occurred with each new set of elections (three since 
1999) these have not been democracy-undermining changes.  Indonesian democracy is 
arguably more robust today than it has ever been, with greater inter-branch balance (a 
directly-elected president replaced the parliamentary-style executive), declining party system 
fragmentation (shrinking from 21 to 16 to 9 legislative parties), and peace (resulting in part 
from much-improved civilian control over the armed forces).  Amidst the decline of 
democracy across its own regional trade circle, Indonesia is the sole country to demonstrate 
improvement in the quality of its democratic institutions throughout the past decade.  
Indonesia is also unique as the world's only Muslim majority democracy not bordering the 
European Union, achieving Freedom House "free" status six short years after democratizing, 
and is the sole "free" democracy in a region full of authoritarian, electoral authoritarian and 
lapsed or defective democratic regimes.4 
This dissertation evaluates the actor-specific motivations and structural factors that 
constrain and enable electoral change over time, by analyzing the ongoing process of 
institutional reform occurring over multiple electoral periods.  In doing so, it is critical to 
carefully measure and evaluate, through a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods: 1) 
the institutional constraints faced by elites at the time of reform initiation; 2) the assessments 
of elites regarding electoral reform options via their seat-maximizing self-interests and 
                                                 
4
 Turkey is the world's other Muslim majority success case of democratization, with a neighborhood of 
established democracies surrounding it, while the closest democracies to Indonesia are Australia (which 
distances itself from Southeast Asia when it is politically convenient to do so), Thailand (whose electorate and 
elites both seem to misunderstand the point of elections to the democratic process) and the Philippines (whose 
quality of democracy is constantly in question due to restrictions on most types of political freedoms and civil 
rights as well as the ongoing conflict and perpetual inability to reach an agreement with the Muslim population 
in Mindanao). 
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beliefs as well as their understanding of the structure and consequences of potential reforms; 
3) the choices and behavior of political elites when initiating and negotiating electoral reform 
packages; and 4) the balance of power among parties and elites in the decision-making 
process as that balance changes to reflect new electoral outcomes.  In addition to 
reconstruction of the reform process at each stage of negotiations up to the resulting law and 
election, I analyze the electoral results to assess the effect of reform on the election outcome. 
 A multi-method approach is necessary because explaining the process of institutional 
change and how new choices are made within the previously-chosen institutional structure 
are two closely related questions.  While quantitatively measurable factors can explain much 
about power balance among decision makers, I argue that not only the power balance 
between but also the ideological and electoral interests of such actors, as well as their level of 
knowledge and understanding of the issues they debate, are important to understanding the 
exact package of changes adopted at any one iteration of reform.  Ascertaining such 
ideological and electoral interests requires a qualitative approach in a system where party 
discipline and legislative experience cannot be assumed to be high and where the interests 
and impact of bureaucrats and civil society leaders involved in the process of reform cannot 
be quantitatively measured.  A quantitative approach is more appropriate for examining how 
reforms affect election outcomes and redistribute power among future decision-makers by 
altering the rules of the electoral game. 
 In new democracies, especially those with inchoate party systems and weak links 
between voters and parties, electoral reforms may paradoxically help to induce or provide the 
impetus for important changes in the party system.  Reforms based on short-term goals may 
end up encouraging additional electoral reforms, rather than the long-term stabilizing effects 
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sought by reformers; yet reforms that happen in an iterated sequence may generate stabilizing 
party system effects over time.  Strategic choice theories that focus on seat maximization 
often provide satisfactory explanations for such outcomes in the aggregate, making those 
models a baseline for such analysis.  However, while my alternative explanations may be less 
parsimonious, they can offer a richer understanding of how electoral reform works in many 
of the world's youngest democracies, clarify why parties sometimes do not exclusively 
pursue seat maximizing strategies, and can inform future cases of reform as well. 
 I focus on two key areas of electoral reform in my approach to understand 
institutional transformation: the structure of intra- and inter-party competition.  The first area 
concerns the subjects of voter attention, or intraparty competition: how does the system 
define who are the competitors in elections?  While it is possible for the competitors in 
elections to be both party and candidate, some types of electoral structures effectively 
remove the role of individual candidacy for legislative office.  Thus, the first area under 
consideration when I focus on Indonesia is the changes made from a party-centric closed-list 
proportional representation system based on provincial-level districts inherited from the pre-
democratic era to a system subsequently more open with smaller and smaller districts that 
have moved the focus much more to candidates while retaining priority for parties on 
multiple levels. 
The second area concerns the subject of the size and complexity of the party system, 
or interparty competition: how does the system control for the number of parties, the relative 
sizes of parties, and the diversity or range of parties within the system?  While it is possible 
to have a relatively large number of political parties with limited fragmentation, some types 
of electoral rules can be implemented to encourage or force simplification (or basic 
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truncation) of the party system.  Thus, the second area under consideration is changes made 
from an easy-entry system at both the stage of entering the electoral arena and entering the 
legislative arena to a system subsequently more closed on legislative entry while still open in 
electoral entry.  These two areas – the structure of party nomination lists and the structure 
and application of an electoral threshold – are the sections of the election and political party 
laws that are the focus of this dissertation.  As each area has undergone multiple changes 
since democratization (both were the subject of discussion and revision for the general 
election and political party laws in 2004 and 2009, and are both under active discussion for 
further revision for the 2014 elections), they represent an opportunity to evaluate multiple-
iteration reforms in consecutive inter-election periods, yet have been the subject of different 
pressures over time. 
 The research design draws upon a combination of three primary types of data: 
archival, interview, and election-related.  The process tracing of the reforms is analyzed via: 
a) archival documents of the draft and final versions of the laws as well as pertinent 
Constitutional Court rulings related to the laws; 2) position papers submitted by each party or 
party coalition in reaction to the initial draft of the law and transcripts of the legislative 
committee proceedings during the drafting negotiation stages; 3) newspaper and journal 
coverage of the reform process; 4) and interviews with participants (legislative 
representatives, party leaders, government bureaucrats, etc) and observers (domestic and 
international civil society members, academics, etc).  Evaluating the effects of the reforms at 
each inter-election period requires the following: 1) election returns from the 1999, 2004 and 
2009 general elections, including all individual vote-share data from all parties at the national 
level from 2004 and 2009; 2) election district maps from the 1999, 2004 and 2009 general 
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elections; and 3) composition of the national legislature based on final seat allocations from 
the Election Commission, including both the size of each party as well as which 
representatives obtained seats. 
 Chapter 2 reviews the literature, introduces my theoretical framework of integrated 
electoral reform and discusses the impact of such a reform model on the resulting political 
party system.  Following the literature review I begin with a discussion about reforms, 
specifically the contrast between seat-maximizing and alternative motivations and ratchet 
effects that constrain choice in iterated reform.  I continue to a discussion of the dimensions 
that reforms take as well as the complications of evaluating cross-temporal reform processes.  
I then introduce my framework of reform suggesting that, although seat-maximizing logic 
that motivates nearly all other scholarly work on reform has merits and can explain a great 
deal about most reforms that occur, the roles of alternative motivations and constraints must 
be integrated in order to evaluate their impact on the outcome of the reform process.  I 
provide a set of testable hypotheses regarding the causes and effects of electoral reform and 
conclude with a brief explanation of the selection of the Indonesian case. 
 Chapter 3 introduces the reader to the Indonesian case.  First I provide a brief 
historical context that describes the transition to democracy under former president B.J. 
Habibie.  I then discuss the broader transition context of democratic reform in Indonesia, 
including the impact of the constitutional amendment process, shift to direct election of the 
president, and political and fiscal decentralization.  Next I establish the relationship between 
and roles of the legislature and the executive in the process of law-making and institutional 
reform and introduce key parties and actors in play since 1999.  Finally I conclude with a 
description of the changing composition of the party system across the democratic elections. 
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 Chapters 4 and 5 cover the periods from 1999-2004 and 2004-2009, incorporating 
both qualitative data, reconstructing the reform process using original legislative committee 
transcripts and in-depth interviews with key reform actors and observers, and quantitative 
analysis, drawing on election outcomes to assess changes to the party system's composition.  
Each chapter first begins with an assessment of the existing electoral structure and party 
system composition resulting from that structure.  Then it introduces the key actors during 
the reform period and explains the initial draft of proposed reforms with each major 
component under revision.  Following a description of the initial position of key 
actors/parties at the outset of reform I process trace the negotiations between the legislative 
commission members and their various parties as well as the input from the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, the government's representative in the electoral reform process, and various 
experts and civil society groups. 
 To perform the process tracing, I draw on a range of qualitative data sources obtained 
during 15 months of fieldwork in Indonesia.  First are archival documents of initial drafts and 
final versions of the law on general elections and the law on political parties used to conduct 
the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections, as well as any Constitutional Court rulings that drastically 
altered the key sections under study.  These were read and coded for the specific changes 
made from one election to the next (ie., the difference between the 1999 and 2004 final laws, 
and 2004 and 2009 final laws), as well as to establish the starting point of negotiations in 
each revision period and changes made during negotiations (ie., the difference between the 
2004 initial draft and final laws, and 2009 initial draft and final laws).  Second are transcripts 
of all official discussions within the relevant legislative commissions, notably Commission 2 
which deals with issues of domestic governance, regional autonomy, and state apparatus, and 
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official party caucus (fraksi) positions on the draft laws.  These were read and coded to 
assess the different party positions on the key sections of the laws (e.g., which parties 
supported the electoral threshold, which did not, which wanted a level above 3%, which 
wanted below 3%), as well as to assess the specific reasons given during commission review 
meetings to justify such positions and to negotiate over specific details (ie., the exact 
percentage a party needed to cross the threshold, etc). 
 Third are newspaper, journal and policy report coverage of commission deliberations, 
party positions on the draft laws and judicial reviews, civil society views on the deliberation 
process and final laws.  These documents were read and coded to triangulate the data yielded 
from the archival documents and transcripts as well as from interviews.  Fourth are 
interviews with: a) members of the People's Representative Council (DPR, Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat) from the 1999-2004 and 2004-2009 Councils, primarily with members 
of Commission 2 and the leaders of the individual party fraksi, b) members of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs from 1999-2004 and 2004-2009, primarily the Director General and expert 
staff responsible for writing the initial draft of each of the laws being studied as well as 
presenting the drafts to Commission 2 and remaining as technical advisers during the internal 
commission negotiations about changes to the drafts, c) members of the Constitutional Court 
from 2007-009 who ruled on issues pertaining to the general election and political party laws, 
d) members of domestic and international civil society providing technical assistance and 
advice to party leaders, voters, and the government during the drafting and negotiation 
processes, e) members of academia who observed, advised, and/or assisted civil society or 
political leaders in the drafting and negotiation processes, f) members of political party 
central boards, specifically those directly handling campaign and election strategy, candidate 
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selection, and public opinion polling.  The transcripts of interviews were read and coded 
along with interview session notes to assess specific reasons for decision-making during the 
reform periods and changes over time in party positions on reform and election strategies. 
 Chapter 5 also includes an explanation of the post-adoption Constitutional Court 
decisions that further altered the election law after the legislature had finished its reform 
process, and the impact and implications of Court decisions altering the outcome of 
legislative choices and the entire process of reform.  All commission transcripts, position 
papers and adopted laws were personally obtained in Jakarta at the library and document 
archives of the People's Representative Council, news coverage through a variety of 
university-based archives, and draft laws and court decisions through individual contacts at 
the Ministry of Home Affairs and Indonesian legal databases.  All interviews were held in 
person in the Indonesian language, in the cities of Jakarta, Serang and Yogyakarta, from 
January through December 2010. 
 In the last substantive section of Chapters 4 and 5 I present a series of quantitative 
analyses of the actual election outcome and various counter-factual outcomes that would 
have resulted had a different package of reforms that was discussed been adopted.  The data 
included in these analyses are drawn from original hard- and soft-copies of official election 
returns, including province and district-level party vote totals from 1999, province, district, 
and sub-district level party and individual candidate vote totals from 2004, and province, 
district, and sub-district level party and individual candidate vote totals from 2009.  These 
returns were hand-coded by party and, where applicable, individual candidates as raw scores 
and percentages within provinces and districts for the purpose of calculating cross-temporal 
vote and seat volatility for each party and the party system as well as incumbency rates and 
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geographic trends.  I also utilized election district maps, including province and district lines 
from 1999, 2004 and 2009, coded by party and, where applicable, individual vote and seat 
shares for the purpose of calculating cross-temporal vote and seat volatility for each party as 
well as to assess the level of regional concentration of parties failing to meet the electoral 
threshold in 2009.  All quantitative data was personally obtained in Jakarta at the central 
office of the National Election Commission (KPU, Komisi Pemilihan Umum) and at the 
library and document archives of the People's Representative Council. 
 Chapter 6 presents an original dataset of 34 countries which experienced some 
electoral reform during the 1950 to 2010 period.  I test my expectations about the causes and 
effects of electoral reform on this dataset, using insights drawn from the Indonesian case to 
illuminate limitations in the statistical analysis.  I find that while seat maximization is of 
utmost importance to explaining reform adoptions, there is some support for the constraints 
of alternative motivations and ratchet effects on unfettered alterations by power-hungry 
elites.  In addition, I find that a long-understudied element of reform, change on the 
intraparty dimension of electoral systems, does in fact have an impact on party system 
fragmentation.  The conclusions of the quantitative analysis highlight some important aspects 
in the Indonesian case regarding confirmation of some aspects of seat-maximization theories, 
as well as some limits. 
 Chapter 7 concludes and speaks to electoral reform discussions in the 2009-2014 
period that are already underway in the legislature, as the process to revise the general 
election law and law on political parties begins again.  The process of electoral reform is far 
from finished in Indonesia, with the third consecutive round of revisions currently under 
negotiation in the legislature.  Lessons learned, and patterns and mechanisms established, 
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from the first two rounds of reform more than adequately inform the ongoing process of the 
third round.  Delving into some of the "unfinished business" of the previous revisions, which 
were exacerbated by the Constitutional Court's decisions in late 2008, the third round of 
reforms already covers a broader range of issues and has posed more contentious debates 
than either previous round.  Following a general conclusion about the constraints provided by 
alternative motivations and ratchet effects on seat-maximizing electoral reforms, I then 
extend conclusions from the Indonesian case and quantitative analysis to illuminate potential 
future electoral reform cases. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Theory 
 Though electoral reforms may be discussed in long-standing democracies they are 
rarely employed.  Oftentimes constitutional framers prioritized continuity within the system 
and set the bar for reform very high, especially with respect to alterations in electoral 
mechanisms.  Experiences of recently democratized countries, notably in Latin America, the 
Former Soviet Union, and Southeast Asia, suggest the benefits of institutions that are not 
easily changed.  In systems lacking institutional “stickiness” powerful executives may exert 
their will over legislatures too weak or slow to halt the process of institutional reform, 
resulting in undemocratic reforms such as the elimination of presidential term limits or 
central government appointment of previously-elected governors.  Even in advanced 
democracies the benefits of institutional stickiness can be clear: Italian reforms in the 1990s 
exacerbated rather than alleviated fragmentation within the party system; since those reforms 
achieved none of their intended benefits, subsequent revision in 2005 produced electoral 
rules that closely mirrored the rules of the pre-reform period in an attempt to rebalance and 
re-stabilize the party system. 
 However, some recent democratizers have employed drawn-out processes of iterated 
electoral reform.  In Eastern Europe, reformist governments in Poland and Romania have 
both pursued multi-stage reform processes to alter their rules for legislative elections since 
1990.  In Latin America, sometimes under regime uncertainty, elected political leaders in 
Bolivia and Guatemala both pursued and enacted legislative reforms in sequential election 
periods in the 1985-1995 period.  And in post-war Germany, the rules governing elections to 
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the Bundestag underwent revisions in the first two elections after the East-West partition.  In 
many of these cases, the reform processes were either directly, as they were in the case of 
Italian reforms of 1993 and 2005, the result of previous reforms or constrained by the 
outcomes of previous reforms.  It is cases in which reforms occur in sequence or over time – 
the details that make them increasingly common and different from other examples of single-
event reform processes – that will be the focus of this chapter. 
 There are reasons to be concerned with electoral reform for the purpose of democratic 
governance.  First is the question of institutional stickiness: if institutions can be easily 
manipulated then there are implications for whether elites are really constrained by 
democratic rules of the game.  Second is the question of effective representation: if rules 
constantly change then there are implications for voter understanding of the rules being used 
to determine representation.  Third is the question of free and fair competition: while changes 
in the rules may not openly constrain the quality and/or quantity of election competitors, 
frequent or extreme changes may negatively affect some subset of the competition 
disproportionately or unfairly, such as minority parties. 
 In all periods of electoral reform there are two questions driving scholarly interest in 
the subject.  First, what structures were in place and what changes are possible after previous 
reform or constitutional writing periods?  Second, who are the key actors playing key roles in 
undertaking reforms and what are their motivations?  With regards to factors such as party 
system composition, individual legislator profiles, and non-party actors, what motivates those 
involved in the process of reform?  The answers to these two questions inform expectations 
of what reforms should be produced by the process of negotiation and adoption as well as 
what impact reforms should have on the existing political party system size and composition. 
20 
 
First, institutional structure is important because certain electoral rules can provide 
limits on possible reform outcomes and general propensity to maintain the status quo or 
something similar (for purposes of stability, institutional stickiness, etc).  For example, 
reforming the Electoral College in the United States requires a constitutional amendment.  
This is an institutional structure that constrains reform possibility because passing an 
amendment is extremely difficult, as 2/3 of US states must ratify the amendment after 
Congressional adoption and surviving a presidential veto, and not one of the 700 proposed 
amendments to reform or eliminate the Electoral College has passed.  It is important to 
understand why some options are never or no longer available since rules may constrain any 
reform possibilities or previously adopted structures may have eliminated particular voices 
(ie., small parties who no longer have a voice or vote after the institution of an electoral 
threshold) and any ideological profiles of those voices.  Previous institutional choices can 
limit the size and fragmentation of the party system or affect coalition incentives, making 
some outcomes more or less likely to occur in the process of adopting electoral reforms. 
 Second, motivations include electoral self-interest and power calculations as well as 
ideological beliefs about the nature of representation and the state.  Such motivations may 
also be affected by how well actors understand the "menu" of electoral system options they 
can choose from and whether their perceptions about likely outcomes alter the nature and 
extent of reforms they pursue.  Previous institutional choices may affect the level of party 
cohesion, the number of ideologically-oriented party representatives, the number of 
legislators having prior legislative experience and the likelihood of legislators having close 
ties to local constituents.  It is important to understand why some types of legislator (e.g., 
more ideological than seat-oriented or party disciplined than self-interested) are more or less 
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likely to succeed under different electoral rules and how, once those types of legislators are 
removed from the decision-making process, their absence may take an entire set of reform 
options off the table or may deplete the institutional memory of previous reform negotiations 
and outcomes.  For example, elites who can win a popular, candidate-centric campaign might 
exhibit different interests for future elections than party members who typically receive their 
nominations based on internal party hierarchy or legislative discipline.  Additionally, 
motivations may include a particular view of the nature of representation and the state or a 
particular view about the role of different agencies in election conduct and decision-making.  
Such motivations are likely to be affected by who actors feel they represent: government 
bureaucratic agencies, civil society, and international and domestic NGOs all may play a role 
in the process of reform. 
 This chapter develops a more generalizable framework about electoral reform, in an 
attempt to encompass not only why and how reform occurs in a given period but also to 
evaluate why the reforms that are eventually adopted differ from what we might otherwise 
expect, based on the relevant actors and their assumed or expressed interests.  I first present 
existing perspectives and debates in the scholarly literature, evaluating the benefits and 
shortcomings of existing theories on the subject as well as the contributions and limitations 
of previous frameworks for evaluating those theories using within-region or small-N 
empirical studies.  I then go on to ascertain how well the conventional wisdom predicts 
events of electoral reform and show that existing theories of seat-maximization predict fewer 
than half of the cases of reform in the established literature.  Next I present my broader 
framework, explaining the utility of an iterated model that conceives of reform as a more 
generalizable process that can account for changes in the reform process over time.  I follow 
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the introduction of my framework with an in-depth discussion of the primary concepts 
involved in the electoral reform process, including the dimensions of reform, types of 
reformer and the role of time and path dependence in the process of constraining reform 
outcomes.  Finally, I explain my expectations about the relationship between reformer 
motivations, relative strength and path dependent constraints, and eventual reforms adopted 
as a set of hypotheses to be tested in the following case study chapters and finally with an 
original dataset of 34 democracies across the globe. 
 
The Existing Literature 
 Initial conditions were once considered the most important explanatory factor in 
democratic transition and consolidation, focusing on the preparedness, resources and 
organizational capacity of opposition members capable of wresting power away from the 
incumbent political elites (e.g., Vachudova 2005) or the importance of constitutional design 
at the time of transition to democracy (Reynolds 2002).  Among others, Kitschelt (1994) and 
Bratton and van de Walle (1994) look to the structure of pre-democratic regimes as 
influential factors in the process of transitional and post-transition constitutional design, with 
little mention of the capacity for reform in later years.  While Vachudova (2005) does in fact 
address the potential for an external solution to the lack of ideal initial conditions, explaining 
the political leverage of future membership used by the European Union on countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe to combat uncompetitive institutional arrangements over time, in 
many parts of the world there is no external actor such as the EU to provide reform pressures 
where they do not otherwise exist.  Reynolds (2002) and Reilly (2006) build on an extensive 
literature (see Lijphart 1977; 1999 among others) stressing the importance of constitutional 
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design in conflict mitigation, but these tend to emphasize the initial choice of institutions 
rather than focus on the process of reform. 
 Now there is also a growing field of study that assesses dynamic processes in the 
development of democracy, focusing on evaluating and understanding the importance of the 
causes and consequences of institutional changes on political parties and party systems.  
Because the short-term effects of institutional change can be powerful in many new 
democracies, this type of research is essential for explaining the evolution in their party 
systems.  The majority of the literature on institutional change focuses on two primary 
questions: what factors lead to institutional change and how do these changes shape political 
outcomes (Roett 1995; Saez 2002; Thelen 2004; Ostrom 2005)?  Though the literature on 
party systems and electoral laws suggests a causal interactive relationship between the two 
(Roberts & Wibbels 1999; Marks & Wilson 2000; Hicken 2009), most studies only consider 
electoral laws as “sticky” independent variables that determine the shape and characteristics 
of the party system (Cason 2002; Dietz & Myers 2007). 
 In long-standing democracies, scholars have identified four causal explanations for 
the pursuit of reform by political elites: 1) expansion of the franchise which creates new 
interests in the voting population, 2) change in voter preferences regarding interests and party 
support, 3) public opinion favoring reform, and 4) an ineffective/inappropriate existing 
system of government.  The first three explanations are based on largely strategic goals – as 
the playing field shifts among and/or within parties, winners will seek to expand and losers 
will seek to shore up their respective electoral slices of the pie by altering the electoral rules 
of the game to their advantage or acquiescing to reforms in order to appease the public.5  The 
                                                 
5
 These are explanations that Reed and Thies (2001a: 153) refer to as “outcome contingent” elite motivations. 
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fourth explanation is based on largely ideological goals.6  For example, methods of 
representation may be viewed as insufficient or inappropriate for the state, such as a 
plurality-based system that drastically ignores minority issues because small parties and 
specific group interests go unrepresented.  Another example is that methods of representation 
are inefficient for the state, such as a proportional system in a large and diverse state with no 
electoral threshold produces dozens of legislative parties that have no hope of coalition-
building or consensus mechanisms to encourage efficient, expedient or effective governance. 
 Studies drawing upon this latter explanation focus not only an alternative causal 
mechanism for electoral change but also tend to focus on changes to electoral systems that 
were less common prior to the 1970s.  An entire literature devoted to mixed-member 
electoral systems, which have been some of the most frequently adopted systems in both 
established and new democracies for the past thirty-five years, discusses change that has in 
fact occurred in established democracies even though they are, as noted, unlikely to reform.  
These theories primarily posit that systems themselves are inherently predisposed, by the 
lack of balance or "electoral efficiency" within the system, to reform but still often seek case-
specific factors that make change inevitable or unlikely in each reform scenario and are built 
on power-based motivations that provide the final 'push' for reform.  Scarrow (2001), Katz 
(2001; 2005), Rahat (2001; 2008), Reed & Thies (2001a; 2001b), and Moser and Thames 
(2001) are a few who address changes in both new and old democracies from majoritarian or 
proportional systems to ones that combine elements of both. 
The logic of the shift to mixed-member systems results from the extremism of the 
previous system's rules: those systems that are extreme in one or more dimensions of inter- or 
                                                 
 
6
 These are explanations that Reed and Thies (2001a: 153) refer to as “act contingent” elite motivations. 
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intra-party competition are predisposed to reformist pressures that require only a small 
trigger from actors (elites or voters) to ignite calls for change (Shugart 2001).  Shifts to 
mixed-member electoral systems had been infrequently, with the exception of Italy, subject 
to further system reform, in part due to the reform's capacity to reduce or eliminate the 
extremism that was the underlying cause of reformist pressure; in these cases once the reform 
is adopted it is unlikely to 'need' to adopt other reforms.  These tend to be systemic shifts that 
result from a disbelief in the ideological trajectory of extreme electoral systems, and despite 
the power calculus that triggers the actual reform, is rooted in some measure of ideology 
about the nature of representation.  The post-communist region now has additional examples 
of movement away from mixed-member systems in Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Russia, 
Ukraine and Bulgaria, the last two of which both switched from mixed to proportional 
systems only to switch back to the mixed systems within a decade or two, respectively. 
 However, the dominant trend in the literature on institutional change focuses on the 
role of strong parties or “winners” in democracy who revise the rules of the electoral game to 
favor their current advantage and push for such changes at the point when they are the strong 
and can attempt to capitalize on their relative strength.7  This literature on strategic choice 
models of electoral reform suggest that reforms are undertaken at the point when one party or 
coalition sees an opening to consolidate their power (Bawn 1993; Benoit 2004; Colomer 
2005; Remmer 2008; Boix 1999; 2010;).  This point can be when party system fragmentation 
and/or electoral uncertainty are high or increasing, before dominant parties or actors become 
                                                 
7
  In some ways, these explanations are similar to Vachudova (2005) who argued that the most consolidated 
democracies in Central Europe were those whose initial conditions offered the greatest balance between the 
opposition forces and outgoing Communists.  Once in power the opposition elite were forced to create strong 
democratic institutions that tightly bound the hands of elected officials, since they could not be sure they would 
win future elections based on the relatively balanced electoral strength of the opposition and the Communists. 
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“locked-in” (Mahoney and Thelen 2011: 3) and competition within the party system becomes 
more institutionalized and self-reinforcing. 
According to these models change is more likely to occur when there is instability or 
uncertainty because in stable systems there is little incentive to challenge or alter the status 
quo or little reason to assume that change will necessarily be beneficial relative to the status 
quo.  Uncertainty alters actors' perception of the value of change, either to consolidate an 
already strong position because of perceived new weakness to competitors or to shore up a 
vulnerable position because of perceived new threats from competitors.  Without this 
uncertainty, there is little reason to suggest that change will benefit the instigator any more 
than the status quo already has, since seat-maximization is the only goal being pursued. 
The early work in this body of literature tended to see strong parties, especially 
strategic ones, as the most ardent supporters of maintaining the status quo in the electoral 
system because it favored their retention (Bawn 1993; Boix 1999; 2010).   Bawn (1993) 
addressed German electoral reform, explaining the choice of electoral systems as a rational 
bargain between parties concerned with their own chances of participating in government.  
She assumes strategic logic among potential reformers where they consider whether changes 
to the system will benefit their electoral seat-share and, secondarily, whether it will benefit 
like-minded potential coalition partners with whom they can assume the role of government 
formation.  Beyond most strategic choice logic, there is an underlying assumption that 
reformers consider the importance of policy outcomes resulting from the new constellation of 
post-reform power-holders, as they are most likely to pursue reforms that not only benefit 
them but also benefit or at least do not detract from the success of their policy partners. 
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 Assessing the more generalizable factors driving party system formation in post-war 
Europe, Boix's work more directly addressed cross-national comparisons of reform pursuits.  
He posited that maintaining the status quo is the most desirable of positions for ruling parties 
with respect to the electoral system and that changes to the electoral arena predispose the 
ruling parties to alter the system.  In particular, two factors changed the electoral arena in 
such a way as to make ruling parties take notice: the entry of new voters and changes in 
voters' preferences.  When either or both of these factors caused the creation of new parties 
sufficiently strong enough to challenge the ruling party or parties, as in the case of rising 
social democratic party support, proportional systems were adopted to ensure that previous 
rulers could remain a viable part of the system.  When only weak new parties were created, 
the status quo was maintained. 
 Subsequent literature built on this earlier work, positing that the uncertainty of strong 
parties produces maintenance of the status quo as powerful actors are afraid to push for 
change that may result in the empowerment of their opponents (Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005; 
Remmer 2008).  In this newer literature, institutional change is the byproduct of shifts in the 
competitive positions of parties where such changes serve as attempts to reinforce the status 
quo rather than create new patterns of political representation, arguing that party system 
volatility is both precursor to and byproduct of reforms.  These scholars sought generalizable 
and testable theories of the driving factors behind electoral reform adoption. 
In a formal game-theoretic setting, such as Benoit’s model, coalitions pursue change 
when they are rationally motivated to do so, with the expectation that alterations of allocation 
formulae will endow them with greater numbers of seats, and possess sufficient strength of 
seat-share to be able to adopt such reforms.  Benoit briefly acknowledges some constraints of 
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this hyper-rational game-theoretic model, including its application to transitional and new 
democracies likely to suffer from a lack of clarity about who makes the decisions about the 
electoral system or perfect information on the part of elites (Benoit 2004: 384-385). 
An early foray into cross-regional and cross-temporal empirical tests of the strategic 
motivations for reform, Colomer finds that the emergence of multi-partism encourages 
pressures for greater proportionality in the system, rather than simply assuming that party 
systems emerge from the electoral structures that constrain them (2005).  The take-home 
aggregate message is that electoral uncertainty will result in perpetual pressures for systems 
based on more proportional, “less risky formulas” (2004: 4)8.  His cross-national analysis 
does not find that the introduction of more proportional electoral rules creates greater multi-
partism but instead only confirm the changes in the system that created the initial pressures 
for proportionality-based reform.  In sum, outcomes do not necessarily reflect greater 
proportionality or more inclusion of smaller parties in the post-reform period but a lower 
level of disproportionality between votes and seats won. 
In a more exhaustive statistical evaluation of recent democratic transition cases in 
Latin America, Remmer’s study finds that the choice of more or less proportional reforms 
results from changing the level of certainty of parties driving reform: in the case of rising 
party system fragmentation smaller parties will push for greater proportionality while in 
cases of declining party system fragmentation larger parties will push for greater pluralism in 
seat distribution (2008)9.  Her analysis, similar to Colomer's, reflects the importance of 
changes in the party system driving reform pressures in the electoral system, despite a lack of 
                                                 
8
 Colomer uses the term “inclusivity” rather than “proportionality” to reference the motivation that parties seek 
to be included or seek to exclude others.. 
 
9
 Remmer uses the term “permissiveness” rather than “proportionality” to reference the motivation that parties 
seek to permit a greater or fewer number of parties into the system. 
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systematic discussion of what drives changes in the party system or whether party systems 
experiencing little change would ever reform.  Her analysis is not confined to legislative but 
includes direct executive electoral reform as well, a potentially complicating factor in 
assessing the strength of strategic logic when it might be unclear who makes the decisions or 
holds veto power over reforms. 
More recent critics of the 'strategic choice' logic have pointed to two other factors that 
can contribute to the shape of electoral reforms: mass intervention and opinion about the 
need for certain reforms and coalition partners who may limit (ab)use of reforms adopted for 
purely political gain.  Renwick (2010) suggests that voters' desires are more important than 
simple strategic choice logic assumes, and that by incorporating what we know about voters 
and their ability to influence political elites, we gain a more nuanced understanding of how 
and why they sometimes make choices that appear to contradict some of their power-oriented 
best interests.  In similar fashion, Renwick et al. (2005) follow the theoretical example of 
Bawn (1993) in suggesting that coalition partner interests will also constrain elite reform 
pursuits.  If a necessary coalition partner will not benefit from reform it may restrain an elite 
from adopting such a reform because the longer-term costs (ie. loss of a coalition partner who 
may be necessary for legislating or government formation) of reform may vastly outweigh 
the short-term seat benefits.  Yet, these theories still suggest that power calculus remains at 
the heart of all reform decisions, and is simply accounting for the pressure of public opinion 
to avoid losing votes. 
 Katz and Norris introduce a broader range of reformer motivations and considerations 
pointing to broad theoretical concerns regarding the limited nature of strategic choice logic 
(Katz 2005; Norris 2011), such as events in which non-electorally strategic actors are 
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involved with the process of reform (Katz 2011) or the strategically optimal choice was not 
taken by the dominant party in the negotiations over revisions to the electoral system (Norris 
2001).  From case studies (Birch et al. 2002; Pilet 2007) to cross-national comparisons 
(Bowler et al. 2006), it is clear that the values and ideologies of reformers can and do affect 
the specific package of reforms adopted, as well as the desire to revisit reform in the future. 
Explanations of reform adoptions in Italy and Japan in the early 1990s clearly point to 
ideological goals among reformers and mass publics.  In the Italian case, reforms adopted in 
1993 shifted the system from list proportional representation to a mixed-member 
proportional system.  The reform resulted from pressures to reduce excessive fragmentation 
in the overwhelmingly-large Italian legislature (630 seats in the lower chamber alone) that 
threatened to perpetually deadlock governments and hamstring effective governance, let 
alone representation (Renwick et al. 2005; Renwick 2010).  The electoral outcome actually 
produced even greater party system fragmentation, with more parties receiving larger (but 
still relatively small) shares of the seats than in the immediate pre-reform elections.  In 
response to mounting frustrations by members of parliament and party leaders alike, in 2005 
the Italian system passed a new electoral law reverting to a system that largely resembled its 
pre-pre-reform structure.  However, neither of the reforms actually benefitted the larger 
parties in clear terms, while the debates and public discussions regarding reform took a 
predominantly ideological tone with respect to representative yet effective government (Katz 
2001; Renwick 2010). 
While the move to a mixed-electoral system proved an ineffective solution to the 
problem of party system fragmentation in Italy, mixed-electoral system adoption was 
intended to resolve a different problem in the Japanese system.  Accusations of corruption 
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and unresponsiveness among the leaders and high-profile members of the perpetually-ruling 
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led to mounting public pressure for some type of 
reform (Reed and Thies 2001a; Christensen 1994).  In 1993 the Japanese Diet adopted an 
electoral law providing for the introduction of a parallel balloting system on which each voter 
could choose a single-member district representative, as in the pre-reform single non-
transferrable vote system, as well as cast a single party vote which would “top up” each party 
in proportion to its share of the party-list votes.  The adoption of a parallel, rather than a more 
proportional, system represents concessions by reformers to the goals of some LDP 
leadership (Reed and Thies 2001a: 168).  However, splits and pro-reform elements within the 
LDP, as well as strategic interests of the opposition party members, forced a change from a 
purely majoritarian system, as the initial LDP plurality plan in 1993 would have assured, to 
one with some measure of proportionality (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995; Sakamoto 1999). 
Another consideration taken by more recent scholarly work on reform posits the 
inherent potential differences between “major” and “minor,” questioning whether reforms 
that are not capable of altering system-wide outcomes should necessarily be subject to the 
same power-based rational concerns and motivations of elites.  The list of four dimensions of 
reform introduced by Lijphart (1994: 10-12) only included seat-allocation formula, district 
magnitude, legal threshold and assembly size as the reforms under consideration.  Katz 
addresses these issues, suggesting that “there is no clear dividing line between major and 
minor reforms” and only assessing reforms within Lijphart’s four dimensions would be 
“inadequate to encompass all the aspects of elections that might be manipulated for partisan 
advantage” (Katz 2005: 69). 
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For example, intraparty reforms have not often been considered to carry particular 
importance since they are assumed to not have an effect on the distribution of seats among 
the reformers but within subsets of reformers (Hazan and Rahat 2010), despite knowledge 
that parties do not bring unitary goals or expectations into the negotiations (Blais and Shugart 
2008).    Recent studies have included other reforms that might alter effective representation, 
such as electoral mechanisms to increase symbolic or identity representation with respect to 
cross-cutting cleavage groups (Htun 2004; Krook 2009; Celis, Krook and Maier 2011), 
without a clear impact on the inter-partisan power balance.  As surmised by Leyenaar and 
Hasan (2011: 447), “ ‘non-major’ reforms can indeed have major consequences for the 
functioning of democracy” and warrant further investigation. 
The Central and Eastern European cases demonstrate a combination of strategic and 
ideological logic employed by reformers during processes of iterated electoral reform.  Birch 
et al. (2002) put forth a framework of “contextualized rationality” in which strategic 
calculations are the basis for most reform pursuits but that in the post-communist transition 
environment contextual factors of historical legacies, ideological goals and perceptions of 
alternative choices will matter (13-18, 23).  More specifically, the contextual factors will 
determine the “menu of choice” while the rational choice logic will determine what 
constellation of reforms are eventually adopted (23).  Most notably in the Central and Eastern 
European cases we finally encounter examples of repeated reform in the transition and 
consolidation phases of democratization in Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine, where 
processes of “continuing amendment” and “substantial overhaul” occur following the first 
free and fair elections (Lewis 2003, 217).  For these cases, particularly when reviewing the 
first decade of change, the selection of an electoral system was an “iterative, recursive 
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process that both formed political actors and was formed by them” and marks a clear 
departure from envisioning the process of electoral reform as exclusively the dependent 
variable (Birch et al. 2002, 178).  Bielasiak and Hulsey (2009) suggest that in the context of 
post-communist democratization and electoral reform there is an inclination by reformers to 
pursue conservative (i.e. less deviation from the status quo) reforms with greater frequency, 
rather than jump into a single large-scale overhaul of the system. 
In the Polish case institutional problems, notably the lack of perceived “genuine 
political competition” in the pre-1991 electoral framework and the problems of seat 
allocation in the post-1991 electoral systems, served as the basis for early reforms that 
occurred prior to each new set of elections.  In Romania the ever-increasing threshold sought 
to gradually limit the size of the party system during the 1990s, coupled with general media 
and popular discontent with politics near 2000 that prompted discussions of a majoritarian-
based electoral system.  In Russia the reforms seem to have eroded democratic governance 
over time, including constant pre-election tinkering of the election laws and the adoption of a 
mixed system that heavily favors the largest party in the system.  Finally, in Ukraine the 
process of reform was extremely delayed as party-centric forces fought the central 
administration and executive for greater control over the process of candidate nomination and 
selection, pushing back the first attempt at post-1989 electoral reform to 1998 with a shift 
from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system.  In many of these cases scholars have 
referenced a combination of ideological and strategic choices in determining the reforms 
adopted at different stages of the process (Birch et al. 2002, 187). 
In addition, in the Central and Eastern European electoral reform cases scholars have 
focused some attention on the relatively low levels of information possessed by reform elites 
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(Shvetsova 2003; Andrews and Jackman 2005).  Elites in these cases often had limited 
experience with electoral competition, failing in many instances to understand the 
complexities of electoral formulae or to accurately estimate the impact of certain reform 
options.  These information-limited contexts are presumed to have a constraining effect on 
the ability of actors to make strategic decisions that can be observed in the aggregate: namely 
that while perhaps still motivated by strategic pursuit of votes and seats, parties may be 
making uninformed decisions which they perceive to be in their best interests but in reality 
leave them worse-off with respect to representation.  Studies of cases in this region in this 
time period point to factors related to high party system uncertainty, with constant new 
entrants, high volatility and a short history from which to glean public support and opinion 
information to make informed prediction (Remington and Smith 1996; Kaminski 2002; 
Shvetsova 2003).  Factors in these post-communist cases are likely to be issues in many other 
cases of new democracy where electoral competition faces levels of uncertainty and poor 
information not typical in established democracies with stable rosters of competitors and 
widely-understood rules of the electoral game. 
 Finally, the literature has begun to assess, usually through case studies or small-N and 
paired comparisons, examples of reform processes undertaken but never adopted or resulting 
in reforms so minor as to have almost no impact on voters or seat allocations from the 
original system.  Some commonly-cited examples of these are first-past-the-post systems in 
the United States (Bowler and Donovan 2008), the United Kingdom (Blais 2008) and Canada 
(Massicotte 2008) where reformist efforts have consistently failed to produce meaningful 
changes to the disproportional formula of national-level elections.  Other examples include 
reform discussions in France and Italy (Renwick 2010) that failed to produce “fixes” for 
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systems deemed by many political observers and elites to have too few or too many parties.  
And in a refutation of most of the logic that systems will trend toward greater proportionality 
over time, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Romania have all recently pursued, with 
varying levels of failure, more majoritarian components of their electoral systems (Nikolenyi 
2011).  Common factors cited by authors of failed reform evaluations suggest the powerful 
veto of courts and high barriers to reforming electoral laws or amending constitutions; 
component such as these in many cases were put into place by drafters of the democratic 
institutions to combat or prevent reform in the first place.  This turn in the literature to 
examination of reform failures brings us full circle to early scholarly justifications for the 
promotion of institutional stickiness. 
 
Testing the Conventional Wisdom 
 While I will save extensive testing of existing and revised theories for a later chapter, 
I introduce here a basic test of the conventional wisdom that seat-maximizing strategy is a 
good predictor of electoral reform.  The analysis is simple: in a dataset of the cases of reform 
most commonly discussed in the previous-referenced literature there are 39 episodes of 
electoral reform that result in more majoritarian or proportional system adoption.  I use party 
system size, as measured by Laakso and Tagapera’s effective number of parties (ENP) 
coding, to represent the power balance among parties within the system, with rising party 
system size as an indicator of increasing uncertainty among decision-makers and declining 
party system size as an indicator of decreasing uncertainty among decision-makers.  I then 
compare whether more majoritarian reforms result from decreasing uncertainty and more 
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proportional reforms result from increasing uncertainty, which are the expected relationships 
based on the seat-maximization literature. 
 Of the eighteen cases of more majoritarian reforms, eight occur following a decline in 
the party system size (the expected relationship) and ten occur following an increase in the 
party system size; of the twenty-one cases of more proportional reforms, nine occur 
following an increase in the party system size (the expected relationship) and twelve occur 
following a decline in the party system size.  Thus, of the 39 episodes of reform, seat-
maximizing logic correctly predicts seventeen cases for a 44% accuracy rate in predictive 
power.  This means that, albeit in a very simple model that does not control for additional 
factors, a coin flip (50% probability) has a better chance of predicting electoral reform than 
seat-maximizing power.  The simplicity of the model, measuring aggregate party system 
dynamics rather than calculations of individual parties, may inhibit its predictive capacity – I 
will investigate this possibility in the following chapters. 
 What might account for the seemingly poor predictive capacity of seat-maximizing 
logic, long heralded by the literature on electoral reform as a theoretically plausible and 
empirically demonstrated explanation?  I argue that existing empirical tests of seat-
maximizing strategies have suffered from shortcomings related to both theoretical and 
methodological issues, which I will address in the next section. 
 
Limitations of Existing Theories and Empirical Tests  
 Two shortcomings of the literature suggest the need for a revision to existing theories 
and more comprehensive and methodologically rigorous empirical tests of theory.  The 
theoretical concerns include a lack of attention to potential ideological motivations of 
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reformers, a lack of attention to the limited knowledge and understanding possessed by elites 
in new democracies about the electoral menu options they face, and a lack of attention to the 
potential for path dependent effects on the trajectory of reforms in long-term or iterated 
processes.  Methodological concerns include a disregard for impact of the intra-party 
dimension of the dependent variable of electoral reforms, a misinterpretation of the most 
appropriate method for temporally classifying observations, and misinterpretations of the 
outcomes in statistical models that are underspecified and suffer from case-selection 
problems.  I will first address the theoretical issues followed by methodological and 
measurement problems in prior empirical analyses, and then will proceed to offer my 
solutions to both in the remainder of the chapter. 
 First, most existing explanations take the theoretical perspective that the relative 
bargaining power and potential for exploiting reform outcomes levied by parties within the 
system determines the outcome of institutional choice: parties make decisions almost entirely 
based on electoral, rather than ideological or even policy-oriented, calculations.  These 
perspectives may gloss over the possibility that leaders pursue reform for other reasons, such 
as a desire to simplify the party system to encourage more cohesive coalitions or robust 
competition (Birch et al. 2002).  While the pursuit of more ideological reasons may dovetail 
with the more self-interested ones, which are undeniably a driving force behind institutional 
change, they nonetheless deserve consideration in light of the fact that many institutional 
reforms that appear to defy purely electoral logic and result in the favorable consolidation of 
a single party or coalition's position of power.  Strategic choice logic also suggests 
predominantly short-term considerations; where reformers have long-term considerations 
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there may be more room for ideological goals as well.10  As such, consideration of both the 
complementary and contradictory power of strategic and ideological motivations should be 
considered to a greater degree. 
 Second, two assumptions made about models of reform narrowly or incorrectly 
reflect the political world.  The first is that political elites fully understand and can accurately 
assess the likelihood of a range of outcomes for each reform option under consideration.  
While elites tend to be more educated relative to the average voter with regard to the 
electoral formulae that translate votes into seats, assuming that all elites, especially those in 
new democracies, share an equal capacity for such calculation is problematic and likely 
incorrect (Andrews and Jackman 2005). 
The second is that reforms can occur in a sporadic fashion, as a simple self-interested 
response to changes in the electoral landscape or as a means to correct miscalculations with 
respect to expected reform-induced outcomes (Hartlyn and Luna 2007: 12; Kuhonta 2008).  
This could also be iterated reform by self-interested elites seeking short-term gain and who 
are constrained by their legislative power.  Where reforms are iterated, with changes 
occurring in the same area over multiple time and electoral periods, programmatic interests 
may be at play that either complement or contradict purely electoral interests.  Automatically 
assuming self-interest likely does not explain why we see iterated change, since correcting 
for miscalculation in later periods need not reflect purely power-based motivations but the 
desire to fix representation and accountability concerns as well.  While I address the issue of 
over-time reform, systematic evaluation of the effect of elite mistakes on the reform process 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
                                                 
10
 See Hartlyn and Luna (2007: 11) on the necessity of distinguishing short- and long-term consequences and 
their relationship to the goals of reformers. 
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 Finally, it would be difficult to consider the causes and consequences of iterated 
rounds of electoral reform without the context of institutional “stickiness” and difficulty in 
democracy of rolling back reforms that voters may have grown accustomed to or desired very 
much.  The question of path dependence must be narrowly11 and explicitly addressed within 
this particular research agenda: did the decision to pursue change in one area effectively 
eliminate the chance for other changes in the future?12  One example of this may be the way 
the executive is elected: once the decision has been made to directly elect the president it 
may be difficult if not impossible to revert to an indirectly-elected executive since the 
person/party holding the presidency is unlikely to give up the office or the choice may have 
originally been the result of popular opinion and thus any other elected official would not 
propose a reversion and risk her future electoral success.13  If reform can only occur once 
then this type of path dependent consideration would not matter since the elimination of 
future options is moot.  In the context of iterated reforms, how choices in early periods 
eliminate or constrain options in later periods must be considered. 
With respect to methodological and measurement issues, the first cause for concern is 
the exclusion in all cross-national studies of the intra-party dimension of reform.  Partly due 
to the influence of Lijphart’s schema of measurable electoral reform on the interparty 
dimension, authors of multi-country analyses have only aggregate changes occurring along 
the majoritarian-proportional continuum with no regard for changes in the processes through 
which individual elites receive seats allocated by the electoral system.  Though Shugart and 
                                                 
11
  I use a narrow definition of path dependence as a process in which a choice made at time t does not 
predetermine events at time t+1 but reduces the likelihood of some possibilities from occurring at time t+1. 
 
12
  For a discussion on the importance of path dependence to studying historic and dynamic contexts see 
Pierson, 2003; 2004; Mahoney, 2000; Hartlyn & Luna, 2007; Munck, 2004. 
 
13
  Tsebelis (2002) gives examples of elites who, once assuming a veto role, function in a path dependent way 
such as a directly-elected executive who would never hand back veto power if elected and continually electable. 
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Wattenberg (2001) introduce the second dimension of reform and attempt to systematically 
assess change along it, their priority is to evaluate the causes of reform and so they do not 
take the step of systematically evaluating the impact of either interparty or intraparty reform 
on electoral outcomes and party system change by country.  All previous discussions of the 
intra-party dimension of electoral reform have come from single case studies that tend to 
point to the unique party or leadership factors that drive those choices rather than systematic 
or generalizable factors.  Including such variables in statistical models to test the causes and 
effects of intraparty reform only requires the coding of an additional variable to replace or 
complement the interparty variables, rather than requiring an entirely new set of models to 
test theories about the cause and effect of reform. 
Second, the process of coding observations of reform has suffered from both over and 
under specification.  Annual data, especially when coded for independent variables that do 
not or rarely vary annually, such as party system size and change in party system size, 
overspecifies the effects of contextual variables and is an inappropriate way to code 
observations even if reforms are adopted in a single year.  Single-event data, especially when 
multiple reforms can occur within a single country in subsequent periods, underspecifies the 
effects of structural variables common to individual cases of reform relative to other cases 
and is an inappropriate way to code observations if a single country experiences multiple 
reform outcomes, especially in the case of different reform adoptions (i.e. proportional 
representation in one election and mixed the next).  A more appropriate method is needed for 
classifying and coding observations and applying them in a single statistical model. 
Third, the outcomes of models previously used to evaluate the factors statistically 
associated with reform outcomes have misinterpreted underspecified results or failed to 
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theoretically justify case selection with respect to the statistical model being employed.  A 
probit model that is only directed to correlate the probability of reform to the effective party 
system size has failed to include a range of control variables as well as alternate 
specifications of the independent variable.  Furthermore, inclusion of cases in which no 
reform on the dependent variable occurs or can be expected to occur should not be included 
in a probit model, which is designed to measure change in likelihood of one outcome or 
another based on the assumption that any given observation has a possibility of any outcome.  
In a system where reform never occurs because barriers are so high that reform is practically 
impossible (barring total system collapse), comparing between the outcome of non-reform 
versus reform is theoretically indefensible given the way the statistical model is 
mathematically designed. 
In order to approach the theoretical and methodological concerns raised by careful 
analysis of existing theories and empirical analyses, I now build on seat-maximizing logic 
with a revised and expanded framework for evaluating electoral reform.  Detailed 
explanation of the role of different components and factors suggests that a more general 
framework can be offered, but with qualifications and measurement concerns.  More 
specifically, I argue that while many things shape and constrain actor preferences during the 
electoral reform process two are of greatest importance to explaining general patterns of 
reform: 1) temporal effects, in particular ratchet effects that produce a unidirectional 
trajectory of reform outcomes; and 2) alternative motivations that constrain seat-maximizing 
tendencies and provide a ceiling to reform outcomes possible under the ratchet effect.  From 
this framework I derive several testable hypotheses and discuss a detailed case study and 
large-N dataset through which to evaluate the explanatory power of existing theory. 
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An Integrated Framework for Evaluating Electoral Reform 
 
Traditional seat-maximizing theory posits the causal mechanism of electoral 
uncertainty as the driving reason for reform pursuits, such that rising uncertainty of future 
electoral success or rising certainty of future electoral losses should lead to greater 
proportionality and declining uncertainty should lead to greater majoritarianism.  However, 
preliminary results indicate the limited predictive power of this relationship.  The 
combination of the reasons for and process of reform offered by more recent cases of 
electoral institutional change suggests three things.  First, there is a need for a more time-
specific way of generalizing the model so that it is no longer simply a model that offers a 
post-hoc power-based explanation for the occurrence of electoral reform at any one single 
snapshot in time.  Second, there is a need to more carefully account for the constraints from 
previously-adopted reforms, which can alter the range of later-period reformers and options.  
Third, there is a need for a more comprehensive model of electoral reform that combines, as 
most elites do in rhetoric and negotiated settings, aspects of power-based (seat-maximizing) 
and ideological (alternative) motivations.  Building upon seat-maximizing logic, which 
underpins most of the reason and timing of electoral reforms, with temporal constraints and 
alternative motivations, we arrive at an integrated framework for evaluating electoral reform. 
In terms of the temporal aspect of reform, there are two primary considerations to 
make.  The first is the question of how and whether different types of reform processes 
should be expected to produce different outcomes.  For example, would single-event reforms 
produce different outcomes than a longer-term process would eventually produce?  The 
second question is how time might affect the long-term reform processes, specifically in 
terms of path dependence effects on later rounds of reforms or revisions to previous reforms.  
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For example, does a decision made at time t affect decisions made at time t+n?  If these two 
considerations can alter the trajectory or direction of reform then they require explanations as 
to what expectations there are about the effects on the timing and shape of reform outcomes. 
In terms of the alternative motivations, there are again two primary considerations to 
make.  The first is the question of what alternative motivations for reform might be, such that 
they would produce potentially different outcomes than seat-maximizing logic would.  For 
example, does a belief about the nature of democratic state stability produce a different 
choice of electoral reform than a desire to obtain more seats?  The second question is how the 
two types of motivations might interact, resulting in complementary or contradictory choices 
and thus different outcomes.  For example, if the belief about the need for a democratically 
stable state produces a different choice of reform than seat-maximizing logic would, which 
one prevails and why?  If these two considerations can theoretically alter the motivations as 
to what reforms to adopt then they require more explanation regarding how they should 
affect expectations about the adoption of reform outcomes. 
I argue that ratchet effects and alternative motivations constrain seat-maximizing 
choices by producing an iterated reform process in which choices are highly dependent on 
more than immediate, short-term calculations of empowered actors.  Such effects are most 
likely to occur in new democracies where incremental change may not be viewed in a 
particularly negative light or actors take a more medium- or long-term view of reform 
outcomes.  In terms of ratchet effects I argue that, due to their exclusionary or inclusionary 
nature, once undertaken some types of reform constrain future reform options.  More 
specifically, some types of reforms result in the sharply reduced likelihood of future reform 
options while other types of reforms increase the likelihood of unidirectional changes (i.e. 
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increases) once they have been applied.  In order to retract or reverse those reforms, there 
needs to be some exogenous or extreme shift in the beliefs or relative strength of actors who 
previously pursued reforms.  It is also possible that later periods of potential reform produce 
adherence to the status quo of previously adopted reforms. 
What then constrains reforms once they have begun on these directed trajectories?  I 
argue that alternative motivations can provide a ceiling that constrains reformers who might 
wish to continually pursue reform to their own benefit.  More specifically, some views about 
the nature of a stable state and/or democratic representation or longer-term evaluations of 
seat-maximization outcomes and party survival might curb reformers’ motivations regarding 
issues like electoral threshold increases and decreases in district magnitudes.  For example, if 
an actor believed that in a diverse country that minority voices should be protected and 
represented, regardless of the size of the group, she might advocate for or pursue an electoral 
system based on proportionality stemming from her belief in minority representation.  
Another example might be if an actor believed that his country should remain unitary, and 
that federal structures would likely cause the dissolution of that state, he might advocate for a 
single set of electoral rules and regulations that applied in the exact same way to each level 
of government so as to avoid local specialization or regionally-specific outcomes.  In order to 
provide a credible alternative to seat-maximizing logic, rather than simple rhetorical 
grandstanding, these motivations must clearly depart from what seat-maximizing logic would 
predict.  In addition, these alternative motivations might be easy for smaller or fringe parties 
to perhaps credibly argue as their real goals, but it would be difficult to assess the actual 
impact of the alternatives relative to seat-maximizing choices if larger, effective reformers 
were not making them. 
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Rather than a simple causal relationship where pure power calculation drives all 
reform pursuits, now a trade-off or complementary relationship exists between power and 
ideology in determining an actor's reform pursuits, and those pursuits are constrained by 
previous choices which may be difficult to undo.  Each actor's pursuits are funneled into the 
negotiation process where actor strength determines the eventual reforms adopted, and the 
resulting electoral outcome produces a new set of actors who may begin the process all over 
again.  If the process begins again, the new actors’ motivations, relative strengths and 
constraints of previous choices determine the course of potential new reform.  If new reform 
does not occur, it is either the result of reform-motivated actors without the strength to pursue 
reforms or a lack of reform-motivated actors, both of which may be the direct result of 
previous choices that eliminate certain voices. 
 
Understanding the complexities of iterated reform processes 
 Before moving on to the component parts of the framework, I address the issue of 
time as it directly affects the type of reform process that may occur.  Simply put, much of the 
literature on electoral reform has viewed reforms as one-off processes that are loosely linked 
to each other by “failures” of previous reform periods that require revisions in order to “fix” 
the problems that arise.  For example, in the Italian reforms the second round of reforms was 
adopted to correct for “mistakes” made in the first reforms in 1992.  Little of the literature 
attempts to conceive of the reform process as pieces of a long-term chain of events, or to 
distinguish between expectations of what single-event versus iterated processes might 
produce.  Here, I attempt to rectify this oversight by opening up a discussion of how and why 
the structure and timing of the reform events themselves might change expected outcomes.  
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Particularly as reforms in new democracies become protracted, multi-iteration processes, as 
new actors with different motivations become involved and as constraints of previous reform 
periods are felt, the need to address and clarify the effects of time on specific procedures is 
important and long overdue. 
The process of reform is often a single-shot event with a single set of actors, goals 
and constraints that combine to produce some package of adopted reforms.  In considering 
reforms that occur under such a finite temporal model, it is theoretically simple enough to 
separate the independent from dependent variables: reform is the outcome to be explained by 
the mixture of actors and motivations constrained by the system already in place.  However, 
what if reform processes exist that are not captured by a single-shot event model?  How does 
an iterated sequence of events complicate or defy the simplicity of the independent-
dependent variable relationship, and what additional factors must be considered? 
 In abstract terms two possibilities exist with respect to multiple-episode reform 
processes: dependent and contiguous series of events and independent and contiguous series 
of events.  The definition of contiguous series of events that I use is events that occur in 
back-to-back inter-election periods.  Dependent and contiguous series of events are those in 
which, over a period of time, involved actors remain relatively constant (either as 
representatives from a particular party or the actual actors themselves) and pursue relatively 
constant goals that either went unfulfilled in early events of reform or were retracted or 
“corrected” in later events of reform.  These series of events constitute long-term reform in 
pursuit of a single set of end-goals or a single ‘trajectory’ of reform.  Such processes, I argue, 
should be considered long-term but still follow the same logic and model as single events 
where, despite taking a very long time to complete, each represents a single process due to 
47 
 
the lack of variation and high level of endogeneity in terms of actors, goals, and constraints.  
Less abstractly put, if a reform process stretches over fifteen years but involves all the same 
actors working toward the same goals as in the beginning, differing only in terms of their 
relative strength to control the process and outcome over time, that represents a single, albeit 
lengthy, event of reform.  What happens in the interim between electoral periods is much less 
influential in altering the end-goal or trajectory of reform and so we can think of those in the 
same theoretical way as we think of a single-event process. 
Yet what really matters is when there is not a clear single process of change, when 
there are so many factors that change from period to period and we need to be able to tease 
out which of those factors really matter, which are the factors that really determine what 
makes change at time t different than change at time t+1, t+2, and so on.  Independent and 
contiguous series of events are different than dependent ones, and I argue that they represent 
a series of single events but ones that are related to each other by way of inverting the 
dependent and independent variables in the model of reform.  Such independent events 
involve a mixture of old and new or entirely new actors, often as a result of previously-
adopted reforms, who bring a mixture of old and new or entirely new goals.  In addition, the 
new event is related to the previous event insofar as the composition of and institutional 
constraints faced by new reformers are direct results of the previous event, reversing the 
causal relationship and bridging between reform events.  As such, independent and 
contiguous events, rather than a long-term single event of reform or simply a series of single 
events of reforms, should be considered an event of iterated reform. 
For the sake of theoretical parsimony, non-contiguous events, even when the reform 
adoptions are related to previous reform decisions, should be treated as separate single events 
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since the likelihood is much greater that actors and external constraints have changed, even if 
general goals and motivations have remained fairly constant.  Thus we really only have two 
types of long-term change – dependent contiguous and independent contiguous – and the 
independent contiguous sets of events warrant a more complex theoretical explanation since 
they are more likely to exhibit the additional factors to and constraints on the strategic model.   
 
Dimensions of Electoral Reform 
 
 In order to fully understand the range of potential electoral reforms that can be 
considered and undertaken, we must have an understanding of the range of system structures 
and outcomes that are available to reformers.  There are two primary dimensions that 
structure democratic systems: interparty and intraparty.  While few electoral systems fall into 
the endpoint categories of these dimensions, many electoral reform paths begin with the 
intention of achieving a categorical jump, rather than incremental movement, towards the 
endpoint at the opposite end of that particular spectrum.  The theoretical importance of the 
interparty dimension to structure democratic competition and effective representation is well 
documented, though the relevance to some authors of such reforms varies depending on the 
degree of change enacted (Sartori 1994; Barkan 1995; Reynolds 1995; Lijphart 1999). 
I argue that more attention is needed on the intraparty dimension, particularly with 
respect to how it affects party system fragmentation as well as maintains party discipline in 
terms of effective representation (Sartori 1994; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001; Norris 2002; 
Andeweg and Irwin 2005; Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011).  To explain the relevance of these two 
dimensions, in his seminal work on the structure of electoral institutions Giovanni Sartori 
introduces the interparty element in the first chapter and the intraparty element in the second 
chapter as the primary components that “shape the party system and affect the spectrum of 
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representation.” (Sartori 1994: ix).  Figure 2.1 depicts the two different dimensions as they 
construct a plane, with every electoral system falling into one of the four quadrants.  The 
systems presented in the Figure show the general location of five ideal types of systems, 
while the following discussion will address each dimension and specific system 
characteristics along each dimension in greater depth.  Reforms thus reposition a system 
along either or both of these two dimensions. 
Figure 2.1 Dimensions of Electoral Reform: Intra- and Inter-party 
 
 
 The interparty dimension refers to the method of seat distribution and allocation, the 
choice of which may affect the nomination and selection aspects of systemic control, and the 
ideal types are proportionality-based and plurality-based representation.  The nature of 
representation infrequently falls into these ideal types, as many electoral systems around the 
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world now employ an intentional mix of proportionality- and plurality-based representation 
mechanisms, but the two channels represent fundamentally different approaches to the nature 
of representation in the party system.  Figure 2.2 demonstrates some of the systems that fall 
along the interparty dimension, and the range of potential systems that reformers can move 
towards or away from. 
Figure 2.2 The Interparty Dimension of Electoral Systems 
 
 Proportionality-based systems, on the right-hand side of the continuum in Figure 2.2, 
are often characterized by some degree of party-centric control.  These systems do not 
necessarily disfavor large parties in decision-making processes but are typically more 
inclusive from the competition and inclusion side.  Proportional systems are designed to 
distribute seats in a way that most closely approximates the exact proportion of votes cast for 
any individual or party.  Large districts are common in proportional systems and without 
mechanisms to limit the number of parties (ie. electoral/entry thresholds) such systems tend 
to produce multi-party systems.  The largest and most fragmented systems with high electoral 
volatility levels occur in countries with the largest average district magnitudes (and diverse 
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populations or low barriers to competitive entry), but the number of 'wasted votes' is low.  
Though proportionality is commonly thought of as reducing the direct link between voters 
and elected representatives, relatively small district size or open lists can approximate some 
of the representation features of plurality-based systems and the larger number of parties may 
offer voters more choices. 
 Plurality-based systems, on the left-hand side of the continuum in Figure 2.2, are 
often characterized by some degree of candidate-centric control.  Plurality-based systems are 
usually designed as 'winner-take-all' contests that allow voters a direct channel of 
accountability by producing a single candidate to represent each party.  Small districts, 
usually one-seat per, are a common feature of plurality systems and tend to produce 
dominant two-party systems because in any given district only one party can win, favoring 
parties with greater resources who go head-to-head.  The smallest party systems with the 
least electoral volatility occur in countries with plurality-based elections, but the number of 
'wasted' votes is the highest in such systems where many times a majority of a district's votes 
can be cast for losing candidates.  Though commonly thought of as increasing costs of 
elections and inner-party conflict, the direct link does allow for a high level of accountability 
and limited number of parties may make choices and party messages more clear to voters. 
 One way of characterizing the proportionality-plurality continuum is the degree of 
inclusivity of each system.  More inclusive systems tend to be those that fall into the 
proportional half of the spectrum, where many parties can compete and survive as the system 
moves closer to full proportionality.  More exclusive systems tend to be those that fall into 
the plurality-based half of the spectrum, where only one party can win in each district and so 
the system favors the largest parties who can spread support to the largest number of districts.  
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While there is a range and the choice of proportional versus plurality does not determine the 
size of the party system alone, the correlation rate is quite high between large multiparty and 
very proportional systems and 2-party plurality-based systems. 
 However, there is one more aspect that can reduce inclusivity even in the most 
proportional of systems: entry thresholds.  Such thresholds are a distinct mechanism for 
altering the overall composition of the party system and skewing representation to favor 
larger groups (i.e. bigger parties).  As thresholds are introduced they, almost by definition, 
reduce proportionality as they reduce inclusivity.  There are two types: 1) competitive entry 
thresholds that raise barriers to registration, nomination and campaign entry; and 2) electoral 
entry thresholds that raise barriers, beyond what might occur from district magnitude, to 
legislative entry via minimum vote-shares.  Competitive entry thresholds exist in most 
countries, often as forms of basic registration, and can range from simple registry and a 
minimum number of signatures to demonstrations of campaign funds and requirements of 
functioning regional and local branch offices.  Electoral entry thresholds exist in many 
proportional countries for the purpose of weeding out extremist parties, reducing the power 
of regionally-based parties, or generally simplifying the party system and government 
formation by reducing the number of participants.  High thresholds of either type, when 
carefully enforced, can reduce inclusivity in proportional systems.  In plurality-based systems 
legislative entry thresholds are unnecessary since the small district magnitude excludes 
smaller-party candidates.  The arrow in Figure 2.2 depicts the effect of thresholds on the 
interparty dimension: a reduction in proportionality. 
 The intraparty dimension refers to who controls various aspects of the electoral and 
legislative arenas, and the ideal types are party-centric versus candidate-centric control.  The 
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nature of systemic control revolves around four aspects of entry into the political arena: 
candidate nomination, candidate selection, government formation and member actions.  The 
first aspect of systemic control is that of candidate nomination, which may be controlled by 
independent nominations directly to ballots, independent nominations to party primaries 
followed by voters selection to general elections, or party nominations to party primaries 
and/or general election lists.  The second aspect of systemic control is candidate selection 
which may be controlled by voters directly or via ordered lists that parties control but only 
win seats if chosen by voters.  The third aspect of systemic control is government formation 
which may be controlled by only one party or formal coalition of parties, a directly-elected 
executive who may be without party affiliation, or parties competing for positions based 
solely on electoral performance and legislative seat-share.  The fourth and final aspect of 
systemic control is member actions which may be controlled by functional or legal 
restrictions that limit types of votes and activity in the legislature, internal party discipline 
(which may include formal mechanisms for punishment or advancement) or nothing at all.  It 
is the first two aspects which are the most proximate to the process, procedures and outcomes 
of elections, and thus are the most subject to the formal electoral reform process.  Most 
electoral reforms on the intraparty dimension move systems between party- and candidate-
centric control of the nomination and election process, along the continuum of different 
systems depicted in Figure 2.3. 
 The two types of intraparty relations represent ideal types and few systems boast 
entirely party- or candidate-centric control.  Party-centric control leaves the majority of 
election-related decisions in the hands of parties, rather than individuals.  In terms of 
candidate nominations party-centric systems are characterized by regulations that close the 
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process of candidate nomination to non-party competitors, employing mechanisms such as a 
prohibition of independent candidates or any other type of non-party/coalition affiliated 
candidates.  In terms of candidate selection processes party-centric systems are characterized 
by regulations that close the process of candidate selection to non-party participants, where 
voters do not select candidates directly but select parties who control which specific 
candidates fill the seats won by the party. 
Figure 2.3 The Intraparty Dimension of Electoral Systems 
 
 Party-centric control in one area need not require or even complement party-centric 
control in another, but many systems that endow parties with a great deal of control on one 
often do so on many aspects.  For example, systems where parties have a great deal of 
internal discipline often have a great deal of party control over candidate nomination and 
selection, though the causal direction may be difficult to discern.  Party-centric control at its 
most extreme means that virtually no role for individuals exists, as parties control the names 
submitted for nomination and seat allocations, and any individual who wishes to compete 
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must become part of an existing party or create a new party as a vehicle for their individual 
goals.  Parties in party-centric systems mostly take action to prevent erosion of their control 
and once control shifts to candidates for nomination and selection it is difficult to undo. 
 Candidate-centric control puts the majority of control into the hands of individuals, 
prioritizing independent candidate characteristics over party roles and identifications.  In 
terms of candidate nomination candidate-centric systems are characterized by regulations that 
open the process to non-party competitors, allowing independent candidates to run regardless 
of whether they have a party affiliation or not.  Most candidate-centric systems still have a 
number of barriers for the entry of independent candidates, such as registration based on a 
certain number of supporting signatures, but in the most candidate-centric systems most of 
these barriers are instituted for functional reasons related to the conduct of elections rather 
than the purpose of limiting the competition of independent candidates.  In terms of 
candidate selection candidate-centric systems are characterized by regulations that open the 
process to non-party participants, for example voters can select candidates directly from 
party lists or non-list ballot positions rather than only casting votes for parties who then 
decide who to place into seats. 
 Candidate-centric control in one aspect need not require or even complement 
candidate-centric control in another, but many systems that endow candidates with a great 
deal of control on one aspect often do so on many.  For example, systems where candidates 
have a great deal of control over nomination and selection often have a lack of party 
discipline because parties become beholden to the strongest candidates to win seats for them 
and maintain their power or number of seats.  Candidate-centric control at its most extreme 
means that virtually all elected offices are filled at the initiative of individual candidates who 
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can bypass parties to run campaigns and voters who choose their representatives directly, 
eliminating much of the role served by parties as intermediaries in the policy/platform-
formation, interest aggregation, and heuristic signaling processes.  Candidate-centric systems 
infrequently move toward more party-centric mechanisms because strong individuals have 
little incentive to give up their individual controls to a group that likely employs some type of 
group-wise decision-making process or may prioritize other types of individuals in the 
candidate nomination and selection process. 
 Much in the same way as thresholds affect the interparty dimension, independent 
candidacy can force party-centric systems to be more candidate-centric in nature.  By nature, 
independent candidates can function without party sanction or endorsement although the type 
of electoral rules may affect the degree to which independent candidates are truly 
independent of the party system and partisan influence and control.  In a system in which 
independent candidates can self-nominate and can be included on the ballots for voters to 
select, the level of party control declines as non-partisan elites may affect the range of 
candidates and composition of the legislature by appealing directly to voters. The arrow in 
Figure 2.3 depicts the effect of independent candidates on systems: a reduction in party 
control over candidate nomination and selection. 
 Reforms in many countries over the past few decades have exhibited a centralizing 
tendency with respect to the two dimensions of reform.  Many countries introducing electoral 
reform have ended up with some form of formal or de facto mixed system (Reynolds, Reilly 
and Ellis 2006: 23-24) with cases as diverse as Japan, New Zealand, and Romania all moving 
toward either a strict mixed-member multi-party system or one that exhibits centrist 
movement along both dimensions of reform.  While the motivations for these central 
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tendencies have been quite different – from dissatisfaction with government corruption in 
Japan to a public referenda stemming from a campaign “mistake” in New Zealand to a 
mixture of strategic and ideological motivations in Romania – the result has still been that 
each case moved toward the center.  Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focus on movement of cases across 
the two dimensions, evaluating whether a central tendency is evident across regions and time.  
Chapters 4 and 5 depict the movement of the Indonesian system along the two dimensions, 
showing a central trajectory over the two inter-electoral periods from 1999-2004 and 2004-
2009, while Chapter 6 goes into greater detail regarding individual case movement toward 
the center across a large-N sample of countries. 
 
The Ratchet Effect and Electoral Reform 
 While the term path dependence suffers from overly-broad (ab)use in comparative 
historical analysis, for the purposes of this analysis 'path dependence' refers to the ratchet 
effect in which specific historical legacies of previous institutional choice directly constrain 
future choices (Huber and Stephens 2001).  When a decision to adopt a certain reform is 
made, rather than pre-determine outcomes, that decision eliminates or renders extremely 
unlikely the adoption of other reform options in the future, due to the actors or strategic goals 
it eliminates.  For example, the adoption of an electoral threshold reduces the number of 
legislative parties (else why would reformers adopt it?) and, in doing so, eliminates the 
voices of all the small parties it prevented from obtaining seats.  Without those voices, there 
would be little to no reason to revisit the threshold except to increase it, since there is no 
longer an advocate for a threshold-less system. 
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The possible exception might be if public opinion reveals a desire by voters to 
remove the threshold, but that is an unlikely exception and one that the majority of 
parliamentarians would probably ignore unless their own voters also wanted removal of the 
threshold.  Thus, the decision to adopt the threshold does not pre-determine the outcome, 
except to likely eliminate some parties from future legislatures, but the adoption does sharply 
reduce the likelihood that the threshold will be lowered or removed in the future.  This 
follows the logic of what Huber and Stephens (2001) have termed a “ratchet” effect: changes 
tend to exhibit largely unidirectional movement at the hands of decision-makers to continue 
to push the ratchet “up” or maintain the status quo and leave the ratchet in the position of the 
previous change.  In this type of trajectory only an extreme action of releasing the ratchet 
will result in a change that undoes or reverses the direction of previous reforms; such an 
action is infrequently undertaken. 
This ratchet effect thus indicates that when reform occurs, the outcome is most likely 
to be maintained; a secondary outcome is that if reform occurs again it will continue to 
deepen the progress of the first reform, rather than rollback the first reform.  The framework 
does not suggest a necessary deepening once one reform process has occurred, but highlights 
the likelihood that once a reform occurs the typical tendency is either to retain the change or, 
if another change is made, to deepen the effect of the previous change.  With respect to 
specific types of reforms, some are more or less likely to display maintenance or deepening 
effects and some are more susceptible to rollback (i.e. displaying less of a ratchet effect). 
 This type of path dependent nature of party-centric control is predicated on 
maintenance of that control unless reforms are adopted that move the system towards more 
candidate-centric control.  Such a change is unlikely to occur "naturally," ie. not as the 
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byproduct of a natural progression of reforms, since the very mechanism used to elect a 
candidate directly presupposes a certain type of candidate who is unlikely to view party-
centric control favorably in terms of their chances for re-election or ability to control their 
own policy goals.  Thus during reform periods parties in a party-centric system will attempt 
to maintain or deepen party-centric control mechanisms when they have the chance, with 
maintenance of the status quo the default expectation in any given time period.  On the other 
side, eroding party-centric control or systems that always boasted candidate-centric control 
suggests that once individuals achieve individual power there are few circumstances under 
which they want to share it that might induce them to rewrite rules in a less individual-centric 
way.  This indicates that once candidate-centric control has been achieved to some degree, 
the most likely 'natural' progression of future reforms is maintenance or deepening of 
candidate-centric control. 
 Yet the switch from party-centric to candidate-centric is unlikely to occur as a result 
of a natural progression of reforms rather than an external shock, such as pressure from 
powerful individuals or external actors or as the result of a shift in ideological beliefs about 
the nature of party-voter or candidate-voter relations.  As such, we should expect to witness 
shifts between party- and candidate-centric control as the result of more than simply strategic 
choice calculations.  Few parties in a party-centric system are likely to want to give up their 
power to candidates or individual members, but may do so either because they view the 
trade-off between seat calculations and reduced central party power as favorable (an unlikely 
scenario) or some ideological factor induces a change in their beliefs about where control 
should lie; the converse is also true for individuals in a candidate-centric system. 
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 An extensive literature has investigated the directionality between proportionality and 
plurality systems, suggesting that shifts toward proportionality are much more common, as 
are shifts to mixed-member systems that combine aspects of proportional and plurality-based 
models (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001; Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2006).  However, path 
dependency in this case trends toward the strategic choice explanation of power calculations: 
the dominant reason for a shift from proportionality to plurality or vice versa is when 
electoral predictions suggest a party or coalition would benefit from doing so, and the choice 
is only as path dependent as the fortunes of the actors who chose to make the shift.  If the 
shift produces worse outcomes for the actors who pushed for its adoption, either the actors 
who benefitted will choose to keep the new system or will choose to change it back if they do 
not believe they will continue to benefit from it.  There is a role for ideology in the causal 
explanation in terms of the substantive rationale for adopting reforms in either direction, and 
this may prove more path dependent especially in terms of preserving the existing level of 
proportionality, but in this case there is little in the strategic choice literature to suggest that 
one type of reform or another is strictly eliminated from future consideration based on 
previous institutional choice.  In other words, in terms of the choice between a plurality- or 
proportionality-based system, if strategic logic is the method used to shift from one system to 
the other, there is no reason why the system cannot be changed back if the outcomes do not 
sufficiently satisfy the expected beneficiaries or the unexpected beneficiaries do not want to 
retain the newly-instituted system. 
 Finally, electoral thresholds and similar mechanisms to reduce party system size are 
incredibly path dependent in nature.  The previous example of the mechanism of an electoral 
threshold demonstrates how path dependence can stra
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rolling back a threshold: based entirely on strategic choice power calculations there does not 
appear to be much of any reason why a system that adopts an electoral threshold would ever 
consider reducing or eliminating said threshold.  In fact, the greater likelihood would be to 
consider raising it.  Here again we see the potential complication for strategic theory, as 
individual actors may violate their own self-interested power calculations and choose to 
lower thresholds or somehow reduce their application.  The only possible explanations are 
that public opinion reveals disapproval of the artificial exclusion of smaller parties via 
thresholds or ideology pushes elites to reconsider the mechanism as a tool of democratic 
competition, since it reduces pluralism in the legislature and increases 'wasted' votes.14  This 
is of course most important in cases where electoral laws must be ratified by a public 
referendum, as in the New Zealand case. 
Intraparty control shifts can be very path dependent if adopted, implemented, and 
enforced.  Parties will resist the opening of lists or shifts to pluralism because those choices 
guarantee some loss of party control, and can move a system from party-centric to candidate-
centric very quickly.  When parties are faced with pressures to open the selection process 
(from civil society, smaller parties who have some popular candidates, etc) they will limit the 
amount of opening or create alternative processes to circumvent open choices as much as 
possible; when large parties oppose this option it will fail repeatedly to gain much ground. 
This means that some options are now virtually eliminated as possible future 
outcomes: once the shift has occurred it is difficult revert to party control over lists once they 
are submitted because the individual candidates now acquiring seats are likely to be the ones 
                                                 
14
 An example of this is the current debate in New Zealand regarding reforms to the Election Law, in particular 
whether there should be a change in the level of the electoral threshold and to what percentage.  While multiple 
public opinion polls were held during the 2011 debate over whether to keep the mixed-member proportional 
system adopted in 1993, the public actually has the right to suggest changes directly to the electoral 
commission. 
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favored by the system of candidate-centric control and/or voters like the mechanism of direct 
choice.  This means that the range of future options is now limited to: 1) maintenance of the 
status quo, 2) move to single-member districts, 3) move to smaller multi-member districts, 4) 
move to a mixed system that balances proportionality with plurality seats in a reapportioning 
or parallel formula, and 5) new requirements to become a candidate (least likely because it is 
too complicated and unnecessary with the diversity and pluralism in the existing process or 
favoring strong individual candidates). 
Interparty control shifts can be very path dependent if adopted, implemented, and 
enforced.  Small parties will resist shifts to pluralism because those choices guarantee some 
reduction in their seat-share while large parties will typically push because it will advantage 
their seat-shares.  When small parties are faced with pressures to reduce proportionality they 
will come together in coalition or try to persuade large parties to avoid as much loss as 
possible; when large parties oppose this option it will not be introduced.  Public opinion 
could also influence large parties to avoid plurality-based seat distribution, given the 
potential for large numbers of 'wasted' votes. 
 Once the shift to greater proportionality occurs it is difficult to revert to pluralism 
unless one party gains enough seats to unilaterally change the system back.  Similarly, once 
the shift to greater pluralism occurs it is difficult to revert to proportionality unless the 
dominant party/parties lose enough seats in future elections that the rest of the parties in the 
system can force a new round of reform.  This means that the range of future options rather 
rests with swings in electoral outcomes: 1) status quo, 2) reduction in district magnitude, 3) 
move to single-member districts, 4) move to a mixed system that balances proportionality 
with plurality in some re-apportioning or parallel formula. 
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Thresholds, at least parliamentary entry thresholds, are incredibly subject to ratchet 
effects if adopted, implemented, and enforced.  Parties already sitting in legislature decide to 
limit their numbers and when large enough parties all agree then they will outvote the smaller 
parties in systems where votes are conducted via non-supermajoritarian processes.  This 
means that some options are now extremely unlikely: there cannot be a return to pre-
threshold entry because any opponent of the threshold (ie. any party who cannot garner 
enough votes to obtain seats) is no longer in the legislature and therefore cannot directly 
impact a vote or negotiation within the legislature.  Path dependently this means that the 
range of future options is basically now limited to: 1) maintenance of the status quo, 2) 
diffusion of the threshold to sub-national legislative elections, 3) increase in the threshold, 4) 
increase in the entry requirements, 5) decrease in the threshold (least likely path). 
 
Alternative Motivations and Electoral Reform 
 The new democracy cases of electoral reform over the past two decades suggest that 
reformers are not simply seeking power and seats every hour of every day.  While few 
believe that all reformers are always only seeking to maximize their short-term seat-shares – 
particularly in the case of reformers in democracies where those reformers have exhibited 
other propensities toward transitional justice, reparations for human rights violations under 
authoritarian rule, and adoption of rules that protect and expand the rights of targeted 
minorities – most models of reform still focus entirely on seat-maximizing logic as the basis 
for all reform decision-making.  Part of the reason is ease in measurement but another is that 
at face value it is easy to accept the argument that political elites will do whatever is 
necessary to maintain or obtain more power.  The inaccurate predictive capacity of these 
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seat-maximizing models suggest a refinement of some type is needed that can more 
accurately account for why reform outcomes do not match the expectations more than 50% 
of the time.   Alternative motivations that reflect a more accurate, or more predictive, view of 
the thought process and beliefs of elite reformers can be identified. 
 First, in terms of stability of the democratic state, parties may recognize that some 
reform trajectories, such as perpetual increasing of electoral thresholds or a switch to single-
member districts, will either be fundamentally destabilizing to democracy and/or perceived 
as unrepresentative or illegitimate to voters.  Thus there will be pressure either within or from 
outside the legislature to place effective ceilings on thresholds or restrict reductions in district 
magnitude that may eliminate elements of proportionality or plurality of voice.  In terms of 
views about the nature of democratic representation, parties may advocate for certain 
electoral system elements because of the type of representative government those elements 
engender.  For example, a party may advocate for single-member districts because they 
believe that is the best way to produce an effective accountability mechanism between voters 
and their representatives.  Similarly, reduction in district size may be pursued by legislators 
as a means to effectively balance the functional role of legislator with the practical concerns 
of future candidates: smaller physical districts allow legislators to split time more effectively 
between legislative duties and local representation work.  Alternative motivations suggest 
that broader goals for state stability and democratic representation may constrain otherwise 
seat-maximizing tendencies. 
In addition, actors may pursue seat-maximization but with longer-term strategic 
considerations that hamper their desire to alter the existing system.  The existing literature 
conceives of seat-maximizing strategies primarily in the short-term, as reforms will affect the 
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next election and its outcome; yet iterated reform processes suggest that long-term views of 
seat-maximization might produce different outcomes.  For example, a medium-sized party in 
a new democracy may be uncertain about its long-term chances of maintaining its current 
vote-share.  While such a party might be in favor of an electoral threshold that eliminates 
extremely small parties it is wary of any increase in the threshold above that, since it is 
unsure of its own projected electoral success in the long-term.  So that party may not 
advocate for much of a threshold now, even though it might benefit in the short-term of the 
next election from the elimination of small parties, for fear that it will be subject to an 
increase later because it is not certain it will benefit in ensuing elections if it should fall at or 
below that new threshold level.  Thus actors may pursue reforms that complement or 
contradict seat-maximizing logic with broader motivations regarding either the function and 
stability of the democratic state, trade-offs in the nature of representative government and 
accountability, or long-term views of seat-maximization.  These alternative motivations have 
effects on reforms, suggesting limits to the trajectory or ratchet effects produced by seat-
maximization pursuits. 
However, in an aggregate study of electoral reform it may be difficult to distinguish 
the effects of alternative motivations in the decision-making process because many parties 
who may employ them do not hold much decision-making power.  In a case study it is 
possible to learn individual positions on reform issues, and therefore to know when reformers 
have, at least rhetorically, argued for alternative reasons to adopt certain reforms.  Yet, in a 
large-N analysis it is quite difficult to assess alternative motivations because distinct 
positions of each party may be unattainable.  The argument here is not that alternative 
motivations must represent a clearly different trajectory of reform than seat-maximizing 
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logic, but rather that when seat-maximizing logic fails to predict reform outcomes alternative 
motivations can provide answers.  In particular, when large or otherwise effective parties 
who can alter or make decisions adopt alternative motivations such effects should clearly 
change expected reform outcomes relative to what seat-maximizing logic would predict, and 
should be evident in an aggregate study.  In sum, in aggregate studies of reform large and 
sometimes medium parties who adopt alternative motivations can change the trajectory or 
package of reforms adopted in ways that make evident when seat-maximizing versus 
alternative motivations are at work. 
 
From Framework to Testable Hypotheses 
 Though clearer explanation of the causal mechanisms at work during the reform 
process can help us to develop a theory that can broadly apply to many cases, a set of specific 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between the component mechanisms can be generated.  
In particular, a series of hypotheses will be generated regarding not only reform adoption as 
the dependent variable, but reform adoption as the independent variable in assessing change 
in the party system in the elections following reform.  In the remainder of this section I will 
lay out hypotheses to correspond to the expectations of the framework: inter- and intraparty 
reform as both consequence and cause of party system change, the centralizing tendency 
within two dimensions of reform, the ratchet effects on reform adoption and trajectories. 
In terms of testing broad theoretical factors, and in line with the literature on electoral 
reform, I use party system size (commonly referred to as party system fragmentation) and 
electoral uncertainty (commonly referred to as electoral volatility) as measurable proxies for 
expectations about general electoral performance and change.  The common expectation in 
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the scholarly literature is that overall change in the composition and relative inclusiveness of 
the party system should result in changing expectations by individual parties regarding their 
own performance and potential in the future.  Thus as party system size or volatility grow 
(i.e. uncertainty increases), reforms should reflect the desire for increasing proportionality; 
conversely as party system size or volatility shrinks (i.e. uncertainty decreases), reforms 
should reflect the desire to limit proportionality and increase majoritarian elements. 
I also consider the amount of disproportionality in the system, measured by the 
distortion in the translation of vote proportions into seat proportions, as a proxy for the 
representativeness of the party system.  In general, proportional systems tend to have lower 
disproportionality with fewer votes wasted on small and losing parties.  Few expectations 
exist about the effect of disproportionality on elite behavior in terms of electoral reform, 
since most theories revolve around the expectation that reformers behave in predominantly 
seat-maximizing ways, and so reducing distortion between vote and seat shares would not be 
of high priority.  However, if we accept that alternative motivations play a role in the process 
of reform adoption we might predict that disproportionality, particularly when it is quite high 
or increasing, would affect the reform options discussed and/or adopted.  Thus, as 
disproportionality increases (i.e. the distortion in the vote-to-seat translation increases), 
reforms should reflect the goal of greater proportionality to alleviate the distortion. 
Three concepts are the basis for most of the testable hypotheses: party system size, 
electoral volatility and disproportionality.  I use commonly-accepted indices to code each of 
these in cross-national comparison: Laakso and Taagepera’s Effective Number of Parties 
(ENP) formula for the party system size, the Pedersen Index for electoral volatility and 
Gallagher’s Disproportionality Index for the disproportionality.  Both the ENP and Pedersen 
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Index can be calculated based on votes or seats, while the Gallagher Index is calculated using 
votes and seats.  Chapter 6 and Appendix C go into greater detail regarding data collection, 
coding and construction of the ENP, Gallagher and Pedersen Indices for the large-N 
quantitative analysis.  In the case study in Chapters 4 and 5 I use relative party vote and seat 
proportions within the Indonesian system in place of an aggregate party system measure and 
individual party vote-to-seat differentials in place of an aggregate disproportionality measure. 
I will test my expectations using measures constructed over time and lagged, to 
represent trends in uncertainty that develop over more than a single pre-reform election 
period.  Thus, expectations are based not simply on the relationship between the pre-reform 
party system fragmentation and the ensuing reform, but on the trend in uncertainty 
established by the change in fragmentation between the two pre-reform elections.  The 
expectations about party system fragmentation, electoral volatility and disproportionality 
yield the first two testable hypotheses of the seat-maximizing (H1) and alternative (H2) 
motivations arguments: 
H1: The probability that reformers will adopt more inclusive reforms increases as party 
system fragmentation and electoral volatility increase, whereas the probability that 
reformers will adopt less inclusive electoral reforms increases as party system 
fragmentation and electoral volatility decline. 
H2: The probability that reformers will adopt more inclusive reforms increases as 
disproportionality increases, whereas the probability that reformers will adopt less 
inclusive reforms increases as disproportionality decreases. 
 
In cross-national comparisons aggregate system size and disproportionality may be 
the unit of measurement to test expectations regarding reform adoptions, but within country 
there are likely to be different expectations about the different actors – their goals and 
relative strength – as factors affecting reform adoptions.  In particular the seat-share of 
medium-sized parties is more likely to affect reform outcomes in systems where the larger 
69 
 
parties do not themselves hold enough of the seats to pass reforms unilaterally.  Furthermore, 
small, medium and large parties are unlikely to be uniformly affected by different reforms, 
and while small and large parties tend to have relatively static preferences for reform, 
medium-sized parties are more likely to fluctuate. 
For example, in discussions about the implementation of an electoral threshold, one 
would expect that large parties would always favor them, since few are usually worried about 
meeting most cut-off levels in future elections, while small parties tend to always be against, 
since all are usually worried about meeting any cut-off level in future elections.  Medium-
sized parties are most likely to have varied preferences based on the fact that the specific 
level and/or proposed increases to a threshold may not have clear effects on them: if a 
medium-sized party falls somewhere close to the proposed level of the threshold its 
preferences for eliminating smaller parties from obtaining seats will conflict with its desire to 
keep itself in the game because it is highly uncertain about future electoral success keeping it 
at or just above that cut-off level. 
Similarly, the propensity to adopt candidate-centric reforms may hinge on the relative 
seat-shares of small, medium and large parties.  In theory, large parties are those that should 
be more capable of fielding and funding candidate-centric campaigns nation-wide, while 
small parties are those that should be least capable of fielding and funding candidate-centric 
campaigns in general but may be successful when concentrating in only one or two districts.  
Medium-sized parties, however, may be equally divided between the desire to preserve or 
pursue party-centric systems.  Medium-sized parties probably lack the funding and resources 
of large parties to sustain individualized campaigns nation-wide but can be successful within 
specific regions; medium-sized parties may also be more interested in pushing party-based 
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platforms that appeal to identity or localized needs in those geographically-concentrated 
constituencies.  While the expectations of success by small and large parties might be much 
clearer with respect to candidate-centric systems, those of medium-sized parties are less so. 
Thus while we might have be able to easily predict small and large party actions on 
both inter- and intra-party reforms, predicting medium-sized party preferences according to 
strict seat-maximizing logic might be difficult.  Three particular expectations regarding the 
non-uniformity of medium-sized party preferences emerge.  First, the effects of a threshold 
or reduced district magnitude are less likely to be uniformly perceived by medium-sized 
parties, depending on their own specific size and uncertainty about future electoral success.  
Second, the impact of vote-to-seat differentials are less likely to be uniformly distributed 
across small, medium and large parties, with small and large parties all losing or benefitting 
relatively equally in terms of differential but medium-sized parties benefitting or losing less 
consistently as a group.  The rationale for this last expectation revolves around the likelihood 
that medium-sized parties reflect strong geographic concentrations of votes more than small 
parties but less nation-wide appeal than large parties, resulting in less uniform effects of 
changes in district magnitude or vote-to-seat allocation formula.  Third, similar expectations 
about medium-sized party preferences and candidate-centric reforms apply: it is more 
difficult to predict medium-sized party preferences (in the aggregate) regarding candidate-
centric reforms than large party expectations of success in candidate-centric systems. 
In general, we would expect that as the seat-share of medium-sized parties decreases, 
larger parties can pursue their seat-maximizing reforms of less inclusive and candidate-
centric reforms with fewer barriers.  In contrast, increasing medium-sized party seat-share 
will make reform direction difficult to predict since these parties as a group are the least 
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likely to share similar objectives.  In addition, as the differential between vote- and seat-share 
outcomes of medium-sized parties decreases across the board, typically resulting in greater 
medium-sized party seat-share, more inclusive reforms will be adopted to ensure future 
success of the medium-sized parties.  These expectations of the different effects of relative 
party size on seat-maximizing logic yield the following hypotheses: 
H3a: The probability of less inclusive reform adoption increases as the seat-share of 
medium-sized parties decreases, whereas the probability of more inclusive reform 
adoption increases as the seat-share of medium-sized parties increases. 
H3b: The probability of candidate-centric reform adoption increases as the seat-share of 
medium-sized parties decreases, whereas the probability of party-centric reform adoption 
increases as the seat-share of medium-sized parties increases. 
 
H4: The probability of more inclusive reform adoption increases as the differential 
between vote-share and seat-share of medium-sized parties decreases, whereas the 
probability of less inclusive reform adoption increases as the differential between vote-
share and seat-share of medium-sized parties increases. 
 
While we expect in new democracies, perhaps more than established ones, that there 
is a greater likelihood of alternative motivations in early periods of reform, over time this 
effect may dissipate.  System-wide there may be a general shift away from more ideological 
or representative pursuits towards more self-interested ones over time.  We would expect to 
see such trajectories evolve as more actors become more knowledgeable and more certain 
about the post-transition political landscape.  This may affect the trajectory of iterated reform 
pursuits when early choices made based on alternative motivations give way to more seat-
maximizing choices in later periods.  Thus there should be greater likelihood of choices such 
as electoral threshold adoption in later periods of reform more than early periods of reform. 
H5: The probability of less inclusive reform adoption, particularly electoral thresholds, 
increases in later rounds of iterated reform, holding party system fragmentation constant. 
 
The last set of expectations regarding reform as the dependent variable focus on 
ratchet effects on reform adoption, there are two primary expectations regarding the impact 
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of time on inter- and intra-party reforms.  First, related to the constraints of previous reforms 
on later reforms, we should expect that reforms tend to take on a directional quality over 
time: if a particular type of reform is adopted in time t with the expectation that it produces 
an effect that benefits those who adopted that particular reform, either reformers are happy 
with the effects and maintain them or wish to increase or continue that particular type of 
reform in time t+1.  We might also expect this effect to fade when reforms occur in non-
contiguous inter-election periods, since the identity (and motivations) of the reformers are 
more likely to change in non-contiguous periods.  For example, the adoption of candidate-
centric reforms is likely to affect the type of legislator elected and to reinforce support for 
candidate-centric methods of election, producing a ratchet effect that “locks in,” and may 
increase, support for candidate-centricity. 
Second, due to a combination of alternative motivations and the iterative nature of 
reforms, the overall reform process has some type of hypothetical or actual ceiling and we 
should expect that over time reforms may progress toward but not cross that ceiling.  For 
example, if a particular type of reform is likely to produce public backlash past a certain 
point (i.e. an electoral threshold so high that it appears to undemocratically limit competition) 
or an unstable party system that is unable to govern (i.e. a plurality-based system so 
fragmented that government cannot be form or is so divided that it cannot pass legislation), 
reform adoption will hit a ceiling before that point or reforms will be rolled back in order to 
correct the problem.  These expectations yield the following hypotheses: 
H6a: The probability of less inclusive reform adoption increases when less inclusive 
reforms were adopted in the previous inter-election period, but the constraints of 
alternative motivations and iterated reforms prevent the adoption of the most extreme 
less inclusive reforms. 
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H6b: The probability of candidate-centric reform adoption increases when candidate-
centric reforms were adopted in the previous inter-election period, but the constraints of 
alternative motivations and iterated reforms prevent the adoption of the most extreme 
candidate-centric reforms. 
 
 Finally, there are a set of expectations about what reforms produce, as the 
independent variable explaining change in the party system, since reformers only undertake 
reforms with the expectation that there will be some change that results from the reforms.  
First, less inclusive reforms undertaken to simplify the party system should result in a 
decrease in the size of the party system, while more inclusive reforms designed to more 
closely reflect voter choice should result in an increase in the size of the party system.  
Second, more inclusive reforms designed to more accurately reflect proportionality in the 
party system should result in a decrease in distortion during the translation from vote-to-
seats.  Third, candidate-centric reforms should have the effect of increasing the size of the 
party system, since the electoral incentives should increase party fragmentation and new 
party entry, relative to party-centric reforms.  Fourth, a reform of any type should have the 
effect of increasing vote and seat volatility in the post-reform election period.  These 
expectations yield the following hypotheses (ceteris paribus): 
H7a: More inclusive reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation 
while less inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation. 
 
H7b: Candidate-centric reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation, 
while party-centric reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation. 
 
H8: Less inclusive reforms will produce an increase in disproportionality. 
 
H9: Any inter- or intra-party reform adoption will produce an increase in electoral 
volatility in the post-reform election. 
 
Taken together, these hypotheses are designed to explore and test assumptions in the 
theory regarding the relationship between electoral reform and party system change.  As 
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such, the very factors that cause electoral reform may in turn be affected by the new rules 
adopted, as the interests of actors are shaped and constrained by the system those actors seek 
to shape and constrain.  While the issue of sequence is of utmost importance to distinguishing 
between reform as the dependent variable and reform as the independent variable, these 
hypotheses are designed to directly test not only the distinction between the two but how they 
relate to each other when reform and party system change occur in repeated interactions.  
 
The Indonesian Case Relative to Broader Theory 
 The case of Indonesian democratic transition and consolidation suggests an 
interesting counterexample to the existing theories about the contribution and importance of 
institutional stickiness to the process of democratization.  Democratic since 1999, Indonesia's 
electoral institutions have undergone substantial and repeated reforms since the democratic 
transition ushered in a massive constitutional revision after the 1999 elections.  Specifically 
in the area of electoral reform, the Indonesian legislature has repeatedly passed reforms that 
have altered the way voters vote and parties compete.  Despite, and to a large degree because 
of, the constant alteration of institutions, Indonesia's political system now possesses greater 
inter-branch balance (a directly-elected president replaced the parliamentary-style executive) 
and peace (resulting in part from much-improved civilian control over the armed forces) than 
it did at the beginning of its democratic transition. 
At the same time, these factors have not frozen political competition as each 
subsequent election has introduced at least one new party to the legislature, indicating an 
openly competitive electoral system that can accommodate and survive the entrance of new 
actors onto the electoral stage, and moderately increasing party system fragmentation from 5 
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(in 1999) to 8 (in 2004) to just under 9 effective parties in 2009 (calculated using the ENP 
measure).  It appears that in this case institutional reforms need not be destabilizing or anti-
democratic; what explains the ability of Indonesia's political elite to manage repeated reforms 
that have strengthened democracy, or at least not weakened it, and how does the Indonesian 
case differ from, reinforce, or build on the existing theory and literature? 
Without delving deeply into the case's details, which will be covered in the following 
chapters, a brief overview of the Indonesian electoral reform context will explain why it is a 
useful case to explore this framework, as the reform process has occurred in two complete 
iterations and a third is ongoing.  Despite perpetual reform negotiation and adoption 
Indonesian democracy has progressed along most indicators, suggesting that at the very least 
the process of electoral reform has not been destabilizing or debilitating to democratization.  
In fact, I argue that the very adaptability provided by the possibility and use of reforms, the 
ones that so often concern social scientists because of the propensity of political actors to 
abuse and rollback progress, has enabled Indonesia's democratization progress. 
 Few political systems undergo multiple rounds of institutional change on the same 
political issue over consecutive electoral periods, despite ongoing or recurring discussions of 
reform possibilities such as in New Zealand, the Czech Republic and Romania.  Indonesia 
has undergone institutional reform on three issue areas between each of three consecutive 
electoral periods since democratization.15  On the questions of the proportionality and party-
centric nature of the system, in 1999 Indonesia retained the closed-list proportional system 
from the pre-democratic era with large province-sized districts, in 2004 it changed to a semi-
closed list proportional system with medium sub-province-sized districts, and in 2009 it 
                                                 
15
 The third reform period is currently ongoing, and has been since 2010 with the expectation of producing a 
new/newly-revised General Election Law in 2012 for the 2014 legislative elections. 
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changed to a full open-list proportional system with slightly smaller medium sub-province-
sized districts.  On the question of party system size, in 1999 Indonesia had a simple electoral 
entry threshold that required any party standing in the election to meet a minimum 
percentage of the vote-share in order to compete in ensuing elections, in 2004 the entry 
threshold was raised higher, and in 2009 the entry threshold was removed in favor of a strict 
parliamentary entry threshold that required any party to obtain at least 2.5% of the total vote-
share in order to receive seats in the national parliament.  In each case, other reform options 
(ie. a single-member district system, a much higher parliamentary entry threshold) were 
discussed but not employed.  These changes make Indonesia an ideal case to examine 
changes in motivating factors and the institutional constraints faced by actors, and we can 
trace such changes within an environment whose institutions are, themselves, a byproduct of 
previous rounds of reforms. 
Figure 2.4 maps Indonesian reform through the 2009 elections, with reference to the 
general directionality of the proposals currently under discussion in the legislature to apply to 
the 2014 general elections. Partly due to the changing nature of reform actors, who alternate 
in terms of power and intraparty composition with each subsequent election, the overall 
process of reform has occurred in a step-wise manner rather than a smooth trajectory from 
one point in the inter- and intra-party dimensions of reform. 
While it appears that Indonesia is moving from a proportional and party-centric 
system to one in the pluralist and candidate-centric category, particular anti-reform pressures 
stemming from ideological opposition to majoritarianism have kept it from reaching that 
degree of change.  It does exhibit the common centralizing tendency of many reformers 
previously discussed this chapter, and it remains to be seen if future reforms propel it to 
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becoming the first reformer since France in 1986 to shift from a fully proportional to a fully 
majoritarian system.  Political actors are still primarily driven by seat-maximizing self-
interests, which are then constrained by their relative capacity to affect the reform process 
and their understanding and information of the reform options available. Each Indonesian 
reform period and specific adoptions, as well as an introduction to the major parties and their 
general positions toward reforms will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing chapters. 
Figure 2.4 Dimensions of Electoral Reform in Indonesia 
 
Finally, the cross-temporal element of reform must be addressed in the Indonesian 
context, as reforms have occurred frequently (every 5 years), regularly (beginning the 
process 1-2 years prior to each election cycle) and in such a manner as to continue 
negotiations about the same topics (system proportionality, party system size, and party- 
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versus candidate-centricness) but with varying actors and actor motivations.  Thus, the 
institutional constraints do change at each reform period, both for specific actors and the 
actors in general, but within the confines of the same system and as a product of the previous 
round of adopted reforms. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Indonesian Political Context 
An extraordinary case of democratization, Indonesia remains one of the world's most stable 
young democracies despite a number of variables seemingly designed to derail or deform 
democratic institutions, function and performance.  The literature, developed extensively by 
democratization scholars, focuses primarily on stateness and bureaucratic capacity (e.g. Linz 
& Stepan 1995), aspects of the rule of law and accountability (e.g. O’Donnell 1996), and 
economic development (e.g. Przeworski et al. 2000) and wealth distribution (e.g. Boix 2003; 
Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; Ansell & Samuels 2010) as primary factors for the 
development and sustainability of democratic government.  In addition, other scholars point 
to the following factors as those which can aid in democratic development: unified national 
identity that reduces inter-group conflict, separatism or independence movements in divided 
societies (e.g. Rustow 1970; Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1991); and a neighborhood of 
established democracies to emulate during the process of consolidation (e.g. Starr & 
Lindborg 2003; Brinks & Coppedge 2006). 
Indonesia possesses strength in few of the factors thought to help stabilize democratic 
transition and encourage consolidation.  Though it has had a slightly above average economic 
growth rate since 2000, the transition itself was born out of economic crisis and perceptions 
of widespread corruption that have not been particularly well addressed by political 
leadership; fast population growth has only exacerbated poverty and inequality levels while 
per capita GDP levels hover around $3900 (measured in purchasing power parity to constant 
2005 US$).  Indonesia’s democratic history began with a single democratic election in 1955 
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that gave way to more than 40 years of authoritarian rule.  It is one of the world's most 
diverse states with large portions of the population speaking hundreds of local languages and 
scattered among an archipelago of 17000 islands that possess wide variation in income 
equality and deposits of extractive resources.  Ethnic and religious diversity has led to 
multiple separatist movements which were barely but brutally suppressed under the New 
Order regime.  Additionally, Indonesia finds itself in a region with few stable democratic 
examples and no simultaneous democratizers, not to mention the world's largest Muslim 
majority population with a substantial religious minority and a geographic location that 
guarantees annual wide-scale natural disasters. 
On issues of stateness and rule of law, however, Indonesia has progressed faster and 
some would argue much further than most comparison countries.  One explanation for the 
progress of Indonesian democracy is the ability of the system to make voters feel 
represented, instilling faith in the state rather than resorting to extra-legal methods of 
achieving their political goals.  Though Indonesia may not have the most highly-
institutionalized parties or party system, there are plenty of options for voters at the polls.  
While the process of Indonesian democratization has not been perfect, and there are plenty of 
aspects about the Indonesian political system to criticize, it has continued through difficult 
domestic conflicts and power struggles.  I argue that a key factor in understanding how it has 
done so is the flexibility of the Indonesian electoral system that allows it to represent the 
wide range of opinions, beliefs and policy goals of the Indonesian population in such a way 
as to not create conflict by excluding any particular subset of the population from the 
democratization process. 
It is difficult to understand the context of electoral reform in a vacuum: legislative 
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politics is affected by executive and judicial politics, civil society affects elected 
representatives, political parties affect each other.  In the context of Indonesian democratic 
consolidation the process of electoral reform has certainly been affected by simultaneous 
reform in other closely-related areas of politics as well as the institutions within which 
change occurred and the ideology and range of representatives negotiating the shape of the 
revisions.  This remainder of this chapter offers political context to democratization and the 
Indonesian reform process.  First I provide an overview to the transition and consolidation, 
followed by an explanation of other major system changes during what is commonly referred 
to as the “reformasi,” or reform, period.  Then I describe the institutional structure of the 
national legislature, focusing on subdivisions within the lower chamber where all national 
legislation is developed.  Finally I introduce the political parties during the process of 
reformasi, highlighting changes both within individual parties and across the party system as 
they have impacted the overall trajectory of democratization in Indonesia. 
 
Indonesia's Transition and Consolidation 1998-2009 
 Multiple opponents to Suharto's regime emerged in the decade prior to his fall.  The 
most prominent of these, partly because of her lineage and partly because she was the one 
that Suharto attempted most directly to undermine within her own organization, was 
Megawati Sukarnoputri.  She is the daughter of Sukarno, known as Indonesia’s Founding 
Father since he led the struggle for independence from Dutch colonial rule and was the first 
president of the independent Republic of Indonesia (1945-1967).  Heiress apparent to the 
leadership of the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party), one of the 
two political parties allowed under Suharto, her provocative and pointed critiques of the New 
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Order government led Suharto to finagle her ousting after her election as party chair at the 
PDI's 5-year congress in 1993.  The government pushed an interim Congress in North 
Sumatra in 1996, not attended by Megawati or her supporters, and the result was a different 
chair-elect.   Megawati's supporters refused to turn over control of the party's Jakarta 
headquarters and the eventual result was the worst rioting and government crackdown in the 
last decade of the New Order regime, with dozens of buildings vandalized and over 200 
arrested.  The sympathy for Megawati and her cause, democratic rule, grew in the months 
after the crackdown. 
 Two other opponents of the New Order came from the opposite end of the socio-
political spectrum: the leaders of Indonesia's (and the world's) two largest mass Islamic 
organizations, Abdurrahman Wahid of the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Amien 
Rais of the modernist Muhammadiyah.  Wahid, a long-time opponent of the New Order’s 
tight restrictions on religious expression and a proponent of religious pluralism as NU Chair, 
actually became a short-term Suharto supporter prior to 1998.  Rais, recently returned from 
studying overseas to ascend quickly to the Muhammadiyah chairmanship in 1995, was a 
staunch opponent of the Suharto regime and proved a fast ally to Megawati’s cause for open 
competition and democracy.  Wahid’s and Rais’ personal animosity towards each other, since 
each wanted to shape the transition and win power in the new Indonesian democratic state, as 
well as their divergent views about the role of Islam in social and political life, proved a 
minor hurdle to realizing their combined interests in advancing reformasi. 
 Combined with a somewhat unexpected last-minute change of allegiance by the 
military leadership and an unexpectedly reformist interim president, it was economic crisis 
that precipitated Suharto’s fall.  The 1998 Asian financial crisis plaguing East Asia wrought 
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its own havoc on Indonesia, amid increasingly obvious corruption from the cronyism and 
nepotism lavished by Suharto on his family and associates.  The combination of the hard-
hitting economic crisis, the number of industries tied up in inefficient Suharto family 
management and long-standing perceptions of corruption were too much for the regime to 
withstand.  Student protests erupted in Jakarta, the relatively wealthy and vulnerable Chinese 
populations in many cities were targeted by mobs, and the military began to back slowly 
away from its support of Suharto.  Powerful figures in the military debated what to do until 
Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto refused to support Suharto.  Suharto soon 
acquiesced to wide-spread demands that he step down, largely retreating from public life 
until his death in 2008. 
 His vice president, Bachruddin Jusuf Habibie, assumed control of the presidency and 
almost immediately called for new elections for the spring of 1999.  Among other steps he 
took in the economic and social realms, he also assembled a team to revise the laws 
governing the elections and political parties.  The team he assembled consisted of mostly 
U.S.-trained political scientists (whose composition and recommendations will be discussed 
in detail in the following chapter).  Despite their recommendations to the government for a 
fairly extensive reform of the electoral system, which included the suggestion of adopting 
single-member districts to replace the existing closed-list proportional representation system, 
the electoral framework largely resembled that of the New Order period with one major 
exception: party competition was effectively opened to any and all.  The controls of the 
Suharto era were removed and the response was staggering: over 100 parties registered and 
48 met the requirements and submitted lists to stand for the elections. 
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 Elections were held in June 1999 and the returns gave a victory of 34% of seats for 
Megawati's PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democracy Party-
Struggle), a faction that had split from the PDI, followed by a surprisingly strong showing of 
26% of seats by Habibie's Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups).  The third of the 
New Order parties, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party), 
came in third with 12% of the seats despite only being the fourth largest party as measured 
by its percentage of votes.  The parties of Wahid and Rais made relatively poor showings of 
11% of seats for Wahid's PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party) as 
the third largest party measured by votes and 8% for Rais' PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, 
National Mandate Party) as the fifth largest party measured by both seats and votes.  Sixty 
seats were still held by the military (TNI or Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Armed 
Forces), one of the more cohesive blocks within the legislature. 
 In the aftermath of the elections for the new legislature a new president and vice 
president needed to be chosen, but the opposition to Megawati, due to her gender, party 
ideology and political lineage, made it difficult for all the power brokers to reach an 
agreement.  Rais and Habibie were both bitterly disappointed at their respective positions 
relative to the PDI-P’s success and nearly all of the Islamist parties, such as the PPP, 
supported the position of a November 1998 edict (fatwa) issued by the government-backed 
Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI) stating that a woman could 
not become the Indonesian president.  With few remaining options as the negotiations 
between party factions in the legislature became more obtuse and clearly designed to thwart a 
Megawati presidency, in October 1999 the PKB’s Wahid narrowly edged Megawati to 
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become Indonesia’s first democratic president with Megawati becoming his extremely 
disgruntled vice president the next day. 
 One of the generally agreed views among the political elite was that some measure of 
political reform was necessary to develop democratic stability, along with economic reform 
to combat the crisis, but each faction within the legislature believed different aspects of the 
government infrastructure were due for reform.  The PDI-P and the military actually were in 
virtual lock-step, believing that strict maintenance of the 1945 Constitution16 and limited 
reform in the political and economic spheres were necessary, with the PDI-P intent on 
implementation of protectionist economic reforms and national identity-enforcing, 
universalist anti-discrimination laws to protect ethnic and religious minorities.  Golkar and 
PAN were the two most reform-minded parties, albeit with different views about what 
needed reform, as Golkar sought a near overhaul of the electoral system but with little 
interest in economic reforms that would likely undermine the position of many beneficiaries 
of Suharto’s nepotism and protection over the years.  PAN sought as much democratic 
reform as possible in both the electoral and economic arenas.  The PKB floundered behind 
the leadership of Wahid and emergent factions within the party, and thus their reformist 
nature appears to have been limited at least due to those factors; many Islamist parties, 
including the PPP and PBB, sought immediate reforms to New Order social and religious 
policies that banned or repressed religious (primarily Islamic) expression. 
                                                 
16
 The 1945 Constitution is the first constitution of the independent Republic of Indonesia written by Sukarno 
and Mohammad Hatta, setting forth the five nationalist principles of pancasila: belief in one God, 
humanitarianism, national unity, democracy through consultation and consensus, and social justice.  The 1945 
Constitution was readopted in 1959 after fourteen years of an alternative constitution imposed by the Dutch and 
provisional constitutions during transition to independent rule.  The 1945 Constitution remained in effect during 
the entire New Order regime and the pancasila ideology was used by Suharto to justify removal of “opposition” 
forces and those who challenged the state (Aspinall 2005: xi). 
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 The transition from the repressive authoritarian rule of the New Order also brought 
with it an explosion of ethnonationalist claims and inter-group conflict in many areas across 
the archipelago.  Separatist pressures began immediately in Timor, Aceh and Papua; Habibie 
had already set a referendum on Timorese independence on the agenda for 2001, while the 
Free Aceh Movement (Gerahkan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) and the Free Papua Movement 
(Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM) began local and, in some instances, violent protests for 
extensive autonomy or independence rights.  In parts of Kalimantan, Maluku and Sulawesi 
communal violence erupted as the legacy of decades of transmigration and unequal 
redistribution under Suharto forced ethnic and religious tensions to the surface.  Eastern 
Indonesia had always been more ethnically diverse with pockets, rather than dominant 
majorities, of Muslims; this diversity was reflected in the rise of conflict amid pressures for 
greater local authority.  Introduced by the team of technocrats in the laws drafted prior to the 
collapse of the New Order, political and economic decentralization became a priority for 
many reformists in the post-transition period. 
 In 2004 a tsunami originating from an Indian Ocean earthquake hit the coastal areas 
of many countries in South and Southeast Asia.  One of the most devastated areas was 
northern Aceh, where more than 150,000 were estimated to have been killed or went missing 
with another 500,000 displaced and more than $4.5 billion in damages and losses.  Public and 
international pressures mounted for a resolution to the conflict and in 2005 a peace 
agreement was reached in Helsinki, followed by a special autonomy law in 2006 that laid the 
groundwork for local Acehnese political parties, greater resource control and revenue 
generating powers, and the implementation of sharia law and police.  Papua has been given a 
special autonomy law that provides for a special legislative chamber to reflect local social-
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cultural aspirations but the province still controls fewer of its own natural resources and has 
no ability to form province-specific political parties.  The settlement with Aceh has largely 
diffused tensions while pressures in Papua remain with limited violence and destabilization. 
 
Political Changes during the Reformasi Period 
During the period of reformasi many issues that plagued the New Order regime were opened 
for discussion.  Among them, three elements constituted the basis for the amendment of the 
1945 Constitution and overall structure of the Indonesian political system: 1) increased 
accountability and transparency in the competitive electoral process, 2) horizontal separation 
of powers between the executive and legislature, and 3) vertical separation of powers 
between the center and the regions.  The result was four major areas of reform that occurred 
primarily during the 1999-2004 period: 1) revision to the electoral system, 2) the creation of 
directly-elected executives at the national and local levels, 3) political and fiscal 
decentralization in conjunction with creation of new subdivisions at the local level, and 4) the 
creation of a second national legislative chamber based on the principle of regional 
representation.  The first area of reform is the subject of following chapters; I briefly outline 
the context of the other reform areas here. 
 
Constitutional Amendment #1: The Directly-Elected President 
Concerns over representative and inter-branch accountability resulted in a shift from 
indirectly to directly-elected executives at the national and local levels.  Direct election of the 
president required a constitutional amendment, which was written and passed during a 
broader process of amendment that also produced the bicameral legislature.  Prior to 2004 all 
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Indonesian presidents and vice presidents were indirectly elected by a vote of the national 
legislature, but were elected to fixed 5-year terms (consistent with the fixed-term legislative 
sessions) during which impeachment of the president would result in assumption of the 
presidency by the vice president rather than a call for new elections.  During the New Order 
the indirect election process did not raise concerns about stability of the executive, since 
Suharto was not in any danger of being impeached until 1998.  However, following the first 
democratic elections there were serious concerns among many of the parties that the multi-
party competitive system would result in instability of the executive. 
The first indirect presidential selection process seemed to support fears of how the 
fixed-term indirect presidency would work in the context of open competition: the leader of 
the largest legislative party, Megawati Sukarnoputri of the PDI-P, was pushed into the vice 
presidency by the leader of the fourth largest legislative party, Abdurrahman Wahid of the 
PKB, despite the PDI-P controlling three times the number of seats of the PKB.  The cross-
party coalition proved unstable, as did Wahid’s administration, and the impeachment of 
Wahid in 2001 that led to Sukarnoputri’s ascendency to the presidency convinced most 
actors in the amendment process that a directly-elected executive would stabilize the system. 
The rules governing the executive election were highly debated, in large part because 
directly-elected executives were a foreign concept for many involved in the amendment 
process.  Concerns over the need to ameliorate the tension between a multi-party legislature 
and a directly-elected executive led to a unique configuration of the rules: a two-round, 
directly-elected but legislative-dependent president and vice president.  Tickets for election 
to the presidency-vice presidency could only be nominated by parties or coalitions of parties 
receiving a minimum of 20% of the vote-share or 25% of the seat-share of the previous 
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legislative elections.  Since the legislative elections were scheduled for April and seat 
allocations were intended to take 30 days, the first round of presidential elections would be 
held the following July based on the April outcome; if a second round was needed it would 
take place the following September.  All parties failing to meet or join a coalition meeting the 
threshold could not nominate their party’s candidates to a president-vice president ticket.  
In theory, the dependence on legislative vote-/seat-share meant that the executive 
would control a significant portion of the legislature and would be able to command some 
support for its policies, hopefully limiting the potential for divided government or constant 
stalemate between the executive and legislature.  Additionally, these stipulations would result 
in a reduction in the number of tickets that could stand for election – mathematically no more 
than 5 parties or coalitions of parties could nominate presidential-vice presidential tickets – 
and the hope was that with fewer tickets either outright first-round winners or two clearly 
dominant second-round competitors would emerge. 
However, for the first direct presidential election many parties were worried about the 
fact that only Golkar and the PDI-P would be able to run their own candidates without having 
to form coalitions with other parties.  The result was a provision, for the 2004 elections only, 
that parties need only clear a 5% vote- or seat-share threshold in the DPR elections to be able 
to submit a ticket for the first direct presidential election; the result was seven tickets 
submitted for the first round and a second round run-off required for Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla (of the Democratic Party with only 10% of the seats in the 2004-
2009 DPR) to defeat Sukarnoputri and Hamzah Haz (of PDI-P and PPP with 33% of the seats 
in the 2004-2009 DPR).  In 2009 the provision did not apply and only three tickets were 
submitted by parties and party coalitions, with the result that SBY won in the first round. 
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Political and Fiscal Decentralization 
The process of political and fiscal decentralization preceded the actual democratic transition 
in the sense that the laws governing decentralization had been in place for decades and had 
been revised prior to the 1999 elections.  However, the implementation of the revised laws 
did not occur until 2000-2001 and were again revised in 2004 to more clearly explicate the 
differences between provincial and district/municipal17 authorities and to incorporate 
provisions regarding the directly-elected local executives (governors of provinces (provinsi) 
and district heads/ mayors of districts/cities (kabupaten/kota)).  The process of 
decentralization clearly intended to make districts and municipalities the primary recipient of 
power and the provinces secondary recipients, but the process of district/municipality 
creation necessitated a larger role for provinces than initially intended. 
The 1999 political decentralization law (UU22/1999) and fiscal decentralization law 
(UU23/1999) set forth an expanded role for district/municipal governments to control 
resources, create policy and implement national programs.  As a result, many new 
districts/municipalities and six new provinces were created in a process known as 
pemekaraan, or blossoming, which dramatically increased the number of 
districts/municipalities between 2000-2006 before trailing off by 2008.  The purpose of the 
pemekaraan was governance-oriented – regions and districts/municipalities representing 
demographically or geographically unique entities that would benefit from greater autonomy 
and localized policy implementation could become distinct subnational government units to 
achieve those ends.  In practice, the majority of new districts/municipalities were created for 
purely political reasons, such as a homogenous religious community’s preference to not be 
governed by another religious group’s political representative. 
                                                 
17
 ‘Districts’ are comparable to ‘counties’ in the United States. 
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The resulting explosion of new districts/municipalities meant that many were ill-
equipped to handle the service and policy needs of their citizens, and so provinces, with 
governance structures from the New Order era already in place, were required to fill in the 
gaps as needed.  In 2004 a revised political decentralization law re-allocated some power 
back to the provinces to make them more equal to the districts/municipalities, but in practice 
the cities and districts continued to receive greater shares of government grants and carried 
more weight in creating localized policies and programs.  The local legislatures (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) all remained directly elected throughout the process of 
decentralization and in 2004 district heads and mayors became directly elected as well.  
Elections for these local executives were done on a rolling basis in 5-year fixed cycles, 
continuing the election schedules that originated during New Order.  While all the DPRD 
were elected in fixed 5-year cycles simultaneously with the DPR, local executives were 
elected in non-DPRD election years (i.e., ranging from 2005-2008 between the 2004 and 
2009 general elections). 
In 2006 a provision for independent candidates to stand for local executive elections 
was upheld by the Constitutional Court, but in practice the majority of tickets (all elected in 
pairs of governor/vice-governor, mayor/vice-mayor, etc) were composed of party or coalition 
representatives who achieved a significant proportion of the vote- or seat-share from the 
previous DPRD elections, according to the same manner as the directly-elected president.  
Though the proposal of allowing independent candidates to contest the presidential elections 
is frequently raised by parties unable to meet the 20% vote/25% seat threshold, the 
Constitutional Court has repeatedly refused to entertain the possibility. 
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Constitutional Amendment #2: The Regional Representative Council 
Concerns over separatism and inter-group conflict arose during the constitutional amendment 
process and resulted in the creation of a second legislative chamber at the national level: the 
Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD).  The second 
chamber, based on the principle of regional representation with four seats assigned to each of 
the 33 provinces in direct, non-partisan elections, eliminated the need for ‘functional group’ 
and regional representatives that had been a hallmark of New Order control.  While the 
second chamber has limited power of initiation, in matters of district creation, subdivision 
and boundary changes or policy relating specifically to the region the DPD holds some rights 
of initiation.  The DPD also votes, along with the DPR, on any constitutional amendments 
and most legislation; however its relative size means that the DPD by itself cannot overturn 
DPR votes and thus has no veto power.  Constant pressure by DPD members to increase the 
chamber’s power have fallen on deaf ears in the DPR, which is controlled exclusively by 
parties and remains uninterested in granting additional powers to a non-partisan chamber, 
and the government, which is controlled by the same parties which control the DPR. 
 
Legislative Institutions in Democratic Indonesia 
The most powerful political institution in Indonesia is the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR), composed of the People’s Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) and the Regional Representative Council 
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD).  The DPR is based on the principle of representation 
by population, with a moderately flexible number of representatives (550 in 2004, 560 in 
2009).  Until 2004 the DPR was composed of two types of representatives: political parties 
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and the military.  In 2004 the military representatives were removed and all DPR members 
became directly-elected representatives of the political parties. 
Parties within the DPR must form or become part of a fraksi, or legislative caucus, 
which can allocate at least one of its members to each of the DPR’s standing commissions 
and special bodies.  Thus, fraksi must usually be composed of at least two dozen members.  
If a single party does not have enough representatives to form its own fraksi, or if it does not 
wish to form its own fraksi, it must join another fraksi.  As of 2009 all legislative parties have 
formed a single-party fraksi; between 1999-2009 multi-party fraksi were common but the 
basis upon which parties joined other fraksi did not necessarily depend on ideological 
distance between the fraksi members.  There are no strict rules for the conduct of fraksi in 
terms of discipline or distribution of commission assignments and each fraksi holds its own 
criteria for assignments, requirements for meetings, and plenary voting. 
The DPR has a very complex internal structure, with eleven standing commissions 
covering different policy areas (e.g., foreign policy, finance and economic development) and 
multiple bodies to provide specific skill sets in areas such as legal drafting.  The DPR is 
chaired by a speaker and four deputies, all elected from within the DPR membership for the 
duration of the five-year session.  Each member of the DPR must sit as speaker, deputy or on 
one of the standing commissions, and each fraksi must have at least one representative on 
each standing commission and special body.  Within the DPR the primary commission for 
election politics is Commission 2 (domestic governance, regional autonomy, and state 
apparatus).  While the majority of members of special committees, which are formed to draft 
laws, come from within the membership of the specific commission assigned to draft the law, 
members of other commissions can sometimes sit on the special committees if they are 
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deemed to hold expertise in a particular area of relevance.  DPR members can also switch 
commissions during five-year legislative sessions, and some fraksi often move leaders among 
commissions when specific pieces of legislation acquire significance. 
In drafting legislation commissions typically meet with government representatives 
and hold meetings to solicit civil society and public feedback on elements of policies and 
programs under discussion.  The commissions often involve DPD representatives in these 
meetings if the legislation pertains to regional governance.  Depending on the commission 
and type of legislation, more direct involvement of ministries or bureaucratic agencies may 
take place during the drafting process, such as having Ministry of Health representatives 
regularly attend meetings during the formulation of a health care services bill or having 
Election Commission representatives provide direct input to a regulation governing the 
distribution of voter education materials.  Commissions are where all legislation must be 
finalized before being presented to a plenary session of the MPR for a vote. 
 
Indonesia's Party System 1999-2009 
 The political party system under the New Order, though tightly controlling 
competition, prepared many actors for the open competition of the 1999+ electoral system, as 
did the social networks of the mass Islamic organizations.  In particular, the Golkar Party, the 
PDI-P and the PPP were uniquely positioned to capitalize on organizational resources they 
had developed under the New Order system.  Two others, the PKB and PAN, had close ties 
to mass Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, respectively.  
Thus, the PKB and PAN could draw some measure of support and identification from the 
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members of the organizations as well as take advantage of the popularity of leaders 
Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid and Amien Rais. 
 These five parties, with a handful of smaller parties from the 1999 and 2004 elections, 
shaped nearly all inter-party competition at the national and local levels and determined all 
government formation and legislative coalitions after 1999.  According to the Constitution, 
the military and representatives of the authoritarian era functional groups, who represented 
distinct demographic minority and regional interests, continued to participate in the 
legislature during the 1999-2004 period, holding 250 of the 700 seats of the joint legislative 
body.  Independent candidates were allowed for district executive elections beginning in 
2006 but with such high entry barriers that few ever ran, let alone won, elections while 
regional non-party representatives were elected to the upper chamber of the legislature 
beginning in 2004.  However, from 2004 the system had undergone enough reform and 
constitutional amendment processes that parties and their representatives controlled the lower 
house, alongside a directly-elected  president and vice president nominated exclusively by 
parties.  The following is a brief description of the major parties in Indonesia and their 
ideologies, constituencies and strategies from 1999 to present, except for pre-1999 history for 
those parties allowed to participate in the New Order system and parties whose leadership 
related to mass organizations which existed prior to and during the New Order. 
 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan or PDI-P (Indonesian Democracy Party of 
Struggle) 
The PDI-P essentially took over the legacy of secular nationalism started by Sukarno and the 
Indonesian Nationalist Party, becoming the Indonesian Democracy Party under New Order 
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and the Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle during the fall of Suharto.  The PDI-P’s 
platform is avowedly secular nationalist, largely protectionist in terms of economic 
development, and the self-referenced party of grassroots activism.  Many high-profile PDI-P 
members were once political and social activists, though the highest echelons of the party 
leadership are undoubtedly Megawati loyalists.  In the three party congresses held since the 
beginning of democratic rule there have never been any real challenges to Megawati’s hold 
on power and the party central board is packed with members loyal to her, rather than based 
on party support or merit. 
The PDI-P has maintained, since 1999, a largely non-reformist ideology with respect 
to the shape and function of the institutional structure of Indonesian democracy.  A surprising 
ally of the Armed Forces leadership, Megawati came to power and governed during her time 
as president primarily with the support of the PDI-P and TNI factions.  Many other parties 
and religious organizations objected to a female president, let alone the daughter of Sukarno 
assuming his role as the head of state, and her presidency relied very heavily on TNI support 
of her policies.  The PDI-P resisted many potential changes introduced during the process of 
constitutional amendment and was the staunchest objector to the introduction of a directly-
elected executive, due partly to fears that Megawati could never win a popular contest 
because of her family’s legacy and the fact that she is a woman and partly to concerns that 
such a popularity contest under pluralism would lead to fragmentation and conflict in the 
party system without regard for balanced representation of minority interests (see King 2005 
or Subekti 2008 for discussion of PDI-P objections).  The PDI-P eventually agreed to the 
various reforms when Megawati believed she could win such a contest. 
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In addition, the PDI-P had always expressed preference for anti-discrimination laws 
that provided for universal protections and privileged no one or group over any others, which 
is a legacy of the nation-building days as the PNI under Sukarno.  As a result, Chinese, 
Christians and Hindus often make up a good deal of the PDI-P’s voting base, though 
Muslims are a clear majority, while territorially-defined ethnic minorities often do not.  
Furthermore, despite many high-profile female leaders, PDI-P resisted the adoption of a 
gender quota on the grounds that female affirmative action policies were unnecessary and 
defied the universality of their typical policy pursuits.  In terms of candidates and electoral 
strategy, the PDI-P is one of the few parties to really maintain a fairly strict set of selection 
criteria, which preferences education (at least university) and work and activism experience, 
and their candidates typically toe the party line and put the party first with respect to 
individual campaigning and representation in meetings with constituents. 
 
Partai Golongan Karya or Golkar (Party of Functional Groups) 
Golkar, during and after the New Order, maintained a clearly secular nationalist platform 
aimed at economic development but with limited redistribution policies in place.  For thirty 
years party leaders had accumulated wealth and power and, despite a clear and dominant 
presence in the more ethnically and religiously diverse provinces of eastern Indonesia, the 
party seemed uninterested in advancing the cause of the impoverished or oppressed 
minorities unless there was some political or economic advantage to doing so.  Under 
Suharto Golkar co-opted local strongmen, the most popular local figures, and leaders of 
religious and social organizations; in the post-transition era the party continued with a similar 
mentality by focusing its efforts on the creation of new sub-national entities it could best 
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control given the new democratic playing field.  However, Golkar had also been the party of 
the technocratic and bureaucratic elite under the New Order, and thus some of Indonesia’s 
most efficient and effective administrators were open-minded about potential reform and still 
members of the Golkar elite. 
Despite the tarnished legacy of Suharto, Golkar leadership resisted change in the post-
transition era for two primary reasons: first, none of the party’s leadership really wanted to 
part with the political and economic spoils they had enjoyed under the New Order; and 
second, they had retained many of the national legislative seats even though their main rival, 
the PDI-P, had won more in 1999.  What emerged was a Golkar party invested in reforms it 
believed would provide benefits to the party in terms of seats and control over local 
resources.  Thus, assuming it would help them return to electoral dominance Golkar 
advocated complete overhaul of the electoral system; pursing a similar strategy in other 
economic and political reforms. 
 The election of Jusuf Kalla to the Golkar chairmanship in late 2004 proved a bit of a 
turning point for the party.  Prior to his selection in 2004 as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 
vice presidential running mate, Kalla had been a self-made millionaire businessman and one 
of the wealthiest men in Indonesia, but seemingly through business acumen rather than 
simple favor from Suharto.  A minor figure in Golkar, his election as vice president made 
him an instant star in the party and he was selected to the chairmanship ahead of much more 
traditional Golkar accolytes, including former generals Wiranto and Prabowo who then left 
the party (see below on the creation of Hanura and Gerindra).  In the years under Kalla, the 
party attracted younger elites who were trained scholars and experts in many areas of reform 
who, coupled with the older generation of technocrats, pushed for more coherent policies 
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towards political and economic reform.  The post-Kalla era has seen some measure of 
retrenchment away from reform and an unwillingness to take a backseat to other parties, such 
as PDI-P and Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party or PD). 
 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP (United Development Party) 
Perhaps the least cohesive of the New Order parties, the PPP was continually hampered by 
Suharto’s attempts to undermine the unity of the different Muslim organizations by pitting 
organization leaders against each other and co-opting them when needed.  The final pre-
democratic election actually showed good returns for the PPP because Megawati openly 
worked to sabotage the success of the Suharto-controlled PDI.  However, the 1999 elections 
proved just how ineffective and poorly supported the PPP was after the removal of the 
artificial aggregation of Muslim interests led to the creation of a number of new parties 
representing individual organizations or specialized groups.  The PPP vote and seat-share 
declined with each successive election, with PKS claiming to have won away the lion’s share 
of the eroding PPP base. 
 As an Islamist party, the PPP is moderate regarding various aspects of Sharia law and 
female participation in political life but continues to pursue a fairly conservative view of 
political, social and economic reform.  It has supported anti-pornography laws and the 
districts where it is strongest are ones where there has been adoption or attempts to adopt 
some Sharia regulations regarding dress codes, gambling bans and similar rules.  In general, 
PPP is not extremely reformist and maintains a view of Indonesia as a unitary country with 
national goals, tending to prefer limited decentralization and restructuring of the state.  In 
terms of electoral issues, PPP is most concerned with consistency across the levels of 
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government, pushing to harmonize rules and regulations such that the same format and 
mechanisms apply in the same way at the national level as at the sub-national level. 
 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB (National Awakening Party) 
Controversy surrounded the decision of Wahid and the governing body of NU to found a 
political party based on or closely tied to NU.  The NU organization had gone through many 
discussions about its relative role in politics for decades, trying to achieve a delicate balance 
between serving its members’ needs and serving as a social and ethical compass providing 
moral restraint to the government (for a comprehensive review of the internal debate about 
NU’s role in political versus social life, see Bush 2009).  Many high-profile NU members 
had been members and candidates of Golkar and PPP before Wahid officially withdrew NU 
from PPP and many of those elites remained as Golkar candidates or became PPP candidates 
once more. 
 Furthermore, Wahid proved as controversial a figure in politics as in his role as NU 
chair.  A believer in religious pluralism and tolerance, Wahid was seen by many in NU who 
wished to pursue an Islamic-oriented state ideology as a political leader who would pursue 
some or total freedom of religion.  Splinter groups of smaller, avowedly Islamist NU groups 
emerged as new parties to challenge the direct link or mandate from NU to PKB.  In practice, 
PKB remained more true to Wahid’s vision of an Indonesia based on religious pluralism.  
Wahid’s ascendency to the presidency in 1999 represented PKB’s electoral strength, the 
strength of NU members and of the organization in politics, and the compromise that Wahid 
represented between reformasi, the continuing strength of Golkar and the broader antipathy 
towards Megawati and the PDI-P. 
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 In electoral terms, either due to limited capacity or the desire to maintain the 
vagueness of NU’s direct involvement in politics, PKB never fully capitalized on NU 
membership as a voting base.  NU membership, estimated somewhere in the 40-60 million 
member range, vastly exceeded the best electoral showing of PKB when, in 1999, the party 
won 51 national legislative seats and 13% of the vote.  Under Wahid, PKB’s attitude towards 
reform focused in more detail on social life and the protection of religious freedoms and 
minority groups than it did on political or economic reforms.  Unafraid to pursue reform but 
infrequently put in the position to advocate for or against it, PKB’s ideological stance has 
remained vague throughout most of the post-transition era and its relatively small size since 
the 1999-2004 period have kept it from positions of legislative or executive power that might 
require it to explicitly categorize itself as reformist. 
 
Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN (National Mandate Party) 
Unlike Wahid, Amien Rais had less difficulty convincing Muhammadiyah members to join 
him in founding and supporting the PAN.  A young and charismatic superstar of the 
modernist school of Islam, Rais returned from time studying abroad to leapfrog much more 
senior and powerful members of Muhammadiyah when he became the organization’s chair in 
1995.  An outspoken opponent of Suharto, the founder of PAN was very much devoted to 
democratic governance and meritocratic reward.  He was disappointed to realize that 
Indonesian voters did not sufficiently recognize his potential.  PAN never achieved the level 
of success he originally thought it would, mustering between 6-8% of the vote in each 
election since 1999 despite an estimated 20-30 million Muhammadiyah members.  Despite 
being a somewhat controversial figure outside his organization and party, within PAN Rais 
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continues to have final authority over most important decisions and policies advocated by 
PAN even though others have gone on to succeed him as its chair. 
 Of all the parties in the post-transition era, PAN remains one of the most reformist in 
terms of ideological positioning and desire to correct inefficiencies in the political system.  
Surpassed only by Golkar in terms of its attempts to overhaul the electoral system to its 
advantage, PAN tends to offer many ideological and prescriptive or corrective assessments to 
justify its pursuit of reforms.  Never a party to suggest that the status quo is a better 
alternative simply because it is already the one in place, PAN has pursued a number of 
changes, both major and minor, to the political structure and economic policies from 1999 to 
2009.  The party has also turned that same introspection inward, attempting (unsuccessfully) 
to reform its own candidate nomination processes prior to the 2009 elections. 
 While PAN aligns itself with a mass Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, that is 
more socially conservative than the NU, it does not pursue an Islamist state based on Sharia 
law.  However, though many PAN members hold more conservative ideological views with 
respect to religious tolerance, Rais and his closest supporters advocated a pluralistic party 
and allowed some Chinese and non-Muslim PAN candidates and legislators during his 
chairmanship. 
 
New Competitors in 2004: the PKS and the PD 
Two ‘new’ parties altered the landscape following the 2004 elections.  The Justice 
Party (Partai Keadilan or PK) had participated in the 1999 elections, winning 1.2% of the 
vote-share and seven national legislative seats but failing to meet the entry threshold for the 
2004 elections.  Repackaging and rebranding itself as the clean, anti-corruption Islamist 
103 
 
Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS), the party claimed 7% of the 
national legislative seats, polling extremely well in urban areas and with younger voters.  In 
addition, PKS’ Hidayat Nur Wahid was the country’s highest single vote-winner and became 
the chairman of the legislature, giving the PKS a position of power not normally obtained by 
a medium-sized party.  The PKS maintained its anti-corruption stance but grew more socially 
conservative in the 2004-2009 period, polling the same 7-8% in the 2009 elections despite 
expectations of another monumental growth spurt.  The PKS suffers from internal 
fragmentation, with the biggest and most salient division coming between the faction of more 
focused Islamists and the faction of more strategic politicians who fear that a conservative 
platform will erode its electoral success. 
The second new party in the 2004 elections was the Democratic Party (Partai 
Demokrat or PD), the vehicle of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY, for short) presidential 
aspirations.  PD won 6% of the vote-share in 2004 and, due to a clause in the election law 
that allowed any party gaining at least 5% to put forth a presidential-vice presidential ticket 
for the election, SBY and his running mate, Jusuf Kalla, claimed the presidency in the second 
round of voting, defeating the ticket of Megawati (PDI-P) and Hamzah Haz (PPP).  The PD 
consolidated itself behind the immense popularity of SBY and made striking gains in 2009, 
pulling in 25% of the votes and seats in the national legislature, with fairly universal support 
from across the archipelago.  The PD is a party of means, with the resources and personnel to 
support future growth, and many of its candidates and party central board are highly 
educated.  PD is also one of the earliest parties to hire political analysts and consultants, and 
make regular use of public opinion polling.  However, much of PD’s identity is tied up in 
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SBY and observers have often wondered what the party’s electoral fate will be once SBY can 
no longer be Indonesia’s president after 2014. 
 
New Competitors in 2009: Hanura and Gerindra return former generals to politics 
Started in 2006 after a losing bid to become the Golkar Party Chairman, Partai Hati 
Nurani Rakyat or Hanura (People’s Conscience Party) was founded by former TNI 
Commander General Wiranto.  Wiranto had been one of Suharto’s closest followers until the 
withdrawal of his support proved one of the final nails in the coffin of the New Order regime. 
In the post-transition era Wiranto was one of Golkar’s most visible leaders, serving as the 
party’s presidential candidate in 2004.  The 2004 election loss, coupled with Kalla’s 
ascendance to the Golkar chairmanship, finally toppled Wiranto from the Golkar hierarchy.  
Rather than take second place he opted to form his own party.  Hanura has become a party 
with highly organized and professional candidates and legislators and, despite the 
introduction of the electoral threshold and to the amazement of political observers, won 3% 
of the votes in the 2009 elections to obtain 18 national legislative seats and a good deal of 
sub-national representation.  Ironically, since he had left the Golkar Party to form Hanura 
because he lost the chairmanship and eventual presidential ticket nomination to Kalla, 
Wiranto stood as Kalla’s running mate in the 2009 presidential election, with the pair 
winning 11% of the vote and coming in third in the only round of voting. 
Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya or Gerindra (Greater Indonesia Movement Party) was 
started in 2008 as a personal vehicle for the advancement of millionaire Prabowo Subianto, 
husband of Suharto’s eldest daughter and another former TNI general with a controversial 
history as the perpetrator of widespread human rights abuses during crackdowns on street 
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protests in 1998.  Gerindra has made poverty alleviation one of its primary platforms, making 
it a natural complement to PDI-P in terms of ideology.  However, the dubious distinction of 
its founder as a man with allegedly ill-gotten wealth and a record of human rights abuses that 
were never prosecuted or punished limited the party’s ability to attract voters or supporters to 
its cause.  The party claimed 4% of the votes in the 2009 elections to obtain 23 national 
legislative seats and a good number of sub-national seats.  Prabowo eventually teamed with 
Megawati to run as vice president on her presidential ticket, likely costing her the votes of 
many party loyalists who viewed Prabowo as a perpetrator of New Order repression and 
violence; the pair won 25% of the vote and came in second out of three tickets in the only 
round of voting. 
 
Minor Parties since Democratization 
Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB (Crescent Star Party), Partai NU or PNU (Nahdlatul Ulama 
Party), Partai Damai Sejahtera or PDS (Prosperous Peace Party), Partai Persatuan 
Demokrasi Kebangsaan or PPDK (National Democratic Unity Party), and Partai Bintang 
Reformasi or PBR (Reformed Star Party) are all smaller parties that have sat in at least one 
national legislature since 1999.  All failed to meet the parliamentary threshold in 2009 but 
continue to have some representation at the sub-national level.  One is Islamist, the PBB, 
with bases of support in Sumatra, West Java and South Sulawesi and with close ties to a third 
mass Islamic organization, Persatuan Islam or Persis (Islamic Association).  One is a now-
defunct NU-related party, the PNU, which formed in order to pursue a more Islamist agenda 
when it became clear that Wahid’s PKB would not.  One is a Christian/Catholic party, the 
PDS, with a base in Jakarta, the North Sumatra capital of Medan, and East Nusa Tenggara.  
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One is secular nationalist, the PPDK, formed by two U.S.-trained Ph.D. political scientists, 
Andi Mallarangeng and Ryaas Rasyid, in response to a lack of perceived reform and 
governance ability in the major existing parties.  Finally, the PBR is a primarily Islamist 
party based in South Sumatra but whose leadership has espoused a blend of Islamist and 
pluralist ideologies.  Of these parties, the PPDK had the most direct impact on electoral 
design and reform as Mallarangeng and Rasyid were both former members of the team of 
technocrats appointed by Habibie to revise the election and decentralization laws in 1998.  
Rasyid had also been a former Electoral Commissioner, with a great deal of experience and 
expertise on electoral systems and election conduct, and became a vocal member of the 
2004-2009 DPR Commission dealing with revisions to the electoral and political party laws. 
 
The Indonesian Party System by the Numbers: 1999-2009 
Between 1999 and 2009 the party system exhibited limited institutionalization in terms of 
support and strengthening of the oldest political parties.  New party entry has been difficult 
but not impossible and the aggregate portion of the votes and seats going to the three New 
Order era parties declined steadily.  Though not necessarily the most relevant indicator, the 
relative balance between New Order era parties and the new(er) parties in the system might 
indicate some measure of party system institutionalization.  The combined vote share for 
Golkar, PDI-P and PPP was 66.87% in 1999, 48.25% in 2004 and 33.78% in 2009; their 
combined seat share was 71.65% in 1999, 53.64% in 2004 and 42.5% in 2009.  In contrast, 
the two new parties in 2004 won more than 15% of the votes and 18% of the seats; the two 
new parties in 2009 won an additional 9% of the vote and 8% of the seats on top of previous 
newcomers. 
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A second dimension on which party system institutionalization might be measured is 
how well parties can be classified or identified along a typical left-right continuum, with 
easily identifiable parties aiding in system institutionalization.  In Indonesia, the classic left-
right divide is rarely used by scholars or political elites and almost never applies to the 
ideologies followed or espoused by any major parties.  Instead, the Indonesian system 
displays a continuum better referred to as secular-nationalist versus religious-oriented, where 
the ideological divide occurs over the nature of the religion-state relationship.  Figure 3.1 
shows this ideological continuum and party placement on it. 
Figure 3.1 The Party System: The Secular Nationalist-Religious Islamist Continuum 
 
 
Since 1999 the balance between the secular nationalist parties and the religious-
oriented (Islamist/Islamic18) parties trended toward secular nationalist domination.  The 
combined vote-share for the religious-oriented parties (PPP, PKB, PAN, PBB, PK/PKS, 
PNU, and PBR) was 34.35% in 1999, 37.54% in 2004 and 27.2% in 2009; their combined 
seat-share was 36.36% in 1999, 42% in 2004 and 30.18% in 2009.  The increase in 2004 can 
                                                 
18
 Though it is a religious party, the PDS is composed of mostly Christians and Catholics and does not pursue a 
combination of religious doctrine with state institutions or the legal system.  Therefore, even though their 
membership, candidates and representatives are almost exclusively affiliated with some Christian faith, they 
have similar goals to secular nationalist parties with respect to state form and function. 
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be directly attributed to the rise of the PKS, which campaigned on an anti-corruption, clean 
government platform that overshadowed the Islamist ideology espoused by the party that 
became much more overt in 2008 with their pursuit of the anti-pornography law. 
Analysis of the party system shows: 1) the decline in the total number of legislative 
parties from 21 in 1999 to 16 in 2004 and 9 in 2009; 2) the increase in the number of 
effective parties in the legislature19 from 4.72 in 1999 to 7.07 in 2004 but subsequent 
decrease to 6.21 in 2009; 3) the decrease in the percentage of “wasted” votes from 9.69% in 
1999 to 4.81% in 2004 but subsequent increase to 18.31% in 2009; and 4) a slight increase in 
electoral volatility from 21.97 between 1999 and 2004 to 23.72 between 2004 and 2009.  
Combined with the two previous dimensions of party system institutionalization, the 
quantitative measures suggest a somewhat divergent trajectory of party system development.  
Between 1999 and 2004 the system appeared to exhibit transitional flux as new parties 
entered the system, old parties consolidated their voting bases and all competitors learned the 
roles of democratic electoral politics.  Then between 2004 and 2009 the system appeared to 
consolidate as parties settled into ideological positions and roles and competition remained 
open but more constrained under the new rules. 
While voters in 2009 faced many of the same parties as in 2004, pre-election 
evaluation of the parties suggested that, outside of the PDI-P and PKS, few other parties 
relied much on ideological or platform-based appeals and from 1999-2009 many voters 
appeared to have preferences for party leaders over parties, demonstrating declining party 
identification (Liddle & Mujani 2007; Mujani & Liddle 2010).  In general, vote volatility 
from 1999 to 2009 suggests that few parties have made inroads to develop constituency-
                                                 
19
 Lakso and Taagepera’s Effective Number of Parties index is commonly used to approximate party system 
fragmentation, and can be calculated for votes and seats.  The number here is calculated by seats. 
109 
 
based platforms or close ties to constituent groups and the system as a whole is not 
particularly well institutionalized with strong personalities dominating much of the post-
transition landscape (Tan 2006).  However, the large and medium parties do have relatively 
stable core constituencies, and programmatic parties tend to have specific voting bases as 
well (Ufen 2008). 
Figure 3.2 Percentage of National Legislative Votes by Party 
 
Source: National Election Commission archives 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the change over time in voteshare of relevant20 parties.  Perhaps 
most striking is the decline in each of the New Order parties and the PKB, increases in 2004 
for PKS and 2004 and 2009 for PD, and the increase in the residual “other” category 
                                                 
20
 “Relevant” here refers specifically to parties who obtained more than one or two legislative seats. 
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encompassing between 12-30 parties in each election.  In addition, in 1999 the largest party 
was nearly 30% larger than the second largest party, with the third and fourth largest parties 
half the size of the second.  By 2004 the two largest parties were almost at parity but there 
were five mid-sized parties half their sizes; by 2009 the largest party was again nearly 30% 
larger than the second and third largest parties which were roughly the same size.   
Figure 3.3 Percentage of National Legislative Seats by Party 
 
Source: National Election Commission archives 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the change over time in the seatshare of the relevant parties.  
Due to changes in the electoral rules and district magnitudes, the seatshare shows greater 
concentration in the large and medium-sized parties from 1999 to 2009.  The distribution of 
seats is more concentrated in 1999, when five parties obtained most of the seats and the two 
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largest shared almost 60%, than in 2004, when seven parties obtained most of the seats but 
with a clear concentration in the two largest.  In 2009 the three largest parties obtained the 
majority of the seats (more than 60%) similar to the 1999 outcome.  The concentration of the 
seatshare held by the two or three largest parties, as well as the relative balance among them, 
indicates the lack of single-party control over agenda setting and legislative control. 
 
Conclusion 
 In the view of most observers of the Indonesian case, far more is often made of 
democratic progress than the lack of party system institutionalization or development of 
closer elite-society linkages.  While Indonesia boasts a healthy and vibrant civil society, and 
a remarkably moderate and tolerant yet deeply religious society to boot, fears of religious 
intolerance and eroding secular protection of democracy plague Indonesia in its second 
decade of democracy.  The strength and dominance of the secular-nationalist parties have 
kept religious populism from dominating the political landscape, despite tendencies to 
support or at least avoid punishing religious intolerance and advocates of policies designed to 
forcibly introduce traditional or religious norms with legal force.  Individualism and 
candidate-centricity has had a twin effect: erosion of the limited ideology- or platform-based 
party development so many scholars value for the entrenchment and consolidation of 
democratic rule combined with an ever-growing sense of ownership by everyday voters over 
the political arena long dominated by elites. 
While party system institutionalization can herald the advent of democratic 
consolidation in many contexts, I argue that, similar to many experiences in Eastern Europe 
(Toka 1997; Vachudova 2005), the absence of strongly institutionalized parties competing 
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with easily predicted outcomes and low electoral volatility need not signal a lack of 
democratic consolidation.  In contrast, vibrant competition incorporating a wide plurality of 
views, some of which might appear undemocratic in ideology or policy advocacy, can in fact 
provide stability for a newly democratic state if all participants agree to adhere to the rules of 
the game and abide by the outcome of elections.  I focus on a key reason for the evolving 
dynamic of Indonesian party politics and democracy: the evolution of the electoral rules of 
the game allowed the system to accommodate diversity and change without obviously 
sacrificing institutional quality. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4: The 1999-2004 Period 
In this chapter I explore the effect of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations on the 
national electoral reforms adopted in Indonesia during the 1999-2004 legislative session.  I 
evaluate each of the major parties’ positions on three elements of reform – an electoral 
threshold, the size of electoral district magnitude, and the type of list proportional 
representation system in use – in order to assess the importance of seat-maximizing and 
alternative motivations in understanding the specific reforms that were adopted.  In order to 
do so, I situate the reform process within the broader post-transition political environment 
and compare party preferences to the proposal by the government and the professed interests 
of civil society.  After assessing how individual party positions affected the exact 
composition of reforms that were adopted I proceed to analyze the impact those reforms had 
on the 2004 election outcomes, assessing whether party expectations were met and setting the 
stage for the ensuring reform process that occurred in the 2004-2009 legislative session. 
Based on seat maximizing hypotheses, in 1999 many initial factors in the Indonesian 
case did not indicate that reform would be inevitable.  There was high uncertainty about 
future election outcomes while the opposition had just won the largest proportion of seats 
under the openly competitive rules established for the 1999 elections, suggesting that the 
opposition should have little incentive to drastically alter a system that had just propelled 
them into power and was already quite proportional.  In general, the opposition was relatively 
interested in maintaining the status quo for both seat-maximizing and ideological reasons 
which will be discussed later in the chapter.  In addition, the army, which had been extremely 
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strong under the New Order and valued the status quo that kept them in the vicinity, if not 
outright possession, of power and decision-making, had no desire to overhaul the system 
since revision might mean a reduction in their presence. 
More importantly, based on the 1999 election outcomes and the large number of 
parties competing in (forty-eight) and gaining seats from (twenty-one) the elections, it is not 
obvious what seat-maximizing logic would predict in terms of what reforms would be 
undertaken, if any.  The system in place in 1999 was already a largely list-based proportional 
one, with moderately large districts based on provincial boundaries and closed nominations.  
Seat-maximizing logic would predict that high and rising uncertainty would lead to greater 
proportionality but the system already boasted a fairly high degree of proportionality such 
that additional proportional elements would be a) difficult to add, and b) viewed as largely 
unnecessary for competitors to hedge their bets for future elections. 
However, the surprisingly lopsided loss by the ruling party meant that at least one 
powerful group had some incentive to alter the existing electoral system.  In addition, the 
academic community and other civil society actors who unsuccessfully pushed for greater 
reform prior to the 1999 elections were very interested in an agenda that included electoral 
reform.  In addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, reforms came in many areas in the 
early democratic period.  Outside the realm of legislative election reform, the process of 
amending the constitution created a directly-elected executive and an upper chamber of the 
legislature based on the principle of regional representation.  Other electoral reforms 
included the elimination of reserved legislative seats for the military and functional 
representative groups, direct election of district heads for provincial and municipal 
governments, and increasing political and fiscal decentralization to said provincial and 
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municipal governments.  In short, reforms were occurring across most elements of electoral 
politics in post-New Order Indonesia, and the vast majority of the reforms were intended to 
strengthen vertical and horizontal accountability to some degree.  The legislative election 
reforms followed a similar path of attempting to 1) increase democratic accountability, and 2) 
increase ease of voting, counting and seat allocation mechanisms.  The final reform package 
adopted would not likely have been predicted prior to or at the beginning of the process. 
In Chapter 2 I introduced a set of hypotheses predicting the determinants of electoral 
reform.  In particular, I focused on the contrast between seat-maximizing expectations 
(hypothesis 1) and alternative motivations (hypothesis 2), the specific expectations that 
medium-sized parties would be a more important indicator of less inclusive and candidate-
centric reform adoptions (hypotheses 3a & 3b) and that as medium-sized parties increasingly 
benefited from distortion in translation of votes into seats they would push for less inclusive 
reforms to cement those gains (hypothesis 4). I hypothesized that reformers in new 
democracies would be likely to pursue more consensual reform processes that appeared less 
interested in seat maximization, but that this effect would fade in later periods of reform 
(hypothesis 5).  Finally, I expected that ratchet effects will increase the likelihood that once 
less inclusive and candidate-centric reforms are adopted they will be retained or reinforced in 
later iterated periods (hypotheses 6a & 6b) but subject to some level of constraint. 
I also hypothesized about the effects of reform on party system outcomes.  I expected 
that more inclusive and candidate-centric reforms would increase party system fragmentation 
(hypotheses 7a & 7b), less inclusive reforms would produce increased disproportionality in 
translating votes into seats (hypothesis 8), and that both interparty and intraparty reforms 
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would produce a general increase in the amount of electoral volatility in the party system 
(hypothesis 9).  I will investigate these expectations in the 1999-2004 period. 
This chapter traces the process of reform during the 1999 to 2004 legislative session 
that produced the 2003 General Election Law, probing the motivations of key actors and 
choices they made in order to test explanations of the theoretical framework given in Chapter 
2.  First, I introduce the context of reform in the post-transition period, based on the party 
power distribution resulting from the 1999 elections and accounting for the simultaneous 
constitutional amendment process.  Next I address the process of reform itself, focusing on 
the sequence of actor participation, the timing of reform negotiations and adoption relative to 
other political reform processes and the upcoming 2004 election schedule, and explain 
changes from the previous election structure in the proposed draft law and party positions 
about the proposed changes.  I then tackle each of the reform components – electoral 
threshold, district magnitude, and list structure – to assess party-level positions, strategic and 
seat-maximizing incentives as well as alternative arguments for or against certain reform 
options.  I evaluate how the negotiation process affected the eventual decisions of individual 
parties and the legislative committees tasked with producing the General Election Law, 
finishing with a comparison of each element in the proposed draft law to the rules actually 
adopted in the final election law passed by the DPR.  Finally I conclude with an evaluation of 
the impact of reforms on the Indonesian party system, assessing whether party expectations 
were met, which parties benefitted and which did not, and previewing possible scenarios for 
the 2004-2009 reform period based on the outcome of the 2004 elections. 
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Transitional Context of the Reform Period 
In 1998, after Suharto had turned power over to his vice president, Habibie gathered a team 
of social scientists to aid the Ministry of Home Affairs in reviewing and, if necessary, 
revising various political laws, including laws on the governance of elections and political 
and fiscal decentralization.  First on the list was to prepare three laws that would lay out the 
rules for the early general elections in 1999: Law Number 2 (UU2/1999) on political parties, 
Law Number 3 (UU3/1999) on the general elections, and Law Number 4 (UU4/1999) on the 
composition and status of the national and local legislatures.  The political parties law needed 
revision in order to relax the tight controls on party formation, registration and participation 
that prohibited any but the three national parties – Golkar, PDI-P and PPP – from competing 
during the New Order.  The general election law needed revision in order to set forth the 
districting and rules for elections to the national legislature, the People’s Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR), and local legislatures, the Regional People’s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD1, at the provincial 
level, and DPRD2, at the district/municipal level).  The general election law also set forth 
rules and processes for the selection of Election Commissioners who would implement and 
oversee all election conduct.  The composition and status law required the least revision, 
except where it touched upon issues related to the previous two laws.  Later revisions tended 
to treat these three laws, along with the separate laws governing executive election and 
election organization, as a package of laws requiring synchronization. 
The team, officially known as the Team to Revise Draft of Laws on Politics of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs (Tim Revisi Undang-Undang Politik di Menteri Dalam Negeri) but 
nicknamed for the number of its members as the Team of 7 (Tim Tujuh), included four 
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scholars who had earned Ph.D. degrees in the United States – Andi Mallarangeng and 
Ramlan Surbakti from Northern Illinois University, Afan Gaffar from Ohio State University 
and Ryaas Rasyid from the University of Hawaii.  The others were Djohermansyah Djohan, 
Luthfi Mutty, and Anas Urbaningrum.  The input from these team members introduced and 
debated electoral system components previously unheard of in Indonesia, such as single-
member districts and a mixed electoral system.  However, by the time the draft law made its 
way out of the Ministry to the legislature, and was subsequently passed by a legislature still 
controlled by Golkar (which held more than 70% of the seats), the electoral system was 
nearly identical to that of previous New Order era elections with the exception that interparty 
competition was now much more open and inclusive. 
The primary difference in the 1999 election, compared with previous ones under the 
New Order, was that parties of basically any persuasion could register and compete in the 
elections; prior to 1998 only three parties were able to compete and were subject to stringent 
controls and intervention by the government.  Now parties could create nearly any platform 
to submit, with nearly any name, symbol and list of nominees, none subject to government 
“approval” other than to abide by the rules and regulations that applied to all parties.  The 
major holdover from the previous law governing political parties was the regional stipulation: 
parties could only form and compete if they possessed a nation-wide presence in terms of 
offices, headquarters and registration of nomination lists.  This constraint, in practice, took 
the form of a registration barrier under which parties were required to register in at minimum 
½ of the provinces, demonstrating that they had an office/headquarters in at least ½ of the 
municipalities in those provinces.  Failure to comply would eliminate a party from 
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competition and the stipulation was retained primarily to discourage regional parties from 
forming in provinces with separatist elements, such as Aceh and Papua. 
Otherwise the system in 1999 largely resembled the basic system under the New 
Order: closed-list proportional representation with provincial boundaries as the electoral 
districts for calculating vote-seat allocation formulae.  Differences were minor, in part 
because the Ministry Team’s suggestions in the draft law were largely overruled by the 
interests of the ruling Golkar Party and military representatives who wanted to retain the 
existing system as much as possible.  The structure of ballots, therefore, contained only party 
names and symbols and voters simply chose a party from the ballot; once seats were 
allocated to parties on the basis of sub-provincial divisions, names were taken in order from 
the party nomination lists that were submitted prior to the election.  Thus voters had no 
control over individual candidates, only over which parties received seat allocations in their 
province.  An additional element, a past election vote threshold set by the Ministry’s team at 
10% of the 1999-2004 DPR seats in order to contest the 2004 general elections, was 
drastically reduced to 2% in the final law. 
On June 7, 1999 Indonesians went to the polls in the first election deemed “free and 
fair” by the international community and election observers stationed throughout the country.  
In all 28 of the country’s provinces the open competition produced multiple party seat-
winners, and fears about election-related violence proved largely alarmist.  Relative to 
elections in India or the Philippines, long held up as the regional democracy examples, 
almost no violence emerged prior or in response to the June elections.  However, concerns 
were raised about the allocation process used to determine remainder seats and the political 
horse-trading between parties over remainder seats across provincial lines.  There was 
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agreement in the international donor community that such practices, which amounted to 
remainder vote-pooling by parties to try and win seats that were known as Stembus Accords, 
should be eliminated in the revision of the election law for the future with an eye toward 
transparency in the allocation process. 
As expected by outside observers, the PDI-P won the plurality of votes with Golkar 
coming in second and a range of votes spread over three other parties, the New Order PPP, 
Wahid’s PKB and Rais’ PAN.  In total, 21 parties won at least one seat, though only six won 
substantial enough seat-shares to boast a relatively large fraksi, or legislative caucus.  In the 
1999-2004 legislative session there were five single-party fraksi (PDI-P, Golkar, PPP, PKB 
and PBB) and four multi-party fraksi (the largest included the PAN) composed of two to five 
parties each.  Table 4.1 shows the seat-shares of the largest parties in the People’s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR).  In addition to the 462 seats 
held by the 21 competitive parties, 60 were reserved for representatives of ABRI (the 
Indonesian military) and PRI (the National Police). 
Table 4.1  1999-2004 Party Seat-shares 
Party Seat % (Number) 
PDI-P 33.12%  (153) 
Golkar 25.97%  (120) 
PKB 11.04%   (51) 
PPP 12.55%   (58) 
PAN 7.36%     (34) 
PBB 2.81%     (13) 
PK 1.52%      (7) 
Others 5.63%     (26) 
 
The loss to the PDI-P, in particular the magnitude of the loss, surprised some in 
Golkar’s leadership who believed that the transitional conflict had largely been due to 
perceptions about Suharto’s corruption and mismanagement, not broader disillusionment 
with the party.  Habibie, still in control of Golkar, began maneuvering for the presidency 
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despite the fact that many parties, such as the PAN, were not interested in supporting a 
Golkar led-government to head the process of reformasi for fear that little reform would 
actually occur.   
Despite holding a plurality of the seats in the DPR, the PDI-P did not end up holding 
the advantage in nominating a president-vice president combination to the executive.  Still 
operating under a de facto pseudo-parliamentary system, the president and vice president, 
who automatically assumed the presidency for the remainder of the fixed 5-year term if the 
president died or was forced to step down, were selected from among the representatives.  
Given the lack of a majority party, a party hoping to secure the presidency would need allies, 
and likely many of them.  For clear reasons, neither the opposition PDI-P’s Megawati nor 
incumbent Golkar’s Habibie would be able to ally with each other, and it was increasingly 
clear that none of the Islamist parties would consider allying with Megawati to allow a 
female presidency.  After a lengthy period of backroom deals and politicking Megawati lost 
in the balloting in the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative 
Assembly) to Wahid and had to accept election as his vice president.  This arrangement 
which lasted until Wahid was forced from the presidency amid scandal in July 2001 and 
Megawati assumed the office with the PPP’s Hamzah Haz, her primary opponent for the vice 
presidency, as her vice president.21 
Following its inauguration, the DPR faced many tasks in 1999, including 
constitutional amendments and decentralization, which were briefly addressed in the 
previous chapter.22 The constitutional amendment process required a special legislative body, 
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 Haz had been one of the most vociferous opponents to a female Indonesian president, challenging Megawati 
for the vice presidency when even the Golkar opponent had dropped out of the race. 
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named the First Ad Hoc Committee or Panitia Ad-Hoc 1 (PAH1), which was led by 
representatives from the PDI-P and Golkar.  The decentralization process required an 
additional legislative commission, one who worked with the PAH1 and also was led 
primarily by PDI-P and Golkar representatives.  Finally, the legislative committee tasked 
with revising the election law drew its membership largely from the PAH1 and 
decentralization commission, as the election law revisions did not really begin in the DPR 
until after the constitutional amendment process ended. 
 
Procedure and Sequencing in the Reform Process 
Despite the lack of a clear seat-maximizing motivation for electoral reform, there 
were numerous actors invested in revision of the system used in 1999.  Chief among the 
proponents of change was Golkar whose leaders now realized that the previous system would 
not benefit them in future elections.  Others advocating for change or revision of the existing 
system included academics and civil society members who worried that the problems 
associated with the 1999 elections, such as the corruption associated with the Stembus 
Accords (trading remainder seats across district lines) and the closed-list system, would 
persist without electoral reform.  International organizations, such as the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems, were consulted or became direct advocates of reform. 
Finally, the political battle over the presidency from 1999 to 2001 also had 
ramifications for allocating government portfolios, although the Minister of Home Affairs 
under Wahid, former ABRI General Surjadi Sudirdja, was replaced by Megawati with 
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 For reasons of space and theoretical focus I do not address these issues here, but the DPR also faced questions 
regarding Timorese independence, the mitigation of civil conflicts in Aceh and Papua and sectarian violence in 
many parts of the country, all of which demanded attention of the national government and legislature from 
1999 to 2004.  For an excellent summary account of the different ethno-nationalist and religious conflicts that 
emerged during the political thaw of the early democratic period see Bertrand (2004).   
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another former ABRI General, Hari Sabarno, in August 2001.23  The core of the team 
preparing the Ministry’s draft election law remained constant, despite the cabinet shuffle in 
mid-2001, and was headed by Siti Nurbaya, a long-time New Order bureaucrat and former 
Golkar youth leader.  Under Nurbaya the team took the approach of consulting numerous 
experts and academics, which directly influenced the components and content of the draft 
law that was eventually submitted to the DPR.24  The advice of the expert consultants, as well 
as the general feeling that the 1999 elections had been transitional and that reform and 
change represented the “only way to move forward,”25 led to the process of revision that 
began, as under the New Order, with a draft from the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
While it seems surprising that Megawati and the PDI-P would allow a former Golkar 
youth leader to head a team tasked with drafting the package of political laws, it was not that 
uncommon an occurrence at the time: under the New Order regime most of the country’s 
most experienced, professional and well-trained technocrats had been in the Golkar fold.26  
Finding an experienced legislator and/or technocrat without Golkar ties at some point would 
have been a rarity.  Within the PDI-P leadership of the DPR even figures such as Jakob 
Tobing, the chairman of the PAH1, were once Golkar members who switched following the 
end of the New Order.  In short, given the lack of well-trained technocrats without a previous 
Golkar affiliation, leadership of the ministry team almost inevitably would have to be 
someone like Nurbaya. 
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 Sabarno would actually go on to replace Yudhoyono as Coordinating Minister of People’s Welfare in March 
2004, by then the Election Law had been passed and election preparations fully transferred to the KPU. 
24
 Interviews with Siti Nurbaya (June 2010), Ramlan Surbakti (March 2010), Cecep Effendi (July 2010), Progo 
and Gunawan Suswantoro (August 2010) and Didik Supriyanto (December 2010). 
 
25
 Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010). 
 
26
 Interviews with Akil Mochtar (May 2010), Jakob Tobing (April 2010), Valina Singka Subekti (April 2010). 
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Under the New Order, the Ministry of Home Affairs had been extraordinarily 
powerful and touched nearly every aspect of political, fiscal and bureaucratic governance.  
The Ministry wrote nearly all political laws, including those governing elections, political 
and fiscal authority, but following the democratic transition needed a new role to define its 
status within the state.27  In the 1999-2004 period assumed it would continue to write draft 
laws, partly due to perceptions within the Ministry that the DPR contained many first-time 
legislators who were relatively inexperienced and poorly-equipped to draft the law 
themselves.28  The revisions to the package of political laws were again headed by a single 
team, each composed of Ministry bureaucrats and technocrats who consulted with Indonesian 
academics such as Valina Singka Subekti and Ramlan Surbakti.29  The Ministry’s team 
focused attention on making a more legally-consistent set of laws that refined elements of the 
existing system, rather than wholesale revision for the purpose of actually changing much 
about the way the rules worked.30  The draft law submitted by the Ministry to the Special 
Committee (Panitia Khusus or Pansus) of the DPR’s Commission 2 diverged from the basic 
framework used for the 1999 elections in a few key ways, summarized in Table 4.2. 
The draft law did not included clear district magnitudes for seat allocations across the 
country, instead referring to electoral districts based on provinces or subdividions of 
provinces based on the population but without a clear allocation mechanism or way to draw 
or distinguish district boundaries, though the draft did specify a 550-seat DPR.  The draft 
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 Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010). 
 
28
 Interviews with Siti Nurbaya (June 2010), Valina Singka Subekti (April 2010) and Ramlan Surbakti (March 
2010).  Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010) indicated perception within the Ministry of limits on 
legislators due to resource constraints, having few support staff or useful documentation to bring to meetings. 
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 Singka and Surbakti both became KPU Commissioners for the 2001-2007 period, and continued to fulfill an 
advisory role with the Ministry during this time; relayed during interviews in March-April 2010. 
 
30
 Interview with Siti Nurbaya (June 2010). 
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also retained the past election vote threshold, raising it to 3% of DPR seats or 4% of the seats 
in half of the DPRD1 or DPRD2, with no addition of a legislative entry threshold.  The 
closed lists were not retained and the wording in the draft law clearly stipulated that plurality 
voting among party lists would determine which candidates received the seats allocated to 
the parties.  The draft law submitted to the DPR represented a wide range of opinions 
regarding different aspects of the electoral system.31  Yet, it was only modestly “cleaner” 
than the version used to conduct the 1999 elections, leaving key issues like district seat 
magnitude and boundaries to the Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU). 
Table 4.2  Proposed Changes in the New Draft Election Law (2001) 
 Threshold District Magnitude List PR 
Previous Election 
Law 
(passed by pre-
democratic MPR in 
March 1999) 
Past election vote 
threshold 2% DPR, 
3% ½ DPRD1 or 
3% ½ DPRD2) 
Provincial boundaries, 
distributed according to 
subdivisions within 
provinces but lists are by 
number of seats 
available province-wide 
Fully closed, list 
order determines 
all seat allocations 
New Draft Election 
Law 
(produced by Ministry 
of Home Affairs in 
June 2001) 
Moderate increase 
(to 3% DPR, 4% ½ 
DPRD1 or 4% ½ 
DPRD2) in past 
election vote 
threshold 
Not specified but 
electoral districts will be 
based on population 
within “provinces and 
subdivisions of 
provinces” with a set 
number of DPR seats at 
550 
Fully open, 
plurality vote 
within party 
district list 
Sources: Draft Election Law and Final Election Law from the Document Archive of the DPR 
 
From the Ministry’s draft law each fraksi prepared an individual reaction to the draft, 
submitting a line-by-line list of changes desired and rationale for their objections.  This 408-
page aggregate set of complaints, the List of Inventory Problems (Daftar Inventarisasi 
Masalah or DIM), provided the Special Committee a starting point for hearings and 
consultations with experts, party leaders, government and Ministry representatives.  Table 
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 Interview with and preparatory documents from Progo and Gunawan Suswantoro (August 2010). 
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4.3 summarizes the positions of major actors on the three elements of reform in the draft law 
(listed in the first row), including the four main single-party fraksi,32 the PAN-led multi-party 
fraksi, smaller parties, and civil society’s positions. 
Between August 27 and September 3 the Special Committee consulted experts, 
academics and civil society organizations, and from August 26 to September 26 held 
discussions with the Ministry regarding various issues raised by the fraksi.  The Special 
Committee met from October to November and a subset of the Special Committee, the 
Working Committee (Panitia Kerja or Panja), met from November to February for further 
debate before the next working draft was submitted to a plenary session of the DPR.  The 
final version was passed and signed into law on March 11, 2003, as Law Number 12 
(UU12/2003).  The entire process took nine months from the draft law submission in July to 
passage in March, although the consultant phase only took one week and both committees 
only met for four months. 
                                                 
 
32
 I do not list fraksi PBB separately from the small/other parties because they hold only 13 DPR seats and thus 
only have a single representative on Commission 2, which is fewer than the PAN-led multi-party fraksi. 
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Electoral Threshold Reform 
By spring 2002 full-scale discussion over the law had begun, and one of the primary 
concerns of many law-makers had been the unwieldy size of the party system.  At 21 parties, 
with ten fraksi and only five single-party fraksi, nearly all representatives of the large and 
medium-sized parties agreed that it was difficult to negotiate anything in the legislature since 
the common custom was to attempt consensus, rather than a 50%-plus-1 attitude, on policy-
making.  In addition, many representatives also questioned the ability of multi-party fraksi to 
resemble true party coalitions since some were clearly cobbled together simply to meet the 
required numbers for a fraksi and dividing up commission and standing body assignments 
among the component members proved quite difficult for some fraksi to manage. 
The draft law from the Ministry of Home Affairs included nearly identical language 
from the 1999 Election Law regarding an electoral threshold (ambang batas): parties which 
contested the previous election were required to receive at least 3% of the vote cast for the 
DPR or 4% of the vote cast for ½ of the DPRD1 or DPRD2 in order to run as the same party 
in the upcoming elections.  Failure to meet this past election vote threshold33 would be 
required to newly register, including a change of name, party symbol/flag and meeting all the 
basic requirements of new party entrants.  This represented a modest change from the 
previous law that had stipulated the same past election vote threshold but with 2% DPR and 
3% ½ DPRD1 or DPRD2 levels.  The draft law did not include any parameters for a 
legislative entry threshold based on a minimum percentage of votes won. 
                                                 
33
 I use the term “past election vote threshold” in place of the term used by Indonesians and consultants in 
Indonesia, who use the term “electoral threshold.”  In this analysis, “past election vote threshold” refers to a 
barrier to electoral registration based on failure to meet a certain percentage of vote-share in the previous 
election, which is different from a “legislative entry threshold” that prevents the allocation of legislative seats to 
parties failing to meet a certain percentage of the vote-share.  The reason for this terminology is to avoid 
confusion since the common political science use of the term “electoral threshold” actually refers to what I call 
a “legislative entry threshold” rather than the “past election vote threshold” used in news dailies, legislative and 
civil society debates in Indonesia. 
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Of the parties seeking some type of strict limitation on party entry into the legislature, 
Golkar was by far the most outspoken, an unsurprising reality given the party’s views on 
limited competition during the New Order.  Golkar advocated for some form of a legislative 
entry threshold above and beyond, and in addition to, the moderate increase in the past 
election vote threshold; the party viewed the fragmented system as directly limiting its seat-
share due to the number of small parties winning seats.  Despite rhetoric regarding party 
system ‘simplification,’ a “sistem partai politik yang sederhana,” an aim of Golkar’s elite 
was clearly a system in which smaller parties were eliminated and would result in a greater 
seat-share for them.  Politics during the New Order had strengthened Golkar’s power in the 
Outer Islands relative to Central (Java) and Western Indonesia.  The party believed that 
elimination of smaller parties, many of which had won seats in the easternmost provinces 
such as Papua and Sulawesi, would result in a direct benefit to them since they would be the 
most likely of the larger parties to regain vote-shares when voters realized they would be 
wasting votes on small parties unlikely to meet a legislative entry threshold.34  However, 
Golkar leadership eventually gave up the idea as too extreme a method of limiting 
competition in the early democratic period, agreeing to raise the past election vote threshold 
for 2004 and postpone discussion of a legislative entry threshold until later.35 
The PDI-P, on the other hand, worried that reducing the number of parties through 
some sort of entry mechanism would be unfair to the spirit of democratic competition.  More 
importantly, such a mechanism would reduce the diversity of interests the party deemed 
necessary to appropriately represent the Indonesian population.36  This perception of PDI-P 
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 Interviews with Jakob Tobing (April 2010), Gunanjar Sudarsa (November 2010). 
 
35
 Interview with Fery Mursyidan Baldan (October 2010). 
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leaders flew directly in the face of party self-interests: the party would almost certainly have 
benefitted from a reduction in the party system size as strategic Catholic and Christian voters 
would undoubtedly have viewed the PDI-P as the most preferable alternative to wasting their 
votes on small parties unable to meet a legislative entry threshold.37  The PDI-P was in favor 
of retaining the past election vote threshold, on the grounds that parties should represent 
national interests that had repercussions for all Indonesians rather than specific interests that 
pertained to only subsets of the population.  The PDI-P advocated gradualism in the process 
of increasing the past election vote threshold, explicit in its message of not wanting to 
undemocratically curb popular voice in the nascent years of democracy.38  However, this 
position left the door open for a return to the subject in the future. 
In short, the PDI-P was happy to curb competition entry to only nationally-oriented 
parties, largely based on the party’s ideological platform of a unified Indonesian national 
identity and universalistic approach to citizenship and anti-discrimination practices.  Yet, the 
party also preferred to allow entry to any nationally-oriented party that could win enough 
votes to obtain seats.  The PDI-P did not view the 1999 election outcome unfavorably, 
having won the largest share of seats, and so it did not take the perspective that eliminating 
smaller parties would be necessary to retaining its strength in 2004.  Thus, on both 
ideological and somewhat strategic perceptions, the PDI-P did not pursue a fixed legislative 
entry threshold that would truncate the party system’s size in 2004, despite a general 
consensus among observers that such a threshold would have benefitted the party. 
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 Interview with Pataniari Siahaan (October 2010). 
 
37
 Interview with Hamid Basyaib (February 2010). 
 
38
 Interviews with Jakob Tobing (April 2010), Pataniari Siahaan (October 2010). 
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The medium-sized parties held mixed views on the issue of electoral threshold 
reform, in part because the uncertainty surrounding the future of electoral politics appeared 
the greatest for them.  Rais’ PAN was already backpedaling in the wake of a less-strong-
than-expected showing in 1999, 39 and wanted the past election vote threshold of 2% at the 
DPR level to remain alongside a raised DPRD1 and DPRD2 level.  While the PPP did not 
know what to make of the splintering of the Islamic/Islamist voice that it had represented for 
so long,40 the party agreed to raise the past election vote threshold but refused to discuss a 
legislative entry threshold.  Wahid’s PKB had begun its descent into internal fragmentation 
within weeks of the election’s results and long before he even assumed the presidency.  In 
the wake of his ouster prior to the election law reform the PKB appeared to have little focus 
or direction amid leadership uncertainty and the accusations of corruption.41  As such, the   
PPP and PKB appeared to come out in favor of increasing the past election vote threshold, 
likely hoping that fewer contestants would result in a better outcome for them in 2004, but 
stopping short of advocating a fixed legislative entry threshold without knowing if they 
would be able to clear it in the future.  PAN also objected to a legislative entry threshold and 
pursued an increase in the past election vote threshold at the provincial and municipal levels 
but did not want an increase at the national level for fear that it would fail to meet it. 
Unsurprisingly, none of the small parties that received between one and a handful of 
seats were in favor of introducing a legislative entry threshold or increasing the registration 
requirements of the past election vote threshold.  In purely seat-maximizing, indeed 
representation survival, logic, all 16 of the small parties immediately opposed any additional 
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 Interview with Indra Piliang (July 2010). 
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 Interview with Ali Hardi Kiaidemek (July 2010). 
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 Personal communications with Marcus Mietzner in Jakarta, November/December 2010. 
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constraints on electoral competition or legislative entry.  In particular, one fraksi representing 
a coalition of small parties advocated for the entire past election vote threshold to be 
removed from the law while the PK fought against any major increases.42 
The role of experts and consultants came largely in the form of IFES consultants and 
Indonesian academics who were now sitting members of the KPU, such as Ramlan Surbakti 
who had been a member of the Team 7 and Valina Singka Subekti who was a professor of 
political science at the University of Indonesia.  Many of these experts advocated some 
measure of threshold, at the very least to reduce the number of parties which obtained only 
one or two seats, for the purpose of simplifying the system.43  During the negotiations it was 
clear that without PDI-P support for a legislative entry threshold there would not be one 
adopted.  Instead the debate revolved around whether the past election vote threshold should 
be increased, with the objections of the small parties eventually being overruled by the 
consensus among experts and the largest parties that the threshold was ineffectively low. 
The final result was a slight increase in the past election vote threshold, to 3% of the 
votes for the DPR or 4% of the votes for ½ the DPRD1 or DPRD2, and no legislative entry 
threshold.  With respect to the electoral threshold issues, only the PDI-P’s position was 
clearly bolstered by a combination of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations, as both 
publicly and during committee meetings the party consistently argued against the 
introduction of a legislative entry threshold that almost certainly would have benefitted its 
seat-share in the 2004-2009 DPR.  However, in the uncertain post-transition political 
environment, all of the parties including the PDI-P advocated for reforms to the electoral 
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 Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010). 
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 Interviews with Ramlan Surbakti (April 2010), Valina Singka Subekti (April 2010). 
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threshold that were clearly strategic in nature, with the large parties agreeing to increase the 
past election vote threshold, the medium parties split on the level and location of the 
increase, and the small parties guarding against the increase. 
 
District Magnitude Reform 
The initial draft law from the Ministry of Home Affairs included a vague stipulation for 
electoral district shape and size: electoral districts would be based on population within 
provinces and subdivisions of provinces.  The Ministry’s team drafted the clause to try to 
tackle the concerns raised after the 1999 election during the counting and seat allocation 
process that the formula for seat distribution among parties was too unclear.  Through a 
mechanism known as Stembus Accords, parties were able to take advantage of the relatively 
vague wording in the 1999 Election Law and trade vote-shares in one district for those in 
another.  The trades occurred between parties who wanted certain representatives in one 
district to be elected and were willing to “trade” votes with another, usually small, party in 
that district for their votes in another district where they did not have a candidate they wanted 
elected as much.44  In short, the draft election law from the Ministry reflected a greater desire 
for a more transparent allocation process and a fixed number of seats per district to determine 
the number of candidates nominated per party per list and provide a fixed quota for 
determining the remainder allocations for parties to obtain seats.  However, it fell short of 
this goal and only proposed a 550-seat DPR without specifying how many seats, either on 
average or a range, per district. 
Golkar was a major proponent of pemekaraan, the process of district/municipality 
creation during decentralization discussed in the previous chapter, both in order to try and 
                                                 
44
 Interview with Kevin Evans (March 2009). 
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control resources at the local level and to push for changes in national legislative districting 
in parts of the country where the party held its greatest proportion of seats.  Since the 
beginning of the 1999 legislative session Golkar had raised discussions of moving to a 
single-member district system, commonly referred to by party leadership as a sistem distrik, 
with district boundaries drawn along administrative boundaries of the districts and 
municipalities (kabupaten and kotamadya) rather than through some population-based 
allocation formula.45  Golkar pursued the single-member districts in conjunction with the 
simultaneous decentralization process by pushing the creation of new municipalities in places 
where it believed it would be most likely to win a plurality-based seat.  As a result, the party 
repeatedly advocated for a switch from proportional representation in provincial- or 
population-based national electoral districts to single-member district winner-take-all seats.  
Rhetorically, the Golkar elite pressed the issue of single-member districts as a system in 
which representatives would be held more accountable to their specific constituencies rather 
than party leaders,46 but the party’s simultaneous advocacy of new district creation and the 
single-member district system suggest a much clearer seat-maximizing strategy at work.  
While it is clear that Golkar would have benefited from some of the redistricting that would 
have taken place under a switch to single-member districts based on administrative 
boundaries, given the PDI-P’s strength in the 1999 elections it is not clear that the net benefit 
to the party would have been as large as suggested unless Golkar continuously attempted to 
gerrymander and create new districts/municipalities to bolster its seat-share in the DPR. 
In contrast, the PDI-P advocated for near perfect retention of the existing system of 
proportional representation.  Partly seat-maximizing in logic, since the PDI-P had been the 
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 Interviews with Rully Azwar (April 2010) and Theo Sambuaga (April 2010). 
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winner in 1999 under such a system, the party’s adherence to the status quo represented an 
ideological stance on the issue as well.  In terms of seat-maximization, the process of 
pemekaraan did not benefit the PDI-P in the event that administrative districts became the 
basis for electoral districts under a majoritarian system – the PDI-P was strongest in 
constituencies in Java, Bali and North Sumatera, none of which were areas where 
pemekaraan was really taking place given the population density and already-high 
subdivision of urban areas.  In terms of alternative motivations, the PDI-P recognized that a 
majoritarian system would almost certainly result in a severe reduction in the size of the 
party system, increasing wasted votes and reducing minority representation across the 
archipelago.47  Thus the PDI-P refused to really consider a switch to single-member districts 
because of the drastic nature of the change it implied.  Preferring a more gradual approach to 
change, the party instead opted to consult with the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems (IFES) experts who pushed a system of within-province non-administrative electoral 
districts based, in principle, on population thresholds.48  The PDI-P also preferred the upper 
limit of DPR seats to be 600 rather than the 550 proposed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
The medium-sized parties reacted, once again, in mixed fashion to the debate that 
arose primarily between Golkar and the PDI-P on the issue of district magnitude change.  
Though Rais in some ways was intrigued by the introduction of a single-member district 
system, having been educated in the US, his party’s general social democratic and pluralist 
platform discouraged a winner-take-all-model and PAN leadership continued to harbor 
suspicions about Golkar’s democratic intentions. 49  Thus, the PAN proved a less enthusiastic 
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 Interview with Pataniari Siahaan (October 2010). 
 
48
 Interview with Bob Dahl (November 2010), supported by IFES country reports released in 2002-2003. 
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advocate of a total switch to single-member districts and leaned more favorably toward 
revision of the electoral district allocation formula that retained proportionality but required 
each district/municipality in a given province to obtain at least one seat in the district’s total.  
In addition to this requirement, the PAN opposed the limit of 550 seats and also argued for 
600 as the ideal number.  It is unclear that PAN pursued district changes for the purpose of 
seat-maximization, since it was not evident what would have been a more seat-maximizing 
strategy for the party at the time.  However, alternative motivations did not appear to be a 
driving force in the PAN’s decisions regarding the degree of proportionality. 
The PPP and PKB were similarly not favorable toward a system of entirely single-
member districts but for different reasons.  The initial position of the PPP was that seats on 
and outside Java should be more balanced, and the party’s leadership became amenable to 
some form of a mixed system when the option was proposed during committee hearings.50  
Party leadership was concerned with appealing to both modern urban and traditional rural 
voters, particularly given the difficulties the party faced in attracting many Muslim voters 
who had typically voted for the PPP under the New Order. 51  The result, very seat-
maximizing in nature, was agreement with a proportional system based on population within 
KPU-drawn district boundaries, with the least densely-populated provinces all receiving at 
least the minimum number of seats regardless of population.  The PKB, on the other hand, 
favored retaining proportionality because it, much like the PDI-P, had specific concentrated 
support in East Java where NU was strongest, and East Java was not a region that benefitted 
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from pemekaraan policies to create new districts where the PKB would win plurality-based 
seats.  The PKB also wanted an increase, as the PDI-P and PAN did, to 600 DPR seats. 
Thus all the medium-sized parties ended up favoring retention of the proportional 
representation system, though for different reasons primarily based on each individual party’s 
perceived self-interests and seat-maximizing logic.  Both the PAN and PPP recognized that 
uncertainty about future electoral success would limit the appeal of single-member districts 
for their parties, while the PKB did not focus too closely on the issue of district magnitude so 
long as Java was not undermined in the seat-counting process.  However, all three of the 
parties that were most successful in 1999 in the Javanese provinces – the PDI-P, the PAN 
and the PKB –wanted an increase in the number of DPR seats to 600 to ensure the continued 
proportions of seats to Java and were forced to negotiate back to the 550 proposed by the 
Ministry.  Once it became clear that single-member districts based on municipalities were not 
going to be the basis for electoral districts, all three agreed to the lower total number of seats. 
The small parties also ended up favoring the proportional system, largely due to self-
preservation motivations since many knew that at most they might win a single seat under a 
plurality-based system but more likely they could lose their seats to Golkar or PDI-P.  Only 
the PBB put forth a specific counter-proposal in response to the Ministry’s draft: seats should 
be distributed based on multiples of 100,000 people in a municipality.  The PBB, with 
strength in densely populated areas in North Sumatra and West Java, likely supported this 
position because it disproportionately favored urban centers.52  The smaller parties also had 
fewer resources and personnel who understood the ramifications of the different district 
                                                 
52
 This is the only party from which I could not obtain an interview with a previous DPR member or party 
leader who knew about the party’s position on why they advocated for this particular way of calculating district 
magnitude.  However, the party’s known geographic bases in North Sumatra and West Java are both densely-
populated urban areas and it is logical to conclude that a formula weighting on population within municipalities 
would advantage these two areas, along with much of Java. 
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magnitude allocation formulae and likely outcomes based on the 1999 results.53  Many of 
these parties made decisions based almost entirely out of fear that changing the system would 
result in their elimination.  As no fraksi but Golkar supported the adoption of a plurality- or 
majoritarian-based system of elections, and though the debate lasted for more time than was 
probably necessary, the net result was the retention of proportionality which all other fraksi 
favored to differing degrees. 
Throughout the district magnitude negotiations, consultations with the IFES experts 
proved quite influential in the eventual system adopted and where the electoral district 
boundaries were drawn.  In particular, IFES provided both the Special Committee and the 
KPU extensive advice regarding allocation options and an IFES technical team provided the 
KPU assistance in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping of population densities in 
order to calculate the most consistent, universal formula for determining district 
boundaries.54  The final result was the adoption of a system of district divisions within 
province based on population, with 69 districts each with 3-12 seats of the DPR’s 550 total 
seats.  The least populated provinces, such as North Maluku and Gorontalo, each had a single 
district with three seats; the most populated provinces, such as East, Central and West Java, 
each had nine to ten districts with 10-12 seats.  Thus, the formula distributed largely based on 
population but with some consideration for the less-populated provinces. 
 With respect to the district magnitude issue, once again only the PDI-P’s position was 
in any measure a combination of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations.  PDI-P leaders 
consistently conveyed the difficulty in making the trade-off between proportionality and a 
more simple party system, clearly expressing some concern about reducing representation in 
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the system while acknowledging that reduced proportionality would benefit the party and the 
presidential system.55  However, in the uncertain post-transition political environment, all of 
the parties including the PDI-P advocated for reforms to the calculation of district magnitude 
that were clearly strategic in nature.  Golkar agreed to maintain the proportional system but 
with a reduction in district magnitude relative to the 1999 level, the medium parties were 
split on how to reduce but still maintain proportionality, and the small parties generally 
guarded against any change that might cause their elimination. 
 
List PR Reform 
The debate over the format of the candidate nomination lists proved in many ways to be the 
most difficult and confusing negotiation of the three reform components.  To understand the 
debate, I will first introduce the seat allocation formula included in the Ministry of Home 
Affairs draft law, and the stipulation regarding individual candidate seat allocations.  The 
draft law included an average remainder quota formula for seat allocations.  Seats were 
allocated by calculating a quota, the total number of votes cast in a district divided by the 
total available seats in the district, and then awarding seats in a given district to parties based 
on their vote totals in multiples of the quota in that district.  After seats were distributed to 
parties reaching full quotas, the remaining unallocated seats were distributed based on the 
parties holding remainder votes of percentages of the quota until all seats were distributed. 
The system in place in 1999 and carried forward by the Ministry’s draft law stipulated 
a simple mechanism for distributing seats within the party once the remainder formula had 
been calculated and applied to allocate seats among parties.  In each electoral district parties 
were to submit a list of candidate nominees, voters would then be able to choose an 
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individual candidate from among the party nominees, party vote total would first distribute 
seats among the parties and then candidates received seats according to the highest individual 
vote totals within the names on a party’s district list. 
The previous system had relied far more on party control in the sense that the 
nomination process ultimately determined which candidates received seats, rather than voter 
choice.  The result of the previous system was that in 1999 many candidates “bought” their 
way to high list positions and expectations that the same practice would occur again in 2004 
prompted some of the Ministry’s revision.56  The control of party leaders concerning the rank 
ordering meant that many types of candidates, particularly women and minorities, were 
buried or excluded from the lists entirely; another byproduct was that, given the lack of 
residency restrictions, parties tended to nominate influential party members and donors in 
districts where they did not reside or to whom they had no constituency ties or sense of 
accountability.57  The general perception of limited elite responsiveness and accountability, 
and the lack of voter choice, frustrated many in the post-1999 election period.  Under this 
new system, party leaders only controlled the nomination procedures based on each party’s 
requirements or criteria for nomination and district placements; voters controlled which party 
candidates actually received the seats. 
Golkar initially supported the draft law’s proposal for an “open” list system that 
would include a more voter-oriented mechanism for selecting individual candidates to fill 
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party seat allocations: opening the lists to voter selection and reducing or removing the 
importance of the party’s rank orderings.58  While Golkar rhetorically pressed for reforms to 
the voter selection process, the party also believed that it could field more wealthy and 
immensely popular candidates who could increase the party’s vote-share if voters could 
directly select individuals,59 and that the open list system would benefit them more than 
parties such as the PDI-P which preached party unity and identity over individual elite 
identification.  Golkar leaders expressed few concerns about whether the opening of the lists 
would negatively affect the party, either in terms of voter perceptions or party unity, and 
never appeared to entertain fears that many other parties did that allowing individual 
candidates to compete against one another might create as much within-party as between-
party competition.60 
Many other parties were skeptical of the lack of control that the open list system gave 
to party leaders, though many supported the idea in the initial positions offered upon first 
reading of the Ministry’s draft law (see Table 3.3 for specific party positions based on the 
DIM document).  However, as negotiations went on a number of parties raised concerns that 
a new form of “money politics” would emerge as fears arose that instead of buying their way 
up party nomination lists individuals would just start paying voters directly for their votes.61  
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In addition, some parties were concerned that candidates campaigning individually would 
reduce party discipline and cohesion,62 diluting platforms and ideologies as their own 
members would be forced to compete against not only candidates from other parties but each 
other, as well.  The PKB and the PAN were two of the only medium-sized parties to express 
and maintain much interest from the early days of the open list debate, partly because both 
assumed they would have locally-popular religious and community leaders and would benefit 
from the additional element of voter choice in their geographic strongholds.63 
The PDI-P was among the most vociferous opponents of the open lists, believing the 
internal party competition would encourage widespread money politics and turn electoral 
politics into a popularity contest.  A party that typically required a comprehensive set of 
criteria for its candidate nominees, including education, work and activism experience, the 
PDI-P was poorly equipped to enter a political campaign based on celebrity and popularity or 
one which required more extensive funds, since the party typically relied on grassroots 
activism and its working class base.64  In short, a party that had built its identity based on the 
party first, and the strength of its leadership, did not have a strong interest in an election 
format that favored individual candidate popularity and limitless campaign funds.  Many 
other parties shared the PDI-P’s concerns during the course of negotiations, though the 
strength of PDI-P objections to the open lists turned the debate toward finding a mechanism 
for combining party and voter choice. 
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Though few parties favored the competitive format of open lists, democracy 
advocates, international observers, and domestic experts rallied around the idea of open lists 
providing greater voter access and choice in the electoral process.  As early as 1998, 
domestic and international scholars debated the lack of voter choice and accountability of 
party leaders in choosing candidates for seat allocations.65  Two of the former members of 
the Team of 7, Ramlan Surbakti and Anas Urbaningrum, were now KPU Commissioners and 
advisors to the Ministry, both favoring more transparent candidate selection mechanisms.66  
The draft law had renewed the debate over the perceived lack of representation and 
accountability arising from elite control over the closed lists.  Proposals and debates that 
began as early as the 1999 election law preparation continued, with many academics and 
civil society members openly advocating for some type of list openness that would force 
legislators to become more accountable to voters.67 
Golkar eventually joined the opposition to fully-opened lists, arguing for the need to 
retain some party leadership control.  Some of the conversion undoubtedly came from Golkar 
members like Feri Mursyidan Baldan, who was a vice-chair of the Working Committee and 
viewed his dual role as Golkar and committee representative as one of a negotiator 
attempting to produce the best election law with as much consensus as possible (interview, 
October 2010).  The negotiated result was to introduce an element of openness to the lists, 
while retaining priority for party leaders to nominate loyalists and others supporting the party 
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ideologies or platforms.  The new ballots would have party name and symbol as well as the 
rank-ordered list of candidate nominees from each party directly beneath the party name.  
Voters could choose a party or candidate with her/his vote, votes would still be aggregated by 
party totals but the seats would be distributed according to an altered formula.  While in 1999 
the names simply were chosen in list order, in 2004 there would be a single modification to 
that rule – if an individual candidate received votes totaling an entire district quota (the total 
number of votes cast divided by the total number of available seats) in Indonesia referred to 
as the electoral divisor (bilangan pembagi pemilihan or BPP) for the district in which s/he 
stood for election, s/he would win the party’s seat outright, regardless of her/his rank-ordered 
placement on the party’s nomination list.  Thus, extremely high support for an individual 
candidate could propel that candidate above her/his list placement; the likelihood of receiving 
such a high individual vote total was not good, so parties still retained the majority of their 
control over the within-party seat allocations.   
With respect to the issue of the openness of the nomination lists, nearly all parties 
chose their relative positions on openness according to seat-maximizing motivations.  PDI-P 
leaders consistently objected to a system based on money politics and popularity contests, but 
in most respects the objections to those factors stemmed from the reality that the party was 
not really capable of competing in such contests, benefiting in terms of legislative discipline 
as a result.  All of the medium-sized and smaller parties advocated for some form of 
openness on the grounds that many viewed certain party leaders as “electable” under a 
candidate-centric system.  Golkar agreed to limit the openness of the system, partly in 
reaction to the overwhelming objection to fully open lists as the negotiations wore on, but 
still managed to force an element of candidate-centricity that Golkar leadership believed 
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would benefit it come election day.  The only non-seat maximizing arguments made, and 
picked up on by industrious political parties, came from the government and civil society in 
the form of concerns about limiting voter choice through party-only candidate selection 
mechanisms used under the New Order.  On the issue of lists, adoption of a partly-open 
system resulted almost exclusively from seat-maximizing motivations by all parties involved. 
 
General Conclusions about and Expectations of the Reform Process 
The 2001-2003 process demonstrated two key elements that explain a great deal about the 
negotiations and reforms eventually adopted.  First, during the period of reformasi observers 
noted how “full of idealism” DPR members seemed about the prospects of reform and how 
much easier to get compromise and a single voice on the issues it was; political interests of 
individual parties appeared to be more of a secondary concern.68  Second, and somewhat 
related to the first characterization of key political actors, parties within the DPR were more 
content to rely on the recommendations, simulations and information provided by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and expert consultants regarding the options for reform.69 
 Due to these factors, the reform process that took the Ministry’s draft proposal and 
turned it into a final election law passed in the DPR lasted a fairly short time – 4 months of 
hearings and committee meetings – and was really only moderately contentious on the issue 
of list type.  The only proponent of a legislative entry threshold or single-member districts 
was Golkar, which did not have support from other fraksi on either issue.  In contrast the 
open lists were totally opposed only by the PDI-P to begin with but became a point of 
discussion during the reform process that eventually resulted in partly-open lists for the 2004 
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elections.  While seat-maximizing logic clearly motivated Golkar on all of the reform 
components, and to a large degree motivated the medium and small parties in their different 
positions, the PDI-P held seat-maximizing and alternative motivations that were evident in 
their stated positions and pursuit of change on many of the issues.   
 In the end, the process of passing the law in the DPR was relatively easy.  One 
particular legacy inherited from Dutch colonial rule was the propensity to only send passable, 
and preferably by consensus, laws to the floor for a vote.  Therefore, the general motivation 
of the committees and Commission 2 was to ensure that all major problems and 
disagreements had been dealt with prior to the floor debate and vote.70  As such, all of the 
issues included in the law needed to be agreed upon in detail before moving forward to a vote 
in a plenary session, and the session in March 2003 when the law was passed reflected this 
ease of voting.  Table 4.4 summarizes the differences between the Ministry of Home Affairs’ 
draft proposal and the final law passed for the 2004 elections. 
Table 4.4  Change between Draft Law (2001) and Final Election Law (2003) 
 Threshold District Magnitude List PR 
Draft Election Law 
(produced by 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs in June 
2001) 
Moderate increase (to 
3% DPR, 4% ½ 
DPRD1 or 4% ½ 
DPRD2) in past 
election vote 
threshold 
Not specified but 
electoral districts will 
be based on 
population within 
“provinces and 
subdivisions of 
provinces” with a set 
number of DPR seats 
at 550 
Fully open, 
plurality vote within 
party district list 
Final Election Law 
(produced by 
Commission 2, 
passed by DPR in 
March 2003) 
Moderate increase (to 
3% DPR, 4% ½ 
DPRD1 or 4% ½ 
DPRD2) in past 
election vote 
threshold 
550 seats divided into 
69 districts with 3-12 
seats, boundary lines 
drawn based on 
population within 
provincial boundaries 
Partly open, list 
order unless 
candidate wins 
100% BPP of 
individual votes 
Sources: Draft Election Law and Final Election Law from the Document Archive of the DPR 
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 Many of the expectations about the election’s outcomes were based on the changes 
between the 1999 and 2004 electoral systems.  The past election vote threshold was intended 
to decrease party system fragmentation and limit it further for the 2009 elections by reducing 
the number of qualifying parties.  The district magnitude was expected to further decrease 
party system fragmentation by reducing the average number of seats parties could win in 
each district, though the primary goal of the fixed district magnitudes was really to reduce 
vagueness and corruption that plagued seat allocations in the previous elections.  Finally, the 
partly open lists were intended to offer voters more choice over their elected representatives, 
while still retaining some control for party leaders as to who obtained nominations to the lists 
and in what order seats would be distributed if voters did not convey specific preferences. 
 Overall, the 2001-2003 reform process showed some support for my hypothesized 
expectations. It is not possible to evaluate some of the expectations given that the 1999 
elections were the only democratic elections prior to the reform process.  On the question of 
seat-maximizing logic, in general uncertainty about the 2004 elections was quite high.  
However, the expectation that declining uncertainty would result in less inclusive reforms 
(hypothesis 1) is not supported by the Indonesian case in 2001-2003, where less inclusive 
reforms were adopted amid high uncertainty. 
The reasons for this are that while many parties clearly demonstrated seat-
maximizing motivations in the reforms they pursued the PDI-P did not pursue exclusively 
seat-maximizing motivations yet controlled much of the reform process.  The PDI-P’s 
opposition to adopting a legislative entry threshold or single-member districts demonstrated 
alternative motivations related to the Party’s beliefs regarding diverse representation and 
proportionality as desirable attributes in the Indonesian democratic system (moderate support 
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for hypothesis 2).  Golkar and the smaller parties were at odds throughout the reform process, 
as they possessed divergent seat-maximizing interests, while the medium-sized parties tended 
to hold similar views on reforms but for varied reasons.  While a legislative entry threshold 
was not adopted in part because the PDI-P opposed one, the medium-sized parties’ 
opposition also prohibited its adoption due to the relatively large seat-share they held 
(hypothesis 3a).  Retention of a proportional representation system, albeit with fixed and 
moderately-sized district magnitude, was perceived to be in everyone’s best interests except 
for Golkar, which agreed when it was clear there were no other supporters of a plurality or 
majoritarian system, and the PDI-P, which insisted on retaining the PR system despite the 
likelihood that a majoritarian system might have benefitted the Party in terms of seat-share. 
 Many medium-sized parties and Golkar pushed for greater candidate-centricity on the 
grounds that they had popular leaders who would perform well in candidate-centered 
campaigns.  This is in direct contrast to expectations (hypothesis 3b) that declining medium-
sized party seat-share, i.e. increased large party seat-share, would result in more candidate-
centric pursuits.  The reason for retaining a relatively closed system was the PDI-P’s 
objections to open lists, not medium-sized party opposition to some openness.  As the system 
in 1999 exhibited limited disproportionality, seat-maximizing concerns about the benefits of 
vote-to-seat distortion by the medium-sized parties played virtually no role in the adoption of 
the moderate-sized districts (limited data to evaluate hypothesis 4). 
 While the first reform period is too early to evaluate the expectations of idealism in 
early reform periods giving way to more strategic pursuits in later reform periods (hypothesis 
5), the 2002-2003 reform period does demonstrate a clear element of idealism and 
reformation in the early years of democracy.  Parties were more willing to give on some 
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issues, and to some degree it appeared that Golkar was willing to compromise on many of its 
desired electoral system elements in order to keep up appearances of supporting the 
democratization and reform process.  Finally, the first reform period is also too early to 
evaluate claims of ratchet effects (hypotheses 6a and 6b), though reforms adopted in 2003 
were of both a less inclusive and candidate-centric nature. 
 
Outcomes in the 2004 General Elections 
The election results71 demonstrated the limited effect of the reforms, with fewer parties 
competing but nearly as many winning seats and only 2 of 550 legislators winning seats on 
the basis of the open list voting (and one was ranked first by his party anyway).  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the limited nature of the reforms relative to the system that existed in 
1999, the reforms do reflect trends in the party system’s evolution as well as the non-
universal nature of how reforms impact parties of similar size and power within the 1999-
2004 DPR.  I will first offer a recap of the election returns, including measures of party 
system size and electoral volatility.  Then I analyze the effects of reforms on party system 
outcomes, assessing whether reforms had any of their intended impacts, i.e. benefits, to the 
large and medium-sized parties. 
There were 24 parties competing, down from 48 in 1999, and 11 were completely 
new parties formed since 2000 or from combinations of parties from 1999.  Of the 17 parties 
obtaining seats, 8 were new entrants or reformations of old parties which either did not or 
could not contest the 2004 elections alone.  Of the 7 parties contesting the elections which 
did not win any seats in 2004, only three were repeat competitors which had won seats in 
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1999 and none had won more than three seats in the previous elections.  The share of the vote 
of the five largest parties plus the PBB and PK was 89.9% in 1999, but 75.2% in 2004 for 
those same parties; however the share of the seats of the five largest parties plus the PBB and 
PK was 94.4%, and 82.7% in 2004.  Thus, there was a significant degree of turnover of votes 
within the system, although the vast majority of seats was transferred between the seven 
largest parties from the 1999-2004 legislature along with three new additions – the PD, the 
PDS and the PBR.   
Table 4.5 2004 Election Outcome: Changes from 1999 
 % 2004 
Votes 
% 2004 
Seats 
2004  
Vote-Seat 
Differential 
% Votes 
Gain/Loss  
% Seats 
Gain/Loss 
% 2004 
Vote-Seat 
Differential 
Minus 
% 1999 
Vote-Seat 
Differential 
PDI-P 18.53 19.82 1.29 -15.20 -13.30 1.90 
Golkar 21.57 23.09 1.52 -0.86 -2.88 -2.03 
PPP 8.15 10.55 2.39 -2.55 -2.01 0.54 
PKB 10.57 9.45 -1.11 -2.03 -1.58 0.45 
PAN 6.44 9.64 3.20 -0.68 2.28 2.95 
PBB 2.62 2 -0.62 0.68 -0.81 -1.49 
PK/S 7.34 8.18 0.84 5.98 6.67 0.69 
PNU 0.79 0.36 -0.43 0.15 -0.72 -0.87 
PKP 1.26 0.18 -1.07 0.25 -0.68 -0.93 
PD 7.45 10.18 2.73 -- -- -- 
PDS 2.13 2.36 0.24 -- -- -- 
PPDK 1.16 0.73 -0.43 -- -- -- 
PBR 2.44 2.55 0.11 -- -- -- 
PPDI 0.75 0.18 -0.57 -- -- -- 
PKPB 2.11 0.36 -1.75 -- -- -- 
PNIM 0.82 0.18 -0.64 -- -- -- 
Pelopor 0.77 0.18 -0.59 -- -- -- 
Others 5.11 0 -5.11 -3.37 -3.68 -0.31 
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Table 4.5 shows results of the 2004 legislative elections: the levels of each parties’ 
vote-share, seat-share, difference between the two,72 and change since 1999.  Table 4.5 also 
confirms that the levels of vote and seat volatility are quite high, but as this is only the 
second post-transition election it is difficult to ascertain whether volatility has really 
increased since 1999 or whether the increase might be due to electoral reforms or democratic 
transition (hypothesis 9). 
At the party level some fared better than others, though the changes produced party-
type effects more than individual party effects.  The differential tells a particular story with 
respect to how well parties fared in response to the reforms: parties that saw their differential 
rise were the beneficiaries of reforms while parties that saw their differential drop 
significantly were the biggest losers of reform.  The smallest parties in the system did worse 
than in 1999, with a small or negative differential for parties failing to win only a few seats 
and a large differential to account for all the parties that failed to win any seats.  Even though 
Golkar became the largest legislative party in 2004 and still maintained a positive vote-to-
seat differential, the party was the biggest “loser” in terms of the new formula for translating 
votes into seats, with its differential declining more than 2% from 1999 when its 3.5% vote-
to-seat differential made the size of Golkar’s fraksi much larger than its basic vote-share 
would have produced. 
Of the major parties, the PPP and PKB both saw little change in their differentials 
between 1999 and 2004, suggesting that the reforms had a limited effect on their seat 
allocations relative to their vote-shares.  However, both parties also performed poorly in 
2004 and so it is difficult to distinguish their overall electoral performance from the impact 
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of the reforms.  In general, both the PPP and PKB had much more geographically 
concentrated bases of electoral support, which further suggests why the reforms had little 
positive effect for their seat-shares.  Reduction to such moderately-sized districts meant that 
few parties could really win many seats in any one district.  Parties that benefitted from the 
reform thus tended to be parties which had more wide-spread constituencies or won a few 
seats here and there across many districts.  Since the PPP and PKB both had concentrated 
vote bases, in West and East Java respectively, the reform had a limited effect on them 
compared to a party like the PAN, which only won a seat or two in any district but did so 
across many districts where it barely had enough votes to get a seat.  The same effect of PPP 
and PKB is also true for the PBB, the smallest of the 1999-2004 fraksi, which saw its seat-
share and differential both decline from 1999 and also possesses very geographically 
concentrated voting bases in West Java and North Sumatra. 
The PDI-P and the PAN were the biggest beneficiaries of the reforms that 
redistributed seats among the contestants, even though both saw reduced vote-shares from 
1999.  Though the PDI-P dropped from being the largest legislative party, reducing by nearly 
40% from its 1999-2004 fraksi size, its differential in the translation of votes into seats was 
negative in 1999 but positive in 2004.  Though the PAN’s vote-to-seat differential was 
positive in 1999, it grew in 2004 to receive the greatest “top up” in seats relative to vote-
share due in large part to its more geographically dispersed appeal.  The PD followed the 
same process, winning a handful of seats in many different districts across the country while 
the other “surprise” vote-winner, the PKS, tended to concentrate primarily in urban and 
university areas rather than more broadly and thus received more limited benefits from the 
modified vote-to-seat translation mechanism.  The small parties tended to see little or no 
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benefit from the vote-to-seat translation.  In some cases, like the PKPB, small parties lost 
nearly all of their votes in the translation to seats because their vote-shares were too spread 
out across many districts and the party failed to win a single seat in many of those instances. 
Figure 4.1 Change in Vote Differential by Party Size 
 
 Figure 4.1 shows these variations grouped by party sizes, with small parties falling 
below 2.5% of the vote-share, medium parties falling between 2.5-10% of the vote-share, and 
large parties falling above 10% of the vote-share.  It is clear from the figure that the medium-
sized parties were the largest beneficiary of the changes in the realignment of the districts, 
but what the figure fails to demonstrate is that in 1999 there were four large parties – PDI-P, 
Golkar, PPP and PKB – and only one medium-sized party, the PAN, while in 2004 the PPP 
moves into the medium party category along with the PAN, PKS and PD and only the PDI-P, 
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Golkar and PKB are still large parties as measured by vote-share.  Additionally, the less 
inclusive reform of the reduction in district magnitude clearly produces an increase in 
disproportionality (hypothesis 8), evident in Figure 4.1 by increased sizes of the bars from 
1999 to 2004.  However, what is interesting to note is that while there were 43 small parties 
in 1999 the number drops to only 17 small parties in 2004, yet the differential of votes-to-
seats increases dramatically.  This demonstrates that even though there are fewer small 
parties, as measured by receiving less than 2.5 percent of the vote-share, they are receiving 
even less of the seat-share relative to the proportion of votes they win. 
Figure 4.2 Average Party Magnitudes in 2004 Electoral Districts 
 
In addition to the changes in differential, average party magnitude also dropped 
across the electoral districts as the average seat magnitude shrank.  Party magnitude is an 
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indicator of how many seats a party holds in a district; the average party magnitude is simply 
the average of the party magnitudes of all legislative parties for a given district.  In 1999, 
when there were twenty-eight districts (for each province), the average party magnitude 
across the national electoral districts was 0.854.  In 2004, when there were sixty-nine districts 
and the district magnitude dropped, the average party magnitude dropped to 0.332.  This 
suggests that despite the reduction in the number of competitors from 48 to 24, it was less 
likely for any party to be able to win a seat in a given district in 2004 relative to 1999.  Figure 
4.2 shows a map of party magnitude values.  Darker colors show a higher average party 
magnitude (>0.333), meaning fewer parties hold seats in that district relative to the district’s 
size, while lighter or no color shows lower average party magnitudes (<0.332).  The inset 
indicates average party magnitudes in the districts in and around the capital city, Jakarta. 
 Change in average party magnitude can indicate many attributes about a district’s 
representatives, but in this particular case the declining average party magnitude indicates 
two particular outcomes about party-level electoral probabilities.  First, parties in general 
were more likely to win fewer seats in each district, although the relatively small changes in 
vote-to-seat differentials suggested that parties made up for winning more seats in a single 
large district with winning smaller numbers of seats in more small districts.  Second, 
pertaining to within party nomination strategies, parties were most likely to win highly-
valued (i.e. highly-ranked) candidates seats when those candidates were listed in the first-
ranked position in districts where the party was strong. 
Multiple seats were difficult to win, given the reduction in district magnitudes.  In 
only five of 69 districts did any party win enough votes to take more than 3 names off its list, 
so candidates not listed in positions #1-3 were almost never in contention for a seat.  The 
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only parties to accomplish the task of winning more than three seats in given district were the 
PDI-P in Bali (5 seats), the PKB in East Java 9 (4 seats), and Golkar in West Java 3 (4 seats), 
South Sulawesi 1 (5 seats) and South Sulawesi 2 (5 seats).  Parties won at least 3 seats 31 
times across the districts, with the majority (20 of 31) going to the PDI-P and Golkar. 
 Thus, declining average party magnitude, 0.4982 in 2004 down from 0.7 in 1999, 
shows that parties in 2004 were increasingly less likely to be successful campaigning in all 
parts of the country, particularly those with low population density and few seats per district.  
Overall, this meant that larger numbers of seats per district, and therefore more 
representatives per district, were being won by parties other than Golkar and the PDI-P.  The 
other parties to receive more than 1 seat in a single district were the PKB, PKS, PD, PAN, 
and PPP; the remaining nine legislative parties only received a single seat in the districts 
where they won seats at all.  However, the combined lack of an electoral threshold and drop 
in district magnitude did not serve to reduce the party system size as measured in effective 
number of parties (hypothesis 7a), though the absolute number of parties did decline 24%. 
 Finally, in terms of individual candidate vote-share, only two candidates successfully 
met the vote quota in their respective electoral districts: Hidayat Nur Wahid of the PKS in the 
second electoral district in Jakarta and Saleh Djasit of Golkar in the electoral district in Riau.  
Wahid’s vote-share, 262,019 votes in a district with a quota of 232,355 votes, easily won him 
an automatic seat for the PKS – the result turned out to be irrelevant since Wahid had been 
listed in position #1 by the PKS in his district anyway.  Djasit’s vote-share was closer to the 
district quota, winning 195,348 votes in a district with a quota of 187,883, but once again the 
result barely mattered: Djasit was also ranked first by Golkar in the Riau district. 
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 Overall, only 32 candidates cleared the 95,011 individual vote level of the smallest 
district BPP in Western Papua (then called Irian Jaya Barat).  While most of the BPP in 
densely populated districts were actually over 200,000 votes, the 95,011 is a good benchmark 
to consider the range of individual candidate votes.  In five districts – East Java district 1 (3 
PKB candidates), East Java district 9 (2 PKB candidates), East Java 10 (2 PKB candidates), 
West Java 2 (2 Golkar candidates) and North Sulawesi (1 PD, 1 PDS and 2 Golkar 
candidates) – did more than one candidate win at least 95,011 votes.  Furthermore, 21 of the 
32 candidates were listed in position #1, with five more listed in position #2 behind a person 
in position #1 who also received at least 95,011 votes.  
 However, there is limited evidence that the openness of the lists affected the party 
system size in terms of seat-share (hypothesis 7b).  As there were no candidates elected under 
this system, the change did not directly affect party system fragmentation.  There were some 
small parties, in provinces such as Papua and East Nusa Tenggara, whose vote-share in 
specific districts benefited from the additional votes cast for particular candidates.  Yet across 
the party system the shift to slightly open lists did not have an effect on party system 
fragmentation by encouraging the creation of candidate-centric party vehicles or the entrée of 
parties whose voters only cast votes for specific candidates and not the parties. 
 
Counterfactual Analysis: How Much Impact did the Reforms Have? 
The past election vote threshold had little effect on entrants in 2004, even though 
there was a drop from 48 to 24 parties contesting the elections.  For example, since it missed 
the past election vote threshold from the 1999 elections, the Moon and Star Party (Partai 
Bulan Bintang) became the Star and Moon Party (Partai Bintang Bulan) and won eleven seats 
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in 2004.  The drop in the number of competitors had little to do with the past election vote 
threshold.  Without a legislative entry threshold the number of legislative parties showed 
moderate decline, from 21 in 1999 to 16 in 2004, but effective parties rose from 5 to 7.5. 
But what if a legislative entry threshold had been adopted?  At 2.5% of the legislative 
vote-share, nine parties would not have been allowed to obtain any seats in the DPR and the 
39 seats they won would have been redistributed back among the seven parties clearing the 
2.5% threshold.  Without a formula for recalculating the BPP, as discussions never 
progressed to the point where such a consideration was necessary, it is difficult to estimate 
the redistribution of the seats held by those nine parties among the remaining qualified 
parties.  However, it is clear that a 2.5% legislative entry threshold would have redistributed 
7% of the DPR seats and reduced the total number of legislative parties from 16 to 7.  
Raising the threshold to 5% would only have eliminated one additional party, the PBB, and 
redistributed 11 additional seats (9% of the DPR). 
The reduction in district magnitude did have an effect on specific parties in the 
legislature, but not very much on the overall party system size.  In fact, the effective number 
of parties actually increased from just over 5 in 1999 to 7.5 in 2004. Declining district 
magnitude did have the effect of concentrating more seats in the medium-sized parties – a 
group that grew from only one party (the PAN) to five (the PAN, PKB, PPP, PKS and PD) – 
at the expense of small parties – a group that included 16 in 1999 and only 10 in 2004.  
However, declining district magnitude also reduced the benefits of disproportionality 
received by the large parties. The differential in translation of votes to seats of all medium-
sized parties was nearly double that of the benefit felt by the large parties.  Votes were spread 
across fewer total parties and aggregated in medium-sized parties much more in 2004. 
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It is difficult, again, to project what the seat distribution would have been like under a 
slightly larger formula for seat distribution, but it is possible to estimate some of the potential 
effects of a switch to single-member district seats.  If the district/municipality boundaries 
were the basis for each single-member district, which is a crude approximation since there 
were far fewer than 550 districts/municipalities in 2004 but most closely represents the 
system Golkar pursued, Table 4.6 shows the seat distribution that would have occurred based 
on the highest vote-shares in each district/municipality-based district.73  One aspect to note 
about the district/municipality-based districts: they are not standardized according to 
population or geography, and represent administrative boundaries. 
Table 4.6 Seat Distribution under SMD in 2004 
Golkar 197 (58.5%) 
PDI-P 83 (24.6%) 
PKB 25 (7.4%) 
PKS 10 (3%) 
PPP 5 (1.5%) 
PAN 5 (1.5%) 
PD 4 (1.2%) 
PBB 3 (0.9%) 
PPDK 2 (0.6%) 
PDS 1 (0.3%) 
Pelopor 1 (0.3%) 
PPD 1 (0.3%) 
Total 337 
 
 Thus, the outcome would very clearly have favored Golkar at the expense of the other 
parties, although the PDI-P’s seat-share would actually have slightly increased over the seats 
it won in the fully-PR version.  However, this is only a rough estimate and does not fully 
represent all districts/municipalities because of missing detailed returns data.  Furthermore, 
the size of the DPR would have either drastically contracted (there were only around 400 
                                                 
73
 The data available at the KPU in Jakarta are missing returns from some municipalities in some districts so 
these calculations are done for only fully available municipal-level data.  It is important to note that two of the 
sets of missing detailed data are in Papua, where small parties have tended to perform very well relative to the 
rest of the country, and Central Kalimantan which is typically considered a PDI-P stronghold. 
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districts/municipalities actually created by the date of the election), or there would have been 
some formula for further subdividing some of the existing districts/municipalities into 
electoral districts.  Given the drastic overrepresentation of Golkar due to the party’s 
purposeful advocacy of the subdivision of existing districts/municipalities outside of Java, it 
is unlikely this particular formula for single-member districting would ever have been 
adopted.  Yet, the counterfactual does allow us to take a crude look at what the change might 
have produced and why other parties resisted its adoption. 
The slight opening of the list did not have any direct effect on the seat allocations 
within the parties; indeed the only two candidates who won seats based on individual vote 
totals were both listed first by their party in their respective districts and would have won 
their seats by virtue of the ranked-order anyway.  In addition, only 32 of nearly 10,000 
candidates (0.3%) won more than the minimum number of votes to be able to claim a seat 
based on the smallest district quota, and almost none were close enough to be able to win a 
seat in their own districts. 
There were also variations across the parties in terms of voters casting candidate-
specific votes.  Across the country, the average was 51.8% of votes cast for individual 
candidates.  The PDI-P far outstripped the competition in Central Java where it won 5.25 
million of the 17.63 million votes cast (29.8%).  However, only 2.02 million votes (38.5%) 
were cast for specific candidates, out of the 5.25 million cast for a candidate or the party, and 
the Party fielded only one candidate, out of 83 nominated on the ten district lists, who cleared 
the 95,011 threshold.  In contrast, Golkar far outstripped the competition in South Sulawesi 
where it won 1.6 million of the 3.6 million votes cast (44.7%).  In contrast to the PDI-P in 
Central Java, 1.06 million votes (65.9%) were cast for specific candidates, out of the 1.6 
161 
million cast for a candidate or the party.  Similarly, in North Sulawesi where Golkar won 
388,469 votes of the 1.2 million cast (32.3%), 327834 of those votes (84.4%) were cast for 
an individual candidate. 
Among the medium-sized and smaller parties there was variation as well.  Despite 
opposition to the open list voting, the PKS fielded a number of very high individual vote 
winners, including the single most popular candidate in the country.  The PKB had the 
second highest number of individual vote-winners in the 95,011+ range, but all were in East 
Java where the Party’s NU ties were strongest and where the party could run its most high 
profile NU religious leaders (ulama or kiai, as they are often called in Indonesia).  Neither 
the PAN nor the PPP did well at the individual candidate level, fielding no candidates who 
broke the 95,011 threshold of individual votes despite geographic strengths in Yogyakarta 
and West Java, respectively.  While the PDS did field a single high vote-winner in North 
Sulawesi, neither the PBB nor PBR had candidates who broke the 95,011 barrier despite their 
geographic strengths in West Java and South Sumatera, respectively, where each had some 
very high profile religious and community leaders.  And finally, the PD did manage to field a 
100,000+ vote-winner in North Sulawesi, as well as a number of other relatively strong 
individual vote-winners. 
In general, the openness of the lists produced no change to the actual composition of 
the DPR.  The two individual candidates who each won a full BPP in their district were 
already listed first by their parties and thus would have won their seats regardless of their 
individual vote total since no candidates listed below them won a full BPP to take their seats.  
However, it is important to note that despite the limited effect of moderate list openness on 
the DPR’s composition, many voters did cast ballots for individual candidates.  Thus, parties 
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could take note of which candidates were popular among voters and have a sense of what 
level of list openness might actually produce effective change in the event of ensuing 
reforms. 
 
Conclusion 
The 2004 legislative, and following presidential, elections produced some unexpected 
victories and losses for the 1999-2004 members of the DPR.  First, Golkar regained the 
mantle of the largest legislative party, though by a slim margin and with limited additional 
seats compared to 1999.  Combined with the victory of Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla, who was 
subsequently elected Golkar chairman in the party’s congress in late 2004, Golkar now had 
direct access to the government as well as better legislative standing.  In many ways these 
positions helped set the stage for the reform period during the 2004-2009 legislative session. 
Furthermore, the dramatic decline of the PDI-P to the second-largest legislative party, 
combined with Megawati’s loss to Yudhoyono and Kalla in the second round of the 
presidential elections, confirmed the reduced role the self-professed “opposition” PDI-P 
would likely play in affecting reform in the 2004-2009 period.  The ascendency of the PD 
and the PKS offset much of the PDI-P’s loss, and the two newer party positions would 
determine more of the direction of reform.  While the electoral system preferences of the 
PKS aligned closely with many preferences of the PDI-P, the two parties did not typically see 
themselves as natural allies.  In contrast, the PD and Golkar alliance in the executive branch 
would come to reflect shared positions on the need for electoral reform as well as some 
shared preferences for the nature of those reforms.  Optimism at winning the presidency 
enhanced the PD’s desire to reform the system in a less-inclusive way, partly to ensure that 
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Yudhoyono would again be able to run for re-election based on the PD’s electoral success in 
the 2009 legislative elections. 
The positions of the three other medium-sized parties – the PAN, PPP and PKB – 
would also shift as the post-2004 election party congresses elected new leadership that in 
many cases altered electoral system preferences.  While the PAN proved to benefit from the 
2004 electoral system, and would go on to pursue more reform again in the next period, the 
PPP and PKB began to back-pedal in the wake of reduced legislative seat-shares.  Three 
small parties – the PDS, the PBR and the PPDK – would join the PBB as parties too small to 
affect change alone but large enough to postpone additional changes en masse. 
In terms of specific reform outcomes, while the district magnitude reduction clearly 
played a role in the vote-to-seat differential and had different ramifications for the various 
parties, neither the past election vote threshold revision nor the switch to partly-open lists had 
an impact on the election outcome in 2004.  However, there was variation in the degree to 
which different parties’ candidates were more or less successful at winning individual votes 
in their districts, setting the stage for divergent views about the need for reforms and the 
likelihood about which reforms parties would be strategically more or less likely to pursue in 
the 2004-2009 period.  Many of the general beliefs individual parties held in the 1999-2004 
period persisted.  The largest shifts in attitudes came from the medium-sized parties which 
had benefitted from the 2003 changes and from the PDI-P, which had become increasingly 
aware of the limited effect of some key reforms such as the past election vote threshold and 
faced with the reality that it had done much more poorly in 2004 than it expected. 
Most importantly, the aggregate party system size had not undergone any major shifts 
due to the reforms, retaining almost as many legislative parties and actually increasing in 
164 
effective party system size from 1999.  Parties seeking widespread reform of the system 
faced the potential for another round of revisions to the structure of elections, alluded to in 
many positions by the PDI-P, Golkar, PAN and other parties regarding “gradual” change and 
increases in elements such as the threshold.  Many of the medium-sized and large parties now 
began the 2004-2009 legislative session with system ‘simplification’ on the brain, though 
few of the medium-sized parties felt as if they were really allies with the PDI-P and Golkar.  
Additionally, the remaining small parties faced the reality that if a newcomer (the PD) and 
other small parties (such as the PKS) managed to win significant portions of the seat-share 
and become medium-sized parties, they would have fewer allies to protect their interests. 
Taken together, the outcome of the 2002-2003 reform period suggests high support 
for seat-maximizing motivations by reformers in nearly every party except the PDI-P, which 
demonstrated a combination of mostly complementary seat-maximizing and alternative 
motivations.  However, the reforms had limited impact on the election outcomes and in fact 
did not produce some of the expected effects that reformers assumed, such as a simplification 
of the party system.  The limited effects of this round of reforms directly contributed to the 
desire for more reforms in the 2007-2008 period, but also constrained some of the options for 
reformers. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 5: The 2004-2009 Reform Period 
In this chapter I explore the effect of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations on the 
national electoral reforms adopted in Indonesia during the 2004-2009 legislative session.  I 
evaluate each of the major parties’ positions on three elements of reform – an electoral 
threshold, the size of electoral district magnitude, and the type of list proportional 
representation system in use – in order to assess the importance of seat-maximizing and 
alternative motivations in understanding the specific reforms that were adopted.  In order to 
do so, I situate the reform process within the post-2004 election context and compare party 
preferences to the proposal by the government and the professed interests of civil society.  
After assessing how individual party positions affected the exact composition of reforms that 
were adopted I proceed to analyze the impact those reforms had on the 2009 election 
outcomes, assessing whether party expectations were met and setting the stage for the 
ensuring reform process that is currently ongoing in the 2009-2014 legislative session. 
The 2002-2003 reform period indicated that legislators were reluctant to make any 
sweeping changes to the structure of elections, preferring the status quo for two primary 
reasons.  First, a healthy amount of skepticism about the intentions of Golkar prevailed 
among many elites in Jakarta; fears of a return to a system of politics that provided unequal 
advantages to different parties prompted many to adhere to the status quo precisely because it 
was Golkar who advocated for change.  Second, the interest of the PDI-P, then the largest 
fraksi, was clearly maintenance of many elements of the system that propelled them to power 
in 1999; ideological concerns also kept the PDI-P from pursuing or allowing reformation of 
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the system in a way that appeared to limit competition and stifle diversity, even when such 
change might have direct benefits to the PDI-P itself.  While not suggesting that alternative 
motivations played the largest role in determining the change (or lack thereof) in the 2001-3 
reform period, it is undeniably true that changes adopted very much reflected the uncertainty 
of the political landscape in the early consolidation phase of democratization as well as a 
broader range of interests and motivations on the part of elites that extended beyond simple 
seat-maximizing calculations. 
 The 2004-2009 period changed many of these elements, notably Golkar and the PDI-
P eventually finding some common ground on the issue of a threshold, other medium-sized 
parties, particularly the PAN, taking up some of the call for more openness of the candidate 
selection process, and the shifting power dynamics between the DPR and two other bodies – 
the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Constitutional Court.  While the early consolidation 
phase had been marked by a distinct adherence to many New Order practices and power 
balances in various aspects of governance, the tides were shifting by the time the review of 
the draft law got under way in Komisi 2 in 2007.  The reform process was more drawn out 
this time, more focused on the specific interests of legislative elites and less interested in the 
views and concerns of observers.  It also left issues on the table and disputes among 
legislators that the Court eventually stepped in to resolve, dramatically increasing the scale of 
change relative to the modest revisions that resulted in 2003. 
 While some of the reform process resulted from shifting power balances between 
branches of government and a shuffling of parties at the top of the system’s hierarchy, a few 
key issues that emerged early on in summer of 2007 were clear legacies of the previous 
reform process and the 2004 election outcome.  The ratchet effect was clear in all three areas 
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of reform, with experience in the 2004 elections playing a large role in views and choices in 
the 2007-8 reform process.  In addition, the composition of the legislature, and in particular 
the members of the Commission 2 and new Special Committee established to reform the 
political package of laws, bore interesting marks of the system adopted in 2003.  Many of the 
members and party leaders associated with the previous reform period remained in the 
legislature and could carry forward debates and views they previously held, though there was 
substantial turnover with the addition of the new PD and increase in the size of the PKS 
fraksi.  In sum, the outcome of the 2001-3 reform process changed specific elements of the 
process in 2007-8 in important ways. 
 In Chapter 4 I recapped the expectations for seat-maximization and alternative 
motivations, with clear evidence of seat-maximizing motives on the part of Golkar and most 
small and medium-sized parties and the PDI-P exhibiting clear alternative motivations on at 
least the legislative entry threshold.  In this chapter I hold similar expectations of seat 
maximization by many parties, though I still expect the PDI-P and, to a lesser extent, the 
PKS to demonstrate at least complementary alternative motives on the issue of thresholds 
and proportionality.  I also expect the medium-sized parties to more aggressively pursue a 
legislative entry threshold and additional reduction in district magnitude given that many of 
them benefitted from the changes to the vote-to-seat distribution translation in the 2003 
Election Law and should now try to more explicitly exclude smaller parties from contention. 
 More importantly, I now introduce some of the expectations of ratchet effects, since 
the 2002-3 reform period produced choices that had two consequences for the 2007-8 period.  
First, the choice to try to reduce district magnitude but retain proportionality had 
consequences for the party system.  There was a reduction in the total number of parties in 
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the DPR, particularly in the number of small parties, and creation of more medium-sized 
parties which benefitted more from the vote-to-seat translation than the PDI-P and Golkar.  I 
expect that the reduction of small parties and increase in medium-sized parties will produce 
either pressure for additional reductions or simple maintenance of the status quo 3-12 seat 
districts.  A similar effect is true for the list system, as the slight openness in 2004 did not 
much impact seat distributions or which candidates won seats, but pushed the issue of voter-
to-representative accountability into the public sphere.  I expect that the issue will be 
revisited and will produce either pressure for additional openness or maintenance of the 
slightly open list system used in the 2004 elections. 
 Second, the past election vote threshold used in place of a legislative entry threshold 
proved too easy to manipulate or ignore.  The result was 16 parties winning seats in the DPR.  
Sixteen is a reduction from the 21 legislative parties in 1999.  Yet the lack of progress in 
simplifying the party system, coupled with a presidential election in which the first round had 
7 tickets eligible to run, raises expectations that in this second period of reform the issue of a 
fixed legislative entry threshold should be a serious consideration.  Partly because the goal of 
party system simplification was not met through the previous mechanism, and partly because 
democracy appeared to be “safe” following the successful conduction of the 2004 legislative 
and presidential elections, I expect an end to the reformasi honeymoon and consensus-based 
process of reform used in 2002-2003 (hypothesis 5).  This should first and foremost affect the 
adoption of a legislative entry threshold. 
 Since these are contiguous reform episodes, I expect ratchet effects to be even more 
constraining than if the reforms were an extra election cycle or two apart.  Given that many 
of the reformers had some experience in the 1999-2004 DPR, I expect that similar 
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motivations will be at play in the 2007-8 reform period but that the alterations made during 
the reform process will explain changes made in 2007-8 that were not undertaken in 2001-3. 
 This chapter traces the process of reform during the 2004 to 2009 legislative session 
that produced the 2008 General Election Law, highlighting key actors, choices and 
constraints.  First, I introduce the context of reform in the post-2004 election period, based on 
the party power distribution resulting from the 2004 legislative and new direct executive 
elections.  Next I address the process of reform itself, focusing on the sequence of actor 
participation, the timing of reform negotiations and adoption relative to other political events 
and the upcoming 2009 election schedule.  I then tackle each of the reform components – 
electoral threshold, district magnitude, and list structure – to assess party-level positions, 
strategic and seat-maximizing incentives as well as alternative arguments for or against 
certain reform options.  I evaluate how the negotiation process affected the eventual 
decisions of individual parties in the DPR and subsequently required intervention by the 
Constitutional Court, finishing with a comparison of each element in the proposed draft law 
to the rules adopted in the final election law passed by the DPR and the rules actually used in 
the 2009 elections after the Court’s review.  Finally I conclude with evaluation of the impact 
of reforms on the Indonesian party system, assessing whether party expectations were met, 
which parties benefitted and which did not, and previewing possible scenarios for the 2009-
2014 reform period based on the outcome of the 2009 elections. 
 
Political Context of the Reform Period 
The newly-instituted direct elections for the president resulted in a PD victory over the PDI-P 
in the second round of voting held in September, as the PDI-P’s Megawati and NU running 
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mate Hasyim Muzadi74 lost to the PD’s ticket of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and 
Jusuf Kalla, who ran without a Golkar party affiliation in the first round but had a pro-Kalla 
Golkar faction’s support in the second round.75  The PD was concerned how the relative 
weakness of the party in the DPR, with only 10% of the seats, would affect the government’s 
ability to pass legislation.  SBY and Kalla became very involved in the months leading up to 
the election of a new Golkar chairman at the party’s 5-year congress and when the PD-
supportive candidates to counter Akbar Tandjung76 had been exhausted Kalla himself 
became a candidate for the chairmanship, winning the election in December 2004.  This now 
afforded the government a greater level of legislative support but many government-
proposed policies reflected as much, and sometimes greater, Golkar preference as PD 
preference due to their relative seat-shares in the DPR. 
While the legacy of dominance of the Ministry of Home Affairs very clearly directed 
the tone and initiation of the reform debate in 2003, as the draft law submitted by the 
Ministry kicked off all discussion.  Representatives of the Ministry were very closely 
involved in the process of educating Commission 2 members regarding different elements of 
the law.  Though not a full-scale change in 2007-2008, the Ministry’s relationship to the 
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 Megawati and the PKB had a complex relationship, as Megawati’s support for Wahid waned during the final 
months of his presidency and her eventual ascendancy to the office.  However, the relationship between the 
PDI-P and PKB, particularly the faction of the PKB which supported NU chairman Muzadi, was still close and 
still one of the few Islamic organizations to support a female president.  Thus, Megawati chose Muzadi as her 
running mate to encourage that relationship and the relatively similar ideological pursuits of the two parties. 
 
75
 After failing to win the Golkar presidential candidacy due to perceptions that as a non-Javanese he would not 
win, Kalla withdrew from the Golkar nominating convention and agreed to run with SBY on a PD ticket, since 
Golkar had already chosen its nominee: Wiranto.  Since PD had a large enough DPR seat-share to contest as a 
single party ticket under the reduced level in 2004, Kalla did not require a specific party affiliation in order to 
contest. 
 
76
 SBY and Kalla perceived Tandjung’s chairmanship as detrimental to Golkar support of PD policies since 
Tandjung had placed Golkar in “opposition” to the SBY-Kalla government along with Megawati’s PDI-P.  
“Golkar Returns to Post-New Order Rule” (Golkar Kembali Berkuasa Pasca-Orde Baru) in the central Javanese 
newspaper Suara Merdeka, December 20, 2004. 
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reform process was altered by the time the commission began reviewing the draft law as a 
new team leader replaced Siti Nurbaya, who left the Ministry to become the first secretariat 
of the newly-formed upper chamber, the DPD.  While in 2003 the final election law did not 
diverge very much from the Ministry’s draft in basic content and practice, primarily choosing 
to refine details and formulae with the exception of altering the openness of the nomination 
lists, the final 2008 election law barely resembled the Ministry’s draft in many key areas, 
including the threshold and openness of lists.  The Ministry team did not insert itself into the 
process to the same degree and some of the new team believed that the commission chairs 
and members would have cared little for their input had the Ministry representatives tried.77 
 What the shift in power between the legislature and the government suggested was 
that the time had come for legislators to legislate, breaking with the New Order tradition of 
government initiation and directives that lingered into the early consolidation phase.  The 
DPR began to assert itself in a number of other key areas, pushing forward policies and 
programs without close consultation to previously domineering Ministries, and the election 
law reform appeared to follow suit.78  While the Ministry of Home Affairs team continued to 
be involved with the process until the final law was sent to the joint MPR session, it appeared 
to the previous team leader that there was less of an active role by Ministry representatives in 
terms of education, simulation and explanation of various elements.79 
 Table 5.1 shows the relative seat-shares of the largest parties in the DPR.  Among the 
parties within the system following the 2004 elections, the two largest parties remained the 
same although the PDI-P fell by nearly half its fraksi size from 1999 and Golkar maintained a 
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 Interview with Sudarsono (July 2010). 
 
78
 Interview with Cecep Effendi (October 2010). 
 
79
 Interview with Siti Nurbaya (June 2010). 
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similar share of the votes and seats.  The PPP and PKB both declined to around the same size 
as the PAN, and now the PKS (formerly the PK) and PD joined them as medium-sized 
parties with 5-10% of the votes and seats each.  Rounding out the effective legislative parties 
were the Islamist PBB, which had been the smallest single-party fraksi in the 1999-2004 
DPR, the Christian PDS, the pluralist Islamist PBR, and the secular PPDK (whose leaders 
included two former Team 7 members, Andi Mallarangeng and Ryaas Rasyid); each of these 
parties held somewhere between 1-3% of the DPR seats and combined with other parties to 
form fraksi.  The first direct executive elections in 2004 resulted in Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono from the PD and Yusuf Kalla from Golkar winning the presidency and vice 
presidency, respectively.  This meant that although the PD controlled a small subset of the 
DPR seats, it had a relatively close working relationship with Golkar in the government.   
Table 5.1  2004 Party Seat Percentages 
Party Seat % (Number) 
Golkar 23.09%  (127) 
PDI-P 19.82%  (109) 
PPP 10.55%   (58) 
PD 10.18%   (56) 
PAN 9.64%     (53) 
PKB 9.45%     (52) 
PKS 8.18%     (45) 
PBB 2%           (11) 
PDS 2.36%     (13) 
PBR 2.55%     (14) 
PPDK 0.73%      (4) 
Other 1.45%      (8) 
 
 In terms of interparty dynamics, new animosity had arisen since the 2004 elections.  
The PDI-P’s chairwoman, Megawati, deeply resented the fact that one of her former 
ministers, SBY, chose to run against her in the first presidential election.80  More 
importantly, she deeply resented losing the second round run-off to the SBY-Kalla ticket; this 
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resulted in the PDI-P’s declaration of itself as the “opposition” to the government coalition, 
which included nearly all other parties and elites in the system.  Following Kalla’s election to 
the Golkar chairmanship the PDI-P now had few allies and far fewer seats than in 1999.  The 
executive marriage of PD and Golkar only reinforced how isolated the PDI-P was in 2004. 
 The 2004-2009 DPR also had a new counterpart – the House of Regional 
Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD) – which replaced the functional groups 
and military representatives in the entirely-elected new MPR.  Despite having no power over 
legislation related to elections except those for the subnational legislatures, the new DPD 
represented a different element of power realignment: the lack of a military presence and 
voice regarding electoral processes and the structure of competitive politics.  The DPD would 
also have an effect on pemekaraan in the sense that it would be a primary location for the 
origination of new districts.  A non-partisan chamber, the DPD had few real abilities to 
constrain actions taken or legislation already approved by the DPR. 
 Finally, the rise of the judicial branch, in particular the creation of a powerful 
Constitutional Court via the constitutional amendment process in 2001, provided a final 
power balancing mechanism to the 2004-2009 DPR.  Four of the nine justices were selected 
by the DPR and two were elected to the DPR prior to their court appointments, prompting 
concerns about judicial objectivity and the introduction of party politics to the bench.  Court 
intervention in late 2008 produced fundamental changes to the structure and conduct of the 
2009 elections. 
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Procedure and Sequencing in the Reform Process 
Similar to the process in 2002-2003, the first draft laws were submitted by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs to the DPR for review.  However, the Ministry itself had undergone a revision 
in the number of experts it consulted during the drafting process, and previous consultants 
held the perception of a return to “business as usual” in the Ministry now that reformasi was 
over.  Former academics and members of the KPU who had consulted with the Ministry in 
the previous reform period were now shut out of the drafting process and the Ministry instead 
relied on bureaucrats to fill the role that experts had previously done.81  The Ministry’s 
proposed draft law diverged to some degree from the final 2003 election law, as summarized 
in Table 5.2, but with a key difference in terms of the list nominating system, once again 
choosing to push a moderate increase in the past election vote threshold and open lists. 
Table 5.2  Proposed Changes in the New Draft Election Law (2007) 
 Threshold District Magnitude List PR 
Previous Election 
Law 
(produced by 
Commission 2, 
passed by DPR in 
March 2003) 
Moderate increase (to 
3% DPR, 4% ½ 
DPRD1 or 4% ½ 
DPRD2) in past 
election vote threshold 
550 seats divided 
into 69 districts 
with 3-12 seats, 
boundary lines 
drawn based on 
population within 
provincial 
boundaries 
Partly open, list order 
unless candidate wins 
100% BPP of 
individual votes 
New Draft Election 
Law 
(produced by 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs in July 2007) 
Moderate increase (to 
4% DPR, 5% ½ 
DPRD1 or 5% ½ 
DPRD2) in past 
election vote threshold 
3-12 seats per 
district, only 
recalculate for 
province creation 
and set maximum 
at 560 seats 
Fully open, plurality 
vote within party 
district list 
Sources: Draft Election Law and  Final Election Law from the Document Archive of the DPR 
  
The draft law retained the 3-12 seat district magnitudes from 2004, including a 
provision for an extra ten seats due to the creation of the new province of West Sulawesi 
(which would need at least the minimum number of seats) and redistribution of seats in the 
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South Sulawesi districts from which the new province had largely been subdivided.  On the 
issue of the past election vote threshold the proposed level was raised to 5% of DPR seats or 
5% of ½ the seats in the DPRD1 or DPRD2, but once again there was no reference to a 
legislative entry threshold.  Finally, on the party nomination lists, the Ministry’s team once 
again attempted to introduce fully open lists with seats distributed based on plurality voting 
(suara terbanyak), rather than a numerically-ordered list, as the mechanism for allocating 
seats won by a party within district. 
 In addition, the perception among consultants and academics was that the DPR 
members thought that they had less need for expert advice and could prepare for the 
discussion and legal drafting themselves.  Many expressed concerns regarding the “closed 
door” nature of the Working Committee meetings, often held in hotels and away from the 
public.82  However, few of the consultants and academics involved in or shut out of the 
process in 2007-2008 believed that the representatives were well-equipped with anything but 
political views, and some questioned whether many of the fraksi even possessed the 
necessary technical staff to simulate election-related outcomes.83  In contrast, the 
chairpersons of the Special Committee and key fraksi representatives felt they more than 
adequately included expert advisors in the reform process and believed that they relied 
heavily on expert input and simulations regarding key decisions.84  In response to the draft 
law, each party submitted a list of problems that were eventually spelled out and presented to 
the Working Committee of Commission 2.  Table 5.3 summarizes these positions of the 
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major parties on the three elements of reform in the draft, as well as some of the preferences 
of civil society regarding particular aspects of the law. 
Key stages of the reform process in 2007-8 took longer than the one that occurred in 
2002-3.  Nearly two months of meetings, from July to September 2007, with consultants, 
experts, civil society organizations and government research representatives preceded the 
meetings of the Special and Working Committees.  The Special Committee officially met 14 
times from September to November for broad discussions and the Working Committee 
officially met 6 times from November to December, followed by 14 meetings of the 
Formulation Team (Tim Perumusan) from January to February 2008 and 17 meetings of the 
Synchronization Team (Tim Sinkronisasi) in February, with a final meeting of the Working 
Committee on February 20 prior to final submission to the plenary session of the DPR on 
February 28, 2008.  Though the process in 2007-8 took the same total amount of time, nine 
months from draft law submission to passage in the DPR, the length of time spent on open-
door consultations was significantly longer in 2007 and the frequency of closed-door Special 
and Working Committee meetings increased. 
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 Electoral Threshold Reform 
The Ministry’s draft law did not alter the fundamental structure of the competitive entry 
threshold but raised that barrier to 1) 5% of the 2004-2009 DPR seats, or 2) 5% of the 2004-
2009 DPRD1 or DPRD2 seats in at least half the provinces or municipalities.  There was also 
an additional provision in the draft law to prohibit those parties which failed to meet barriers 
of 3% of seats in the DPR or 4% of seats in half of the DPRD1 and DPRD2 from running 
alone in 2009.  Those parties would be required to run with another party meeting the 
barriers alone or between the two (or more) together or to disband.  The draft law did not 
include a provision for the addition of a legislative entry threshold beyond these moderate 
proposed increases to the entry barrier, and the Ministry’s justification about the proposed 
increases clearly indicated that they believed an entry barrier would simplify the party system 
if the barrier was high enough. 
Once in negotiations in the DPR, however, the issue of a too-large and too-complex 
party system arose again.  With 17 parties, and nine fraksi, there were still seven parties with 
fewer than five seats (1% of the DPR) and another three with fewer than fifteen seats (3% of 
the DPR).  As the legislative session progressed, more and more concerns were expressed 
over the nature of a presidential system combined with such a large, and perceived unwieldy, 
party system.  There had already been seven presidential tickets competing in the first round 
of the 2004 elections.  Many observers hoped that a reduction in the number of legislative 
parties would translate into some consolidation of tickets in the executive elections that 
followed. 
 In response to the limited changes in the Ministry’s draft law, the fraksi raised their 
objections in the pemandangan umum, or “general views,” session of the Special Committee 
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that introduced complaints and concerns.  Golkar agreed with the increases in the past 
election vote threshold and argued that the next step should be the adoption of a fixed 
legislative entry threshold to increase the effectiveness of the representative body.  The PDI-
P had always been a proponent of continuing diversity in the system but by the time the 2007 
draft law was submitted the party had changed its views on the ability of the past election 
vote threshold to be effective.  Concerns that parties would continue to “cheat” the system by 
changing names or face limited enforcement scrutiny convinced PDI-P leaders that a 
legislative entry threshold would accomplish the goals of making parties work harder (“kerja 
keras”) and simplifying the party system as long as the threshold did not get too high, 
eliminating diversity.85 
Among the medium-sized parties, the PD and the PAN were less concerned about the 
change in the threshold level.  The PD agreed to the increase in the past election vote 
threshold but made no mention of a legislative entry threshold, while the PAN argued that the 
problem was not the level of the threshold but effective implementation and enforcement of 
the existing threshold.  The PPP’s view on the draft law threshold was that it should not 
increase from 3% and the party took the position that returning to 3% was adequate for 
simplifying the system, both in the short and long term.  The PKB wanted to delay the 
increase to the threshold until the 2014 election, keeping the parameters established in the 
2003 election law for the 2009 elections, while the PKS was more specific and not only 
wanted a delay but wanted the increase to only become 4% of the DPR seats or 5% of the 
seats in half of the DPRD1 or DPRD2, rather than 5% of either. 
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The fraksi representing the small parties – PBB, PDS, PPDK, PBR, Pelopor – all 
objected to the increased past election vote threshold and what they perceived as 
“hegemony” or “tyranny” (hegemoni/tirani) of the majority that sought to reduce the number 
of parties by eliminating all the small ones and the voices they represented.  In addition, 
some of the smaller parties were confused by the apparent contradiction in the draft law that 
read as if it applied to the 2009 election, and thus appeared to preempt the previous election 
law that automatically granted them entry into the 2009 elections since they were part of the 
DPR already. 
Outside of the parties, the expert teams (tim ahli) that were formed by the government 
and civil society groups all expressed similar concerns about the ability of parties to “cheat” 
the mechanism of the past election vote threshold.86  However, there was little consensus on 
the best way to approach the problem, through the legislative entry threshold or better 
enforcement of the existing rules.  Many observers felt the system too unwieldy to continue 
with more than a dozen legislative parties but worried about the intentions of actors pushing 
for the threshold. 
 The result, both within the legislature and the pool of advisors, was a 4-month 
stalemate over the most appropriate way to structure competition, with the small parties 
insistent on a legislative entry threshold of no higher than 1-2%, if one had to be adopted at 
all.  One vice chairperson of the Special Committee suggested that a clear objective at the 
outset of negotiations was to simplify the party system and reduce the total number of DPR 
parties.87  However, the large number of participants made the reality of such an outcome 
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difficult to achieve and negotiations took so long that the eventual result was challenged in 
the Constitutional Court which upheld the most significant change. 
Two separate bargaining tools emerged during the negotiations over the threshold that 
resulted in a single eventual compromise.  First, three of the largest parties – Golkar, PDI-P, 
PKS – wanted a fixed 3% legislative entry threshold, which most calculated would reduce 
the number of parties to the 3-7 party range.  While the PAN and the PKB were willing to 
settle at 2.5% but did not want to go higher, the PPP and PD held similar positions to the 
smallest parties that anything beyond 1-2% would be undemocratic.  The PPP argued that a 
threshold of 1% was enough because it could always be increased gradually in the future if 
needed.88  Only the PD and PKB’s positions suggested a lack of clear strategic focus, with 
the PD clearly rising in popularity throughout SBY’s term in office and the PKB consistently 
showing signs of internal fragmentation and declining support. 
The second issue was whether the legislative entry threshold would apply to the 
DPRD1 and DPRD2 or whether it would simply be for calculating seat allocations to the 
DPR; in this case the arguments for and against applying the threshold at all levels varied 
both on the grounds of ideology and apparent strategy.  While the PDI-P and Golkar were 
consistent proponents of applying a legislative entry threshold at all levels,89 both for the 
sake of universality and because each stood to gain in the districts where they were strongest, 
the PAN took the perspective that the DPRD1 and DPRD2 were generally such small 
numbers of seats that a threshold would not matter anyway.90  The PPP and PKB had mixed 
views on applying a threshold below the national level, with the PPP viewing the unitary 
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system as requiring universality in application of the rules91 and the PKB viewing the local 
diversity and keeping the big parties honest as justifications for retaining different sets of 
rules for the different levels of government.92  While the PKB’s argument could easily have 
represented both ideological and seat-maximizing motivations, given the party’s extreme 
strength in East Java but limited appeal in many other parts of the country, the PPP’s push for 
a universal threshold must be evaluated as an ideological perspective on the nature of the 
unitary state – few parties stood to lose as much as the PPP if it could not win seats in local 
governments  and its precipitous decline in the national polls caused it to be eliminated from 
the political arena. 
In the end, the PDI-P, Golkar and PKS issued an ultimatum to the other parties of a 
2.5% legislative entry threshold or they would simply raise the number and force the issue to 
a vote, which they would win with tacit PAN and PKB backing.93  The goal of the PDI-P and 
Golkar had been for a threshold that applied at all levels of government but the resistance 
they faced in passing the 2.5% level led them to compromise and only apply the legislative 
entry threshold to the national election.  In return, they also wanted the continuation of the 
past election vote threshold which made its way into the law. 
However, both thresholds were challenged at the Constitutional Court.  In a 6-3 vote, 
the Court ruled that the past election barrier would be removed but the 2.5% threshold would 
be upheld at the national level.  Thus, the final rule applied to the elections was a 2.5% fixed 
legislative entry threshold and no past election vote threshold based on previous electoral 
performance or DPR membership.  According to Justice Akil Mochtar, part of the Court’s 
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reasoning came from the argument that Indonesian democracy was consolidated and could 
withstand the “simplification” of the party system, though he expressed reservations that the 
lack of a past election vote threshold would not consolidate anything (interview, May 2010). 
Throughout the negotiations PDI-P leadership displayed both seat-maximizing and 
alternative motivations regarding the application of a legislative entry threshold, arguing that 
while the party system needed simplification in order to provide more effective governance 
there were limits to how much competition should be limited.  Golkar displayed little besides 
seat-maximizing logic in its pursuit of a legislative entry threshold, as its representatives 
occasionally conveyed their expectations that the adoption of a threshold that eliminated 
smaller parties (i.e. new entrants that were fragments from Golkar) would result in those 
smaller parties returning to Golkar and bringing their voters with them.94  In seat-maximizing 
logic, the PKS eventually threw its weight behind a fixed legislative entry threshold once the 
party came to the realization that it would likely be a beneficiary from the elimination of 
smaller parties; this was an about-face from the much-smaller PK perspective in 2002 when 
the party opposed any threshold because it was one of the smaller parties facing elimination. 
The PD, PAN and PKB all hedged their bets in seat-maximizing mode, wanting little 
to no legislative entry threshold in case their electoral fortunes did not improve in 2009 but a 
more effective past election vote threshold to keep the small parties from contesting and 
winning a seat here or there that might otherwise go to them.  The final result was a direct 
bargain between the largest parties, which held somewhat different rationale for their 
preferences, and the varied expectations of the medium-sized parties.  The Constitutional 
Court ultimately striking down the past election vote threshold pleased the small parties in 
danger of missing the threshold, while the lack of a legislative entry threshold at the 
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provincial and municipal levels represented a compromise between the larger parties 
(particularly Golkar, PDI-P, and PKS) and the smaller parties in order to pass some law in 
time for the elections, as well as the fact that the committee had run out of time to continue 
the deadlocked debate. 
 
District Magnitude Reform 
The Ministry’s draft law again did not alter the fundamental structure of the districts that had 
been put in place in 2003, retaining the exact provisions for districts of 3-12 seats in 
magnitude and leaving the actual drawing of district lines to the KPU.  While the Ministry’s 
justification did not note a specific objection to the general size of the districts in terms of 
magnitude, it did raise some concerns about the formula for allocating the number of seats 
per district and warned of potential “gerrymandering” abuses that might occur. 
 Golkar, in addition to outright pursuit of a single-member district system, chose to 
frame its objections to the 3-12 seat district magnitude and call for a lowering of the ceiling 
to 6 maximum seats per district.  The fraksi position paper criticized the 120% list length 
provided for in the 2004 elections, under which parties could nominate a list of candidates up 
to 120% of the available seats such that a 10-seat district’s party list could nominate 12 
names, arguing that it encouraged candidates who were not serious or invested in 
representing their district.  Golkar thus proposed a 3-6 seat district magnitude range with 
exactly the number of nominees per seats available – a 4 seat district could have up to 4 
names from each party on that district’s party lists.  However, Golkar also inserted a section 
into its position paper objecting to the mechanism for districting as needing to “increase 
communication with regional [constituents],” proposing a revision to the method for 
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allocating districts to regions to better balance “on Java” and “off Java” and to consider 
allowing for a non-fixed number of DPR seats. 
  By this time, the PDI-P had come around to the idea of smaller districts, arguing that 
their legislators could not do good work if they were expected to split time between 
campaigning in physically enormous districts and making policy decisions in Jakarta.95  The 
3-6 district magnitude range garnered support among its leaders largely because of that 
constituency representation argument and in reaction to concerns voiced by observers that 
legislators needed to be closer to their constituents.  However, the PDI-P remained 
steadfastly opposed to a single-member district system on the grounds that it would eliminate 
diversity and minority representation and, at least publicly, did not entertain discussions 
about reducing the district magnitude floor below 3. 
 However, nearly every other party wanted to retain the 3-12 seat districts used in 
2004, including the PPP, PAN, PKB and PKS, with the PD initially more concerned with the 
total number of districts (maximum of 80) than the seats per district.  During the course of 
discussions only the PKB and PKS appeared to change their positions, with both leaning 
toward a slight reduction in the ceiling on district magnitude to a 3-8 seat range.  However, 
while the PKS changed its position permanently after running internal election simulations 
that suggested the change would increase the party’s seat-share,96 the PKB worried about its 
overall declining voteshare and thus did not present itself as a consistent supporter of any 
reduction in the magnitude throughout the negotiations.  One PAN representative interviewed 
expressed the view that the party had at one point wanted to consider adopting a single-
member district system but did not feel there were enough other parties in support of the plan 
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and so backed off;97 however, no other PAN representatives suggested anything similar in the 
party’s platform in the 2004-2009 period.98 
 One additional option that was raised, Golkar’s “on Java”/“off Java” concern, 
manifested itself as a confusing dialogue about a sistem kombinasi, or a combination system 
more commonly referred to as a mixed-electoral system that was advocated for by some 
influential civil society members and international organizations, including Hadar Gumay of 
CETRO (Center for Electoral Reform), an Indonesian civil society organization focused on 
education about electoral system reform.  The mixed system considered by the government 
was one in which the Java-based voting would take place in single-member districts based on 
district/municipality divisions (the kabupaten and kotamadya of the DPRD2) and the outside 
Java-based voting would continue to take place in multi-member districts with party lists.99  
However, it is unclear if Golkar, or any other members of Commission 2 conceived of a 
mixed-system to this effect – interviews with Golkar representatives suggest they were more 
interested in a parallel system than the reapportioning model suggested by Gumay.100  The 
mixed system was never a serious consideration, partly because of the confusion surrounding 
which formula for seat allocation and ballot format were being discussed and partly because 
of the perception that it would be a difficult system for voters to understand. 
 The compromise between the PDI-P/Golkar bloc pushing for 3-6 seat districts, the 
PKS in favor of 3-8 seat districts, and every other party still supporting 3-12 seat districts 
was a slight reduction to 3-10 seats per district.  The districts would be drawn along similar 
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lines to those in 2004 but the population-based calculations combined with the creation of a 
new province (West Sulawesi) produced eight new districts overall, from 69 in 2004 to 77 in 
2009.  How to subdivide some of the districts proved extremely controversial, such as the 
debate between Golkar and PAN over subdividing South Sulawesi’s two electoral districts 
into three plus the addition of the new West Sulawesi district.101 
 In sum, the shift in the PDI-P’s stance on district magnitude reflected some balance 
between seat-maximizing and alternative motivations since the party’s leadership clearly 
recognized that smaller districts would allow the party to a) more effectively campaign in and 
b) more closely represent distinct constituencies.  However, the PDI-P’s continued 
opposition to single-member districts consistently indicated that the party really did not 
believe that full-scale majoritarian districting could appropriately represent the diversity of 
the Indonesian nation.  Golkar’s position in pursuit of single-member districts and, failing 
that, much reduced magnitude of the electoral districts based on proportionality, clearly 
signaled seat-maximization as its basic logic, while all the medium-sized and smaller parties 
opposed to single-member districts and drastic reductions in average district magnitude 
clearly did so for self-preservation reasons.  The exception to this observation was the PBR 
which argued that single-member districts would be the preferable system due to the views of 
its chairman, Bursah Zarnubi, that the most democratic form of accountability came from a 
single representative-single district relationship, despite clear indications that such a system 
would rob the party of all dozen of the seats it held in the DPR.102 
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List PR Reform 
The Ministry’s draft law once again included a provision for fully open lists, very clearly 
applying the same principles and similar wording as the DPD’s multi-member district 
plurality elections just within the confines of party lists.  The wording of the clause (RUU 
Pemilu 2007, Article 208) clearly stated that seats would be allocated to candidates within a 
single party in each electoral district on the basis of suara terbanyak, the largest vote.  Thus, 
the seats that would be awarded to parties in a given district were intended to go to the 
candidates with the highest vote totals within that party’s district list.  The wording was more 
explicit than in the 2002 draft and the government’s justification to the DPR was that the 
eventual wording of Article 107 in the 2003 Election Law circumvented full implementation 
of the open list system that the law implied and that the Ministry had included in the original 
2002 draft law. 
 Once again, the PDI-P generally took a position of opposition to the open lists but in 
this period the PAN had joined Golkar in supporting the move to open lists that the PD, with 
its presence in the government, also supported to some degree.  Golkar’s objections were not 
very clear in details: in its position paper to the first Working Committee meeting the party 
confusingly advocated for a gradual opening of the lists in which a proportion of the BPP 
(district quota) necessary to win a seat as an individual candidate, rather than the 100% of a 
BPP as in 2004, eventually gave way to completely open lists; alternatively Golkar suggested 
a single-member district system. 
 In sum, both Golkar and the PD proposed similar revisions to the wording of the law 
that would require individual candidates to receive a minimum proportion of a BPP in order 
to obtain a seat through voter choice; party leaders expressed some reservations about the 
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loss of control of their candidates once nominated but on the whole reasoned that they would 
retain control of the nomination process.  The PDI-P, realizing that most other parties 
objected to returning to fully closed lists,103 eventually acquiesced to the idea while keeping 
in mind that the proposed reform still retained party control for the nomination process and 
so their typically high criteria for selection of candidates would remain the party’s decision.  
However, the PDI-P never supported open lists and sought the compromise over the 
openness of the list that would retain as much centralized party control over the nomination 
process as possible.104  The PAN threw its entire support behind fully open lists but it was the 
only fraksi to do so at any point throughout the negotiations and remained a consistent 
advocate for the fully open lists,105 though some individual representatives did raise the idea 
from within the other fraksi. 
The PKS position on the open lists was the most difficult to discern, notably because 
representatives made contradictory statements and even their position paper in the Special 
Committee suggested a confusing support for open lists, though perhaps it was simply to an 
element of openness.  It is possible the confusion stemmed from fragmentation within party 
leadership,106 and also given that they were one of the few parties to have extraordinarily 
popular, though clearly party-oriented, DPR representatives such as Hidayat Nur Wahid who 
was the highest individual vote-winner in the 2004 election.  However, the PKS’s internal 
hierarchy and advancement system was far more suited to closed lists, based on a process of 
caderization (kaderisasi) in which grassroots activists worked their way up to candidacy at 
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the local, then provincial, then national level.107  On the whole, PKS representatives indicated 
little support for fully open lists and spoke about the eventual outcome as an unavoidable 
political compromise.108 
The PPP argued that lists should reflect both voter choice and party goals, but left it 
unclear how to adjudicate between the two in terms of actually allocating seats.  In practice, 
no PPP representative or party leader interviewed expressed anything but opposition on 
behalf of the party to fully open lists and most spoke of the eventual outcome in the same 
way as most PKS representatives: as an unavoidable political compromise.109  The rest of the 
smaller parties, from the PBB to PDS to PPDK, all appeared unhappy with the prospect of 
fully open lists and viewed them as a mechanism for the largest parties to win more votes by 
courting popular figures and exploiting “money politics” in ways they would, or could, not. 
The process of deciding what to do about a proposed system that almost no fraksi 
favored in its exact structure led to a protracted debate over how to “reclose” the lists to some 
degree.  In one of the more technically-oriented discussions during the election law revisions, 
the Special Committee evaluated numbers from the 2004 elections to assess what percentage 
of a BPP would make for a difficult, yet reasonable, level for an individual candidate to 
obtain in order to win a seat.  Proportions of a BPP in the 25-50% range were the most 
frequently discussed, 25% being the initial proposed level by the PD in their position paper in 
July 2007.  The committee settled on a 30% BPP cutoff on the grounds that a higher figure 
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like 50% would eliminate all voter choice because so few candidates in 2004 won 50% of a 
BPP in individual candidate votes.110 
The law eventually stated that 30% of one BPP was the basic requirement to win a 
seat individually (i.e. out of list order) at all and the 100% BPP automatically qualified an 
individual candidate to win a seat outright.  However, if multiple candidates received 30-99% 
they would be chosen based on the rank-ordering of the submitted lists rather than the highest 
individual vote-share.  For example, if a party received a party vote-share of one BPP in a 
district, qualifying for one seat, but none of its individual candidates in that district won at 
least 30% of the BPP in individual candidate votes, the party’s seat would automatically go 
to the first-ordered name on the party’s district list.  If a party received a party vote-share of 
one BPP in a district, qualifying for one seat, and one of its candidates won between 30-99% 
of a BPP in individual candidate votes, the party’s seat would automatically go to that 
candidate, regardless of that candidate’s ordered list position.  If a party received a party 
vote-share of one BPP in a district, qualifying for one seat, and two of its candidates won 
between 30-99% of a BPP in individual candidate votes, the party’s seat would go to the 
candidate ranked higher on the party’s ordered list, regardless of whether that candidate had 
the higher individual vote total of the two or if s/he had the exact same number of individual 
votes.  Any candidate receiving 100% of one BPP in individual votes in a district would 
automatically gain a seat in that district. 
Thus, the eventual package adopted defied most of the logic behind the openness of 
the lists in terms of translating voter choice into seat allocations.  Voter choice would only 
matter in cases where an individual could win 100% of a BPP and an automatic seat or where 
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a party won a single seat and only one candidate won between 30-99% of a BPP.  In all other 
situations the party list ordering would prevail in determining the candidates who filled seats. 
Challenging the clauses (UU10/2008, Article 214a-e) in the Constitutional Court, 
petitioners from PD argued that the 30-99% stipulation clearly violated the spirit of pluralism 
and voter choice.  In a unanimous ruling on December 19, 2008, the court overturned the 
constraints in Article 214, striking its contents from the Law and fully opening the lists to 
suara terbanyak, or highest individual vote, as the sole determinant in selecting individual 
candidates to fill party seat allocations.  The court justified its opinion on the basis that 
Article 214 violated the spirit of “direct” election and sovereignty of the people stipulated in 
the Constitution.  Particularly in the case where two candidates acquire extremely different 
numbers of votes the logical application would be that the candidate acquiring more votes 
win the seat over the candidate acquiring fewer votes, which was not guaranteed under 
Article 214.  Parties were not required to resubmit the party nomination lists that were 
approved by the KPU in October, and so voters faced ballots that still reflected the party’s 
rank ordering of candidates but could vote knowing that their votes would entirely determine 
which of those candidates would receive seats. 
The Court’s ruling prompted a number of concerns regarding judicial objectivity, as 
the ruling very closely reflected the system originally proposed by the government and 
certain political factions.  However, though many parties expressed displeasure and 
skepticism at the ruling, all parties agreed to abide by the new rules though many now 
worried that the fully open lists would cause widespread internal friction as parties’ 
candidates would enter the March 2009 campaign period with less incentive to advocate for 
the party relative to their own personal interests.  The parties expressing the greatest 
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frustration at the law, but with few concerns that they could not control their own candidates, 
were the PKS and PDI-P;111 the PAN leadership was happy with the Court’s ruling though 
individual representatives expressed private concerns about the party’s strategy for 
competing in a system of fully open lists.112 
With respect to the format of the lists, once again nearly every party chose to pursue 
the type of system it believed would be seat-maximizing for itself in the 2009 elections.  The 
PDI-P, and to a lesser degree the PKS, pursued closed lists on the grounds that their party’s 
candidates reflected broader goals about the party’s platform and therefore the party should 
get to choose which of those candidates to represent the party’s (and its voters’) interests in 
the legislature.  Furthermore, the PDI-P and PKS had very meritocratic candidate selection 
criteria, relative to the other parties, and both wanted to advertise the idea that work and 
advancement within the party were reasons for people to become members and stay working 
with/for the party on key ideological issues over time.  Thus, when it came to debating over 
the format of the lists, the PDI-P and PKS opposed fully open lists and pursued a level of 
openness as a concession to the larger group within the DPR that wanted more direct voter 
choice of candidates. 
The remaining parties, in particular the PAN, were more interested in some form of 
open list also for strategic reasons.  Most had strength in specific voting bases, in particular 
the PKB in East Java and Golkar in the Outer Islands such as Sulawesi, or could field 
professionally-networked, resource-endowed and/or locally popular candidates, such as the 
PD and the PAN, in order to pursue party seats via individual candidate strength.  In some 
                                                 
111
 Interviews with Anis Matta (July 2010), Agus Purnomo (November 2010), Yassona Laoly (November 2010) 
and Ganjar Pranowo (November 2010). 
 
112
 Interviews with Djoko Susilo (July 2010) and Alvin Lie (July 2010). 
194 
ways the PAN’s pursuit of open lists was a combination of seat-maximizing and alternative 
motivations because the PAN’s leadership represented a more tightly-knit and ideologically-
focused group than its candidates.  However, all the parties pursuing a combination of open 
and closed list attributes did so partly to ensure party control over some aspects of candidate 
nominations and partly to tap into individual candidates’ abilities to directly win greater seat-
shares for the parties. 
 
General Conclusions about and Expectations of the Reform Process 
The 2007-8 process demonstrated some similarities to the 2002-3 process but three key 
differences drove many of the negotiations and explain a good deal about the reforms that 
were eventually adopted, as well as the justification and motivation for the Court challenges.  
First, the reformasi “idealism” appeared to fade as party elites in the DPR now found it more 
difficult to compromise and reach consensus, pursing political interests as their primary 
concern.113  Second, parties within the DPR were less content to rely on the 
recommendations and information provided by the government or expert consultants,114 
although a number of individual legislators specifically referred to how helpful expert advice 
had been in formulating their positions and decisions.115  Third, the effects of the previous 
round of reform in 2002-3 constrained negotiations and set up circumstances for the 
prioritization of specific issues in 2007-8.  Table 5.4 summarizes the differences between the 
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Ministry of Home Affairs’ draft law, the law passed by the DPR, and the final changes made 
by the Constitutional Court rulings. 
Table 5.4  Changes from Draft Law (2007) to Final Election Law and Court Rulings (2008) 
 Threshold District Magnitude List PR 
Draft Election Law 
(produced by 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs in July 2007) 
Moderate increase (to 
4% DPR, 5% ½ 
DPRD1 or 5% ½ 
DPRD2) in past 
election vote 
threshold 
3-12 seats per 
district, only 
recalculate for 
province creation 
and set maximum 
at 560 seats 
Fully open, plurality 
vote within party 
district list 
Final Election Law 
(produced by 
Commission 2, 
passed by DPR in 
March 2008) 
Moderate increase (to 
4% DPR, 5% ½ 
DPRD1 or 5% ½ 
DPRD2) in past 
election vote 
threshold; 
2.5% legislative entry 
threshold only for 
DPR 
3-10 seats per 
district, results in 
increase to 76 
districts for the 
560 DPR seats 
Partly open, 100% BPP 
automatically wins 
individual candidate a 
seat, 30-99% BPP wins 
individual candidates 
seats in list order of all 
party district candidates 
with 30-99%, <30% in 
list order 
Final Electoral 
System in 2009 
(following 
Constitutional Court 
Rulings in October 
and December 2008) 
2.5% legislative entry 
threshold only for 
DPR 
No change: 3-10 
seats per district 
Fully open, plurality 
vote within party 
district list 
Sources: 
1) Draft Election Law and Final Election Law from the Document Archive of the DPR 
2) Constitutional Court Rulings downloaded from Hukumonline (HOL database) of Indonesian legal 
proceedings 
 
 Due to these factors, the reform process that turned the Ministry’s draft proposal into 
the law passed by the MPR lasted roughly the same length of time as the previous process – 
with 4 months of hearings and committee meetings – but the time spent on different aspects 
of the process varied, as well as the access of non-committee members.  While the process in 
2002 involved more open meetings, hearings and consultations, the process in 2007 was 
perceived to be much more “closed door” and exclusive to legislators rather than experts or 
196 
the government’s advisors.116   In addition, the number of hearings and meetings held during 
each month was nearly double that of the totals in 2002, such that the process technically 
took the same length of time in months but actually took twice the amount of time in hearing 
and meeting frequency.117   
 In this period, parties negotiated far more over the specific levels of thresholds, 
district magnitudes and list openness, rather than switching positions as many had in the 
previous reform period.  Both in the beginning of the 2007 reform process and at the end 
only Golkar and the PDI-P really wanted a strict legislative entry threshold, and they 
disagreed on how high the level should be to start, while all the medium and small parties 
were opposed.  However, the collective will of Golkar and PDI-P was enough to force the 
discussion to revolve around how high the threshold would be, rather than whether one 
would be instituted. 
On this issue, since the PDI-P still expressed reservations about too much constraint 
on competition and preferred starting low and following a gradual increase in a legislative 
entry threshold, the 2.5% level was chosen as the result of a compromise between the two 
parties which wanted a threshold and the remaining parties which did not.  In 2002-2003 this 
negotiation never occurred because 1) only Golkar wanted a threshold, and 2) there was more 
general consensus that curbing competition could be detrimental to democracy.  By 2007 
concerns about democratic survival and constrained competition had declined and the “too 
many parties” argument had progressed to the point where a legislative entry threshold was 
no longer unacceptable and so the negotiations became about what the level of the threshold 
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should be and to which levels of government the threshold should apply, more so than 
whether there should be a threshold at all.  The Court’s decision reflected the general 
consensus that the past election vote threshold had not been well-implemented and that the 
legislative entry threshold did not violate any constitutional rights of the parties. 
 In terms of the district magnitude, once again only Golkar really pursued single-
member districts and civil society’s suggestion about mixed electoral systems was not 
embraced as too many parties deemed the complexity problematic for Indonesian voters.  
With the PDI-P still opposed to majoritarianism, but increasingly in favor of smaller districts 
to create closer representative-constituent ties, the debate really only revolved around 
lowering the district magnitude ceiling.  The result was a modest change.  Both the threshold 
and district magnitude debates occurred with an eye toward reducing party system 
fragmentation, and the expectations of many parties were that particularly the threshold 
would reduce the overall number of parties receiving legislative seats and increasing the 
strength of the parties that did. 
 Finally, in one of the more divisive issues besides the threshold, the question of type 
of list nomination procedures dominated many of the debates.  While the PDI-P, and to a 
lesser extent many of the small parties, wanted to return to fully closed lists, most of the 
parties agreed that some form of open list would be preferable, though they varied in the 
reasons why they believed so.  With the exception of the PAN, which now completely 
supported fully open lists, all the remaining medium-sized parties and Golkar pushed for 
some form of system in which the lists were more open than in 2004 but short of fully open.  
The negotiations over the level resulted in the 30-99% stipulation that kept power, based on 
projections from the 2004 elections, firmly in the hands of party leaders except where 
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extraordinarily popular local elites might be able to win seats outright.  As a result, the 
challenge issued to the Constitutional Court by PD representatives who agreed with the 
original government proposal of fully open lists became the final rule when the Court found 
in favor of striking down the 30-99% stipulation.  Thus, the final rule governing the lists was 
only completely supported by one party – the PAN – when all others had preferred some 
other system to the one that was used. 
Partly due to this fact, few parties had nominated candidates assuming that plurality 
voting within party lists would determine who received seats.  The expectations regarding the 
impact of the change accordingly varied depending on the party in question.  Parties such as 
the PDI-P and PKS assumed few changes because their candidates were instructed not to 
compete on an individual basis and believed their voters were more likely to cast ballots for 
the party than individuals.  Golkar assumed many of its highly-listed candidates would win 
seats based on individual vote-share anyway since it had nominated many wealthy, locally 
popular candidates to high list positions based on perceptions that they would attract more 
voters to the party.  In sum, parties had different expectations about how much the fully open 
lists would affect their electoral success and specific representatives in the 2009 elections. 
Overall the 2007-8 reform process showed some support for my expectations, 
particularly in the constraints placed on reformers as a result of the previous reform period.  
In direct contrast to expectations about seat maximization, the growing party system size 
from 1999 to 2004 should have predicted more inclusive reforms in the 2007-8 period as 
parties were expected to hedge their bets for 2009 (hypothesis 1).  Instead, the growing party 
system actually dovetailed with a reductivist mentality about the need for simplification of 
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the multi-party system and the result was adoption of less inclusive reforms despite high and 
growing uncertainty. 
While this suggests support for alternative motivations (hypothesis 2), the reality of 
the situation was that all parties, including the PDI-P to a greater extent in this reform period, 
pursued fairly seat-maximizing strategies at the individual level in pursuing reforms they 
believed would benefit them.  The increased benefit in the reduction of districts in 2004 
convinced many medium-sized parties, along with the PDI-P and Golkar, that continuing to 
pursue a smaller party system might result in a net gain.  The PDI-P had to some degree 
abandoned its defense of total pluralism, and agreed that the past election vote threshold did 
not appear to have any effect on simplifying a too-crowded party system.  More rhetorical 
explanations of “better representation” to justify open lists and “efficient governance” to 
justify the legislative entry threshold were in force in 2007-8, but in practice the advocacy of 
individual parties demonstrated almost exclusively seat-maximizing logic. 
The medium-sized parties, now more numerous and holding more seats than 
previously, became an important subset in the legislative debates (hypothesis 3a & 3b).  One, 
the PD, held the presidency and was in a fairly close coalition with Golkar.  PDI-P insistence 
on remaining in “opposition” to the government thus relinquished a good deal of weight to 
the remaining medium-sized parties  during negotiations.  The medium-sized parties got 
much of what they all wanted during these negotiations, including a low legislative entry 
threshold that would eliminate small party competitors, some measure of party list openness, 
and a general retention of proportionality.  However, an important aspect of the medium-
sized parties was the divergence of some on key issues: the PAN wanted fully open lists 
while the PKS wanted relatively closed, the PKS would agree to a legislative entry threshold 
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earlier than the other medium-sized parties, and both the PPP and PKB seemed uncertain 
what strategies to pursue.  If anything, the 2007-8 negotiations highlighted the range of 
information and understanding possessed by the medium-sized parties regarding electoral 
system options.  A key issue was the district magnitude, where some parties clearly 
understood that redistricting would affect them directly (the PAN in South Sulawesi, in 
particular) and others had little idea what this would mean (hypothesis 4). 
The flexibility in strategy and goals by the PDI-P, the PKS and PD during the 
negotiation process, as well as the aggressive way that Golkar pursued the entry threshold, all 
heralded a shift in post-reformasi tendencies to try to get along and appear consensual.  Long 
before the electoral reform process began the PDI-P had declared its opposition to the 
PD/Golkar government.  This stance was reinforced as the PDI-P dug in its heels on issues of 
list openness, protesting until the adoption of the new law against it.118  Despite holding 
collectively fewer seats than in 2002-3 Golkar and the PDI-P were much more willing to 
draw a line in the sand on the issue of a legislative entry threshold, preferring to force 
medium and small parties into some sort of settlement rather than agree to simply raise the 
past election vote threshold.  Thus, the 2007-8 period clearly demonstrated some departure 
from the post-transition honeymoon that encouraged certain parties to “play nice” and 
promote a general consensus (hypothesis 5). 
Finally, the debates over the legislative entry threshold, reduction in district 
magnitude and list openness also demonstrated clearly perceived limits to the extremeness of 
change that reformers were willing to undertake, with the exception of Golkar’s attempts to 
restructure the entire system.  On issues of inclusivity, even with the introduction of a 
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legislative threshold there were many arguments by the PDI-P, and eventual agreement by 
the PKS, that the threshold should not begin at a very high level in order to avoid a two-party 
system outcome (hypothesis 6a).  On the issue of list openness, even with Golkar and the 
PAN at different times advocating for complete openness or even single-member districts 
there was never consideration that independent candidates be given free hand to run 
(hypothesis 6b). 
 
Outcomes in the 2009 General Elections 
The election results119 demonstrated much greater effects of the reforms than in 2004, as 
more parties competed but far fewer won seats and many highly-ranked candidates lost seats 
to lower-ranked candidates with the fully open lists.  The reforms reflect some trends in the 
party system’s evolution relative to the 2004 elections, as well as the non-universal nature of 
reform impact on parties that was evident in 2004.  But the direct effects of the 2007-2008 
reforms on changes in the party system are much clearer than those which occurred in the 
previous reform and election.  I will first offer a recap of the election returns, including 
measures of party system size and electoral volatility.  Then I analyze the effects of reforms 
on party system outcomes, assessing whether reforms had any of their intended impacts, i.e. 
benefits, to the large and medium-sized parties. 
 In 2009 there were 38 parties competing, though four achieved successful registration 
following Constitutional Court challenges in which the Court upheld their right to contest 
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despite failing to meet the 2004 election law’s past election vote threshold.120  Nearly all of 
the 24 parties that competed in 2004 returned, with an additional dozen new party entrants.  
In Aceh, according to provisions in the Regional Government Act (UU 2006), the local 
parties could now contest the DPRD1 and DPRD2 elections but were still barred from 
entering the DPR elections. 
 Compared with 1999 to 2004, when electoral volatility of votes measured 24.34, the 
2004 to 2009 vote volatility measured 30.57 for a modest increase.  Seat volatility actually 
dropped from 41.76 from the 1999-2004 period to 26.45 in the 2004-2009 period.  On 
balance, it would be difficult to make the argument that the increase in vote volatility was 
due primarily to electoral reforms rather than the coattail effect of SBY’s popularity on major 
gains by the PD.  In terms of seats, however, the decline suggests that reforms did not have 
the effect of wildly redistributing seats among parties or to new parties (hypothesis 9). 
At the party level, there was wider variation in how parties fared under the new rules 
and party-type (size) effects were as pronounced as the effects individual parties felt.  Table 
5.5 shows basic outcomes from the 2009 national legislative elections: the levels of each 
parties’ vote-share, seat-share, difference between the two, and change since 2004.  Once 
again, the differential tells a particular story with respect to how well parties fared in 
response to the reforms: rise in differential indicates beneficiary of reform while decrease in 
differential indicates losers in the reform game.  The smallest parties were once again the 
biggest losers in the new translation, though some of those losses came from not being able 
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to obtain seats if parties missed the 2.5% threshold.  The differential for the small parties 
would have been minus 12.58%, rather than minus 18.31%, without the threshold. 
Table 5.5 2009 Election Outcome: Changes from 2004 
 % 2009 
Votes 
% 2009 
Seats 
2009 
Vote-Seat 
Differential 
% Votes 
Gain/Loss 
% Seats 
Gain/Loss 
% 2009 
Vote-Seat 
Differential 
Minus 
% 2004 
Vote-Seat 
Differential 
PD 20.81 26.43 5.62 13.36 16.25 2.89 
Golkar 14.45 18.93 4.48 -7.13 -4.16 2.97 
PDI-P 14.01 16.79 2.78 -4.52 -3.03 1.49 
PKS 7.89 10.18 2.29 0.55 2 1.45 
PAN 6.03 8.21 2.18 -0.41 -1.42 -1.01 
PPP 5.33 6.79 1.46 -2.82 -3.76 -0.94 
PKB 4.95 5 0.05 -5.62 -4.45 1.17 
Gerindra 4.46 4.64 0.18 -- -- -- 
Hanura 3.77 3.03 -0.74 -- -- -- 
Others 
(29) 
18.31 0 -18.31 -1.65 -9.09 -7.44 
 
In 2009 PD had the biggest increase in absolute vote-share, seat-share and differential 
between the two.  The PD and Golkar were the biggest beneficiaries of the reforms made 
during the 2004-2009 period improving their vote-to-seat differential by almost 3, nearly 
twice the rate of improvement over the next biggest beneficiaries, the PDI-P and PKS.  While 
the PD and PKS both improved their overall vote and seat shares, the PKS more modestly 
than the PD, Golkar and the PDI-P continued to decline in vote and seat share, representing 
two of the three largest drops in both.  However, the four largest parties all benefitted from 
the new reforms relative to the gains they made in the translation of votes to seats in 2004. 
The other biggest declines in terms of votes and seats were the PKB, which saw the 
size of its fraksi cut in half from 2004 but also reaped a modest benefit from the new vote-to-
seat translation, and the PPP, which saw the size of its fraksi cut by 30% from 2004 and also 
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lost out from the new vote-to-seat translation.  The PAN once again saw limited change in its 
vote-share but now appeared to be less of a beneficiary of the reforms than it had been in 
2004 when only Golkar had benefited more from the new vote-to-seat ratio.  The two 
newcomers managed to win larger vote-shares than any other new party besides the PD in 
2004 but while Gerindra benefitted very slightly from the vote-to-seat translation Hanura, 
with more limited national appeal, did not. 
Of the 17 parties from the 2004-2009 DPR only seven won seats in the 2009 general 
elections, along with two new entrants: Gerindra and Hanura.  The 2.5% threshold eliminated 
six parties that would have claimed seats if the fixed entry limit were not in place: the PBB, 
PBR, PDS and PKPB from the 2004-2009 DPR, and two new entrants: the PKNU and the 
PRN.  The remaining 23 parties would not have had seats based on their district-level vote-
shares, even if the 2.5% threshold had not been put into effect.  Of the nine parties that won 
seats in the 2009-2014 legislature, Gerindra and Hanura were the smallest fraksi while the 
PDI-P and Golkar remained in the top three largest, joined by the PD; the four medium-sized 
parties remained relatively similar with the PKB switching groups with the PD to become the 
fourth medium-sized party along with the PKS, PPP and PAN.  The three largest parties in 
2009 collectively received 49.3% of the vote-share, while in 2004 those same three parties 
collectively received 47.6% of the vote-share; of the seven returning DPR parties the 
percentage of vote-share in 2004 was 80% while in 2009 it was 73.5%.  This suggests that, 
while volatility in the system was quite high, voters primarily switched between the largest 
parties rather than to smaller or new parties. 
The threshold had the effect of moderate seat consolidation among the top parties.  
While in 2004 the six largest parties – Golkar, PDI-P, PD, PKS, PPP and PKB – held 73.6% 
205 
of the votes and 81.3% of the seats, in 2009 the six largest parties – Golkar, PDI-P, PD, PKS, 
PPP and PAN – held 68.5% of the votes and 87.3% of the seats.  What increased between 
2004 and 2009 was the large number of wasted votes going to parties who failed to win any 
seats: 18.3% of votes were now cast for parties who could not receive a seat in any district 
even if it had a candidate who managed to win a full BPP on her/his own.  The threshold also 
had the effect of reducing the effective BPP for the larger parties to qualify for largest 
remainder calculations since the BPP were calculated using the district’s vote totals for all 
parties qualifying for the national threshold, rather than the vote total of all parties competing 
in a given district. 
Figure 5.1 Change in Vote Differential by Party Size 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the variation grouped by party sizes, with small parties falling 
below 2.5% of the vote-share, medium parties falling between 2.5-10% of the vote-share, and 
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large parties falling above 10% of the vote-share.  It is clear from the figure that while the 
medium-sized parties were the biggest beneficiaries in 2004, the large parties were the 
biggest beneficiaries in 2009 and the cost to small parties increases in 2009 from 2004.  The 
legislative entry threshold eliminated all parties falling into the “small” category and so the 
small party category holds no seats in 2009, composed of 29 parties, up from 17 in 2004.   
Figure 5.2 Average Party Magnitudes in 2009 Electoral Districts 
 
In addition to the changes in differential, average party magnitude also dropped 
across the electoral districts as the average seat magnitude shrank and the number of 
competitors increased.  In 2004, with sixty-nine electoral districts, the average party 
magnitude across the national electoral districts was 0.332.  In 2009, with seventy-six 
electoral districts and a drop in district magnitude, the average party magnitude dropped to 
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0.191, indicating that it was less likely for any party to be able to win a seat in a given district 
compared to 2004.  Figure 5.2 shows a map of party magnitude values including all parties in 
the system.  Darker colors show a higher average party magnitude (>0.192), meaning fewer 
parties hold seats in that district relative to the district’s size, while lighter or no color shows 
lower average party magnitudes (<0.191).  The inset in Figure 5.2 indicates average party 
magnitudes in the capital city, Jakarta. 
Compared to Figure 4.2 in 2004 many districts are similarly high or low relative to 
the average party magnitude level of 0.191.  Two particular aspects of average party 
magnitude change since 2004 are interesting to note.  First is that subdivisions in particular 
districts, such as South Sulawesi, Riau, Banten and West Java (circled in red), have reduced 
the average party magnitude in the new districts, perhaps as a result of the larger number of 
seats available across the larger numbers of districts.  Second is that some districts that had 
small party representation in the DPR, such as Papua and North Sumatra (circled in green), 
show increased average party magnitudes since some former representatives could not win 
seats due to the 2.5% threshold. 
However, reducing to the subset of parties which made the threshold plus the seven 
who would have won at least one seat if not for the threshold gives an average party 
magnitude of 0.455, a higher figure than the average party magnitude in 2004.  The larger 
number of less competitive parties in 2009 deflates the average party magnitude, causing 
some overestimation in the level of difficulty for competitive parties to win seats in 2009. 
As in 2004, obtaining multiple seats in a district was a difficult feat, particularly with 
the increased number of parties competing.  Only 28 times did a party win 3 or more seats in 
a single district, all by the PD, Golkar and PDI-P.  A similar number of the seats were won as 
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the only seat a party took in a given district: 308 seats would go to a lone party representative 
from that district, compared with 301 in 2004.  The reduction in the district magnitude 
ceiling from 12 to 10 resulted in few differences regarding the chances any given party had 
of winning 1, 2 or more seats.  Yet, the elimination of parties failing to meet a 2.5% threshold 
resulted in two parties – Gerindra and Hanura – only obtaining single-seat districts.  Unlike 
in 2004 when nine parties (53%) only won a single seat in every district where they obtained 
seats, in 2009 only two parties (22%) were unable to obtain multiple seats in any district.  
Thus the combination of the district magnitude reduction and adoption of a legislative entry 
threshold clearly increased disproportionality in the system (hypothesis 8). 
 Finally, in terms of the effect of the fully open lists, there are a number of outcomes 
that suggest how important this reform was to the changes within the party system.  First, 
parties once again were not universally affected by the opening of the lists, with variance in 
the number of party-only votes cast across the nine legislative parties and variation in the 
frequency with which their voters chose out of list order in a way that elevated lower-ranked 
candidates.  Second, in confirmation of scholarly literature demonstrating that voters often 
choose in order when presented with a ranked list, a majority of candidates listed in the first 
list position won seats while fewer than 10% of the winning candidates were ranked 4-12.  
Third, the high level of turnover and infrequency with which incumbents won re-election 
when placed in the first position on the lists of major parties suggest that strategies of 
relocating party loyalists to different districts where the party expected to win seats would be 
more difficult to pursue if voters were unwilling to vote for transplanted elites with no 
constituency ties.  Table 5.6 offers some descriptive statistics about the election of the 2009-
2014 DPR cohort. 
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Table 5.6 Successful Candidates Under the Fully-Open Lists 
 Average Minimum Maximum 
Individual Vote Totals 50462 6005 (Hanura) 327097 (PD) 
BPP 149470 86864 (West Papua) 230772 (West Java 6) 
PD Candidates 55544 10045 327097 
Golkar Candidates 54771 20378 218991 
PDI-P Candidates 58256 12231 242504 
PKS Candidates 44904 17487 119287 
PAN Candidates 44482 11481 157651 
PPP Candidates 43688 9094 127585 
PKB Candidates 46177 7133 90092 
Gerindra Candidates 27916 9168 118443 
Hanura Candidates 26171 6005 100465 
# Candidates over minimum BPP 58 
# Candidates over maximum BPP 2 
# Candidates over average BPP 11 
# Candidates over minimum BPP (2004) 51 
 
 Despite objections by both parties to open lists in theory, in practice neither the PDI-P 
nor PKS really had trouble with incumbent re-election or those with high list placement 
winning their seats.  Among the major parties the PAN and Golkar won the largest number of 
“out-of-order” seats and the only winning candidates below position #7 on the lists; Golkar 
also had the lowest incumbent re-election rate of the largest parties.  The PPP, PKB, Gerindra 
and Hanura typically had their top positioned candidates elected, while the PD had a large 
number of candidates elected beyond position #1 but due largely to the increase in the party’s 
seat-share – most of the PD candidates were elected in relative list order. 
 There is limited evidence to suggest that openness of the lists affected the party 
system in terms of seat-share, at least not when comparing the outcome to the simultaneous 
introduction of a legislative entry threshold.  However, the threshold clearly had an effect on 
the number of parties yet did not actually reduce the effective number of parties (hypothesis 
7a).  In contrast, it is plausible to suggest that the vote totals for individual candidates in 
some districts, especially in the nine legislative parties, did boost the number of seats 
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allocated to those specific parties in those districts.  As such, there is some support for the 
relationship between candidate-centricity and an increase in party system fragmentation 
(hypothesis 7b), though the result is helped by the simultaneous effect of the threshold. 
 
Counterfactual Analysis: How Much Impact did the Reforms Have? 
In terms of the effects of the threshold on the size of the party system and the amount 
of wasted votes in the 2009 elections, Figure 5.3 shows how the 2.5% threshold eliminated 
parties which would otherwise have won a handful of seats.  In only Papua, in the darkest 
color at the far eastern side of the map, would multiple small parties have won seats, 2 of the 
ten in the district would have gone to the PDS and the Patriot Party (Partai Patriot).   
Figure 5.3 Small Party Seats without 2.5% Threshold 
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The remaining thirteen small party seats would have been distributed among the PBB 
(3 seats), PDS (4 seats), PKDI (1 seat), PKNU (4 seats) and PPRN (1 seat).  The small parties 
would have won seats in quite predictable locations: the PBB in West Java, West Nusa 
Tenggara and South Sulawesi with their more conservative Muslim populations; the PDS in 
North Sumatra, North Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara district 2 with their large Christian 
populations; the PKDI in East Nusa Tenggara district 1 with its large Catholic population; 
and the PKNU in East Java districts where NU membership is highly concentrated but 
leadership is fragmented. 
With the 2.5% threshold the nine legislative parties won a collective 81.9% of the 
vote-share, with 18.3% of votes “wasted” on parties which did not receive any seats; without 
the threshold there would have been fifteen legislative parties winning a collective 88.47% of 
the vote-share, with 11.53% of the votes “wasted” on parties which would not have received 
any seats.  This means that the threshold itself only accounts for an additional 6.77% of 
wasted votes in 2009 (but by itself supports hypothesis 8).  
Table 5.7  Seat Distributions at Different Levels of the Legislative Entry Threshold 
Party 2.5% Threshold 5% Threshold No Threshold 
PD 148 +22 0 
Golkar 106 +14 -1 
PDI-P 94 +15 -2 
PKS 57 +12 -2 
PAN 46 +4 -2 
PPP 38 +4 -1 
PKB 28 -28 -2 
Gerindra 26 -26 -2 
Hanura 17 -17 -3 
PDS 0 -- +5 
PKNU 0 -- +4 
PBB 0 -- +3 
PKDI 0 -- +1 
Patriot 0 -- +1 
PPRN 0 -- +1 
 
212 
Table 5.7 shows the breakdown of potential outcomes in the elections, given the exact 
formula for seat distribution regardless of the level of the threshold.  The second column 
shows the actual outcome of the elections by seat-share among the nine parties meeting the 
2.5% threshold.  If the threshold had been higher, for example 5%, three additional parties 
would have been eliminated: Hanura, Gerindra and the PKB.  Seats would have been 
redistributed among the remaining six parties as listed in the third column.  Without a 
threshold seats would have been redistributed according to the allocation formula among the 
fifteen parties according to the fourth column.   
The final figures suggest that retaining the 2004 system would have made a 
significant difference, as only twelve of the 560 DPR members won more than 100% of the 
BPP in their district and all were from PD, Golkar, PDI-P and PAN.  An additional 242 DPR 
members would have fallen into the 30-99% BPP category of the pre-court ruling law, and of 
those DPR members 234 would have won based on their ordered list rankings and which 
other candidates from their party met the requirement of 30-99% in their district and 8 would 
not have won a seat under the pre-court ruling system.  Of the remaining 306 DPR 
representatives who did not win at least 30% BPP in individual votes, 235 were listed in high 
enough ordered positions and would have been allocated their party’s seats in their districts 
and 71 would not have won a seat under the pre-court ruling system.  Thus, 78 (13.9%) of the 
2009-2014 DPR members who were elected under the fully open list system would not have 
won seats under the system of partially-open lists prior to the Court’s ruling. 
Among the legislative parties there was again variation in individual candidate votes.  
Table 5.8 shows the range of the party’s representatives winning seats under the different 
BPP thresholds debated, adopted and implemented.  Only the seven legislative parties from 
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2004-2009 had candidates selected out of list order under the fully open lists, as Hanura and 
Gerindra both only had the top-listed candidate win in all districts where they won any seats.  
Of the seven parties with candidates being chosen out of order, at 11 (25.6%) of its DPR 
representatives the PAN had the highest proportion, followed by PKB (19.2%), PD (18.6%), 
PPP (16.2%), Golkar (15.9%), and the PDI-P (13.7%).  With only one (1.8%) of its seat-
winning candidates chosen out of party list order, the PKS had the lowest rate among the 
seven parties. 
As Table 5.8 also notes, only four parties had candidates winning at least 100% BPP 
in their district – the requirement for an individual to win a seat out of list order in 2004 – the 
PAN, PDI-P, Golkar and PD.  Eight of those candidates winning more than their district’s 
BPP were listed in the first position by their parties in their respective districts, while four 
(two from Golkar and one each from PDI-P and PD) were listed in positions 2-3.  In contrast 
to 2004 when the highest individual vote winner, Hidayat Nur Wahid, won his seat with 262, 
019 votes (113% BPP in Jakarta district 2) listed by the PKS in ordered position #1, the 2009 
election’s single highest individual vote winner, SBY’s son Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, won 
327,097 votes (177% BPP in East Java district 7) listed by the PD in ordered position #3. 
Table 5.8 Individual Candidate Votes by Party 
Party Total Seats <30% BPP 30-99%BPP 100+% BPP Highest BPP 
Hanura 18 17 1 0 83.3% 
Gerindra 26 25 1 0 64.6% 
PKB 27 14 13 0 59.6% 
PPP 37 24 13 0 87.5% 
PAN 43 28 14 1 106.6% 
PKS 57 37 20 0 81.2% 
PDI-P 95 46 46 3 151.8% 
Golkar 107 47 57 3 149.3% 
PD 150 68 77 5 177% 
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In general, the introduction of the legislative entry threshold and openness of the lists 
had large effects on individuals and parties but little overall effect on the effective number of 
parties represented in the DPR.  A difference of fifteen seats due to the threshold and 
redistribution within the parties of seats to candidates listed out of order suggest limitations 
of the effect of the reforms in this election outcome.  However, if the threshold is once again 
increased as there has been a push to do, and parties that can capitalize on candidate-centric 
elections begin to sprout up and win seats in 2014, we will have a better sense of the longer-
term effects of these reforms which are difficult to rollback. 
 
Conclusion 
 In the 2009 elections the district magnitude reduction had a limited impact on parties 
in the system due to how small the change really was.  However, the electoral threshold had 
the effect of eliminating seven parties who would otherwise have won seats and the open lists 
had the effect of shaking up many party list orders, electing 75% legislative newcomers to 
the 2009-2014 DPR.  To assess the impact of the open lists on experienced party leaders one 
need look no further than the 2004-2009 Special Committee of Commission 2: despite being 
listed first by their parties, Chairman Fery Mursyidan Baldan of Golkar and Vice-chair Andi 
Yuliani Paris of PAN both lost to lower-ranked candidates in their districts.  Though there 
was variation in the degree to which the reforms affected the different parties, the effects 
tended to be larger and more widespread in 2009 than in 2004; small parties were clearly all 
affected but none of the medium or large parties escaped the effects of the changes either. 
 The elimination of the small parties and increasing proportion of wasted votes were 
due only partly to the implementation of the legislative entry threshold, and were also related 
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to the second round of district magnitude reduction.  Without the threshold fifteen seats (less 
than 3%) would have gone to small parties; in 2004 there were 39 of 550 seats (more than 
7%) which would have gone to small parties had a 2.5% threshold been implemented.  In 
sum, while the threshold did its part to truncate the size of the system and keep seven 
additional parties from gaining 1-4 seats each, in practice there were far fewer total seats that 
would have been allocated to parties who missed the threshold. 
 While the party system size did reduce, the effective number of parties actually 
moderately increased once again, from 8 to 9.  This time, however, the distribution of seats 
among the legislative parties resulted in three clearly large parties which each held 
substantially greater numbers of seats than the remaining six parties.  With respect to the 
presidential elections, only these three parties were even in the ballpark of the required 
percentage of votes or seats needed to run their own tickets and only PD was able to run a 
ticket without an additional party involved.  Golkar and the PDI-P both failed to meet the 
20% vote-share or 25% seat-share requirement alone.  Golkar was forced to add Hanura, with 
Wiranto as Kalla’s running mate, and the PDI-P was forced to add Gerindra, with Prabowo 
as Megawati’s running mate.  The lack of small parties with only a handful of seats meant 
that now the smallest medium-sized parties faced the reality that they would be the next in 
line to miss an increased threshold and would certainly have to form a coalition with other 
medium-sized parties in order to run a presidential-vice presidential ticket.  The smaller and 
medium parties now worried about looming discussions of the legislative entry threshold 
being implemented at the local level as well, since many received seats at the provincial and 
municipal levels where the threshold did not apply in 2009. 
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 Finally, within parties dynamics had shifted with the fully open lists.  Party leaders 
faced the uncertainty of retaining discipline and control both within the party and their fraksi 
in the DPR.  General voter following of the lists were blamed on the late change in the 
electoral rules but it was unclear that voters necessarily would have chosen differently 
otherwise: ballots contained sometimes hundreds of names with thirty-eight parties and up to 
twelve names per party list in the largest districts.  Broader concerns about voter education 
and popularity contests loomed as the voting drew to a close and discussion of the next round 
of revisions to the general election law began in early 2010. 
 One of the most important conclusions to draw from the 2007-8 reform period was 
the increasing reliance of individual legislators and candidates on bypassing the legislative 
process and challenging the final law at the Constitutional Court.  This finding, which 
mirrors the increased number of challenges to actual election results in the post-2004 
environment, has two possible root causes.  First, the laws themselves were not well-written, 
prompting the need for judicial review to clear up confusion and contradictory clauses.  This 
has been a major reason commonly cited by the Court when it justifies hearing highly-
politicized cases.121  Second, the Court is becoming more politicized as a result of the 
appointment process, which allows the party members and legislators to become appointees 
and to bypass the legislative process, too.  If court involvement continues to affect the 
electoral reform process to such a high degree, it will be worthwhile to speculate whether this 
is simply an Indonesia-specific phenomenon or whether this is a more widespread issue.  
However, it is unclear what general prediction might be made about Court proclivities on 
issues like proportionality and/or party-versus-candidate control. 
                                                 
121
 I interpret this finding from the wording of the Court’s ruling on the list openness. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Quantitative Analysis 
A general framework of understanding electoral reform is by no means a panacea by which 
all reform at any time in any place can necessarily be explained.  Rather, the framework and 
causal mechanisms presented in the previous chapters serve as a bridge between existing 
theories, the numerous cases in which the scholarly literature and history have demonstrated 
the limits of the predictive capacity of existing theories, and a new direction for this study 
and future research to fill in the gaps.  Previous studies, particularly of individual cases or 
small-N comparisons, often confirmed the importance of strategic choice logic in the 
decision-making of reformers but found limited statistical support. The following analyses 
make an attempt to systematize complementary explanations to seat-maximizing models, 
while confirming the importance of strategic explanations in the process of electoral reform. 
Previously-established theory about seat-maximization generated expectations that 
more inclusive reforms would result from rising party uncertainty (hypothesis 1), while 
alternative motivations suggested that more inclusive reforms would result from rising 
disproportionality (hypothesis 2). Through the case study in chapters 4 & 5 I unpacked two 
additional factors that affect the reform process and outcomes adopted: the relative strength 
of medium and large-sized parties which can affect perceptions of what seat-maximizing 
outcomes actually are for individual parties, and ratchet effects as they impact potential later-
round reform choices and outcomes. The first factor led to expectations that declining 
medium-sized party seat-shares would result in less inclusive reforms (hypothesis 3a) and 
more candidate-centric reforms (hypothesis 3b), while decreasing medium-sized parties’ 
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vote-to-seat differentials would lead to the adoption of more inclusive reforms (hypothesis 
4). The second factor led to expectations that reforms become more seat-maximizing in later 
periods of reform (hypothesis 5), particularly when early reform periods occur during 
democratic consolidation and reformers become more strategic over time.  Additionally, 
ratchet effects increase the likelihood of less inclusive (hypothesis 6a) and more candidate-
centric (hypothesis 6b) reforms when such reforms were adopted in the previous inter-
electoral period, though both face limits on the level to which they can reform. 
A second set of expectations also hypothesized about the effects of electoral reforms. 
I expect that both more inclusive (hypothesis 7a) and candidate-centric (hypothesis 7b) 
reforms will result in increased party system fragmentation, that more inclusive reforms 
should produce a decrease in disproportionality within the party system (hypothesis 8).  
Finally, reforms of either type in either direction should increase the level of electoral 
volatility in the system (hypothesis 9).  I list all expectations about the causes and effects of 
electoral reform in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Hypotheses of the Causes and Effects of Electoral Reform 
Predicting Causes of Electoral Reform 
H1 The probability that reformers will adopt more inclusive reforms increases as party 
system fragmentation increases, whereas the probability that reformers will adopt 
less inclusive electoral reforms increases as party system fragmentation declines. 
H2 The probability that reformers will adopt more (less) inclusive reforms increases as 
disproportionality increases (decreases). 
H3a The probability of less (more) inclusive reform adoption increases as the seat-share 
of medium-sized parties decreases (increases). 
H3b The probability of candidate-centric (party-centric) reform adoption increases as the 
seat-share of medium-sized parties decreases (increases). 
H4 The probability of more (less) inclusive reform adoption increases as the differential 
of medium-sized parties decreases (increases). 
H5 The probability of less inclusive reform adoption, particularly electoral thresholds, 
increases in later rounds of iterated reform. 
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H6a The probability of less (more) inclusive reform adoption increases when less (more) 
inclusive reforms were adopted in the previous inter-election period, but the 
constraints of alternative motivations and iterated reforms prevent the adoption of 
the most extreme less (more) inclusive reforms. 
H6b The probability of candidate-centric (party-centric) reform adoption increases when 
candidate-centric (party-centric) reforms were adopted in the previous inter-election 
period, but the constraints of alternative motivations and iterated reforms prevent 
the adoption of the most extreme candidate-centric (party-centric) reforms. 
Predicting Effects of Electoral Reform 
H7a More inclusive reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation 
while less inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation. 
H7b Candidate-centric reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation 
while party-centric reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation. 
H8 More inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in disproportionality while less 
inclusive reforms will produce an increase in disproportionality. 
H9 Any inter- or intra-party reform adoption will produce an increase in electoral 
volatility in the post-reform election. 
 
I will now offer a systematic method and measurements for how to replicate these 
factors in large-N hypothesis tests, suggesting a specific range – 10-20% of legislative seat-
share – to serve as a generalizable range of what constitutes a “medium-sized” party given 
the general parameters of the party systems in the current dataset as well as a broader context 
to countries not included in this dataset.  I will also offer suggestions for incorporating these 
additional factors into future case studies. To test the hypotheses listed in Table 6.1 and to 
evaluate the overall contributions of the expanded framework I have built an original dataset 
that includes cases of democratic electoral reform from 34 countries. Here I first summarize 
the dataset, complete with explanation of the methodological additions and improvements 
this data offers over previous datasets. I then describe previous models and/or the revisions 
and additions to those models as they relate to the previously introduced hypotheses, 
followed by the presentation of the results and analysis. I conclude the chapter with a 
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discussion of the benefits of unpacking the process of electoral reform in terms of more 
accurately projecting reform outcomes. 
 
The Dataset 
The dataset constructed for this analysis is composed of 34 countries.  The cases were 
selected for their inclusion on the basis of: a) being part of a set already evaluated for reform 
propensity and outcome, and b) having at least some episode of reform during the 1950-2010 
time period.  Reforms discussed in the ensuing analysis only include changes made to the 
structure of elections to the lower house of the legislature; there are no changes that focus on 
executive or upper house elections.  The primary sources for case selection come from 
Shugart and Wattenburg (2001), Birch et al. (2002), Remmer (2008), and Renwick (2010).  I 
use cases from established sources of reform for two reasons.  First, in order to closely 
replicate previous findings and to establish the utility of my expanded dataset and causal 
variables, I need to use the most similar set of cases I can find relative to previous studies. 
Second, there is little question that the cases in these studies all qualify to some degree as 
recognized cases of electoral reform. 
Though I exclude some of these cases, I do so for very specific reasons when they 
clearly do not qualify as comparable cases for this analysis. All cases from these four sources 
are included except for two from Shugart and Wattenberg and one from Remmer. Israel is 
not included because it is a case of reform of the method for electing the executive while my 
hypotheses are all focused on legislative electoral reform. Hungary is not included because 
its reforms occurred prior to the first free and fair election, making it is more a case of 
electoral engineering than reform of a system used to democratically elect the members 
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reforming it. Panama is not included because its only electoral reform fails to meet Lijphart’s 
threshold for a sufficiently “large” electoral reform, a distinction I address in the next section. 
Additionally, I include one case not analyzed in one of these four primary sources: 
Indonesia. The reason for its inclusion is that it is clearly a case with (multiple) electoral 
reforms, as demonstrated by the previous case study analysis, while its exclusion from the 
previous studies is likely due to very specific factors: it is not a mixed-electoral system (the 
Shugart and Wattenberg cases), it is not in Eastern Europe (the Birch et al.’s cases), it is not 
in Latin America (Remmer’s cases) and it is not an advanced industrial democracy 
(Renwick’s cases). Other cases of reform or, in most instances, failed reform are not 
discussed at length in the manuscript or included in the dataset, such as the failed referendum 
in the UK in 2011. Since I do not include cases without at least one qualifying electoral 
reform during the 1950 to 2010 period, many of the cases in Colomer’s study would not fit 
this criteria and so his dataset is not part of the basis for case selection (Colomer 2005). The 
cases and observation periods are listed in Table 6.2.   
The reason for selecting only cases in which at least one reform episode occurred is 
two-fold.  First, it is misleading to suggest that electoral reform is possible in any country 
under any circumstances.  The scholarly literature has demonstrated numerous constraints on 
the possibility, let alone the propensity, to reform.  Such explanations range from large 
numbers of veto players to high barriers to the amendment of constitutions, among other 
concerns.  As such, this does not represent selection bias on the dependent variable by 
excluding countries simply because they have never achieved reform; there may in fact be 
some particular institutional aspect of their political system that prohibits reform. This is not 
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to suggest that reform must always be possible but rather must not always be impossible: I 
assume that if no reform ever occurs that it may be impossible to democratically reform. 
Table 6.2 Cases and Observations A 
Country Elections Included  Country Elections Included 
Albania 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 
2009 
Japan B 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 
2003, 2005, 2009 
Armenia 1999, 2003, 2007 Lithuania 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 
Bolivia 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002, 
2005, 2009 
Macedonia 1998, 2002, 2006, 2008 
Bulgaria 1991, 1994, 1997, 2001, 
2005, 2009 
Mexico 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 
2003, 2006, 2009 
Colombia 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 
1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 
2006 
New Zealand B 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 
1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 
Croatia 1995, 2000, 2003, 2007 Nicaragua 1996, 2001, 2006 
Czech Republic 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, 
2006 
Paraguay 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 
Dominican 
Republic 
1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 
1998, 2002, 2006 
Peru 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 
2001, 2006 
Ecuador 1988, 1992, 1996, 1998, 
2002, 2006, 2009 
Poland 1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, 
2005, 2007 
El Salvador 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 
2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 
Romania 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008 
France B 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 
1997, 2002, 2007 
Russia 1995, 1999, 2003 
Georgia 1995, 1999, 2004, 2008 Slovak Republic 1998, 2002, 2006 
Germany 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 
1969, 1972, 1976, 1980, 
1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 
1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 
Slovenia 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 
Guatemala 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 
2003, 2007 
South Korea 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008 
Honduras 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, 2005, 2009 
Thailand 1992, 1995, 1996, 2001, 
2005 
Indonesia 2004, 2009 Ukraine 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007 
Italy B 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 
2006, 2008 
Venezuela 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 
1998, 2000 
A
 List of observations does not include the elections prior to the first listed, though data for these prior elections 
were collected in order to calculate lagged and over-time variables. 
B
 The French, Italian, Japanese and New Zealand data panels ideally should begin earlier to establish longer 
patterns of inter-party competition but the raw election return data was unavailable for calculation. 
The second reason is that it is difficult to know the exact circumstances and processes 
of reform debates that never produced reform in countries that are not included in the dataset.  
Perhaps many countries entertain the notion of reform but do not pursue it for various 
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strategic, ideological and/or institutional reasons.  While this is not an exhaustive list of 
electoral reforms across time, by selecting cases in which reform has occurred at least once 
but span geographic and temporal distance there is some commonality (at least one episode 
of reform in the dependent variable per case, and many episodes in which the dependent 
variable is ‘no reform’) and some contextual and structural diversity (i.e. neighbors, 
international influences, economic crises and development levels, transition mode, and 
demographics, to name just a few). 
Since I conceptualize reform episodes as “nested” within countries, and include 
countries with examples of both reform adoption and non-reform, I then turn to the choice of 
appropriate criteria for coding observations. For theoretical and methodological reasons each 
observation is based on a single inter-electoral period rather than sporadic reform episodes or 
annual data.  Because each observation is based on a time period covering two sets of 
elections, the dataset contains at minimum two elections for each country spanning at 
minimum ten years of democratic rule. In addition, data from multiple electoral periods is 
needed to calculate lagged variables and variables designed specifically to measure some 
aspect of change over time.  Each country is coded from the election period (see Appendix C 
for the extended codebook with more detailed explanation of the process of coding 
observations) prior to the adoption of its first reform through the last election up until 2009. 
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 For most countries observations actually begin more than ten years prior to the first 
reform whenever data was available since multiple prior elections are necessary in order to 
construct the lagged and time-change variables which actually begin two elections prior to 
the electoral reform observation period.  The dataset does not cover electoral periods prior to 
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 See Appendix C for descriptions of the three exceptions to the pre-2010 rule: Russia, Thailand and 
Venezuela. 
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1947, even though in the New Zealand case an unbroken string of democratic elections began 
well before the first observation in that data panel. 
Given that the overwhelming majority of election reform processes happen only once 
during an inter-election cycle – and indeed, it would seem less useful to measure reform as 
an outcome or precursor to party system change if the reform did not happen in the election 
following its adoption – this method of coding observations as single inter-election periods 
makes theoretical sense.123  In addition, given the number of variables of interest which 
remain constant during the course of an inter-electoral period, this method of coding each 
inter-electoral cycle naturally avoids methodological concerns that arise from lack of 
variation on multiple independent variables for multiple observations in which there is also 
no change on the dependent variable.  Rather than code observations annually, during which 
there is no or little variation on the majority of variables in the model for years at a time, or 
coding blocks of time in 3, 5 or 10 years, which either suffer from the same lack of variation 
in short lengths or fail to capture electoral change in the longer periods, the practice of 
coding by inter-electoral cycle avoids both methodological complications and substantive 
concerns about matching the statistical model to the theoretical question. 
 
Electoral Reform as the Dependent Variable 
 For the first set of hypotheses about the causes of reform, the adoption of inter- or 
intra-party reform is the outcome being predicted.  Both of these outcomes are defined by 
movement along the axes of the two dimensions of electoral reform in Figure 2.1.  Each 
observation is assigned one of three possible values for each of the two dimensions: a 
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 The reason for establishing the coding process is only of particular importance here since it is a distinct 
method from previous studies which use annual time-series data and thus cannot be perfectly replicated due to 
the difference in the structure of the time-series data panels. 
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baseline category representing no movement along an axis, a category representing positive 
movement along an axis, and a category representing negative movement along an axis.  In 
substantive terms this means that, for each of the two dimensions, a country in any one 
reform period can be doing only one of three things: no reform or reforms that cancel out 
“movement” toward a different system, reform toward greater interparty inclusivity or party-
centric control, or reform toward less interparty inclusivity or candidate-centric control. 
In coding the outcome of inter- and intra-party reform I rely on the types and levels of 
change during a given observation. The interparty dimension reform is measured 
categorically,124 with a score of 1 representing more inclusive (i.e. more proportional) 
reform, a score of 0 representing no reform, and a score of -1 representing less inclusive (i.e. 
more majoritarian) reform.125  Examples of reform that fall into the ‘more inclusive’ category 
include a large increase in average district magnitude,126 a large increase in the overall size of 
the legislative lower chamber,127 and adoption of a national constituency district in addition 
to the already existing non-national districts.128  Examples of reforms in the ‘less inclusive’ 
category include introduction or substantial raise of a legislative entry threshold, large 
reduction in average district magnitude, and a large reduction in the overall size of the 
legislative lower chamber.  A score of no reform is given to countries that do not adopt any 
                                                 
124
 This copies the basic coding scheme followed by Remmer (2008), which was necessary in order to replicate 
her analysis.  In addition, since the categories are not related in an ordered way, for the multinomial logit it does 
not matter what numeric values are assigned to the more and less inclusive categories.  See Appendix C for 
additional details on the exact coding rules. 
 
125
 “Inclusive” refers to legislative inclusivity, rather than inclusion into the electoral competition. 
 
126
 Large district magnitude results in more proportional distribution of seats. 
 
127
 Theoretically, the larger the legislative chamber the more seats are available for distribution and potentially 
the larger district magnitude can be. 
 
128
 This has the effect of creating a district of relatively large magnitude which can increase small party seat 
chances. 
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revisions to existing electoral structures or only make minor changes such as a very small 
reduction or increase in average district magnitude. 
 The intraparty dimension of reform is also measured categorically,129 with a score of 
1 representing more party-centric reform, a score of 0 representing no reform, and a score of 
-1 representing more candidate-centric reform.  Examples of reforms that fall into the party-
centric category include the removal of candidate-oriented ballots so voters could only cast 
votes for parties, or a large addition of entry barriers to independent candidates to register for 
and win elections.  Examples of reforms that fall into the candidate-centric category include 
provisions for voters to be able to cast party and/or specific party candidate votes on their 
ballots, such as in an open list PR system, or a reduction in entry barriers to independent 
candidates to register for and win elections.  A score of no reform is given to countries that 
do not adopt revisions to existing electoral structures or only make minor changes such as a 
slight alteration in independent candidate registration for elections. 
 While there are examples in the literature of more itemized (Carey and Shugart 1995; 
Shugart and Wattenberg 2001) indicators of inter- and intraparty structures, there are 
particular reasons to use the tripartite measure just described with respect to studying reform 
along the two dimensions.  First, more fine-grained methods of indexing the range of 
possible system outcomes does provide sensitivity in the starting and/or ending point of the 
reform process, and potentially lends itself to sensitive measurement of the amount of change 
from one time point to another.  However, existing indices tend to involve a rank-ordering of 
system types to devise the final measurement for each country, and so change from pre- to 
post-reform periods may take into account not simply how much change occurs in an 
individual country but across countries in the sample as well.  Furthermore, such indices 
                                                 
129
 See fn. 124 and Appendix C for explanation of the tripartite coding scheme. 
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include measures such as voter identification of parties, which relate more to attributes or 
strengths of the actors in the system than the competition rules that govern their inclusion. 
In addition, in attempting to understand the adoption of some packages of reforms 
versus alternatives through an analysis of actor-centric motivations, measuring the exact 
amount of difference in the pre-reform and post-reform systems may obscure a range of 
reforms that occur more naturally through redistricting in the event of population change, etc, 
which may not require negotiation between parties but simple recalculation of distribution 
formula.  As the research question here does not revolve around the final product so much as 
the process of reform itself, and since I expect there to be a good deal of negotiating over 
details of reform, the exact index-measured distance from the pre- to post-reform system is 
less important than the directionality of the change.  Thus I focus more on measuring whether 
reform occurs, and the general direction of change, rather than the specific change. 
In terms of each dimension, I follow slightly different rules for what categorically 
shifts an observation from 0 to 1 or -1.  I adhere to Lijphart’s requirements for the amount of 
change in a range of categories on the interparty dimension: changes in electoral formula, 
increase in district magnitude of at least 20%, increase in electoral threshold of at least 20%, 
and increase in assembly size of at least 20% (Lijphart 1994: 13).  On one of Lijphart’s 
requirements, that 20% of seats must be affected by the change, do I diverge and use the 
requirement of Massicotte and Blais (1999: 345) of 5% seats affected by the changes, in 
order to account for shifts to mixed electoral systems.130  However, I do not provide an 
ordering for changes aggregated across that range of categories, a change in any of the 
requirements counts as a category shift from 0 to 1 or -1.  In other words, it does not matter if 
a case exhibits sufficient change in one, two or three categories; so long as it meets the 
                                                 
130
 This actually follows a coding scheme exception set forth by Renwick (2011). 
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minimum requirement of change in at least one category it receives a code of 1 or -1 on 
interparty reform.  Most cases do not exhibit change in more than one category at any one 
reform period, suggesting limited explanatory power of an ordered scale. In qualitative 
assessments of the Indonesian case the more fine-grained detail of change in multiple 
categories of interparty reform were assessed, but for the quantitative analysis I only use the 
1, 0, -1 values. 
On the intraparty dimension, which has not previously been evaluated as the 
dependent variable in a multi-case quantitative analysis, I largely follow the three-level 
change of ballot components used by Carey and Shugart (1995) and Shugart and Wattenberg 
(2001).  Intraparty changes may occur in shifts between types of balloting: voters may not 
“disturb” lists submitted by party leaders (i.e. closed list), voters may “disturb” lists 
submitted by party leaders (i.e. semi- to fully-open list), leaders do not control access to 
ballots or rank (i.e. independent candidacy, primaries, etc) (Carey and Shugart 1995: 421).131 
I follow Renwick’s coding scheme where the minimum required change is at least 20% voter 
preferences that can alter party list ordering (Renwick 2011).132 Once again, I do not provide 
an ordering for changes aggregated across the components; so long as a case meets the 
minimum requirement of change in at least one component it receives a code of 1 or -1 on 
intraparty reform.  In qualitative assessments of the Indonesian case I addressed different 
aspects of the causes and effects of intraparty reform, but for the quantitative analysis I only 
use the 1, 0, -1 values. 
                                                 
131
 Both of these intraparty measurements are created to assess intraparty “efficiency” and allow for variation in 
pooling votes across segments of mixed-electoral system ballots and districts.  I do not include those elements 
here because they change less frequently within systems and because they are included by the authors to assess 
specific elements of the intraparty dimension that do not matter for this evaluation.  Ballot structure here is the 
most important factor, and so I confine my coding scheme to changes in balloting procedure and selection. 
 
132
 As most of these changes tend to be fairly extreme, e.g. shift from closed list to fully open, reducing the level 
of 20% voter preference would only affect two cases in the coding. 
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 In the dataset, in terms of interparty reform there are 33 observations of more 
inclusive reform, 20 observations of less inclusive reform, and 5 observations where reforms 
adopted are of both more and less inclusive nature.  In terms of intraparty reform there are 13 
observations of more candidate-centric reform and 17 observations of more party-centric 
reform.  Appendix B offers a full list of the reforms, by case and observation, included in the 
dataset.133  While not a comprehensive picture of all reforms undertaken by these cases for 
the duration of the individual country data panels, this represents the most comprehensive list 
of reforms, per the qualifications laid out in the coding rules, that I could find for the sample 
of cases included in the dataset.  Language skills and document availability limited any 
additional reform coding. 
 
Independent Variables 
 To estimate the effects of seat-maximizing logic, the literature has predominantly 
used the proxy of party system size, measured by the effective number of parties by either 
vote-share or seat-share, to assess rising or declining uncertainty and dominance of the 
largest parties in a given party system.  I follow that literature here and code party system 
size via Laakso and Taagepera’s calculation for the effective number of parties by vote-share 
(ENPV) and seat-share (ENPS) (Laakso and Taagepera 1989).  I also include lagged values 
for prior elections and calculate the value of change between one election and the next coded 
by vote-share (Change ENPV) and seat-share (Change ENPS).  For additional details on the 
formula used to code independent variables, see the extended codebook in Appendix C. 
                                                 
133
 My coding of electoral reform outcomes closely mirrors Remmer (2008) and Renwick (2010), and I use the 
same general categories of the various authors in Shugart and Wattenberg (2001).  I primarily use their sources 
to triangulate my own reading of election laws and regulations, so there should be few divergences in the 
coding of reforms adopted.  There are a few exceptions where I have altered or used alternate levels of change 
as robustness checks for subsets of the data. 
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 The second set of additional party system variables relates to the hypotheses 
generated by the Indonesian case study.  The motivations of the medium-sized and largest 
parties in the Indonesian case study proved to be quite important.  As the proportion of 
medium-sized party seat-share increased, the largest parties attempted to push through less 
inclusive reform mechanisms to eliminate small parties, and likely to raise the bar for 
medium parties.  I hypothesize a similar effect to test in the large-N analysis, though I use a 
much higher threshold for what constitutes a medium-sized party than in the Indonesian case.  
I code two medium-sized party variables in the dataset: 1) the seat-share held by all parties 
with 10-20% each of the seat-share (MPS); and 2) the proportion of parties with 10-20% of 
the seat-share (Medium Parties).  The reason for choosing the 10-20% range is that 20% 
typically represents a small enough legislative block to lack the ability to push forward an 
agenda unaided but 10% of seats is large enough to represent a significant portion of the 
population’s vote.  I run these in place of the traditional and alternate models listed above, 
usually as lagged variables to represent medium-sized party seat-shares during the period of 
electoral reform.  I also calculate change between seat-shares and proportion of medium-
sized parties from one election to the next. 
 Additionally, the disproportionality in translating votes to seats is used as a latent 
proxy for ideological leanings.  In theory, when disproportionality is relatively high the 
allocation formulae from votes to seats distributes those seats disproportionately relative to 
vote-share.  Ideologically-motivated elites seeking to make the system “more representative” 
are more likely to pursue electoral reform of seat allocation formulae that more closely or 
accurately translates votes into seats.  As such, I use the Gallagher Index (Gallagher 1991) to 
calculate a value of disproportionality (Disproportionality) for each observation, as well as 
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including lagged values and values measuring the change in disproportionality from election 
period to election period.  For details on calculating disproportionality, see Appendix C. 
 To test whether disproportionality matters more depending on which parties are the 
beneficiaries of the vote-to-seat translations, I also include a measure for the 
disproportionality calculated only for the medium-sized parties (Disproportionality Medium-
Sized), measured using the 10-20% seat-share range.  I calculate this variable in order to test 
my expectations about divergent preferences within the party system depending on parties’ 
beliefs about whether they do or will benefit from pursuing certain reforms as motivated by 
seat-maximization.  I calculate this variable the same way as the Disproportionality measure 
but simply calculate for only the vote and seat differentials for the medium-sized parties.  I 
also include the lagged values. 
 Finally, the level of overall uncertainty (sometimes referred to as instability) in the 
electoral and party systems are often measured in the literature via two proxies: vote-share 
volatility and seat-share volatility.  Volatility is calculated according to the Pedersen Index 
(Pedersen 1979) for both the aggregate change in votes from one election to the next (Vote 
Volatility) and the aggregate change in seats from one elected legislature to the next (Seat 
Volatility), as well as including lagged values and values measuring the change in volatility 
from inter-election period to inter-election period.  For additional details on calculating 
volatility, see Appendix C. 
As the observations are temporally defined as inter-election periods, for the sake of 
theoretical and methodological simplicity all party and electoral system variables are 
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assumed to be static between elections.134  Therefore I do not recalculate party system size, 
disproportionality or volatility levels for during-period change in seat-share due to 
resignations, appointments, removals or any other event that may produce a small change in 
the relative seat-share of parties or independent legislators.  In the event of complete 
government collapse or crisis of confidence, most legislatures in the dataset would simply 
hold new elections via rules designed for just such a purpose, and so a new observation 
would begin anyway.  For a discussion of methodological and theoretical justifications for 
inter-election codes, see Appendix C. 
To test the hypothesized effect of new democracy on the dependent variables I 
include a measure of the age of democracy.  The measure is calculated by subtracting the 
commonly accepted year of transition from the year of observation, rather than subtracting 
the year that a country’s score on a measure such as the Polity scale or the Freedom House 
index designated the country as “democratic” or “free.”  The measure and each panel do not 
include breaks in a country’s democracy (i.e. a full-scale lapse or coup that results in years of 
undemocratic elections following the transition), and so in the case of Russia, Thailand and 
Venezuela their data panels end early.135  Values are given in years while logged values are 
included to account for the five more established democracies (France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, New Zealand), particularly the case of New Zealand which is the only case with an 
unbroken series of democratic elections beginning prior to the twentieth century.  In some 
models the age of democracy is replaced by a dummy variables for the wave in which a 
                                                 
134
 I recognize that many legislative replacements may occur due to death, appointments, corruption or other 
removal mechanisms, but there are too many cases to code for these and replacements often still come from the 
same party so these should not affect the aggregate measures of party system size, etc. 
 
135
 See Appendix C for a discussion of ending the Russian, Thai and Venezuelan panels before 2010. 
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country experienced its democratic transition: 1st wave pre-1949, 2nd wave post-World War 
II, 3rd wave post-1978. 
 
Control Variables 
 Most models related to causes and consequences of party system change include 
control variables measuring economic growth and/or stability.  Since I am measuring the 
effects of said institutions they are not included as controls, and I include a range of 
economic control variables to make certain that economic change, crisis or performance are 
simply driving party system change as opposed to the effects of institutional change (Roberts 
and Wibbels 1999).  The first, and most traditionally used, is a measure of the rate of growth 
of a country’s GDP per capita.  The second is a measure of the unemployment rate, as a 
percentage of the total working age population.  The third is a measure of urbanization, as a 
percentage of the total population living in urban areas of more than 1 million inhabitants.  
The values of the controls are all obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database, an annual time-series of hundreds of economic and labor indicators.  
Typically models do not include all of these measures, with the GDP per capita as the 
variable reported in the analyses below.  I also include dummy variables for geographic 
region (Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Western Europe). 
 In addition, since the observations are coded in a periodic manner, rather than in 
annual or event-based data panels, I include a control for the length of each inter-election 
period measured in months, beginning from the month immediately following the election in 
time t until the month of the election in time t+1.  That measurement is used as the inter-
election period length (Election Period Length) for the observation at time t+1.  The length 
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ranges from 6 to 76 months but nearly a majority (47%) fall between 40-54 months (~3.5-4.5 
years), with only nine elections occurring within 24 months of the previous election and only 
six (three in Italy alone) occurring past 60 months after the previous election.  A yearly 
measurement proved extremely insensitive so monthly data are used since the range does not 
cover too large or non-normal a distribution, with most observations falling between 24 and 
60 months making it difficult to justify annual or logged data on the temporal control. 
Table 6.3. Dataset Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Min Max 
Age of Democracy (Year) 28.16 0 151 
Logged Age of Democracy 2.86 0 5.02 
Election Period Length (Month) 43.27 6 76 
Vote Volatility (EV) 33.69 4 99.95 
Seat Volatility (SV) 33.95 3.02 100 
Effective Number of Parties by Vote-share 
(ENPV) 
4.32 1.91 12.9 
Effective Number of Parties by Seat-share 
(ENPS) 
3.48 1.22 10.86 
Change in ENPV -0.14 -16.47A 4.59 
Change in ENPS -0.03 -10.62 7.47 
Disproportionality 8.53 0.85 37.96 
Change in Disproportionality -0.51 -30.5 29.68 
Change in GDP per capita 2.63 -9.6 14.02 
Unemployment Rate 9.2 1.1 36 
Urbanization 63.58 29.76 89.7 
Medium-sized Parties’ Seat-share (MPS) 19.85 0 90.65 
Proportion of Medium-sized Legislative Parties 
(Medium Parties) 
36.81 0 80 
Change in Medium-sized Parties’ Seat-share 
(Change MPS) 
-0.11 -73.48 84.78 
Change in Proportion of Medium-sized 
Legislative Parties (Change Medium Parties) 
0.98 -60 60 
Disproportionality Medium-Sized Parties 2.32 0.26 8.10 
N 244 
A
 For the minimum value of the change in ENPV, which is significantly larger than the largest value 
of ENPV in the dataset, the change value comes from the 1990 Romanian election which produced a 
party system size of 21.99 ENPV but is not included in the descriptive statistics because the 1990 
Romanian elections are not part of the qualifying observations.  Removal of this outlier of change in 
EPNV only moves the mean value to -0.04, for a change of 0.1. 
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To summarize, Table 6.3 lists the descriptive statistics of all independent and control 
variables included in any of the statistical models.  Lagged variables are not listed but the 
values of the variables measuring change over time in a variable category, such as change in 
ENPV from one election to another, are given.  Details about each reform in each case are 
listed, along with the categorical reform codes, in Appendix B.  Full descriptions of coding 
rules, formulas used for calculations of indices, exceptional cases and notable outliers are 
available in Appendix C, as well as detailed descriptions how exceptions and outliers 
affected particular model specifications.  The dataset, unlike some previous datasets, 
constructs all measurements from raw data of each party’s votes or seats resulting from a 
given election and attempts to do so using uniform election reporting or by cross-validating 
data sources.  By using consistent calculations for all observations this removes some of the 
bias that might arise from aggregating values from different sources.  A full list of sources 
for the raw party-level election results and seat allocations, as well as data and information 
about the electoral reforms adopted, are listed by each country in Appendix D; as previously 
mentioned all control variables relating to economic performance come from the World 
Bank.  All models were run using Stata9 and specific models are listed where applicable in 
the following analyses. 
 
Models 
 In order to consistently test previous models of reform by replicating them as closely 
as possible I begin with a multinomial logistic regression model to test the causes of 
interparty reform outcomes.136  The basic model is as follows: 
                                                 
136
 The basic model is a replication of the formula used by Remmer, minus the “year” control variable since my 
estimation is based on periodic, rather than annual, data.  I only replicate Colomer’s model in Appendix E 
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Reform = Lagged Party System Size + Lagged Change in Party System Size + 
Lagged Electoral Volatility + Change in Economic Performance + Democratic Age 
 
I run the same model independently with respect to vote-shares and seat-shares, so that 
Model A estimates the outcome of interparty reform with respect to changes in the party 
system measured in votes and Model B estimates the outcome of reform with respect to 
change in the party system measured in seats.137  The only variable I have eliminated which 
is included in previous studies is the “Year” control, since my dataset is coded periodically 
rather than annually.  I also use my expanded dataset, so it is very close but not a perfect 
replication.  For a more exact set of replications, see Appendix E. 
 I then expand the model estimating reform, first to include a broader range of 
variables than previous studies do in order to increase model fit and explanatory power and 
also to estimate a second set of models regarding intraparty reform.  The expanded model is 
as follows: 
Reform = Lagged Party System Size + Lagged Change in Party System Size + 
Lagged Electoral Volatility + Lagged Disproportionality + Lagged Difference 
between Largest Party Seat-share + Lagged Sum of Largest Party Seat-share + 
Change in Economic Performance + Democratic Age + Election Period Length 
 
I continue to run the model independently with respect to vote-share and seat-share, and so I 
estimate the outcome of interparty reform with respect to changes in the party system 
measured in votes (Model C) and seats (Model D).  Then I estimate the outcome of intraparty 
reform with respect to changes in the party system measured in votes (Model F) and seats 
(Model G). The only exception is the difference and sum of the two largest parties seat-
shares, which is measured in seats regardless of which model is being run.  For theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                       
because he only includes one independent variable, party system fragmentation, in his probit analysis and 
controls for no other effects on propensity to reform. 
 
137
 This again replicates how Remmer runs her models, separating votes and seats. 
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reasons, it makes more sense to conceptualize the relative share of the largest parties in terms 
of seats since the legislative arena is still where most reform occurs (or is passed), so 
regardless of whether it is fluctuation in vote-share that triggers desires for reform, the 
reform will still be constrained by the relative legislative power of the two largest parties. To 
test the hypotheses generated by the Indonesian case study I also run two additional models 
estimating the outcome of interparty reform in which I replace the aggregate party system 
lagged and change variables with the variables measuring medium-party seat-share and the 
proportion of medium-sized parties in the system (Models E & H).  In these models I drop 
the difference and sum variables for the largest parties due to issues of multicollinearity with 
the medium-sized party data. 
 
Results and Analysis 
Most reform occurs within the first two decades of democracy, with the latest-
occurring reforms – Italy, Japan and New Zealand all moving to mixed electoral systems – 
coming in years 61, 41 and 136 of democratic age.  While this does not suggest an inability 
of reform occurrence late into and beyond the democratic consolidation phase, it suggests 
that institutional stickiness likely prevents the majority of reform discussions from 
progressing beyond the negotiation stage or may, due to the increase in veto players in highly 
institutionalized democratic settings, be held up at some late stage in the reform adoption 
process (i.e. Court intervention or failure to pass as a popular initiative or referendum).  Only 
two interparty and two intraparty reforms occurred in democracies older than 50 years and 
both were in the more inclusive/more party-centric direction: Italy’s second reform and New 
Zealand’s first. 
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Just seven interparty and seven intraparty reforms occurred after the tenth democratic 
election in any country, for a 87.93% rate of early democratic interparty reform and a 76.67% 
rate of early democratic intraparty reform.  The average democratic age at which interparty 
reform occurred is 14.75 years (14.2 for more inclusive and 15.7 for less inclusive), and the 
average for intraparty reform is 21.9 years (same average for party-centric and candidate-
centric).  The distribution is skewed toward reforms in early democracy with only 16 
interparty reforms (26.7%) occurring after the average and only 10 intraparty reforms 
(33.3%) occurring after the average.  There are relatively even distributions of each direction 
of reform across each of the distributions.  This suggests that while newly-democratic reform 
is not necessarily the only type there is, the overabundance in recent decades of electoral 
reform by democracies in their first or second decade means that more and more reformers 
are relatively new to the democratic game of competitive electoral politics and so 
assumptions based on high information and institutional experience should be made with 
some skepticism. 
 The dataset, as has already been mentioned, contains examples of all four potential 
types of reform outcomes: more inclusive and less inclusive along the interparty dimension, 
and party-centric and candidate-centric along the intraparty dimension.  In Colomer’s study, 
he only presented evidence of 37 cases of what I refer to as more inclusive reform, none of 
less inclusive, party-centric or candidate-centric reform; Remmer’s study contained 14 cases 
of more inclusive reform and 9 of less inclusive reform, with none of party- or candidate-
centric reform.  My dataset contains 58 observations with interparty reform – 20 less 
inclusive, 33 more inclusive, and 5 where the inclusivity mechanisms offset each other in the 
aggregate effect of the reform – and 30 observations of intraparty reform – 13 of candidate-
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centric and 17 of party-centric reform.  Thus there appears to be greater variation in the 
dependent variable of reform outcome than previous studies have shown, and with that 
variation comes more incentive to explore the different aspects of reform as both cause and 
consequence of changes in the party system. 
 Measuring the factors correlated with electoral reform adoption have proven difficult 
in past statistical models that often underestimated or demonstrated omitted variable bias 
(Colomer 2005) or examined only a regional subset of cases with few observations and 
variables to model (Remmer 2008).  I expanded the data to include wider case selection and a 
larger number of cases, more reform observations over a longer period of time, and more 
sensitive and alternative measures to those used in previous studies-.  Despite this, these 
statistical models find little evidence to support seat-maximizing motivations or effects from 
many structural factors. 
Table 6.4 shows the results of the replication model with my expanded dataset.  The 
model is a multinomial logistic regression with the outcome of “no reform” as the baseline 
category, with statistically significant results in bold type-face.  I find few statistically 
significant variables of interest except a lagged ENPV indicator, a lagged ENPS indicator, 
and the control for the age of democracy, all predictive of less inclusive reform adoption.  
Interestingly, the economic control of change in GDP per capita is negative and statistically 
significant in models predicting less inclusive reform adoption.  This suggests that in poor 
economic times the parties in the legislature may fear being voted out of office and so will 
shy away from less inclusive reforms that might raise the bar for legislative entry if they 
suffer at the polls. 
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Table 6.4 Replicating Estimates of Legislative Reform138 
 Model A Votes Model B Seats 
 More Inclusive Less Inclusive More Inclusive Less Inclusive 
ENPV (lagged) 0.042 
(0.230) 
0.520* 
(0.257) 
  
Change ENPV (lagged) 0.086 
(0.172) 
0.053 
(0.166) 
  
ENPS (lagged)   -0.502 
(0.310) 
0.576 
(0.303) 
Change ENPS (lagged)   0.099 
(0.207) 
0.092 
(0.230) 
Vote Volatility (lagged) 0.000 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
  
Seat Volatility (lagged)   0.014 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
Change in GDP per 
capita 
0.026 
(0.086) 
-0.257** 
(0.092) 
0.064 
(0.080) 
-0.227** 
(0.085) 
Democratic Age -0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.039 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.030 
(0.021) 
Constant -1.968* 
(0.963) 
-2.938* 
(1.224) 
-0.900 
(1.001) 
-3.459** 
(1.220) 
Pseudo R² 0.0882 0.1174 
N 126 140 
* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001 
 
 But what about interparty reform in a more expansive model that includes alternative 
indicators of party system and potential strategic motivations?  Table 6.5 shows the expanded 
model that includes additional indicators for disproportionality, the medium-sized parties’ 
relative seat-share, the proportion of legislative parties that are medium sized, and the 
disproportionality of just the medium-sized parties in the system.  Many variables are 
similarly signed as they are in the previous model but the new variables suggest some 
interesting trends in the data and the importance of the additions to improving the fit of the 
model. 
 
 
                                                 
138
 See Appendix E for direct replication, and variants of replication, of Remmer’s full model estimating 
electoral reform. 
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Table 6.5 Estimates of Interparty Reform 
 Model C Votes Model D Seats Model E Seats 
 More 
Inclusive 
Less 
Inclusive 
ENPV 
(lagged) 
0.007 
(0.235) 
0.677* 
(0.288) 
  
Change in ENPV 
(lagged) 
0.156 
(0.194) 
-0.036 
(0.162) 
  
ENPS 
(lagged) 
  -0.567* 
(0.226) 
 
Change in ENPS 
(lagged) 
  0.073 
(0.163) 
 
MPS 
(lagged) 
   -5.552* 
(2.672) 
Medium Parties 
(lagged) 
   1.763 
(2.296) 
Vote Volatility (lagged) -0.006 
(0.017) 
0.000 
(0.021) 
  
Seat Volatility 
(lagged) 
  -0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
Disproportionality 
(lagged) 
0.054 
(0.052) 
-0.199* 
(0.098) 
0.067 
(0.044) 
0.091* 
(0.044) 
Disproportionality of 
Medium Parties 
(lagged) 
   -0.094 
(0.159) 
Change in GDPpc 0.006 
(0.088) 
-0.212* 
(0.105) 
0.131 
(0.064) 
0.120 
(0.064) 
Election Period Length 0.024 
(0.030) 
0.074 
(0.042) 
-0.017 
(0.021) 
-0.016 
(0.021) 
Age of Democracy -0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.040 
(0.027) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
Constant -3.170 
(1.697) 
-5.859* 
(2.466) 
  
Pseudo R² 0.1582 0.0998 0.1053 
N 126 131 128 
* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001 
 
There is one important factor to note in the model specifications for Models C-E.  The 
range of outcomes from less inclusive to no reform to more inclusive might be theoretically 
conceptualized as either an ordinal (most likely) scale or a purely categorical scale.  I 
estimated the model as an ordinal outcome, using an ordered logistic estimation and testing 
for violation of the proportional odds assumption.  However, Model C violated the 
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proportional odds assumption (suggesting non-uniform distance between ordered categories) 
and thus I reverted to multinomial logit estimation for the vote-share model.  I chose 
multinomial rather than a generalized ordered logistic model since there seems to be a 
theoretical justification for considering the “no reform” category as a baseline instead of an 
assumption that there is no inherent baseline category between the three possible reform 
outcomes. Models D and E are both ordered logit estimations, following the scale of -1, 0, 1 
in the coding scheme.  Previous studies have either theoretically or methodologically applied 
a categorical structure to the possible range of outcomes, resulting in the use of a multinomial 
logistic estimation technique. 
First, the coefficient of the lagged disproportionality indicator is negatively signed 
and statistically significant for the less inclusive outcome in Model C. The interpretation of 
this result is simple: higher disproportionality is less likely to precede shifts to less inclusive 
systems, particularly when accounting for party system size by vote-share and the relative 
seat-share of the medium-sized parties.  One possible substantive interpretation of this 
finding supports a more complementary perspective about electoral reform pursuits: when 
disproportionality increases along with the share of seats of medium-sized parties, larger 
parties are prevented from adopting less inclusive reforms.  In addition to the 
disproportionality coefficient, the positive and significant sign on the coefficient for party 
system size when predicting less inclusive reform is the opposite expected of seat-
maximizing logic. 
Second, in Models D and E the proportional odds assumptions of an ordered logit are 
not violated and so we can evaluate the outcomes of less inclusive, no reform and more 
inclusive as ordered.  In these models, when substituting in the lagged variables for the seat-
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share of the medium-sized parties or the proportion of medium-sized parties and including a 
measure for disproportionality of the medium-sized parties, we see magnified effects from 
the aggregate party system variable.  The negative and statistically significant coefficients for 
both ENPS and medium-sized party seat-share suggest that increasing party system size and 
medium-sized seat-share reduce the likelihood of more inclusive reform adoption.  
Theoretically this likely occurs because larger parties will react to dilution of their power, 
indicated by increasing party system size or medium-sized party strength, by adopting less 
inclusive reforms to eliminate or coalesce with specific medium-sized parties. 
The effect is much stronger for medium-sized party seat-share, indicating that when 
medium-sized parties become quite strong as a group the likelihood of more inclusive 
systems that can accommodate small parties will drastically decrease.  Thus while the overall 
system size matters, the strength of medium-sized parties more clearly helps determine less 
inclusive reform adoption or reduction in the likelihood of more inclusive reform adoption.  
When run as a multinomial logit that differentiates between more and less inclusive as 
categories of reform rather than on an ordered scale, the positive effect of medium-sized 
party seat-share becomes much larger for the likelihood of adopting less inclusive reforms.  
In addition, in Model E disproportionality is positively and significantly associated with 
more inclusive reforms, confirming the trend in Model C. 
Following the theory from the Indonesian case, the medium-sized parties were more 
likely to be positively affected by earlier reform adoptions, as the largest parties sought to 
eliminate the smallest parties, but negatively affected by later reform adoptions, as the largest 
parties sought to regain votes from the medium-sized parties.  Smaller parties were always at 
a disadvantage.  This aggregate test further suggests the importance of evaluating the strength 
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of different types of parties rather than via an aggregate system size measurement, 
particularly when contemplating the possibility of over-time reform. 
Finally, Table 6.6 shows the results of the expanded model with the outcome of 
intraparty reform and including the regional and wave dummies.  I drop the democratic age 
variable due to collinearity with the wave dummy variable.  Most coefficients fail to reach 
statistical significance and are often sign in unexpected directions. 
Table 6.6 Estimates of Intraparty Reform 
 Model G Seats Model H Seats 
 Party-Centric Candidate-
Centric 
Party-Centric Candidate-
Centric 
ENPS 
(lagged) 
-0.221 
(0.399) 
-0.278 
(0.563) 
  
Change in ENPS 
(lagged) 
0.300 
(0.351) 
0.754 
(0.543) 
  
MPS (lagged)   1.094 
(4.687) 
-1.441 
(4.658) 
Medium Party (lagged)   -3.908 
(5.127) 
0.247 
(4.637) 
Seat Volatility 
(lagged) 
0.006 
(0.022) 
0.007 
(0.026) 
0.009 
(0.023) 
0.013 
(0.022) 
Disproportionality 
(lagged) 
0.019 
(0.076) 
-0.198 
(0.137) 
-0.011 
(0.062) 
-0.232 
(0.131) 
Change in GDPpc 0.002 
(0.100) 
0.090 
(0.122) 
0.003 
(0.096) 
0.099 
(0.133) 
Election Period Length 0.078 
(0.069) 
0.056 
(0.041) 
0.076 
(0.065) 
0.047 
(0.038) 
Asia Dummy 1.997 
(1.756) 
0.397 
(2.152) 
2.147 
(1.727) 
1.344 
(1.859) 
Central/Eastern Europe 
Dummy 
-32.902 
(5197.884) 
0.464 
(1.426) 
-32.795 
(1853.310) 
0.884 
(1.390) 
Latin America Dummy 21.368*** 
(2.045) 
0.220 
(1.845) 
21.699*** 
(2.054) 
0.661 
(1.784) 
2nd Wave Democracy 0.084 
(1.655) 
17.772*** 
(2.765) 
0.016 
(1.636) 
18.615*** 
(2.065) 
3rd Wave Democracy -20.387 
 
17.404*** 
(2.889) 
-20.537 
 
17.908*** 
(2.445) 
Constant -6.293 
(4.340) 
-21.612 -6.513 
(3.715) 
-22.972 
 
Pseudo R² 0.2232 0.1948 
N 135 136 
* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001 
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The findings in this model should differ somewhat compared to interparty reform, as 
the balance between legislative parties has theoretically less of an impact on reforms 
affecting nomination and election behavior within parties.  However, since intraparty reforms 
often happen in conjunction with interparty reforms, we would expect to see some patterns 
between the systemic factors and the outcome of reform.  Thus it is notable that party system 
characteristics, such as size and dispersion across the system, do not have a significant or 
consistent effect on intraparty reform pursuits and adoptions.  Model F, replicating Model G 
replacing seats with votes, is not reported in the table because it yielded no statistically 
significant findings except for the Latin America regional dummy, which demonstrates the 
same effect on both interparty and intraparty reform outcomes as in both Models G and H. 
In the intraparty models, the addition of the region and wave dummy variables 
account for some of the story, though much more for candidate-centric reforms.  Results 
show that the Latin America coefficient is positive, large and statistically significant for 
party-centric outcomes in both models; the effect disappears in the candidate-centric models.  
Democratic wave makes a large and significant difference in the choice of candidate-centric 
reforms, with positive, large and statistically significant coefficients for the 2nd and 3rd waves. 
This finding confirms some empirical cases of reforms in the two waves.  The 2nd 
wave finding results from some proportional systems that undertook transitions to mixed-
electoral systems, such as Japan in the 1990s and Germany in the post-war period.  The 3rd 
wave finding results from some mixed-electoral systems that undertook transitions to 
majoritarian systems, such as Bulgaria and Macedonia in the early 2000s.  Thus not all 
candidate-centric reforms in the second and third waves are necessarily toward the same type 
of system, but movement toward candidate-centricity does appear to be a more recent 
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development in cases of electoral reform.  The effect is large for both waves, suggesting that 
reforms of a candidate-centric nature are likely to be adopted when compared to the 1st wave. 
In terms of whether democratic age will affect a country’s propensity to make 
candidate-centric or party-centric reforms, of the thirteen episodes of candidate-centric 
reform, seven occurred before the twentieth year of democracy and six occurred between 
years twenty and fifty of democracy.  In contrast, of the seventeen episodes of party-centric 
reform, thirteen occurred before the twentieth year of democracy while four occurred 
between the fortieth and 140th year of democracy.  While it is clear that new democracies are 
more likely to make party-centric than candidate-centric reforms, older democracies also 
made party-centric shifts.  This suggests that while older and newer democracies might be 
equally likely to make intra-party reforms, the direction of reform is unlikely to be a 
candidate-centric shift past a certain age of democracy. 
 
Evaluating Ratchet Effects Across Cases 
In terms of the effects of path dependency on reform, Table 6.7 shows the paths taken 
by repeat reformers on the three types of reforms: electoral threshold change, district 
magnitude change, and movement toward or away from candidate-centric reform.  In the 
interparty reform dimension, electoral threshold increases and district magnitude decreases 
are more likely to be continued or the previous outcome retained in subsequent periods, 
while electoral threshold decreases are unlikely to occur at all and district magnitude 
increases are rolled back as often as they are retained, but never further increased.  The 
exception to the rule regarding electoral threshold decrease: Albania in 2001 rolled back the 
threshold instituted in 1992 but then in 2009 returned the threshold to its original level.  
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Removing the Albanian case from the analysis produces a dataset with no rollbacks in 
electoral threshold increase, only retention and continuation in threshold levels when other 
reforms occur, and no cases of electoral threshold decrease in the dataset. 
Table 6.7 Ratchet Effects and Outcomes in Multiple-Iteration Reform Processes 
 Retain Change Rollback Change Continue Change 
Electoral Threshold Increase 6 1 
Albania 2001 
5 
Electoral Threshold Decrease 0 1 
Albania 2009 
0 
 
District Magnitude Increase 2 2 
Peru 2000 
Poland 2001 
0 
District Magnitude Decrease 
 
3 0 3 
 
Candidate-Centric Adopted 0 1 
Italy 2005 
1 
Party-Centric Adopted 2 2 
Bulgaria 2009 
France 1986 
3 
 
In the intraparty dimension, party-centric reforms are slightly more likely to be 
continued than rolled back or retained in multiple iterations than candidate-centric reforms, 
while candidate-centric reform is never simply retained when multiple stages of intraparty 
reform occur.  However, both types of intraparty reform are nearly as likely to be rolled back 
as continued or retained.  This suggests that intraparty reform is less likely to show a ratchet 
effect than electoral threshold reform or decreases in district magnitude, which are difficult to 
rollback but easy to continue.  Thus, electoral threshold increases and district magnitude 
decreases display a clear ratchet effect on their reform trajectories, but intraparty reform and 
district magnitude increases do not.  Interparty reform is more than twice as likely to be 
repeated: there are 23 episodes of repeated interparty reform, 13 of electoral threshold change 
and 10 of district magnitude change, but only nine episodes of repeated intraparty reform. 
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Patterns and Trajectories of Reform Causes 
 The statistical models offer some key insights into the causes and consequences of 
electoral reform in the aggregate.  In terms of the causes, what is clear is that party system 
variables have a limited effect on intraparty reform adoptions and that, despite the influence 
of seat-maximizing theory, there is little statistical evidence to support the hypotheses that 
either aggregate party system size or change (as a proxy for strategic shifts) are the driving 
factors in interparty reform adoptions, particularly in the case of directional expectations.  
Decreasing party system fragmentation is not associated with less inclusive reforms nor is 
increasing party system fragmentation associated with more inclusive reforms, disproving 
hypothesis 1.  In terms of disproportionality, used here as a test of alternative motivations, it 
decreases the likelihood of less inclusive reform in the vote-share model and increases the 
likelihood of more inclusive reform in the medium-sized party seat-share model.  This 
provides support for hypothesis 2 that alternative motivations may be at work. 
Findings about the seat-maximizing hypotheses regarding medium-sized party seat-
share are clearer.  Less inclusive reform is more likely the result of an increase in the seat-
share of medium-sized parties, the opposite of hypothesis 3a.  The effect on more inclusive 
reform is weaker, with statistically insignificant results when separating out the outcomes in 
a multinomial logit.  There is no statistical support for the argument that medium-sized party 
seat-share affects the likelihood of party- or candidate-centric reform (hypothesis 3b). 
Greater disproportionality in the translation of medium-sized party votes into seats 
does not have a statistically significant effect on reform adoption and thus does not support 
my expectation (hypothesis 4).  Seven of the 17 cases of iterated reforms are of a less 
inclusive nature and those seven cases are out of the total 20 less inclusive reforms overall.  
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This suggests no support for hypothesis 5 that reformers are more likely to adopt less 
inclusive reforms once the democracy honeymoon period ends. 
In terms of temporal and ratchet effects, the data do show support for hypothesis 6a 
but not as much for hypothesis 6b.  Later-round less inclusive reforms are much more likely 
to mimic previous round less inclusive reforms, with almost no rollback in electoral threshold 
implementation and no rollback in district magnitude reduction.  The counter-example of 
more inclusive reform does not display the same directionality, with rollbacks as likely as 
maintenance of the same type of reform.  However, with so few multiple-iteration examples 
of candidate-centric reform (2), the effect is not supportive of hypothesis 6b: candidate-
centric reform is equally likely to be rolled back as to occur a second time.  Table 6.8 
summarizes these findings. 
Table 6.8 Summary of Hypotheses and Results – Electoral Reform as Dependent Variable 
# Hypothesis Supported? 
1 The probability that reformers will adopt more inclusive reforms increases as 
party system fragmentation increases, whereas the probability that reformers 
will adopt less inclusive electoral reforms increases as party system 
fragmentation declines. 
No 
2 The probability that reformers will adopt more inclusive reforms increases as 
disproportionality increases. 
Yes 
3a The probability of less (more) inclusive reform adoption increases as the seat-
share of medium-sized parties decreases (increases). 
No 
3b The probability of candidate-centric (party-centric) reform adoption increases 
as the seat-share of medium-sized parties decreases (increases). 
No 
4 The probability of more (less) inclusive reform adoption increases as the 
differential of medium-sized parties decreases (increases). 
No 
5 The probability of less inclusive reform adoption, particularly electoral 
thresholds, increases in later rounds of iterated reform. 
No 
6a The probability of less (more) inclusive reform adoption increases when less 
(more) inclusive reforms were adopted in the previous inter-election period, but 
the constraints of alternative motivations and iterated reforms prevent the 
adoption of the most extreme less (more) inclusive reforms. 
Yes 
6b The probability of candidate-centric (party-centric) reform adoption increases 
when candidate-centric (party-centric) reforms were adopted in the previous 
inter-election period, but the constraints of alternative motivations and iterated 
reforms prevent the adoption of the most extreme candidate-centric (party-
centric) reforms. 
No 
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 The first major conclusion to draw is that seat-maximizing logic, though useful as a 
baseline theoretical framework for considering elite motivations and the process of decision-
making, suffers from a lack of predictive capability in evaluating electoral reform adoption in 
the aggregate.  In each category of interparty reform adoption nearly the same number of 
instances of contracting and expanding party system size by votes and seats were evident.  In 
terms of more inclusive reform observations, which should follow expanding party system 
size as parties seek to convert a system of total loss into only partial loss, one more 
observation of contracting party system size occurred than of expanding party system size.  
In terms of less inclusive reform observations, which should follow contracting party system 
size as dominant parties seek to capitalize on their gains, one more observation of expanding 
party system size occurred than of contracting party system size.  In offsetting reforms there 
were equal numbers of observations of party system contraction and expansion.  With only 
44% of the observations following the expected reform path, the data suggests that many of 
the cases of reform cannot explained by seat-maximizing logic alone, or cannot be properly 
predicted the way that seat-maximizing theories have traditionally been measured via the 
proxy of aggregate party system size and change in the overall party system of a country. 
 The level of disproportionality in the system offers an additional insight into both 
strategic and alternative motivations: as disproportionality increases, elites who are pursuing 
reforms to either make the system more effective or representative, such as by reducing 
wasted votes or more accurately translating votes into seats, should pursue interparty reforms 
that are likely to reduce disproportionality (i.e. more inclusive).  The most striking contrast in 
terms of disproportionality is evident when we evaluate which systems undertook which 
reforms.  Equal numbers of low and high disproportionality cases undertook more inclusive 
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reform; in contrast, cases of less inclusive reform occurred in systems with low 
disproportionality 15 times, while only 4 times did cases with high disproportionality 
undertake less inclusive reform.  The implications of the data do suggest that 
disproportionality may be an indicator of alternative motivations that is worth more carefully 
considering in cross-national studies of electoral reform. 
In addition, the depth of understanding regarding reform as both an effect and a cause 
of party system change is enhanced by more nuanced ways of evaluating the nature of party 
systems and the distribution of power within them.  By assessing the relative strength of 
medium-sized parties, shown in the Indonesian case to be an extremely influential aspect of 
different reform periods, and the relative strength of the largest parties in the system, we can 
understand how and why a reform that seemed as if it should have been adopted might not 
have been.  While the effective size of the party system correlates highly to the seat-share of 
the two largest parties in the system (0.9121), the correlation between the effective size of the 
party system and the seat-share of the medium-sized parties is lower (0.777) and suggests 
less normal distribution regarding the parties in the middle.  In a system with few medium-
sized parties and many small parties, large parties may employ less inclusive reforms to 
eliminate the competition and may do so in collusion with the few medium-sized parties. 
 Finally, despite Colomer’s assertion that the primary direction of reform is toward 
greater proportionality due increasing uncertainty, with respect to trajectories of reform the 
evidence along the two dimensions of inter- and intraparty reform suggest a trend toward 
centrality and the importance of including the intraparty dimension, similar to predictions 
about reaction to “extreme” system bias (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001: 28).  Figure 6.1 
shows the initial position while Figure 6.2 shows the final position of each case.  
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The total number of cases represented has been reduced from 34 to 33 since Czech 
reforms were offsetting and the case demonstrates no movement along either dimension.  
These trajectories support hypotheses 6a and 6b regarding ceiling or constraints on ratchet 
effects and suggest support for arguments about the salience of mixed electoral systems or 
systems that mix elements of inter- and intra-party selection mechanisms.  The centralizing 
tendency is unmistakable particularly in the case of single-event reforms shown in Figure 
6.3, with nearly all cases trending toward the center.  Solid arrows indicate central trajectory 
and dashed arrows indicate reforms of a non-central nature, e.g. the move from an open list 
system to closed-lists. 
Figure 6.3 Single-Reform Case Trajectories 
 
255 
There are a number of cases of reform that move from the bottom and center of the 
lower-left quadrant, mostly electoral variants of single-member districts with runoff 
elections, toward the center, mostly to mixed systems employing parallel ballots.  There are 
also a number of cases of reform that move from the top and center of the upper-right 
quadrant, mostly electoral variants of large- or national-district systems with closed 
proportional lists, toward the center, mostly to mixed systems with reapportioning 
mechanisms and balance between plurality and proportional seats.  Figure 6.3 only shows the 
reforms of the 14 cases of single-iteration reform and three (Peru, Romania and Venezuela) 
of multiple-iteration reform where one of the iterations was the offsetting category and no 
actual shift along any dimension occurred.  The remaining cases of multiple-iteration reform 
are each mapped out below in Figures 6.4 and 6.5.  For these cases each arrow represents an 
episode of reform and each case contains at least two arrows, solid arrows denote 
centralizing movement and dashed arrows non-central movement. 
Figure 6.4 shows the trajectories of the eight cases that either followed centralizing 
trajectories or ended up closer to the center than before the first reform period, even if the 
latest round of reforms took the country toward the upper-right hand quadrant as in the cases 
of Germany and Guatemala.  Colombia is a case that began as proportional, shifted to a less 
inclusive but still proportional system through a reduction in district magnitude and the size 
of the legislature, then shifted to a more candidate-centric system by allowing parties to open 
their nomination lists to voter choice.  The result was a final placement closer to the center 
and the Dominican case shows an identical trajectory.  The Indonesian case shows a step-
wise progression toward the center away from the upper-right quadrant.   
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Figure. 6.4 Centrally-oriented Multiple-iteration Cases 
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Figure 6.5 Non-centrally Oriented Multiple-Iteration Cases 
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In contrast to the first three cases that all demonstrate a central trajectory from the 
upper-right hand quadrant, Bulgaria is a case that began as a mixed-electoral system, shifted 
to fully proportional after the first election, and then eighteen years later returned to the 
mixed system it originally used; in this case the original and final position are the same still 
centrally-located relative to the interim position.  The Bolivian and Mexican cases both 
demonstrate central movement, though primarily along the interparty reform dimension and 
from opposite original positions, and the German and Guatemalan cases are predominantly 
centralizing along a diagonal trajectory but in the final reform period exhibit minor 
movement away from the center toward greater proportionality. 
Figure 6.5 shows the trajectories of the six cases that followed reform trajectories 
toward the upper-right quadrant, representing systems with greater proportionality and party-
centric control. For example, Macedonia is a case that began, in typical post-Communist 
fashion, as a majoritarian system, shifted to a mixed-system, and subsequently shifted to a 
fully proportional list system.  The interim position is upward and the right of the original 
position and the final position moves again upward and right of the interim position, for a 
trajectory through the center from the bottom-left to the upper-right quadrant.  The cases of 
Poland and Ukraine139 follow nearly the exact same trajectory while Croatia follows a similar 
one but with an original position more towards the center.  The Albanian case has the most 
movement, with original and final positions that resemble the general trajectory of the 
Macedonian, Polish and Ukrainian cases.  With the inverse trajectory of Bulgaria, Italy is a 
case that began as a proportional representation system, shifted centrally to a mixed-electoral 
                                                 
139
 Ukrainian electoral reforms in 2011 will result in a positional shift for the Ukrainian case back towards the 
center as a mixed-electoral system will be reintroduced for the 2012 national elections.  Since the dataset 
currently covers reforms through 2010, this shift is not depicted and Ukraine remains in Figure 6.5 rather than 
Figure 6.4 
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system, and then returned to a fully proportional system once again; the resulting position at 
the end is relatively similar to its original position, in the center of the upper-right quadrant.  
The last two boxes in Figure 6.5 show two exceptional cases that move neither toward a final 
position in the center or a trajectory toward the upper-right hand quadrant: Honduras and 
France.  In the Honduran case, the trajectory is at first right-ward towards greater 
proportionality but then moves downward towards more candidate-centricity.  France began 
as a two-round majoritarian system, shifted to fully proportional lists for a single election, 
and immediately reformed back to the two-round system it has employed ever since. 
 What the repeated reform cases tell us is that with one exception, repeated reforms 
can shift countries over the course of reform from either the lower-left or upper-right 
quadrant toward the center, or from the lower-left or upper-right to the center to the upper-
right quadrant.  The only exception to the center or upper-right final positions is the case of 
France.  Though discussions of a system with more proportional elements have been 
discussed among the French, no real movement toward reform has occurred (Renwick 2010).  
Otherwise, all repeat reformers only moved toward the center or upper-right quadrant, 
regardless of their starting point. 
 While these figures are not enough to tell us the full story of how and why elites 
adopted the reforms they did, what is clear is that even when majoritarian or candidate-
centric elements are chosen, they are done so in a distinct and limited way: there are no shifts 
in the dataset to a full single-member district system.  There are six cases of repeated 
reformers and one case of a single-episode reformer, Armenia, shifting to a fully-proportional 
system from a previous system that was not primarily proportional in nature.  However, the 
overwhelming majority of cases demonstrate the centralizing tendency to balance 
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proportional and majoritarian elements of interparty competition as well as adjudicate 
between party and candidate-centric elements of intraparty competition. In sum, the 
trajectories of these 34 cases within a multidimensional framework of reform elements 
suggest a more complex picture than previously assumed. 
 This conclusion fits with the arguments regarding alternative motivations and ratchet 
effects, as well as the theory that reforms likely have an ideological or alternate “ceiling” that 
limits reformers’ abilities to continually implement seat-maximizing reforms.  Combined 
with the findings of perpetual increases in electoral thresholds and decreases in district 
magnitudes, the centralizing tendency of the majority of cases suggest that seat-maximizing 
efforts have a limit above which continual reforms have been or will be unlikely.  In most 
cases where the iterated reforms have been continual increases in electoral thresholds and 
reduction in district magnitudes, movement has remained toward the center or even to the 
upper-right quadrant.  Since both electoral thresholds and reduced district magnitude 
represent leftward movement along the x-axis, and only the case of France moves to the left 
of center in the subset of iterated reforms, there is support for an argument about the limits of 
seat-maximization since cases that move more centrally do not eventually pass through the 
center to the left, except for France in the 1980s. 
 
Electoral Reform as the Independent Variable 
 Now that we have examined some of the causes of reform, let us turn to some of the 
consequences that the adoption of various reforms have on some notable party system 
outcomes and indicators.  For the second set of hypotheses about the effects of reform on 
party systems, the dependent variables in the different models are: party system size by votes, 
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party system size by seats, electoral volatility, seat volatility, disproportionality in the 
translation of votes into seats, seat-shares of the largest and medium-sized parties, and the 
changes in each of these variables between elections at time t and time t+1 where t represents 
the election prior to a reform episode.  When used as dependent variables they simply shift to 
the right-hand side of the equation from the previous analysis, with no change in the 
construction of the measurements but sometimes with the inclusion of a temporal lag 
depending on the hypothesis being tested. 
To test the hypotheses regarding the expected impacts of reform, since elites arguably 
do not undertake and adopt reform if reform will produce little or no change, I include two 
sets of dummy variables to indicate when reform has occurred during the inter-electoral 
period of the observation.140  Cases are given a value of a ‘1’ if they adopt a reform that 
makes the party system more inclusive (corresponds to a ‘1’ score on the interparty reform 
dependent variable) and a ‘0’ if they do not adopt such a reform.  Cases are given a value of 
‘1’ if they adopt a reform that makes the party system less inclusive (corresponds to a ‘-1’ 
score on the interparty reform dependent variable) and a ‘0’ if they do not adopt such a 
reform.  Cases are given a value of ‘1’ if they adopt a reform that makes the party system 
more party-centric (corresponds to a ‘1’ score on the intraparty reform dependent variable) 
and a ‘0’ if they do not adopt such a reform.  Cases are given a value of ‘1’ if they adopt a 
reform that makes the party system more candidate-centric (corresponds to a ‘-1’ score on the 
intraparty reform dependent variable) and a ‘0’ if they do not adopt such a reform.  This 
dichotomous coding of the independent variables by using each distinct reform outcome on 
each of the two dimensions most closely parallels the use of the 3-category code values of 
reform as the dependent variable in the previous analysis. All control variables used in the 
                                                 
140
 Once again, I copy Remmer’s independent variable reform coding procedure. 
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previous analysis are used to test the hypotheses regarding reform as the independent 
variable. 
 
Models 
I evaluate the impact of reforms on party system outcomes – ENPV, ENPS, Vote 
Volatility and Seat Volatility – once again replicating the formula from the time-series 
models of previous studies:141 
ENPV = More Inclusive Reform + Less Inclusive Reform + Lagged ENPV + 
Change in Economic Performance + Democratic Age 
 
Once again the only modification to the replication model is the exclusion of the “Year” 
control variable since my dataset is not coded annually, and this model serves as the basis for 
Models I (ENPV), J (ENPS), K (Vote Volatility) and L (Seat Volatility) where the relevant 
dependent variable and lagged dependent variable are substituted into the basic model.  For a 
more exact set of replications, see Appendix E. 
 I then expand the model evaluating the impact of reform, including a broader range of 
variables to account for intraparty reform effects and to increase model fit and explanatory 
power.  Additionally I evaluate the impact of reform indicators on the amount of change 
occurs in party system outcomes between the pre- and post-reform elections, rather than 
simply measuring the effects of reform on party system outcomes.  These models are 
structured: 
ENPV = More Inclusive Reform + Less Inclusive Reform + Party-Centric Reform + 
Candidate-Centric Reform + Lagged ENPV + Lagged Electoral Volatility + Change 
in Economic Performance + Democratic Age + Election Period Length 
                                                 
141
 Once again these are replications of Remmer (2008), including the division of analysis by votes and seats. 
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I continue to run the models independently with respect to vote-share and seat-share, so 
Models M-P and U-W evaluate the impact of reform on change in the party system measured 
in votes and Models Q-T and X-Z evaluate the impact of reform on change in the party 
system measured in seats.  This model serves as the basis for Models M-P(ENPV and 
Change in ENPV), Q-T (ENPS and Change in ENPS), U-W (Vote Volatility and Change in 
Vote Volatility) and X-Z (Seat Volatility and Change in Seat Volatility), and so the relevant 
dependent variable and lagged dependent variables are substituted into the basic model but 
the independent variables and controls remain relatively static. 
Finally, I run three sets of models to evaluate the impact of reform on 
disproportionality and the change in disproportionality, the sum of and change in the seat-
share of the medium-sized parties in the system and the sum of and change in the seat-share 
of the two largest parties in the system.  The model is structured: 
Disproportionality = More Inclusive Reform + Less Inclusive Reform + Party-
Centric Reform + Candidate-Centric Reform + ENPV + Change in ENPV + ENPS 
+ Change in ENPS + Difference Between Largest Party Seat-share + Sum of 
Largest Party Seat-share + Change in Economic Performance + Democratic Age + 
Election Period Length 
 
This model includes both vote-share and seat-share measurements of the party system 
because disproportionality is a measure of the difference between votes won and seats 
obtained.   Thus it would be substantively confusing to measure disproportionality in a model 
with only one or the other as predictors since they are theoretically related but do not co-
vary.  Models AA-AB show Disproportionality and change in Disproportionality, Models 
AC-AD show the Sum of the Seat-share medium-sized parties and change in the Sum of the 
Seat-share of the medium-sized parties, and Models AE-AF show the Sum of the Seat-share 
of the two largest parties and change in the Sum of the Seat-share of the two largest parties. 
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Results and Analysis 
 Previous studies’ models tested the impact of legislative reform on four party system 
outcomes: ENPV, ENPS, Vote Volatility and Seat Volatility.  Once again, I replicate the 
basic model from previous studies, a pooled time-series analysis with random effects,142 with 
my expanded dataset.  The unit of analysis is still inter-electoral period and so the 
observations are coded based on periods rather than years and the only variable not included 
in the replication is the “year” indicator since years are not the unit of analysis. 
Previous studies do not specify the use of correction mechanisms, such as an AR1 
(autoregressive correlation), for inefficient estimation in time series models.  However, I 
have unbalanced panels across a range of structural and contextual variables which may 
affect the efficiency of estimating effects.  I include the AR1 correction for auto-correlation 
where necessary and note the addition of the corrective mechanism in the results table.  Table 
6.9 shows the results of the replication with AR1 corrections for the ENPV and ENPS 
models and uncorrected estimations for the vote and seat volatility models. 
In terms of outcomes, both more and less inclusive reforms have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on electoral volatility as expected.  In the other models the 
only other factors that typically matter are the lagged values of the dependent variables.  In 
other words, reforms clearly affect volatility but seem to have a limited impact on party 
system size and the coefficients are signed in inconsistent ways with respect to strategic 
predictions: more inclusive reforms precede a shrinking party system by vote-share and an 
expanding party system by seat-share, while less inclusive reforms precede expanding party 
systems of both types.  The directionality of the less inclusive coefficients suggest that either 
                                                 
142
 I run Hausman diagnostic tests to determine whether models should use random effects instead of fixed 
effects; according to the results of all Hausman tests, the random effects are the more efficient estimation 
model. 
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elites employed strategically inefficient reforms or they employed reforms for some reason 
other than pure seat-counting strategic logic; the coefficients on the more inclusive indicator 
are less clearly interpreted. 
Table 6.9 Replicating the Impact of Legislative Reform143 
 Model I ENPV 
(AR1) 
Model J ENPS 
(AR1) 
Model K Vote 
Volatility 
Model L Seat 
Volatility 
More Inclusive -0.154 
(0.120) 
0.073 
(0.103) 
8.169* 
(2.086) 
10.654** 
(2.030) 
Less Inclusive 0.413 
(0.158) 
0.095 
(0.133) 
11.881** 
(2.461) 
14.607*** 
(2.267) 
ENPV (lagged) 0.147*** 
(0.024) 
   
ENPS (lagged)  0.095 
(0.030) 
  
Vote Volatility (lagged)   0.488*** 
(0.035) 
 
Seat Volatility (lagged)   
 0.394*** 
(0.033) 
Change in GDPpc -0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.026 
(0.012) 
0.401 
(0.197) 
0.243 
(0.190) 
Democratic Age -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.048 
(0.026) 
-0.041 
(0.027) 
Constant 3.780*** 
(0.175) 
3.323*** 
(0.145) 
14.603*** 
(1.832) 
16.815*** 
(1.715) 
R² 0.2510 0.1209 0.4489 0.3934 
Wald chi2 13.31 4.94 72.89 65.91 
N 160 178 125 144 
* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001 
 
The next models evaluate the addition of intraparty reforms to the models predicting 
party system change, as well as an increasing range of independent and control variables.  In 
Table 6.10, Models M and N show the impact of accounting for intraparty reform and 
election period length, with Model N also controlling for vote volatility, when examining the 
impact on party system size by vote-share.  Models M and N clearly show the importance of 
candidate-centric reforms, with large, positive and statistically significant coefficients 
                                                 
143
 See Appendix E for a full set of replications of Remmer’s analysis of the impact of electoral reforms. 
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suggesting that adopting candidate-centric reforms increases the size of the party system as 
measured by vote-share.  This is likely because an increase in candidate-centricity tends to 
result in the creation of many new parties to serve as vehicles for popular candidates.  The 
other significant variables, the lagged dependent variable and electoral volatility, have 
positive coefficients.  Even more significant is that it is the only reform variable to play a role 
in affecting the size of the party system.  Election period length is significant and positively 
signed in the first model, suggesting that the party system is likely to expand as the length of 
time between elections grows; this is unsurprising since longer inter-election periods allow 
smaller parties more time to amass financial resources and build campaign networks. 
Table 6.10 Including Intraparty Reform Impact on ENPV 
 Model M 
ENPV 
(AR1) 
Model N 
ENPV  
Model O 
Change in 
ENPV (AR1) 
Model P 
Change in 
ENPV  
More Inclusive -0.497 
(0.174) 
-0.508 
(0.171) 
-0.453 
(0.175) 
-0.509 
(0.171) 
Less Inclusive -0.154 
(0.181) 
-0.373 
(0.184) 
-0.100 
(0.182) 
-0.375 
(0.184) 
More Party-Centric 0.589 
(0.221) 
0.569 
(0.221) 
0.525 
(0.221) 
0.569 
(0.221) 
More Candidate-
Centric 
1.379** 
(0.236) 
1.742*** 
(0.236) 
1.384** 
(0.238) 
1.742*** 
(0.236) 
ENPV (lagged) 0.174*** 
(0.024) 
0.183*** 
(0.024) 
-0.841*** 
(0.023) 
-0.817*** 
(0.024) 
Vote Volatility  0.019*** 
(0.003) 
 0.019*** 
(0.003) 
Change in GDPpc -0.011 
(0.14) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
Democratic Age -0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Election Period 
Length 
0.014* 
(0.004) 
0.011 
(0.004) 
 0.011 
(0.004) 
Constant 3.014*** 
(0.260) 
2.354*** 
(0.259) 
3.701*** 
(0.170) 
2.353*** 
(0.259) 
R² 0.3202 0.3819 0.5868 0.6465 
Wald chi2 30.10 64.28 337.16 344.34 
N 160 157 160 157 
* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001 
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 Models O and P evaluate the same models but use change in the party system size as 
the dependent variable, assessing whether the reform has an impact on changing the direction 
of the election outcome relative to the pre-reform election’s outcome rather than simply 
assessing whether the reform is correlated with the post-reform election.  Model O evaluates 
the impact on change in the party system measured by vote-share and Model P further adds 
vote volatility and election period length.  The results of the models in Table 6.10 show that 
candidate-centric reforms have a statistically significant and positive impact on change in the 
size of the party system, with similar results for the other variables in Models M and N.  The 
only change is that the lagged party system size variable becomes negatively signed.  This 
finding is expected since it suggests that the larger the party system the less overall change in 
system size is likely to occur.  These results suggest that not only is candidate-centric reform 
predictive of bigger party systems in general, but that it also leads to expanding party systems 
between the pre-reform and post-reform elections.  Once again, it is the only reform variable 
with a significant effect. 
 The next set of models focuses on the same questions with respect to the party system 
measured in seats.  Models Q and R in Table 6.11 show the impact of accounting for 
intraparty reform and election period length, and Model R also controls for seat volatility 
when examining the impact on party system size.  In these models, though still positively 
signed, the coefficient for candidate-centric reform is smaller than in the previous vote-based 
models and only statistically significant when the model does not include seat volatility, 
while all the coefficients for party-centric reform are now negatively signed.  This suggests 
that candidate-centric reforms may have a limited effect such that systems allowing or 
favoring individual candidates or parties created as candidate-specific vehicles may correlate 
268 
to larger legislative party systems, but that the effect is nullified by the general presence of 
volatility (i.e. high turnover) in the electoral system.  However, the coefficients for 
candidate-centric reform just miss statistical significance as measured by a .05 cutoff. 
Table 6.11 Including Intraparty Reform on ENPS 
 Model Q 
ENPS 
(AR1) 
Model R 
ENPS 
(AR1) 
Model S 
Change in 
ENPS (AR1) 
Model T 
Change in 
ENPS (AR1) 
More Inclusive 0.253 
(0.150) 
0.116 
(0.150) 
0.270 
(0.151) 
0.115 
(0.151) 
Less Inclusive -0.208 
(0.159) 
-0.294 
(0.158) 
-0.182 
(0.159) 
-0.304 
(0.158) 
More Party-
Centric 
-0.328 
(0.192) 
-0.362 
(0.190) 
-0.345 
(0.194) 
-0.367 
(0.190) 
More Candidate-
Centric 
0.641* 
(0.186) 
0.577 
(0.190) 
0.635* 
(0.187) 
0.579 
(0.185) 
ENPS (lagged) 0.124* 
(0.031) 
0.090 
(0.031) 
-0.875*** 
(0.030) 
-0.903*** 
(0.031) 
Seat Volatility  0.014** 
(0.003) 
 0.014** 
(0.003) 
Change in GDPpc -0.035 
(0.012) 
-0.032 
(0.012) 
-0.033 
(0.012) 
-0.033 
(0.012) 
Democratic Age -0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Election Period 
Length 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
 0.004 
(0.004) 
Constant 2.958*** 
(0.224) 
2.679*** 
(0.223) 
3.219*** 
(0.145) 
2.642*** 
(0.224) 
R² 0.1384 0.1976 0.4406 0.4667 
Wald chi2 9.84 19.87 254.77 271.24 
N 178 178 178 178 
* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001 
 
The other variables perform similarly to Models M and N with little of statistical 
significance.  However, the strength of seat volatility cuts into the significance of the lagged 
dependent variable in Model R, where it just misses statistical significance.  This suggests 
that seat volatility between time t and time t+1 explains slightly more about the size of the 
party system at time t+1 than the size of the system at time t. 
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In terms of the models with the change over time party system dependent variables, in 
Models S and T in Table 6.11 the variables of interest work the same way, with candidate-
centric reform positively signed but only significant in the model that does not include seat 
volatility, though once again just misses the cut-off for statistical significance in Model T.  
The same general directionality and level of significance of other independent and control 
variables applies as in Models Q and R.  Once again, when accounting for change in the size 
of the party system, rather than the size of the system by itself, the lagged party system size 
becomes negatively signed but maintains its significance throughout.  These results, similarly 
to the vote-share models, suggest that not only is candidate-centric reform associated with 
bigger party systems but that it also leads to expanding party systems. 
In terms of modeling the impact of reform on electoral volatility, Models U and X in 
Table 6.12 show the impact on vote and seat volatility, while Models V, W, Y and Z show 
the impact on change in volatility.  In technical terms, volatility itself is a change over time 
variable, measuring the aggregate turnover from one election to the next, but the amount of 
volatility and the change in the overall amount from one election to the next is a distinct 
concept.  As such, I model volatility and change in volatility similarly to the previous sets of 
models on party system size and change in party system size measured by votes and seats.  
While Models U and X add the intraparty reform indicators and election period length to the 
basic model, Models V and W substitute the change measures for simple volatility in the 
basic models from Models K and L, and Models Y and Z add the intraparty and election 
period length variables to those models. 
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In terms of the added impact of intraparty reform on vote and seat volatility, Models 
U and X indicate relatively similar outcomes with respect to the vote-based and seat-based 
models, yet larger and statistically significant coefficients in the seat-based models suggest 
that seat turnover is more sensitive to electoral reforms than vote turnover.  In Models V, W, 
Y and Z variables mostly perform as expected, though the negative coefficient of candidate-
centric reform in the change in seat volatility model suggests that candidate-centric reform 
decreases seat volatility when most models indicate increasing volatility with any reform.   
Otherwise, all other lagged and related party system indicators all are consistently 
signed as expected.  The limited statistical effect of intraparty reform on overall system 
volatility makes theoretical sense.  First, intraparty reforms are designed to redistribute seat 
allocations within rather than across parties.  Second, the relatively low number of 
observations combined with the fact that inter- and intra-party reforms tend to occur 
simultaneously suggest it is possible that the lack of significance in the intra-party reforms is 
being driven to some degree by outliers that do not follow the general trend of the data. 
 In all electoral volatility models, the length of time between elections once again has 
a positive influence on the dependent variables, meaning that longer inter-election periods 
increase volatility relative to shorter periods.  Once again, this is not a surprising finding 
given that longer inter-election periods give smaller parties and independent candidates more 
time to amass resources to contest elections.  In addition, lengthy inter-election periods tend 
to occur in systems with flexible terms when the ruling party faces more certain losses in the 
upcoming election and chooses to prolong their tenure until the last possible moment to call 
new elections.  Both of these factors, more than structural or contextual factors, are likely to 
have a specific effect on the relationship between the level of volatility and the length of the 
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inter-election period.  However, the statistical significance of the finding suggests the 
importance of its inclusion into the models as a control for variation in inter-election periods. 
What the results presented in Tables 6.9-6.12 all suggest is the importance in 
evaluating the effects of both inter- and intraparty reforms, since in almost all of the 
expanded models at least one of the two intraparty reform indicators is statistically 
significant relative to other indicators in the model, aside from the lagged dependent 
variables.  At minimum, the results suggest the relevance of including the intraparty reforms 
in the model, especially when their coefficients are larger or more statistically significant 
than the traditional interparty reform indicators, much in the same way that the significance 
of the inter-election period length indicator suggests the necessity of its inclusion into 
statistical models to serve as a control for the effect of time.  Furthermore, the R-squared 
values of the models including both the inter- and intraparty reform indicators are always 
higher than the models that only include the interparty reforms, suggesting a greater degree 
of model fit and explanatory power when accounting for intraparty change. 
Finally, the last models evaluate the impact of reform on disproportionality in the 
translation of votes into seats, the share of the seats obtained by the medium-sized parties in 
the system and the share of the seats obtained by the two largest parties in the system.  Model 
AA in Table 6.13 models the impact of the independent and control variables on 
disproportionality while Model AB shows the impact of the independent variables on the 
change in disproportionality from the pre- to post-reform elections.  Models AC and AD 
show the results of two similar analyses with the Sum of the Seat-share of the medium-sized 
parties replacing disproportionality and change in disproportionality; in Models AE and AF 
the Sum of the Seat-share of the two largest parties become the new dependent variables. 
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Seat-maximizing logic expects that while more inclusive reform should follow this 
pattern to reduce overall disproportionality, less inclusive reform should follow the opposite 
in that low disproportionality should predispose systems to increasing disproportionality 
following reform.  The less inclusive reform outcome suggests either that elites have either 
made miscalculations regarding the eventual translation of votes into seats or perhaps those 
elites have alternative motivations, such as an ideological goal to make the system more 
representative or to reduce wasted votes, and thus even when it is strategically optimal to 
pursue greater disproportionality such elites do the opposite.  The less inclusive coefficient is 
the only statistically significant of any reforms in both disproportionality models.  In terms of 
intraparty reform, neither type is statistically significant in either disproportionality model.  
However, intraparty reforms should have little theoretical effect or relationship to overall 
disproportionality between parties in the system.  As expected, changes in the size of the 
party system have the largest effect on disproportionality. 
The results from Models AC and AD show little effect of either type of reform on 
medium-sized party success, except for candidate-centric reforms which have a positive and 
statistically-significant impact on seat-share of medium-sized parties.  In contrast, Models 
AE and AF show a large, negative and significant impact of less inclusive inter-party reform 
on the outcome of the two largest parties’ collective seat-share.  What is unusual is that, 
according to seat-maximizing logic, less inclusive reforms should increase the seat-share of 
the dominant parties in the system, but Model AE reveals a very large opposite effect.  Yet 
this is also in line with the Indonesian case in 2004 in which the benefits of the reduced 
district magnitude were felt more by the medium-sized parties than the largest parties. 
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In Model AE candidate-centric reforms, though just barely missing statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level, have a large coefficient but positively-signed, suggesting that 
when a system shifts to greater candidate-centric selection processes the party system, 
measured in seat-shares, will become more consolidated.  Presumably this would be the 
result of the largest parties being able to capitalize on the strength of individual candidate 
popularity and resources to win elections.  Similarly, Model AD shows that medium-sized 
parties are more likely to feel positive effects of a shift to more candidate-centric systems 
since they may be able to rely, as small parties cannot, on the strength of particular 
candidates and resources to run candidate-centric campaigns.   
 
Implications of Reform Effects 
In terms of consequences of electoral reform for party system change, of particular 
note is the relative importance of intraparty reform in affecting the party system.  This refutes 
the logic employed in previous studies that excluded the effect of intraparty reform elements 
when considering reform-induced change in party system size and composition.  First, the 
traditional expectations of reform are supported: more inclusive reforms will produce an 
increase in party system fragmentation while less inclusive reforms will produce a decrease 
in party system fragmentation (hypothesis 7a).  However, this effect is only clear when the 
model accounts for intraparty reform as well as interparty reform.  The lack of support for 
hypothesis 7a in models that only include interparty reforms suggests the limited nature of 
those models to account for the effects of reform on party system outcomes.  In models that 
account for intraparty reform, candidate-centric reforms produce an increase in party system 
fragmentation as measured by statistical significance in both votes and seats (though to a 
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lesser degree in the seat-based than vote-based models), which supports hypothesis 7b.  
Party-centric reforms do not display the same effect on either vote- or seat-shares. 
More inclusive reforms, long assumed to be adopted in seat-maximizing models to 
adapt to rising uncertainty rather than rising disproportionality, do produce a decrease in 
disproportionality but to a lower degree than less inclusive reforms, which are statistically 
significantly likely to reduce disproportionality.  Thus refutes hypothesis 8, and provides no 
confirmation for aggregate use of alternative motivations that might reflect a greater desire to 
reduce distortion between party vote-share and seat-shares. 
Finally, while both more and less inclusive interparty reforms are extremely likely to 
produce an increase in electoral volatility in post-reform elections, particularly in terms of 
change in vote or seat volatility, the effect is not as evident from intraparty reforms, 
providing support for only half of hypothesis 9.  Thus, while intraparty reforms, particularly 
of a candidate-centric nature, are likely to raise the size of the party system, interparty 
reforms are likely to more generally raise uncertainty within the party system.  Table 6.14 
summarizes the expectations relative to the findings from the analysis of electoral reform 
effects on party system outcomes. 
Table 6.14 Summary of Hypotheses and Results – Electoral Reform as Independent Variable 
# Hypothesis Met? 
7a More inclusive reforms will produce an increase in party system 
fragmentation while less inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in 
party system fragmentation. 
Yes 
7b Candidate-centric reforms will produce an increase in party system 
fragmentation while party-centric reforms will produce a decrease in 
party system fragmentation. 
Yes 
8 More inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in disproportionality 
while less inclusive reforms will produce an increase in 
disproportionality. 
No 
9 Any inter- or intra-party reform adoption will produce an increase in 
electoral volatility in the post-reform election. 
Partly 
 
 277
Conclusion 
The results of the multi-country analysis suggest mixed support for the hypotheses generated 
by the iterated framework of electoral reform.  While ratchet effects and a centralizing 
tendency are unmistakably important in understanding over-time reform, the causes of seat-
maximizing and alternative motivations on the adoption of reform are less clear.  The limited 
support for either seat-maximizing or alternative motivations as causal variables in predicting 
electoral reform suggest that other influential factors in the Indonesian case, particularly the 
role of civil society and international organizations as well as intervention of the courts, 
should be considered as testable factors in future analyses of the large-N dataset. 
 In terms of evaluating claims that intraparty reforms are less likely to impact party 
systems, the analysis suggests support for an interesting argument in the debate: while 
interparty reforms are more likely to generate volatility in the party system, increasing 
overall uncertainty regarding electoral outcomes, intraparty reforms are more likely to 
directly affect the size of the party system, particularly in the case of candidate-centric 
reforms increasing party system fragmentation.  The findings suggest more work is needed to 
fully consider and unpack the effects of intraparty reform on various elements of party 
systems, especially in large-N comparisons of which this analysis represents an early attempt.  
Assumptions that there is no need to study intraparty reform in the same manner as interparty 
reform appear incorrect. 
 Overall the analysis suggests mixed support for the various expectations regarding the 
interaction between party system change and electoral reform.  Though there is mixed 
evidence to support seat-maximizing logic as the dominant motivation, some of this finding 
may be due to the way in which party system size, change and uncertainty are measured.  
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Medium-sized parties may hold the key to a number of reform processes, since they are 
likely to be large enough to have a voice in debate but unlikely, by themselves, to be the 
driving force behind most reforms. The data also show that it is difficult to ascertain what a 
good proxy for seat maximizing logic might be in terms of predicting intraparty reform, since 
party system fragmentation may say very little about the power balance within parties that 
pushes some elites to pursue more or less candidate-centric reforms.  The importance of the 
wave of democratization, particularly when predicting candidate-centric reform, suggests the 
need for a better indicator of policy diffusion across cases akin to the finding in the 
Indonesian case that international NGOs and aid donors made a measurable difference in the 
range of reform options discussed. 
 While there are limited quantifiable measures for alternative motivations, the finding 
that systems with high disproportionality tend to adopt more inclusive reforms suggests that 
reformers may be concerned with the distortion in vote-to-seat translation, rather than simply 
pursuing less inclusive reforms that would exacerbate the distortion effect. Finally, evidence 
of ratchet effects also suggests an additional constraint on reformers’ abilities to simply push 
systems to the extremes on the two dimensions of reform: a general centralizing tendency 
across cases is clear.  These findings dovetail with the Indonesian case study showing that 
while reformers might pursue more extreme elements of electoral systems, such as a 
relatively high electoral threshold, there are potentially limits to the choices they can make 
given the context of democratization, open competition, and representation issues. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
I have argued that a theoretical framework combining seat-maximizing logic, alternative 
motivations and ratchet effects can help explain and more accurately predict the electoral 
reforms adopted in 34 countries from 1950 to 2010 than one focused on seat maximizing 
logic alone.  While established theories focus primarily on seat-maximizing logic, which I 
find to be of utmost importance to most electoral reform processes, I include alternative 
motivations and ratchet effects to explain unexpected reform outcomes as well as constraints 
on seat-maximizing (and potentially abusive and undemocratic) change.  In addition, I focus 
on an understudied aspect of the impact of reforms on party system change: I include the 
intraparty dimension of electoral systems when predicting whether and how party systems 
will change in elections following reform adoption. 
 I devised two sets of hypotheses to address the causes and effects of electoral reform 
on party system outcomes.  In terms of causes of electoral reform, I expected that seat-
maximization (hypothesis 1) and alternative motivations (hypothesis 2) would increase the 
likelihood of specific reform adoptions.  I also hypothesized that the motivations of medium-
sized parties in the system would have distinct effects compared to aggregate party system 
size (hypotheses 3a, 3b and 4).  I expected that new democracies would be the more likely 
location of alternative motivations (hypothesis 5) and that ratchet effects would “lock in” 
certain reform options when the process stretched over multiple rounds of reform 
(hypotheses 6a and 6b).  In terms of effects of electoral reform, I first hypothesized that 
reforms of a more inclusive or candidate-centric nature would increase the fragmentation 
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within a party system (hypotheses 7a and 7b).  Then I expected that more seat-maximizing 
reforms should produce an increase in distortion between vote-shares and seat-shares across 
the party system (hypothesis 8) and concluded that reforms of either type or in either 
direction should produce a general increase in instability within the party system. 
I found the most support for the hypotheses about ratchet effects in interparty reforms 
and the effects of reforms on party system fragmentation, and I found the least support for 
hypotheses about the exact nature of how medium-sized parties affect reform outcomes.  
However, both the Indonesian case study and the multi-country analysis suggested the 
importance of medium-sized parties in affecting reform outcomes and highlighted the 
difficulty in evaluating medium-sized parties as a group with common interests.  Though 
both analyses provided some evidence of alternative motivations and clearer evidence of 
ratchet effects in iterated reform processes, there was more evidence than initially expected 
regarding the important role of seat-maximizing logic across the cases and multiple rounds of 
reforms.  In particular, both analyses indicated the need for more sensitive measures, such as 
using medium-sized party seat-share instead of an aggregate party system size measurement, 
when evaluating seat-maximization explanations as well as those focusing on mechanisms 
that might constrain seat-maximization. 
I explored this framework – drawing causal links, investigating the plausibility of and 
testing these hypotheses – in two distinct ways.  First, I conducted a case study of Indonesian 
electoral reform in contiguous periods, from 1999 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2009.  In the 
Indonesian case the complexities of seat-maximization across different types of parties 
explain some of the constraints on reformers in the earliest years of democracy, providing an 
interesting explanation as to how and why the reforms that have been adopted since 2003 
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have borne the constraints of that early period.  Overall there is strong evidence of seat 
maximizing logic across all party types.  At the same time, there is some evidence for ratchet 
effects and some parties in some cases pursuing alternative motivations.  Alternative 
motivations were most evident in the actions of the PDI-P, perhaps because as a large party it 
risked its own survival less than small parties which could not risk elimination in pursuit of 
more ideological goals. 
Then I performed statistical analyses of the hypothesized causes and effects of 
electoral reform, investigating the causal relationships between seat-maximization, 
alternative motivations, ratchet effects and electoral reforms.  The analysis found mixed 
results and limited evidence to support seat-maximizing and alternative motivations, though 
ratchet effects did appear to constrain some electoral reform options quite well.  The results 
of the analysis point to remaining challenges in cross-national tests of these arguments. 
Specifically, I argue that while seat-maximization is an undeniably significant 
motivation in the adoption of electoral reform, acknowledging alternative motivations may 
be extremely important in understanding reform adoptions particularly in certain new 
democracies where a broader range of motivations might be at play.  In the case of at least 
some new democracies alternative motivations may take the form of perspectives about the 
nature of representation in a democratic state or longer-term concerns about stability and 
peace, and these may complement or contradict seat-maximization or provide for constraints 
on how much seat-maximization may take place.  In contrast, such constraints may not be as 
evident in established democracies because there are norms against or pre-existing rules 
limiting how much dominant parties can or will modify electoral rules to reduce or eliminate 
the competition. 
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 In terms of temporal effects, recent events suggest that reform adoption may be an 
iterated process in many cases, as reformers learn from mistakes or pursue a course of 
gradual change rather than wholesale revision.  In cases where the reform process occurs 
over time, constraints on later periods of reform may arise from choices made in previous 
periods.  One example is the introduction of an electoral threshold that likely eliminates 
certain parties/voices, setting the stage for future reform periods in which retention (and even 
increase) of the threshold is the most likely outcome. 
I distinguish between reforms that occur in contiguous (sequential) periods from 
those that occur in non-contiguous periods in order to explain why ratchet effects are more 
important in some cases than in others.  In the case of contiguous period reforms, actors from 
one party are likely to be relatively similar and to retain broadly similar motivations across 
periods even though the reform context around them may change (i.e. other parties may grow 
in strength relative to them).  In the case of non-contiguous reforms, especially when reforms 
occur more than a decade or two elections apart, actors from one party are likely to change 
and thus may change some of the party’s motivations and goals in addition to the changing 
reform context.  Ratchet effects are much more likely to impact reformers in contiguous 
periods than non-contiguous periods. 
The quantitative analysis bears out some of the refinements of the framework I have 
proposed, particularly in evaluating medium-sized party interests and ratchet effects on 
reform adoption.  Of particular note is the fact that, especially when predicting less inclusive 
reforms, the share of seats held by medium-sized parties is a better (and more sensitive) 
predictor than is an aggregate measure of party system size.  This suggests the benefits of 
disaggregating the interests of subsets of parties, by relative size and strength, in order to 
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understand reform adoptions more accurately.  Rather than using a measure simply weighting 
the overall size of the system’s effective parties, we might look to evaluating the relevance of 
certain subsets of parties when predicting a range of electoral reform outcomes.  Though the 
case study indicates that even within subsets of parties, such as medium-sized parties, there is 
likely to be variation in what is interpreted to be in a party’s seat-maximizing interests, the 
more sensitive measure I propose can be beneficial to understanding the limitations of 
established theories in cross-national analysis. 
The quantitative analysis also draws attention to comparisons of the effects of both 
the interparty and intraparty dimensions of electoral systems on party system outcomes.  
While previous studies have focused on the effects of change along the interparty dimension 
on party system fragmentation and electoral volatility, my analysis includes a test for the 
effects of change along the intraparty dimension as well.  I find that candidate-centric 
reforms have the largest measurable, and statistically significant, effect on increasing party 
system size, while less inclusive reforms have the largest measurable, and statistically 
significant, effect on increasing electoral volatility.  The findings suggest that while 
interparty reforms are important for explaining overall and increasing electoral uncertainty, 
the intraparty reforms are important for explaining overall and increasing party system size.  
The implication of the finding is that intraparty reform has an effect on party systems in ways 
previous theory only assumed were affected by interparty reform.  Thus, changes to the 
intraparty dimension need further study. 
 The Indonesian case further demonstrates the limitations of theories with respect to 
the motivations and outcomes of electoral reform which focus exclusively on short-term seat-
maximization.  Reforms to the election and party laws before every election since transition 
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produced a new legislative composition after each election.  Existing “strong” or “strategic” 
party theories posited by the existing literature can only explain some of the reform pursuits 
as small parties have actively pursued electorally-detrimental reforms for ideological reasons.  
Few of the over-time changes that have occurred resulted from explicit reform “trajectories,” 
which have nonetheless appeared despite the lack of cohesion among the large parties 
regarding long-term goals of reform.  Few of the reforms adopted reflect pure seat-
maximization, as both the type of party and candidate elected have reflected few probable 
strategic pursuits of the large parties. 
 However, seat-maximization played a much larger role than originally anticipated, 
particularly in earlier reforms.  While I expected that self-interest would emerge in later 
periods of reform in Indonesia, and indeed the degree to which party elites were capable of 
projecting and articulating their seat-maximizing goals increased in later rounds, seat-
maximizing (or seat-preserving) interests were clearly at play even in the initial post-
transition reform period.  Parties of varying size and ideological positions pursued seat-
maximization or seat-protectionist reforms in 2002 and again in 2007, though the reforms 
that different parties believed would produce the greatest electoral benefit varied. 
From the start, Golkar pursued a majoritarian electoral system in the belief that the 
party would be the largest beneficiary.  Perhaps due to the knowledge possessed by Golkar 
elites, who had spent years conducting (and often manipulating) elections, it is unsurprising 
that the party had the most accurate sense about the way to accomplish its seat-maximizing 
goals in the post-transition landscape.  Even so, in the 2002-2003 period Golkar was forced 
into compromises regarding electoral reform because it was no longer the largest legislative 
party and also because of a general environment of democratizing reform (reformasi) that 
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encouraged consensus politics and protection of openly competitive politics.  By 2007 those 
concerns faded and Golkar, again the largest legislative party, resumed its pursuit of more 
drastic changes to the electoral system. 
In stark contrast, the PDI-P almost never strayed from key messages and goals 
regarding its overall view of the electoral system.  Sometimes as a complement and 
sometimes in opposition to maximization of its legislative seat-share, the PDI-P pressed for 
continuation of a closed-list system of proportional representation with few limits to 
competitive entry.  The goal of closed-list proportional representation, and the ideological 
views espoused by party leaders in favor of its retention, suggests a close marriage of seat-
maximizing and alternative motivations for the PDI-P in both 2002 and 2007.  However, 
resistance to a legislative entry threshold in 2002 and resistance to a legislative entry 
threshold above 2.5% in 2007 suggest that alternative motivations trumped seat-
maximization to some degree.  An entry threshold would almost certainly have reduced the 
size of the party system, increasing the PDI-P’s seat-share and providing incentives for 
smaller parties such as the PDS and other Christian, Catholic and minority parties to join the 
PDI-P.  By 2010 PDI-P leadership finally allowed seat-maximization to take over its interests 
on the issue of the legislative entry threshold, joining Golkar and the PD in calling for a 
threshold at 4-5% in the latest round of reforms. 
The smaller parties, almost to a letter, exhibited seat-maximizing strategies in nearly 
every area in both rounds of electoral reform.  They were unanimously opposed to a 
legislative entry threshold, opposed increases in the past election vote thresholds, and 
generally opposed reduction of district magnitude.  On the issue of open lists, small parties 
varied in whether they supported closed or open lists but mostly chose open lists since they 
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felt their popular candidates might fare better in a popularity contest than in a closed system 
where voters might be less familiar with their parties.  As such, nearly all of the small parties 
always pursued reforms designed to minimize their seat losses and stave off their elimination 
from national politics.  The one exception: upon joining the DPR in 2004 the PBR advocated 
for single-member districts as more democratic and directly linking parties to voters, despite 
observations that the party would never be able to win seats under such an electoral system. 
The medium-sized parties displayed seat-maximizing strategies as well, though they 
were far less unified than the small parties in their interpretations of which reforms would 
benefit them the most.  Furthermore, the PKS tended to side with the PDI-P on some issues 
that straddled the line between seat-maximizing and alternative motivations, though from the 
position of the PKS those goals tended to be purely seat-maximizing in outcome, such as 
keeping the legislative entry threshold relatively low in 2009.  What is clear is that some of 
the medium-sized parties had more difficulty discerning what was in their seat-maximizing 
interests than did Golkar or the small parties, and the parties which were more successful at 
navigating seat-maximization strategies inevitably benefited from changes to the system in 
subsequent elections.  The PKB and PPP, the leaders of which did not appear to fully 
understand the implications of some elements of reform in both periods and thus had 
somewhat confusing positions on specific changes, both suffered losses in the 2004 and 2009 
elections.  In contrast, the PAN, PD and PKS all improved or maintained their seat-shares 
and displayed a clearer understanding of specific elements of the electoral system that might 
maximize their electoral gains.  The medium-sized parties not only had divergent interests on 
many issues, particularly when measured by seat-maximizing logic, but also displayed more 
variation in their understanding of how to assess their potential electoral gains and losses. 
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Finally, the iterated process of reform in Indonesia demonstrates a clear ratchet effect 
in the second (and current) reform periods based on constraints in the first round of reforms.  
The lack of adoption of a legislative entry threshold in 2003 proved to be the nail in the 
coffin for smaller parties, as the 2004 elections proved to the PDI-P the ineffectiveness of the 
past election vote threshold and the need for a stronger mechanism to simplify the party 
system.  In the current period of reform the debate on the legislative entry threshold centered 
around two options pushed by the PDI-P, Golkar and PD.  First, what level should the 
legislative entry threshold be raised to?  And second, how should the legislative entry 
threshold be applied at the two subnational levels?  Even the PAN and PKS admitted the 
likely outcome of raising the threshold rather than simple maintenance.  Since none of the 
small parties remained there was no one to advocate removal of the threshold, and since the 
smallest parties (Hanura, Gerindra, PKB) had few seats among them they remained an 
ineffective counterweight to the large parties. 
Similarly, the fixed district magnitude adopted for the 2004 elections provided Golkar 
a platform for further reductions in 2007, since the party’s attempt to push single-member 
districts continued to fail but slight reduction in the district magnitude ceiling could be 
argued for with an ideological rhetoric of linking voters more closely to local representatives.  
In the current reform period, the debate has been about once again lowering the district 
magnitude ceiling and perhaps a slight reduction in the floor, to something in the 2-6 or 2-7 
seat range.  There has been little advocacy for returning to larger districts, though nearly all 
parties besides the PD, Golkar and PDI-P have expressed concerns about the new reduction 
proposals.  While the PAN once again favored some element of single-member districts, and 
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Golkar once again entertained notions of a mixed system the debate has focused on the size 
of districts and further magnitude reductions but still retaining proportionality. 
On the issue of open lists, once the slight opening occurred in the 2004 elections it 
was difficult for many parties to advocate a return to closed lists, except the PDI-P who had 
always been opposed to openness and whose voters clearly did not mind putting their choices 
in the Party’s hands.  Most parties in 2007 were still wary of fully-open lists, partly of course 
because all parties had leaders who worried about their most loyal members losing seats and 
being forced to pander to popular election contestants.  The openness of the list created by 
the Court’s decision proved to have serious ramifications for some of the staunchest 
advocates of greater voter choice, such as Golkar, many of whose leaders promptly lost their 
seats to more popular candidates.  As such, in the current period of reform only the PDI-P 
really advocated for a reclosure of the lists in part because many of its voters continued to 
cast votes for the Party itself and most of the PDI-P candidates winning seats in 2009 
remained party loyalists.  The PDI-P was later joined by the PKS whose leaders and party 
rhetoric followed closely with the PDI-P’s assertion that its internal hierarchy and 
development programs would produce the best-quality legislators to represent party and voter 
interests, and whose selected candidates were nearly all the first-listed by the Party anyway. 
 In sum, the Indonesian case study clearly raises questions about the utility of the way 
in which we evaluate the effect of seat-maximizing logic on electoral reform, both from 
theoretical and methodological standpoints.  First, the Indonesian case suggests that seat-
maximization is not the only factor determining the interests and pursuits of reformers, 
though it is a very important one.  In order to gain a more complete picture, particularly in 
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how iterated reforms may change direction or be constrained by previous choices, we need to 
evaluate the role of alternative motivations and ratchet effects on reform outcomes. 
Second, the Indonesian case demonstrates the wide range of reform pursuits that can 
be made, all with seat-maximization as the foundation for choices.  Large, medium and small 
parties inevitably pursue different rules to prevent their elimination or maximize their share 
of seats available.  It is important to conceive of more sensitive measures that can allow us to 
test the relationship between seat-maximizing pursuits and electoral reform in the aggregate.  
Increasing party system fragmentation as a proxy for rising uncertainty in Indonesia gave 
way to less inclusive reforms twice, the opposite of what existing theory would predict.  The 
case indicates seat-maximization was very important to explaining the reforms adopted yet 
the established proxies lack predictive power, particularly in avoidance of classifying the 
interests of groups of parties by their relative size and strength within the system. 
Finally, we have some sense of the range of systems that might result from reforms to 
the existing electoral rules: countries that begin at one or both ends of the two dimensions of 
electoral systems typically demonstrate a general convergence toward the center and away 
from the extremes.  This is not to suggest that all reforms will inevitably end up in the center, 
and indeed there are some examples which move back toward the outside, such as France, 
Macedonia, and even Poland of late.  However, the general framework may give us a better 
understanding of how newly democratic or democratizing countries might pursue reform.  
The framework may even extend to cases of opening electoral authoritarianism, such as in 
Malaysia and Singapore where the systems are really only one or two reforms away from 
greater (and more fair) electoral competition. 
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While it is unclear how such systems might reform, or whether they ever will, the 
unfair or uncompetitive elements in their elections are not simply confined to rules restricting 
competitors but are often linked to the general rules of the electoral game.  In Malaysia, 
single-member districts and gerrymandering have allowed the Barisan Nasional (BN) ruling 
coalition to remain in power for five decades.  A shift to greater proportionality, even an 
incremental shift, would drastically change the fortunes of the opposition.  Though it is 
difficult to speculate on the independent impact of such a reform, election returns from the 
past ten years suggest that the ruling BN has remained in power not only through defamation 
and imprisonment of opposition leaders but also through extreme gerrymandering to avoid 
allowing the opposition to take hold in any particular electoral districts.  Nevertheless, 
opposition vote-share has grown, threatening the BN in 2008 and providing hope for 
elections in 2013.  A small change to the election rules would undoubtedly hand the BN its 
first electoral defeat and worst electoral performance yet, and could be followed by other 
incremental changes that the logic of ratchet effects suggest would drastically alter the 
system in a short period of time.  A better understanding of the process of iterated electoral 
reform can inform us what systems might look like if even small reforms were initiated. 
 While critics of Indonesia’s democratic progress have cited the potential negative 
effects of constantly changing electoral rules of the game, raising concerns about the 
involvement of a perceived politicized Constitutional Court and ineptitude and politicization 
of the National Election Commission members, the system as of 2009 has managed to avoid 
or navigate some typical pitfalls of early democratic consolidation.  First, though voter 
turnout has declined since 1999, from 93.3% in 1999 to 84.1% in 2004 to 71% in 2009, 71% 
is still comparable to many other new democracies including some with compulsory voting 
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mechanisms (e.g. Brazil at 82% in 2010 and Argentina at 72.4% in 2009).  Indonesian voters 
have not stopped going to the polls, though some public opinion surveys indicate worrying 
trends in rising levels of voter apathy and lack of voter identification with political parties.144 
 Second, in a country as diverse as Indonesia, it would not be surprising to witness 
communal violence during and immediately after the political opening associated with a 
democratic transition.  This expectation could be even more the case in Indonesia where the 
nationalist state-building project spanned more than four decades and was very tightly 
enforced under the authoritarian New Order regime.  However, though intergroup violence 
flared up in the early 2000s, it tended to stay localized and eventually abated.  A key part of 
the reason for the decline in violence relates to the flexibility of the Indonesian electoral 
system to continue to include many different voices without freezing political identities too 
much, combined with decentralization policies that have allowed for localized control of 
government.  While some post-conflict, post-authoritarian states have adopted highly 
segmented political systems that reinforce in-group/out-group identification, the Indonesian 
system has emerged with few parties advocating for strict “us versus them” mentality.  In 
other words, though the party system is large, and by some accounts weakly institutionalized, 
parties have provided voters many options and few of the options include a narrow 
interpretation of who or what it means to be Indonesian. 
The very adaptability provided by the possibility and employment of electoral 
reforms, the ones that so often concern social scientists because of the propensity of 
undemocratic actors to abuse and rollback progress, has enabled Indonesia's democratization 
                                                 
144
 Poll figures reported on the same day in two separate news dailies from two separate survey firms.  Results 
from the Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) were published in The Jakarta Post and results 
from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS-Jakarta) were published in The Jakarta Globe on 
February 13, 2012. 
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progress.  We know that a great deal more fragmentation would exist within the party system 
and that consolidation and party institutionalization would likely be hampered with the 
inclusion of many of the fifteen parties from the 1999-2004 and 2004-2009 legislative 
periods if not for recently adopted reforms.  Even though nine effective parties is still quite a 
large party system, in a country as diverse as Indonesia a small party system would likely 
eliminate a subset of voices, diminishing the quality of representation.  Whether the parties 
become more institutionalized and continue to represent the populations they profess to 
represent remains to be seen, but the changes thus far have been ones that have allowed 
democratization and stabilization to progress, even if significant issues remain. 
While not all electoral reforms serve the purpose of helping to consolidate democratic 
institutions, the Indonesian case and a number of others in the cross-national analysis provide 
evidence of democratic durability during reforms.  In some cases democracy can be undone 
or undermined by changes to the structure and quality of elections, suggesting both the 
theoretical and normative importance of institutional “stickiness.”  Yet in many cases 
analyzed in this study, the process of electoral reform provided elites chances to fix or correct 
for perceived flaws in the function of democratic governance and representation.  The 
inflexibility of many systems prevents changes that might more accurately reflect voter 
choice and representation, as highlighted by failed reform process in countries such as the 
United Kingdom.  Through the Indonesian case study and quantitative analysis herein I have 
demonstrated that reforms may be pursued by elites with mixed motivations and subject to a 
range of constraints.  Analyzing these mixed motivations is important to achieving a better 
understanding of the process of and outcomes produced by reforms, even as this analysis also 
highlights that in some cases the potential benefits of reform have been underestimated. 
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APPENDIX A. List of Field Interviews 
 
The title or affiliation listed is accurate at (or close to) the time of the interview, unless 
otherwise noted.  For those individuals who I interviewed more than twice or who 
consistently shared their expertise with me I have not listed a date and have listed some of 
their most important affiliations. 
 
Faisal Akbar, Hanura fraksi 2009-2014 from South Sulawesi, November 2010. 
 
Kuskridho Ambardi, University of Gadjah Mada and the Indonesian Survey Institute. 
 
Titi Anggraini, Perludem, March 2009, December 2010. 
 
Nurul Arifin, Golkar fraksi 2009-2014 from West Java and former Golkar Central Board 
(2004-2009), October 2010. 
 
Rully Chairul Azwar, Golkar fraksi 2009-2014 and former Golkar DPR representative (1999-
2004) from Bengkulu, April 2010. 
 
Ferry Mursydan Baldan, Nasional Demokrat and former Golkar DPR representative (1999-
2009) from West Java, October 2010. 
 
Anies Baswedan, Paramadina University, February 2010. 
 
Hamid Basyib, Expert Staff to the Chairman of the MPR and PDI-P member (former PDI-P 
candidate 2009 General Elections), March 2010. 
 
Arif Budimanta, PDI-P fraksi 2009-2014 from West Java, July 2010. 
 
Yudi Chrisnandi, Hanura Central Board and former Golkar Central Board member, July 
2010. 
 
Choisin Chumaidy, PPP Central Board and former PPP DPR representative (1999-2009) 
from West Java, November 2010. 
 
Bob Dahl, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, November 2010. 
 
Hanif Dakiri, PKB fraksi 2009-2014 from Central Java and former NDi-Jakarta 
representative, July 2010. 
 
Cecep Effendi, Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
Peter Erben, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, October 2010. 
 
Kevin Evans, former UNDP consultant, March 2009. 
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Ida Fauziyah, PKB fraksi 1999-2014 from East Java, June 2010. 
 
Frank Feulner, Parliamentary Advisor from the UN Development Program section in Jakarta, 
February 2010. 
 
Hadar Gumay, Director of the Center for Electoral Reform (CETRO). 
 
Mestariyani Habie, Gerindra fraksi 2009-2014 from South Sulawesi, December 2010. 
 
Lukman Hakim, KPUD commissioner in Sragen, Banten, April 2010. 
 
Fahri Hamzah, PKS fraksi 2009-2014 and former PK DPR representative (1999-2004) from 
West Nusa Tenggara, July 2010. 
 
Benny Harman, PD fraksi 2004-2014 from East Nusa Tenggara, December 2010. 
 
Refly Harun, Center for Electoral Reform (CETRO), March 2010. 
 
Miryam Haryani, Hanura fraksi 2009-2014 from West Java, November 2010. 
 
Muhaimin Iskandar, Minister of Labor and Transmigration and former PKB DPR 
representative (1999-2009) from East Java, November 2010. 
 
Ali Hardi Kiaidamek, PPP Central Board and former PPP DPR representative (1999-2004) 
from West Java, July 2010. 
 
Yassona Laoly, PDI-P fraksi 2004-2014 from North Sumatera, November 2010. 
 
Agung Laksono, Coordinating Minister of the People’s Welfare and former Golkar DPR 
representative (2004-2009), October 2010. 
 
Alvin Lee, Jurnal Parlemen and former PAN DPR representative (1999-2009) from Central 
Java, July 2010. 
 
Saiful Mahsun, PKB Central Board and former PKB DPR representative (2004-2009), 
November 2010. 
 
Lena Maryana, PPP Central Board and former PPP DPR representative (2004-2009) from 
Jakarta, December 2010. 
 
Anis Matta, Vice Chairman of the DPR and PK/PKS fraksi 2004-2014 from South Sulawesi, 
July 2010. 
 
Akil Mohktar, Constitutional Court justice and former Golkar DPR representative (2004-
2007) from Central Kalimantan, May 2010. 
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Muhammad Najib, PAN fraksi 2009-2014 from East Java, July 2010. 
 
Siti Nurbaya, DPD Secretariat and former Ministry of Home Affairs team leader (1999-
2005), June 2010. 
 
Andi Yuliani Paris, PAN fraksi 2004-2009 from South Sulawesi, October 2010. 
 
Indra Piliang, Golkar Party Central Board, July 2010. 
 
Constant Ponggawa, HPRP Lawyers and former PDS DPR representative (2004-2009), 
November 2010. 
 
Ganjar Pranowo, PDI-P fraksi 2004-2014 from Central Java, November 2010. 
 
Progo, former Ministry of Home Affairs representative (1999-2005), August 2010. 
 
Agus Purnomo, PKS fraksi 2004-2014 from Yogyakarta, November 2010. 
 
Paul Rowland, National Democratic Institute-Jakarta. 
 
Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Vice Chairman of the DPR and PPP fraksi 1999-2009 from 
Central Java, July 2010. 
 
Theo Sambuaga, Golkar Party Central Board and former Golkar DPR representative (2004-
2009) from North Sulawesi, April 2010. 
 
Adam Schmidt, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, March 2009. 
 
Pataniari Siahaan, former PDI-P DPR representative (1999-2004) from Riau, October 2010. 
 
Valina Singka Subekti, Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of 
Indonesia and former KPU Commissioner (2001-2007), April 2010, June 2010. 
 
Agun Gunanjar Sudarsa, Golkar fraksi 1999-2014 from West Java, November 2010. 
 
Sudarsono, Ministry of Home Affairs (2005-2009), July 2010. 
 
Bima Aria Sugiarto, PAN Central Board, July 2010. 
 
Eva Sundari, PDIP fraksi 205-2014 from West Java, July 2010. 
 
Supriarna, KPU Technical Bureau, August 2010. 
 
Didik Supriyanto, Detik.com and former Ministry of Home Affairs representative (1999-
2004), December 2010. 
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Ramlan Surbakti, Kemitraan Institute, former KPU Commissioner (2001-2007) and former 
Team 7 member (1998), April 2010, December 2010. 
 
Djoko Susilo, Ambassador to Switzerland and former PAN DPR representative (1999-2009) 
from Central Java, July 2010. 
 
Gunawan Suswantoro, Bawaslu Secretariat and former Ministry of Home Affairs 
representative (1999-2005), August 2010, November 2010. 
 
Sutjipto, PD fraksi 2009-2014 from East Java, December 2010. 
 
Rustem Tamburaga, Golkar Party Central Board of Southeastern Sulawesi and former Golkar 
DPR representative (2004-2009) from Southeastern Sulawesi, June 2010. 
 
Andrew Thornley, former International Republican Institute. 
 
Jakob Tobing, Leimana Institute and former PDIP fraksi representative 1999-2004, June 
2010. 
 
Pramono Anung Wibowo, PDI-P fraksi  1999-2014 from East Java, November 2010. 
 
Slamet Effendy Yusuf, MUI and former Golkar DPR representative (1999-2009) from 
Central Java, May 2010. 
 
Bursah Zarnubi, PBR Central Board and former PBR DPR representative (2004-2009) from 
South Sumatera, August 2010. 
 
Zulkiflimansyah, PKS fraksi 2004-2014 from Banten, July 2010. 
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APPENDIX B. List of Reform Codes by Case and Observation 
Country Year Reform explanation Inter Intra 
Albania 1992 Reform institutes mixed system with 71% two-round 
single-member districts and 29% list proportional, 
and reapportioning mechanisms with a 4% threshold 
for proportional seats.  This results in more 
inclusivity from the previous entirely two-round 
single-member district system and a more party-
centric system with the introduction of 
proportionality seats. 
1 1 
Albania 1996 Reform enhances majoritarian elements by adding 15 
more majoritarian seats to the legislature, which 
increases the imbalance between the plurality and 
proportionality mechanisms, and moderately raises 
the legislative entry threshold.  This results in an 
overall reduction in inclusivity (between both 
increases, not individually). 
-1  
Albania 2001 Reform returns to 71% single-member district/29% 
list proportional split by removing the newly-added 
15 single-member district seats from the 1996 
election, and reducing the threshold back to 2.5% for 
individual parties and 4% for coalitions.  This results 
in overall increase in inclusivity (by including both 
increases, not individually). 
1  
Albania 2009 Reform shifts to full proportional system in 12 multi-
member districts for all 140 seats, plus thresholds of 
3% individual party and 5% coalition thresholds.  
This results in an overall increase in inclusivity due 
to the large shift in seats determined by 
proportionality rather than pluralism (from 40 of 140 
to 140 of 140 seats now determined by 
proportionality) which more than offsets a minor 
increase in the entry threshold; also results in more 
party-centric system. 
1 1 
Armenia 1995 Reform via the new constitution shifts from the 
majority of seats allocated in single-member districts 
to the majority of seats allocated in proportional 
multi-member districts prior to the 2003 elections.  
This results in a more inclusive and party-centric 
system. 
1 1 
Bolivia 1986 From D'Hondt to double quotient formula for seat 
allocation.  This results in less proportional seat 
distribution from voteshare since a party needs at 
minimum a full quota to get remainder seats, whereas 
with D’Hondt parties failing to get a full district 
quota can still receive remainder seats. 
-1  
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Bolivia 1991 From double quotient to Sainte-Lague formula for 
seat allocation. This reform results in more 
proportional seat distribution since a party does not 
need to receive a full quota to get any seats, and the 
formula is more favorable to small parties relative to 
double quotient as well as the d'Hondt formula. 
1  
Bolivia 1994 From proportional lists at regional level to mixed 
member proportional split between regional single-
member districts and one national PR tier, with 
reapportioning mechanism.  Also instituted a 3% 
threshold for the mixed lists.  This reform results in a 
single large proportional district, which is more 
proportional overall, but the move to single-member 
district seats plus the implementation of a fixed 
legislative entry threshold results in generally less 
proportionality and inclusiveness, and results in a 
more candidate-centric system through the single-
member regional districts. 
-1 -1 
Bolivia 1996 Refinements to the "top-up" aspect of the mixed 
apportioning and using d'Hondt to allocate list seats.  
This results in a more flexible relationship between 
the nominal and regional tiers, and the law provides 
that "party or parties receiving the lowest share of 
seats shall be deprived of seats" because the national 
tier determines overall seats, not regional lists.  With 
the threshold this results in less inclusivity. 
-1  
Bulgaria 1991 From mixed parallel to entirely list proportional.  
Results in more inclusive and party-centric system. 
1 1 
Bulgaria 2009 From entirely proportional to mixed parallel system.  
Results in less inclusive system and more candidate-
centric with addition of single-member districts. 
-1 -1 
Colombia 1991 Reform to reduce the magnitude of districts and the 
overall size of legislature, plus creation of districts 
for indigenous groups.  Results in overall reduction 
of inclusiveness due to the redistricting and shrinking 
availability of legislative seats. 
-1  
Colombia 2003 Reform allowing parties to only submit one list per 
district but parties have the option to allow their list 
to be open to voter choice rather than nationally-
mandated closed lists for allocating seats.  Results in 
an overall move toward more candidate-centric, 
rather than party-centric, control over seat allocation. 
 -1 
Croatia 1995 From 50% single-member district/50% proportional 
seat division to a majority of seats determined by 
proportionality-based mechanism.  Results in more 
inclusive system. 
1  
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Croatia pre-
2000 
From mixed reapportioning to entirely list 
proportional, with some redistricting to combine 
single-member districts into multi-member list-based 
districts.  This results in a more inclusive and party-
centric system due to the shift to total list 
proportionality. 
1 1 
Czech 
Republic 
 2000 More reforms were originally planned, but eventually 
the reform process resulted in an increased legislative 
entry threshold, a switch from the Droop quota to the 
Hare seat allocation formula, and a slight decrease in 
district magnitude with an overall increase in the 
number of electoral districts.  This results in 
offsetting inclusivity effects of the increased 
legislative entry threshold and switch from Droop 
quota to Hare seat allocation formula. 
+/-  
Dominican 
Republic 
1997 Reform adds seats to increase the overall size of the 
house and district magnitude marginally increases 
from 4 to 5.  This results in overall increase in 
inclusivity (between both increases, not individually). 
1  
Dominican 
Republic 
2002 Reform introduces preferential voting for lower 
house candidates on the party lists, plus creation of 
new electoral districts by subdividing the 8 largest 
districts from the previous set.  This results in a more 
candidate-centric system that justifies scoring the 
intraparty shift, while the district subdivision alone 
does not affect nationwide allocation enough to 
justify scoring interparty reform shift. 
 -1 
Ecuador 1998 Reform results in increased overall congress size, and 
switch from list proportional representation in the 
mixed national-regional system to plurality in multi-
member districts but retains the national district for 
one final election.  This results in less proportionality 
offset by the increase in the overall number of seats 
available to competitors. 
+/-  
Ecuador 2000 Reform produces effective elimination of the national 
district (nominal tier) and a switch to d'Hondt 
formula for allocating list seats.  This results in 
declining inclusivity because system is now entirely 
based on small multi-member district plurality 
without a single large district for small party 
representation. 
-1  
El Salvador 1988 Reform increases overall congress size and creates a 
same-ballot national constituency for 1/4 of seats.  
This results in a more inclusive system as there are 
more seats available and an increase in 
proportionality at the national tier level. 
1  
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France 1985 From two-round system to proportional 
representation for all seats of the lower house.  This 
results in a more inclusive system and more party-
centric by taking away the direct vote choice under 
the two-round system. 
1 1 
France 1986 From proportional representation to two-round 
system for all seats of the lower house.  This results 
in a less inclusive system and more candidate-centric 
by reinstating the direct voter choice. 
-1 -1 
Georgia 1995 From the entirely two-round system inherited from 
the pre-democratic soviet era to a mixed system with 
list proportional seats.  This results in a more 
inclusive and party-centric system. 
1 1 
Germany 1953 From proportional with D'Hondt allocation formula 
to mixed system with reapportioning mechanism in 
closed lists; the list seats are allocated by the D'Hondt 
formula with a 5% threshold or 1 district seat outright 
for the PR seats.  This results in less inclusivity due 
to shift from all seats proportional to majority 
plurality; also more candidate-centric with shift to 
single-member districts from pure party lists. 
-1 -1 
Germany 1956 Reform slightly increases legislative entry threshold 
to a 3 district seat minimum, plus linking between 
national and state pools where the state-level 
voteshares are pooled to determine the national 
proportion for seats then allocated at state level with 
state candidates.  This results in greater inclusivity 
due to state-level determinants that allow for more 
competition among smaller and regional parties. 
1  
Guatemala 1990 Reform produces increase in overall size of 
legislative house.  This results in a more inclusive 
system as there are more seats available for 
competition. 
1  
Guatemala 1994 Reform reduces size of legislative house and 
introduces fixed, separate votes for national and 
district deputies (as in a parallel ballot system).  This 
results in less inclusive system because there are 
fewer seats available for competition and separate 
ballot results in a system typically benefitting largest 
parties at expense of including smaller parties. 
-1  
Guatemala 1995 Reform increases the overall size of the legislature.  
This results in a more inclusive system. 
1  
Honduras 1985 Reform increases overall house size and increases 
district magnitude, average from 4.6 to 7.4.  This 
results in an overall increase in inclusivity (between 
both increases, not individually). 
1  
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Honduras 2004 From proportional with closed and blocks to open list 
panachage in which voters can vote for as many 
candidates as there are seats in that electoral district 
and can select candidates from among the different 
party lists rather than from a single one.  This results 
in a shift to a more candidate-centric intraparty 
system. 
 -1 
Indonesia 2003 From closed to semi-open proportional lists where 
voters now have choice of individual candidates on 
the ballots but candidates must receive a full 
allocation quota in their district to win the seat 
outright if not ordered high enough on their party list, 
plus a moderate reduction in district magnitude, and 
the creation of population-based electoral districts 
within provincial administrative boundaries.  This 
results in more inclusive system with reduction in 
district magnitude and de-coupling of province-level 
seat calculations; results in more candidate-centric 
system as voters are offered direct choice of 
legislators. 
-1 -1 
Indonesia 2008 From semi to fully-open list proportional with a  
slight reduction in average district magnitude, with 
the floor remaining at 3 but the ceiling dropping from 
12 to 10,  and the introduction of a 2.5% legislative 
entry threshold.  This results in less inclusive system, 
due primarily to the threshold, and more candidate-
centric with the shift to complete voter choice from 
lists. 
-1 -1 
Italy 1993 From list proportional to mixed with majority of seats 
based on single-member district plurality.  This 
results in less inclusive system and more candidate-
centric with shift from all proportional to majority 
plurality seats. 
-1 -1 
Italy 2005 From mixed to list proportional.  This results in more 
inclusive system and more party-centric with shift to 
full proportionality. 
1 1 
Japan 1994 From single non-transferrable vote to mixed parallel 
ballot with majority of seats based on single-member 
plurality.  This results in more inclusivity and more 
party-centric with shift away from entirely plurality-
based elections. 
1 1 
Lithuania pre-
2000 
From two-round single-member districts to mixed 
system with proportionality-based seats.  This results 
in a more inclusive and party-centric system with the 
addition of proportional seats rather than a purely 
majoritarian system. 
1 1 
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Macedonia 1998 From majoritarian to mixed system with 71% single-
member district seats and 29% list proportional seats 
with D'Hondt seat allocation formula and 5% 
threshold for proportional seats.  This results in more 
inclusive system by addition of proportional seats, 
which offsets the threshold since the previous 
majoritarian system had a much higher effective 
threshold due to its plurality-based nature; also 
results in a more party-centric system. 
1 1 
Macedonia 2002 From mixed system to fully proportional with six 
multi-member districts with 20 representatives per 
district.  This results in a more inclusive and party-
centric system. 
1 1 
Mexico 1989 Reform limits the majority party to 70% seats in 
lower house and the fully-split ballot for the parallel 
system is introduced.  Results in more inclusivity. 
1  
Mexico 1990 Reforms allow any party with at least 35% of both 
ballots to get an absolute majority of seats but the 
majority party is limited to 60% of seats even if it 
receives more than 60% popular vote.  This results in 
more inclusivity as it caps the total proportion of 
seats automatically going to a single party, making 
more seats overall available to competitors. 
1  
Mexico 1993 Reform eliminates the 35% rule with no more 
guaranteed majority party.  This results in a more 
inclusive and competitive system. 
1  
Mexico 1996 Reform increases the legislative entry threshold 
increased slightly and no party can get more than 8% 
more seats of votes it gets except if it wins those seats 
in the plurality ballots; also introduces 5 national 
multi-member districts to replace the single nation-
wide district for the PR side of parallel ballot.  This 
results in an overall increase in inclusivity by 
reducing the weight of the “top-up” part of the 
parallel format and by subdividing the national 
districts which, given the entry threshold, may enable 
rather than limit small party competition when 
regionalized. 
1  
New Zealand 1993 From a preferential single-member district system to 
mixed system with reapportioning.  This results in a 
more inclusive system and more party-centric with 
addition of list proportional seats. 
1 1 
Nicaragua 1992 Reform changes to a new seat allocation formula 
favoring small parties more than the allocation 
formula of previous system.  This results in an 
increase in inclusivity. 
1  
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Nicaragua 1995 Reform reduces overall district size but combined 
with the creation of national constituency to balance 
representation.  This results in an offset between 
more and less inclusive elements. 
+/-  
Paraguay 1990 Reform separates the ballots for each house and 
changes from a single national district to 18 multi-
member districts corresponding to administrative 
districts and the capital.  This results in a decrease in 
inclusivity due to shrinking district magnitude. 
-1  
Peru 1993 Reform from 25 multi-member districts to a single 
national district but the size of lower house is reduced 
from 180 to 120 seats.  This results in an offset of 
more and less inclusive mechanisms. 
+/-  
Peru 2000 Reform returns from a national district to 25 multi-
member districts.  This results in less inclusivity. 
-1  
Poland 1991 Reform adopts open list proportionality, shift away 
from the majoritarian Soviet-era system, with 
Hare/St-Lague allocation formula.  This results in a 
more inclusive system but, although adopting a list-
based system, the fully open lists leave the system 
more or less the same level of candidate-centricity as 
the prior majoritarian system. 
1  
Poland 1993 Reform switches to D'Hondt seat allocation formula 
and reduces the district magnitude floor from 7 to 3, 
with the legislative entry threshold at 5%.  This 
results in a less inclusive system. 
-1  
Poland 2001 Reform shifts to closed proportional lists and 
switches back to Sainte Lague from D'Hondt seat 
allocation formula, plus a reduction in the district 
magnitude ceiling (from 69 to 19) matched by a 
slight increase in the district magnitude floor (from 3 
to 7).  This results in a more inclusive and more 
party-centric system with complete closure of 
proportional lists taking away from direct voter 
choice of candidates. 
1 1 
Romania 1992 Reform reduces district magnitude and switches from 
Hare to D'Hondt seat allocation formula, establishes a 
3% legislative entry threshold and a higher coalition 
threshold.  This results in an offset of  more and less 
inclusive mechanisms. 
+/-  
Romania 2007 Switch from proportional to "mixed" system where 
districts are single-member majority voting, but 
districts without a majority winner are returned to a 
county-level pool of party list proportionality where 
seats are allocated from the general pool (of non-
majority won seats across districts within the county) 
-1 -1 
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using the D'Hondt formula and a 5% threshold to the 
parties' candidates with highest individual vote totals 
in the single-member district voting (i.e. largest 
remainders calculated at the county level would be 
distributed to party individuals in that district).  This 
results in a less inclusive system with a switch away 
from entirely proportional seat allocation, and a shift 
toward a more candidate-centric system. 
Russia 1993 From majoritarian two-round Soviet-era system to a 
mixed parallel with 5% threshold and closed lists for 
proportional seats.  This results in a more inclusive 
and party-centric system. 
1 1 
Slovakia 1998 Reform increases district magnitude by collapsing all 
four national electoral districts into one large district.  
This result is a more inclusive system. 
1  
Slovenia 2000 Reform introduces a 4% legislative entry threshold, 
following the failure of reform to purely or partly 
majoritarian system.  This results in a less inclusive 
system due to threshold adoption. 
-1  
South Korea 1994 Reform eliminates majority-assured provision in the 
mixed system by linking single-member district and 
list votes.  This results in more inclusivity by 
constraining “top-up” benefits to dominant parties. 
1  
Thailand 1997 From proportional to mixed system with majority of 
seats based on single-member plurality.  This results 
in a less inclusive and more candidate-centric system 
with shift away from entirely list proportional seats. 
-1 -1 
Ukraine 1997 From a majoritarian to a mixed system.  This results 
in a more inclusive and party-centric system. 
1 1 
Ukraine 2004 From a mixed system to fully proportional.  This 
results in a more inclusive and party-centric system. 
1 1 
Venezuela 1989 Reform from proportional to mixed format with a 
35% single-member district/65% proportional seat 
split, with votes from the two legislative chambers on 
split ballots.  This results in a decrease in inclusivity 
with large shift to plurality-based seats; also shifts to 
more candidate-centric with single-member districts. 
-1 -1 
Venezuela 1997 Reform shifts from 35/65 to 50/50 single-
member/proportional representation split, with some 
multi-member district creation out of single-member 
districts that are too large for a single seat but cannot 
be divided since the constitution stipulates those 
districts must use the plurality method of election.  
This results in offsetting more and less inclusive 
mechanisms. 
+/-  
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APPENDIX C.  The Dataset Codebook 
 
The dataset constructed for this analysis is composed of 34 countries: Albania, Armenia, 
Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Thailand, Ukraine and Venezuela.  The cases are 
selected for their inclusion on the basis of a) being part of a set already evaluated for reform 
propensity and outcome, and b) having at least some episode of reform during the 1950-2010 
time period.  The primary sources for case selection come from Shugart and Wattenburg 
(2001), Birch et al. (2002), Remmer (2008), and Renwick (2010).  Indonesia is the only case 
addition not mentioned or analyzed in one of these four primary sources, partly due to its 
geographic location and the fact that it had not experienced democratic transition until 1999, 
at least five years after the next youngest case.  Other cases of reform or, in most instances, 
failed reform are not discussed at length in the manuscript or included in the dataset, the most 
notable being the failed and non-binding reform referendum in the United Kingdom in 2011. 
 
 
Case selection 
The reason for selecting only cases in which at least one reform episode occurred is two-fold.  
First, it is misleading to suggest that electoral reform is possible in any country under any 
circumstances.  The scholarly literature has demonstrated numerous constraints on the 
possibility, let alone the propensity, to reform.  Such explanations range from high levels of 
veto players to high barriers to amendment of the constitution, among other concerns.  As 
such, countries who have never experienced reform during their democratic history are not 
candidates for comparison not only because they have never achieved reform; there may in 
fact be some particular institutional aspect of their political system that practically prohibits 
reform.    This is not to suggest that reform must always be possible but rather must not 
always be impossible. 
 
The second reason is that it is difficult to know the exact circumstances and processes of 
reform debates that never produced reform in countries that are not included in the dataset.  
Perhaps many countries entertain the notion of reform but do not pursue it for various 
strategic, ideological and/or institutional reasons.  While this is by no means an exhaustive 
list of countries and electoral reforms across region and time, by selecting cases in which 
reform has occurred at least once but span geographic and temporal distance there is some 
commonality (at least one episode of reform in the dependent variable per case, and many 
episodes in which the dependent variable is ‘no reform’) and some contextual and structural 
diversity (i.e. neighbors, international influences, economic crises and development levels, 
transition mode, and demographics, to name just a few). 
 
 
Observations: Measurement Issues 
The dataset contains at minimum two observations for each country spanning at minimum 
ten years of democratic rule, since for each observation data from multiple electoral periods 
is needed to calculate lagged variables and variables designed specifically to measure some 
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aspect of change over time.  Each country is coded from the election period (see below for 
explanation of coding observations) prior to the adoption of its first reform through the last 
election up until 2009, for most countries observations actually begin more than ten years 
prior to the first reform whenever data was available since multiple prior elections are 
necessary for the coding of independent variables of interest. 
 
There are three exceptions to the coding through the last pre-2009 election period: Russia, 
which stops with the 2003 elections, Thailand which stops with the 2006 elections, and 
Venezuela, which stops with the 200 elections.  In each of these three cases the countries are 
coded from the earliest free and fair post-transition election period available (Russia in 1993, 
Thailand in 1992, and Venezuela in 1978, which is the earliest election for which reliable and 
comparable data could be obtained) up until it is clear that the electoral system is subject to 
fraud and competition constraints or has been altered in such a way as to prohibit electoral 
competition, or the democratic regime has been replaced with military rule.  There are other 
cases which have breaks in the quality of elections during their panels of observations, such 
as Georgia in the 2004 elections, which remain as part of the dataset due to their immediate 
reversion to free and fair elections and/or retention of other structural aspects of democratic 
institutions and rule.  Alternative models have been run without the 2004 and 2008 Georgian 
election period observations, with no substantive change to the results.  Table 2.1 lists all 
cases and observations periods in the set. 
 
Each observation in the dataset represents a single inter-election period, meaning the 
observation begins after the conclusion of an election in time t and ends with the conclusion 
of an election in time t+1.  For example, the data measurements for observation ‘Bulgaria 
2005’ include events occurring during the period from July 2001 (the month after the 
conclusion of the previous election in June 2001) until July 2005 (the month with the next 
sequential elections).  All variables for this observation occur during this period or, in the 
case of lagged variables, the period immediately prior to it; in this case observation ‘Bulgaria 
2001’ from May 1997 to June 2001 contains the lagged data for the observation ‘Bulgaria 
2005.’  To control for variation in the length of time covered in each observation, two 
controls – for the number of years and number of months between the end of the previous 
election period and the conclusion of the current election period – have been included and 
run with the models; nonetheless, they prove statistically insignificant in nearly all analyses.  
Given that the overwhelming majority of election reform processes happen only once during 
an inter-election cycle – and indeed, it would seem less useful to measure reform as an 
outcome or precursor to party system change if the reform did not happen in the election 
following its adoption – this method of coding observations as single inter-election periods 
makes theoretical sense.  In addition, given the number of variables of interest which remain 
constant during the course of an inter-electoral period, this method of coding each inter-
electoral cycle naturally avoids methodological concerns that arise from lack of variation on 
multiple independent variables for multiple observations in which there is also no change on 
the dependent variable.  Rather than code observations annually, during which there is no or 
little variation on the majority of variables in the model for years at a time, or coding blocks 
of time in 3, 5 or 10 years, which either suffer from the same lack of variation in short 
lengths or fail to capture electoral change in the longer periods, the practice of coding by 
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inter-electoral cycle avoids both methodological complications and substantive concerns 
about matching the statistical model to the theoretical question. 
 
With respect to the few variables that can be coded as annual data, such as controls for 
economic growth and urbanization, two alternative sets have been coded.  The first is an 
annual code for the year of the election; in the example of observation ‘Bulgaria 2005’ this 
data is coded for the year 2005, though much of it is taken from sources such as the IMF and 
World Bank and the data that is available often spans a less sensitive time period than true 
annualized data.  The second is an average code for the years in the inter-electoral period; in 
the example of observation ‘Bulgaria 2005’ this data is an average of the values from years 
2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005.  Models were primarily run with the former set based on the 
annual data from the year of the election. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Electoral Reform 
The dependent variable of interparty reform has been coded categorically, with three possible 
values: no reform (the base category in the multinomial logistic regressions), more inclusive 
reform (i.e. more proportional, lower barriers to legislative entry, fewer constraints on 
legislative entry), and less inclusive reform (i.e. more majoritarian, higher barriers to 
legislative entry, greater constraints on legislative entry).  All reforms of this nature refer 
specifically to the electoral and allocation rules for seats in the lower (or only) house of the 
national legislature.  
 
A second set of dependent variable codes account for intraparty reform but are not run in 
multinomial logistic regression models due to the lack of observations necessary for the 
statistical computations.  This version of the dependent variable is also coded categorically, 
with three possible values: no reform, more party-centric (or less candidate-centric), and 
more candidate-centric (or less party-centric).  These are evaluated qualitatively as there is 
some variance on this dependent variable aside from the reform/no reform dichotomy.  
Significantly fewer cases of this type of reform have previously been identified, a fact which 
is largely due to the lack of scholarly attention to “minor” reforms as characterized by 
Lijphart and which include reforms along the intraparty dimension.  These initial codes of 
this dependent variable represent the first attempt to systematically account for their 
occurrence and the factors that might affect their likelihood of adoption. 
 
The data for all reforms come from analysis of the electoral laws and constitutions pertaining 
to each individual country, supplemented with secondary sources and translations where 
original or English-language (when necessary) documents were not available.  A 
comprehensive list of these sources for each case follows in Appendix C. 
 
 
Independent Variables: Party System Attributes and Democratic Age 
In the majority of models I include some combination of the following independent variables, 
removing and/or alternating with other variables or measurements when collinearity issues 
arise.  First are two variables of effective party system size: the effective number of parties 
by vote-share (ENPV) and the effective number of parties by seat-share (ENPS), which are 
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sometimes referred to in the literature as the ‘effective number of electoral parties’ and the 
‘effective number of parliamentary parties,’ respectively.  These are both calculated using 
Laakso and Taagepera’s formula for effective number of parties, and for both I have included 
single measurements of independents (aggregated into a single number) and other parties 
(when data availability did not permit a more sensitive measure of exact votes or seats going 
to usually very small parties) in the calculations.  These measures are both continuous and 
their values range from 1.9 to 12.9 (ENPV) and 1.2 to 10.9 (ENPS).  Laakso and Taagepera’s 
measure is calculated (for voteshare, in the example) as follows: 
 
 ENPV  =  
∑
 
 
Independents and others tend to be relatively small numbers (typically less than 3% of seats 
or votes) and their inclusion into the ENPV and ENPS calculations make for less confusing 
interpretation of the model results, so with an eye toward consistency in construction of these 
variables I have simply included them.  In 16 of the 244 observations more than 4% of seats 
eventually went to independent candidates, a complication for measures designed to assess 
party system size and concentration.  These have been included and calculated in the same 
way as all other observations, particularly given that they all occur in countries employing 
mixed electoral systems and thus their exclusion or calculation via a different metric might 
result in biased results for the models.  While I recognize the theoretical limitations of 
measuring and coding these systems according to the same formula as the remaining 
observations, for the sake of statistical consistency I have remained agnostic about the 
theoretical implications with the caveat that this particular measurement issue suggests that 
any statistical models attempting to aggregate across such diverse systems should be taken 
with a modicum of skepticism. 
 
Second are two variables measuring change over time of the party system size: Change in 
ENPV and Change in ENPS, which are simply the value of ENPV/S in time t subtracted 
from the value of ENPV/S in time t+1.  Each of these variables are also coded as continuous 
measures and range from -16.5 to 4.6 (ENPV) and -10.7 to 7.5 (ENPS).  For each 
observation the change between the one-previous election and the two-previous election are 
coded for vote-share, the change between the one-previous and two-previous are coded for 
seat-share, and the two-previous and three-previous are coded for seat-share.  These are the 
primary variables to test the hypotheses that rising or declining uncertainty strategically 
motivates pressures for and adoptions of electoral reform. 
 
Third are two variables measuring the level of disproportionality within a given electoral 
system: the disproportionality between vote-share and seat-share in a given election and the 
change in disproportionality between electoral periods, measured as the value of 
disproportionality in time t subtracted from the value of disproportionality in time t+1.  The 
disproportionality scores are calculated using the standard Gallagher formula, which 
produces continuous measures ranging from 0.8 to 37.8, and the Change in 
Disproportionality is a continuous measure ranging from -30.6 to 29.7.  The Gallagher Index 
is calculated via the following formula: 
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 Disproportionality  =  

∑   
 
Fourth are two variables measuring the aggregate level of turnover in the electoral and party 
systems via votes (voteshare volatility) and seats (seatshare volatility) between given 
elections.  These values are commonly calculated via the Pedersen Index and produce a 
continuous measure falling between a 0 to 100 range, with 0 representing no turnover and 
100 representing total turnover in votes or seats between parties and candidates in the system.  
The volatility scores in this sample range from 4 to 99.95 (for votes) and 3.02 to 100 (for 
seats), and the change in these measures vary by the same amounts.  The Pedersen Index is 
calculated (for voteshare, in the example) via the following formula: 
 
 Volatility  =  
∑	

 
 
Finally is the variable calculating the age of democracy, measured in years, which is used to 
account for experience with democratic competition as well as to proxy for the long-term 
stability and consistency of democratic institutions.  The assumption in the literature is that 
as democracies become older and their institutions more entrenched and routinized, the less 
volatility the system should experience overall.  Hence, all else equal as democratic age 
increases there should be less electoral and seat volatility, less party system change, and less 
pressure for electoral reform.  The base variable is measured in years from the point of 
transition (rather than the point at which the case passes some threshold score on another 
indicator of democracy, such as Polity or Freedom House) and is a continuous measure 
ranging from 0 to 151.  However, since only New Zealand passes 62 years of democracy and 
does so before its data series even begins, the raw values are used rather than a logged value.  
Alternative models have been run with the logged values and produce relatively similar 
results in most models.  
 
 
Control Variables: Economic Factors 
Three control variables are coded for each observation.  The first control is for broad 
economic performance that might affect voter and elite perceptions about the necessity or 
increasing pressure for change in the political system.  To account for fluctuations in 
economic growth and development, two different measures are included in various models: 
GDP per capita growth and unemployment rate, both measured annually.  Rather than simply 
including change in GDP per capita, which might not be the most sensitive metric of public 
dissatisfaction with economic performance, the unemployment rate provides an alternate 
measure.  Due to relatively high collinearity, most models employ only one of the two, 
usually change in GDP per capita which is the more commonly-used in the scholarly 
literature.  Change in GDP per capita is measured continuously and ranges from -9.6 to 10.1; 
the unemployment rate is also measured continuously and ranges from 1.1 to 36.  All data for 
all years of these economic controls come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database published by the World Bank and last accessed on September 15, 2011. 
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The second control measures the level of urbanization in a country, via a measure of the 
percent of the country’s population living in an urban area defined by a population of 1 
million or greater.  The measure is designed as an additional structural control to account for 
predominantly rural versus predominantly urban populations in the sample.  The measure is a 
continuous variable ranging from 29.7 to 89.7.  It is only sometimes included in models as an 
additional control and is never explanatory from the standpoint of statistical significance.  
The data for this indicator also comes from the WDI database from the World Bank and was 
last accessed on September 15, 2011; it is unavailable for the German case from 1949-1959 
in a standardized format. 
 
The third control is the length of the inter-election period, measured in months.  Despite the 
theoretical and methodological reasons for using inter-election period-based observations, 
controlling for the length of time that has elapsed between elections provides an additional 
control regarding the potential direct effect of time on propensity for and adoption of reform.  
In addition, the length of time control also proxies system instability since very short inter-
electoral periods often signal government failure (i.e. successful no confidence procedures) 
and internal party system instability and high uncertainty.  Since all inter-election periods fall 
between the range of 6 to 76 months but, since only three fall under 12 and five fall over 60, 
the control variable is measured continuously in the number of months rather than a logged 
value.  An alternative measure, the number of years, is not particularly sensitive with respect 
to variation and thus is not used in any of the models. 
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APPENDIX D. List of Electoral and Data Sources 
 
Albania 
Election returns: 1991-2001 from Birch et al. 2002; 2005-2009 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2005-2009 verified from Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from: primary legal documents translated, compiled, and accessed from 
the F. Clifton White Virtual Resources Center from the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems, including 1991 and 2000 election reports and election laws; secondary 
sources: Birch et al. 2002. 
 
 
Armenia 
Election returns: 1995-1999 from Birch et al. 2002; 2003-2007 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2003-2007 verified from Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from: secondary sources: Birch et al. 2002. 
 
 
Bolivia 
Election returns: 1985-2005 from Payne et al. 2007; 2009 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and reform information from secondary sources: 
Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 2008; Mayorga 2001a; 2001b; and an ACE: The Electoral 
Knowledge Network report: http://aceproject.org/ace_en/topics/es/esy_bo/, last accessed on 
June 5, 2012. 
 
 
Bulgaria 
Election returns: 1990-2001 from Birch et al. 2002; 2005-2009 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2005-2009 verified from Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from secondary sources: Birch et al. 2002. 
 
 
Colombia 
Election returns: 1978-2006 from Payne et al. 2007.  Electoral system and reform 
information from secondary sources: Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 2008. 
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Croatia 
Election returns: 1992-2000 from Birch et al. 2002; 2003-2007 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2003-2007 verified from Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from: primary legal documents translated, compiled, and accessed from 
the F. Clifton White Virtual Resources Center from the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems, including 1995 election report and law; secondary sources: Birch et al. 
2002. 
 
 
Czech Republic 
Election returns: 1990-1998 from Birch et al. 2002; 2002-2006 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2002-2006 verified from Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from secondary sources: Birch et al. 2002; Kopecký 2004; Nikolenyi 
2011. 
 
 
Dominican Republic 
Election returns: 1978-2002 from Payne et al. 2007; 2006 from Psephos Adam Carr’s 
Election Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  
Electoral system and reform information from secondary sources: Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 
2008. 
 
 
Ecuador 
Election returns: 1996-1998 from Payne et al. 2007; 2006-2009 from Psephos Adam Carr’s 
Election Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  
Electoral system and reform information from secondary sources: Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 
2008; and an ACE: The Electoral Knowledge Network report: 
http://aceproject.org/ace_en/topics/es/esy_ec.htm, last accessed on June 5, 2012. 
 
 
El Salvador 
Election returns: 1988-2006 from Payne et al. 2007; 2009 from Psephos Adam Carr’s 
Election Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  
Electoral system and reform information from secondary sources: Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 
2008. 
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France 
Election returns: 1978-1997 from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline database at 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed on September 15, 2011; 2002-
2007 from Election Resources on the Internet at http://www.electionresources.org/, last 
accessed on September 15, 2011; 2002-2007 verified with Psephos Adam Carr’s Election 
Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral 
system and reform information from secondary sources: Alexander 2004; Renwick 2010. 
 
 
Georgia 
Election returns: 1992-1999 from Birch et al. 2002; 2004-2008 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2004-2008 verified from Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from: primary legal documents translated, compiled, and accessed from 
the F. Clifton White Virtual Resources Center from the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems, including 1995 election report and law; secondary sources: Birch et al. 
2002. 
 
 
Germany 
Election returns: 1949-2009 from Election Resources on the Internet at 
http://www.electionresources.org/, last accessed on September 15, 2011; 2002-2009 verified 
with Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and reform information from secondary sources: 
Bawn 1993; Boix 1999; Scarrow 2001; Klingemann and Wessels 2001. 
 
 
Guatemala 
Election returns: 1985-2003 from Payne et al. 2007; 2007 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and reform information from secondary sources: 
Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 2008. 
 
 
Honduras 
Election returns: 1981-2005 from Payne et al. 2007; 2009 from Psephos Adam Carr’s 
Election Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  
Electoral system and reform information from secondary sources: Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 
2008. 
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Indonesia 
Election returns: 1999-2009 from the Indonesian National Election Commission (Komisi 
Pemilihan Umum).  Reform information from primary source legal documents including 
general (legislative) election laws number 2 year 1999, number 12 year 2003, and number 10 
year 2008; the 1945 Constitution and Amendments from year 2002.  All documents have 
been translated and interpreted solely by the author of the dataset. 
 
 
Italy 
Election returns: 1987-2006 from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline database at 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed on September 15, 2011; 2008 
from Election Resources on the Internet at http://www.electionresources.org/, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2006-2008 verified with Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from secondary sources: Renwick 2010; Renwick et al. 2005; Katz 2001; 
d’Alimonte 2001; Gambetta and Warner 2004. 
 
 
Japan 
Election returns: 1990-2000 from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline database at 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed on September 15, 2011; 2003-
2009 from Election Resources on the Internet at http://www.electionresources.org/, last 
accessed on September 15, 2011; 2005-2009 verified with Psephos Adam Carr’s Election 
Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral 
system and reform information from secondary sources: Reed and Thies 2001a; 2001b. 
 
 
Lithuania 
Election returns: 1992-2000 from Birch et al. 2002; 2004-2008 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2004-2008 verified from Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from: secondary sources: Birch et al. 2002. 
 
 
Macedonia 
Election returns: 1994-1998 from Birch et al. 2002; 2002-2008 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2006-2008 verified from Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from: primary legal documents translated, compiled, and accessed from 
the F. Clifton White Virtual Resources Center from the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems, including 1994 and 2002 election reports and election laws; secondary 
sources: Birch et al. 2002. 
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Mexico 
Election returns: 1988-2003 from Payne et al. 2007; 2006-2009 from Election Resources on 
the Internet at http://www.electionresources.org/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  
Electoral system and reform information from secondary sources: Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 
2008; Horcasitas and Weldon 2001; Weldon 2001. 
 
 
New Zealand 
Election returns: 1990-1999 from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline database at 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed on September 15, 2011; 2002-
2008 from Election Resources on the Internet at http://www.electionresources.org/, last 
accessed on September 15, 2011; 2002-2008 verified with Psephos Adam Carr’s Election 
Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral 
system and reform information from secondary sources: Denemark 2001; Barker et al. 2001; 
Nagel 2004. 
 
 
Nicaragua 
Election returns: 1990-2006 from Payne et al. 2007.  Electoral system and reform 
information from secondary sources: Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 2008. 
 
 
Paraguay 
Election returns: 1989-2003 from Payne et al. 2007; 2008 from Psephos Adam Carr’s 
Election Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  
Electoral system and reform information from secondary sources: Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 
2008. 
 
 
Peru 
Election returns: 1980-2006 from Payne et al. 2007.  Electoral system and reform 
information from secondary sources: Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 2008. 
 
 
Poland 
Election returns: 1991-2001 from Birch et al. 2002; 1989, 2005-2007 from the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-
e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed on September 15, 2011; 2005-2007 verified from Psephos 
Adam Carr’s Election Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 
15, 2011.  Electoral system and reform information from: primary legal documents 
translated, compiled, and accessed from the F. Clifton White Virtual Resources Center from 
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, including 2001 election report and law; 
secondary sources: Birch et al. 2002. 
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Romania 
Election returns: 1990-2000 from Birch et al. 2002; 2004-2008 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2004-2008 verified from Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from: primary legal documents translated, compiled, and accessed from 
the F. Clifton White Virtual Resources Center from the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems, including 1992 election report and law; secondary sources: Birch et al. 
2002; Nikolenyi 2011; Coman 2011 and personal communication with Emanuel Coman in 
September 2011. 
 
 
Russia 
Election returns: 1993-1999 from Birch et al. 2002; 2003 from Psephos Adam Carr’s 
Election Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  
Electoral system and reform information from: primary legal documents translated, 
compiled, and accessed from the F. Clifton White Virtual Resources Center from the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, including 1993 election report and law; 
secondary sources: Birch et al. 2002; Moser and Thames 2001; Moser 2001; Shvetsova 2003. 
 
 
Slovak Republic 
Election returns: 1990-1998 from Birch et al. 2002; 2002-2006 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2002-2006 verified Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from: secondary sources: Birch et al. 2002. 
 
 
Slovenia 
Election returns: 1992-2000 from Birch et al. 2002; 2004-2008 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2004-2008 verified Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from: secondary sources: Birch et al. 2002; Nikolenyi 2011. 
 
 
South Korea 
Election returns: 1988-2008 from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline database at 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed on September 15, 2011; 2004-
2008 verified with Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, 
last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and reform information from 
secondary sources: IPU Parline database. 
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Thailand 
Election returns: 1992-2005 from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline database at 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed on September 15, 2011; 2001-
2005 verified with Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, 
last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and reform information from 
secondary sources: Kuhonta 2008; Hicken 2004; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001. 
 
 
Ukraine 
Election returns: 1994-1998 from Birch et al. 2002; 2002-2007 from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Parline database at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, last accessed 
on September 15, 2011; 2002-2007 verified Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, last accessed on September 15, 2011.  Electoral system and 
reform information from: secondary sources: Birch et al. 2002. 
 
 
Venezuela 
Election returns: 1978-2000 from Payne et al. 2007.  Electoral system and reform 
information from secondary sources: Payne et al. 2007; Remmer 2008; Crisp and Rey 2001; 
Kulisheck and Crisp 2001. 
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APPENDIX E.  Replication of Previous Studies 
 
Replication of both Remmer (2008) and Colomer (2005) was difficult due to the nature of the 
two studies’ data structures.  While Remmer’s data was coded annually, Colomer only 
analyzed a single point in time: the time period during which reform occurred.  As s result, 
replication proved challenging for both analyses.  I was more successful in replication for 
Remmer’s design, particularly in the case of assessing the impact of electoral reform on party 
system fragmentation and stability. 
 
Table E1 provides a summary of the results from a replication of Remmer’s study in 
estimating electoral reform outcomes.  As Remmer does, I run two independent multinomial 
logit analyses: estimates of electoral reform by vote-share (row 2) and estimates of electoral 
reform by seat-share (row 3).  In column 2 I present the significant findings from Remmer’s 
study, column 3 shows my replication of her analysis using her coding of the dependent 
variable (electoral reform outcome) for the Latin American cases during her time period 
(1978-2002), column 4 shows a replication of her basic model using a revised coding of the 
dependent variable and for the time period 1978-2010, column 5 shows a replication of her 
basic model using the expanded universe of my dissertation dataset from 1950-2010 and 
replacing change in GDP with change in GDP per capita, which is highly correlated with 
change in GDP but is more readily available for more cases over the expanded time period.  
Column 5 is based on the same analysis in Table 6.4 of chapter 6, and serves as the base 
model in the dissertation’s quantitative analysis that I then expand to include new variables.  
The only case omission is Panama, which I do not code for the dissertation and discuss in the 
case selection section of chapter 6; otherwise I code all of the same cases beginning with 
Remmer’s data sources and then supplementing. 
 
As the table shows, there is divergence between Remmer’s results and my own, partly due to 
the different coding structure because hers is annual data and includes a year dummy while 
my dataset is coded periodically.  My primary finding is that some of her significant 
variables are no longer significant and there are some reversed signs on the independent 
variables, though interestingly my recoded replication and expanded model have more 
similarities with her original analysis than the closest replication based on only the Latin 
American cases from 1978-2002 in both vote-share and seat-share estimations. 
 
Table E2 provides a summary of the results of a replication of Remmer’s study in estimating 
the effect of electoral reforms on party system outcomes.  As Remmer does, I run four 
independent time-series regression analyses: impact of electoral reform on party system size 
measured in vote-share (row 2), impact of electoral reform on party system size measured in 
seat-share (row 3), impact of electoral reform on vote volatility (row 4) and impact of 
electoral reform on seat volatility (row 5).  In column 2 I present the significant findings 
from Remmer’s study, column 3 shows my replication of her analysis using her coding of the 
dependent variable (electoral reform outcome) and for her time period (1978-2002), column 
4 shows a replication of her basic model using a revised coding of the dependent variable and 
for the time period 1978-2010, column 5 shows a replication of her basic model using the 
expanded universe of my dissertation dataset from 1950-2010 and replacing change in GDP 
with change in GDP per capita, which is highly correlated with change in GDP but is more 
 319
readily available for more cases over the expanded time period.  Column 5 is based on the 
same analysis in Table 6.9 of chapter 6, and serves as the base model in the dissertation’s 
quantitative analysis that I then expand to include new variables. 
 
The replication for the impact of electoral reforms more closely mirrors Remmer’s findings, 
though the similarities are stronger for the vote-share models than the seat-share models.  In 
the model estimating the impact of reform on ENPV the findings are closer between the 
expanded model from my dissertation and her original Latin American dataset from 1978-
2002. In the model estimating the impact of reform on vote volatility the closest replication is 
almost identical, and the revised coding of Latin American cases differs only slightly.  In the 
model estimating the impact of reform on ENPS the replications do not follow as closely, 
with more variables of interest proving statistically significant and signed in the reverse 
direction from Remmer’s analysis.  Similarly, in the model estimating the impact of reform 
on seat volatility the replications do not follow as closely, with more and different variables 
of interest proving statistically significant.  Overall, the replication of the impact of electoral 
reforms more closely confirms Remmer’s findings, though the addition of new variables in 
my analysis in chapter 6 proves many of these findings to be of secondary importance. 
 
Replicating Colomer proved the most difficult, not the least because of his method of case 
selection and choice of model.  First, although I find evidence of both more and less inclusive 
reforms across my cases, Colomer’s original model only estimated one type of reform 
outcome: from majoritarianism to proportionality.  Second, Colomer included many 
additional countries that I do not have in my dissertation dataset because the reforms 
occurred well before 1950 (e.g., Belgium in 1898-99, Denmark in 1913-15, Italy in 1913-19) 
or the country had a majoritarian electoral system but never underwent reform (e.g., 
Australia, Canada, India, UK, USA).  As a result, the only replication I could conduct was on 
a limited subset of the cases used in Colomer’s original study that underwent reform at some 
point between 1950-2010.  This makes for a very poor replication but should shed some light 
on whether at least part of the mechanism he is arguing for – that rising party system size 
measured by ENPV leads to proportional representation rule changes – is supported. 
 
Table E3 provides a summary of a replication of Colomer’s study in predicting the 
probability of change from majoritarian to proportional rules.  I present Colomer’s results 
(column 2), and then I run a revised model of a multinomial probit with three possible 
outcomes of “become more majoritarian/less inclusive,” “no reform,” and “become more 
proportional/more inclusive” based on the coding rules and cases I use for my analysis in 
chapter 6 (column 3).  Since I do not conduct any bivariate regression analysis in chapter 6, 
this replication is not the basis for any of the statistical models in the rest of the dissertation. 
 
The results presented in Table E3 show that the coefficient for ENPV is signed in the same 
direction (positively) but not statistically significant as a predictor of more inclusive reform.  
In contrast, increasing ENPV is actually a similar and statistically significant predictor of less 
inclusive reform in the multinomial probit model.  Thus, there is no evidence in an attempt to 
replicate Colomer’s basic bivariate prediction model that the relationship between increasing 
party system fragmentation measured by vote-share and a change from majority to PR rules 
holds when no other variables are included in the analysis. 
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Table E3.  Replicating Probability of Change from Majority rule to PR (Colomer 2005) 
 Initial Findings Multinomial expanded universe 
Predicting more 
inclusive reform 
Predicting less 
inclusive reform 
Probability of change from 
majority to proportionality 
• Coefficient of 
ENPV = 0.298 
• Significant at .01 
level 
• Coefficient of 
ENPV = 0.046 
• Not significant at 
.1 level 
• Coefficient of 
ENPV = 0.220 
• Significant at .05 
level 
N 70 167 
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